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This thesis discusses public policy's place in article 81 of the Treaty.1 It demonstrates that public 
policy considerations are relevant within that provision. It also suggests how and where they 
should be considered there.2 Bork has said that:
"Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one 
question: What is the point of the law - what are its goals? Everything else follows from the 
answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by several, 
how is he to decide cases where a conflict in values arises? Only when the issue of goals 
has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules."3
Bork’s first point is that we must consider whether, in article 81 cases, the Community decision­
maker should be guided *by one value or by several* goals.
An OECD report on the design and implementation o f competition law and policy refers to two 
ends o f the spectrum in the debate about competition policy's objectives.4 *At one end is the view 
that the sole purpose of competition policy is to maximise economic efficiency. This approach 
leaves no room for socio-political criteria, such as fairness and equity, in the administration of 
competition policy. The opposite view is that competition policy is based on multiple values 
that are neither easily quantifiable nor reduced to a single economic objective. These values 
reflect society's wishes, culture, history, institutions and perception of itself, which cannot and 
should not be ignored in competition law enforcement.
Hovenkamp is a vocal exponent at the first end of this spectrum. He has, somewhat 
controversially, said that no one in the mainstream United States debate:
"...would any longer assert that consumer welfare should not be the central or even 
exclusive goal of antitrust, or that antitrust should be concerned about unemployment, 
inflation or other macroeconomic issues."3
Many competition lawyers say the same of Community competition policy.6 So, it seems, does 
the Commission. In 2004 it said that:
1 Article 81 of the Treaty is the Community equivalent of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 in the USA.
2 That is not to say that this thesis is of no interest to those involved outwith article 81 of the Treaty. Community 
competition policy forms a whole, the different provisions pursue the same aims, see, for example, Case 6/72 
Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission (1973), paragraph 25. Therefore, many of my conclusions are 
equally applicable to article 82 and merger analysis too. Furthermore, my demonstration of how and why the Treaty 
should be interpreted as a systematic whole will also interest readers outside of the competition law world. In this 
sense, it might be viewed as a bridge between competition lawyers and other Community specialists.
3 Bork (1978), page 50. In the interests of space, abbreviated references to books, journals, cases and other documents 
are given in the footnotes. Full references to all documents cited can be found in the Bibliography.
4 The World Bank and OECD (1999), pages 1 and 2.
s Ehlermann (1998), page 13.
6 See, for example, Ehlermann (2001), pages 302,303 and 359 and Amato (1997), page 116.
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"The objective of article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources."7 *
There is a growing tendency among Community competition specialists to treat their topic in a 
highly technical way, as distinct from Community law as a whole.* The theoretical foundations 
for such views are rarely expressed. However, some theoretical insight might be gained from the 
recent reflections o f Lowe on the European Convention:
"The Draft Treaty is generally positive as far as competition policy is concerned. I would 
highlight, in particular, the fact that 'a single market where competition is free and 
undistorted’ figures amongst the objectives of the EU, that the legislative power to establish 
die competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market shall remain in 
the EU's exclusive competence and that the substantive rules of the EC Treaty on antitrust 
and State aid have been taken over without changes."9
Lowe focuses on the (unchanged) wording of article III-161 (article 81 of the Treaty, as it is 
currently known), as well as the continued reference to 'an internal market where competition is 
free and undistorted', article 1-3(2). He only sees an isolated competition policy provision, 
pursuing a single aim. Competition as an end in itself.
One might question whether 'isolationism' is the right approach. Some argue that, as the law 
now stands, the competition rules contained in the Treaty are part of a wider system and must be 
interpreted in this context. Take Slynn for instance:
"The task of the European Court is to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
EEC Treaty the law is observed. In construing particular articles of the Treaty it is hardly 
surprising that the Court should have regard to the framework of the Treaty as a whole, to 
its general principles, to the tasks and activities which the Treaty prescribes for the 
Community."10
More particularly, in relation to Community competition policy, van Miert has said:
"Competition policy has so long been a central Community policy that it is often forgotten 
that it is not an end in itself but rather one of the instruments towards the fundamental goals 
laid out in the Treaty - namely the establishment of a common market, the approximation of 
economic policy, the promotion of harmonious development and economic expansion, the 
increase of living standards and the bringing about of closer relationship between Member 
States. Competition therefore cannot be understood or applied without reference to this 
legal, economic, political and social context."11
7 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 13.
* Baquero Cruz (2002), page I. This tendency is often reinforced by political scientists and specialists in other 
Community law disciplines who tend to ignore Community competition policy, Wesseling (1999a), pages 6 and 7.
9 Lowe (2004), page 3. Mr Lowe is the Commission's Director General of Competition.
10 Slynn (1985), page 393.
11 van Miert ( 1993), page 120.
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This dispute, between the 'isolationists' and those that read the Treaty as a system, goes to the 
very heart of Treaty interpretation. It affects everything, from the substantive interpretation of 
individual provisions to the facility with which the Treaty can be applied, procedurally. Its 
resolution is vital for determining whether, in article 81 cases, the Community decision-maker 
should be guided T?y one value or by several' goals.
Part A of the thesis discusses the consideration of non-economic objectives12 in antitrust. 
Chapter One asks why public policy objectives might be incorporated within a competition 
policy; and, when this might be appropriate. This analysis is not restricted by legal constraints. 
It serves as a theoretical starting point for our discussion. Useful as this approach is for 
establishing why one outcome might be more preferable to another, in theory, it is less helpful 
for helping us predict what the outcome ought to be in a specific legal context. Context is 
important. As Shenefield, somewhat pessimistically says:
" . . .a  goal o f  perfect convergence [in global competition po licy ]...is  an illusion. It can never 
happen; and  even if  it could happen, it would in all probability be a  bad thing. There are too 
m any variations o f  country and culture to permit a  uniform  formulation o f  the law  o f  
com petition to  be successful everywhere and for all tim es."13
One might agree or disagree with his views on the feasibility o f international antitrust rules; but, 
it is hard to dispute that law (and more importantly legal interpretation) is founded in country 
and culture. They cannot be separated in practice. Slynn and van Miert both agree that article 81 
must be interpreted in its Treaty context. Chapter Two explains and justifies this position, which 
is dominant among general Community lawyers. As a result, Part A concludes that, contrary to 
the Commission's statements cited above:
"In the vast majority o f  cases, including those related to article 81, they [the Community 
Courts] have chosen to com prom ise, i.e. to encourage the balancing o f  different policy 
objectives w ithin specific articles. This is because they view  competition policy not as an 
end in itself, but as an instrum ent in a  wider system for achieving the Treaty's fundamental 
goals. The Community Courts interpret article 81 broadly and  many public interest issues 
can now be considered w ithin it."
A comparison can be made with Bork's interpretation of US antitrust. He concludes that the 
legislature intended the Sherman Act to solely pursue welfare14 15objectives. Despite this fact, the 
US courts have read many other objectives into it.13 In the Community, we have, in many ways,
12 In this thesis, 'non-economic objectives’ refers to all public policy objectives, with the exception o f economic 
efficiency. Furthermore, 'non-economic objectives', 'political considerations’, 'non-economic values', 'non-welfare 
aims', 'non-efficiency goals' and 'public policy objectives', and any combination of the above, are treated as 
synonyms.
13 Shenefield (2004), pages 388 and 389. See also Ehlermann (1998), page 484.
H In this thesis 'welfare' and 'surplus' are used as synonyms for 'economic efficiency*.
15 Bork ( 1993), page 418.
- 9 -
the opposite position. The Member States, through the structure of the Treaty and the addition 
of certain policy-linking clauses, have created a system based on multiple values. These values 
reflect society's wishes, culture and history. It is not the intention that they be ignored in 
Community competition law enforcement Despite this, we have seen the Commission claim 
that article 81 can be reduced to a single economic objective.
So, theoretically, Community competition policy, particularly article 81 of the Treaty, could be 
interpreted in different ways. One way is to focus on just one goal, for example, economic 
efficiency. At the other extreme, many other relevant objectives can be considered there. We 
suggested that the latter method better reflects the Community legal order.
One might (cynically) ask whether this debate makes any substantive difference. In fact, it does. 
The inclusion o f non-economic objectives in article 81 cases can significantly complicate 
decision-making. It can also fundamentally alter the final outcome. This is important, as it 
affects the agreement's status under article 81(2) o f  the Treaty. For these reasons alone, the 
debate is vital. However, there are additional reasons why answers are more keenly sought 
today:
•  Regulation 1/2003 abolishes the notification regime.16 As a result, the parties to an 
agreement17 can no longer gain immunity from fines.18 More importantly, this lack of 
guidance reduces the certainty about the agreement's status under article 81(2) of the 
Treaty, which increases the litigation risk;
•  Regulation 1/2003 decentralises article 81 enforcement. The Commission can still take 
article 81 decisions. However, in addition, the whole o f article 81 is now directly 
enforceable in the Member States' courts and competition authorities. A plethora of new 
bodies can now apply a provision, article 81(3) o f the Treaty, that they have never used 
before. Unless it is clear which objectives are relevant in their decisions and how to 
balance them, there is a risk o f inconsistency and even 'wrong' decisions;
•  Another important reason for studying the issue now is that the new Commissioner for 
competition was appointed in November 2004. The Commissioner for Competition can
16 Commission, Guidance Letters Guidelines, still allows the parties to seek informal guidance from die Commission 
on novel questions, however, this will not often apply, articles 7-10.
17 For the purposes o f this thesis I only refer to "agreements" but, where the context allows, I also include, by 
implication, "decisions by associations o f undertakings and concerted practices". Also, I only refer to "restriction of 
competition". This expression usually includes "prevention, restriction or distortion of competition".
18 Something they effectively had once their agreement had been notified. Commission, Guidance Letters Guidelines, 
article 4, emphasises the Commission practice o f only imposing more than symbolic fines when "...it is established, 
either in horizontal instruments or in the caselaw that a certain behaviour constitutes an infringement"
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dramatically affect, in a day to day way, the consideration of non-economic objectives 
by the Commission (and thus by other relevant decision-makers);19 and,
• Article 81 has often been used as a tool for achieving Treaty objectives, such as market 
integration,20 to bypass blockages in the legislative process.21 The recent enlargement of 
the Community and its impact on decision-making effectiveness may mean that more 
reliance is again placed on this objective, and others, in article 81.
This leads us to Bork's second question. If the antitrust judge is to be guided by several values, 
how is he (or she) to decide cases where conflicts arise between different values? The 
Commission recognises these problems and has produced a series of guidelines to clarify how 
decentralisation will work. In particular, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, set out its view 
of the substantive assessment criteria for the application of article 81 as a whole, and article 
81(3) of the Treaty in particular.22 As Monti says:
"...one o f  the major goals o f  our reform s is to guarantee that, after 1st May 2004, com panies 
benefit from  a  high degree o f  legal certainty as to w hat is allow ed and what is not under the 
competition rules."23
These guidelines are generally helpful. However, they say nothing of the consideration of non­
economic objectives within article 81, except that they are relevant, insofar as they can be 
subsumed within article 81(3)'s four conditions.24 This bare statement is confusing because:
•  it does not reflect the Commission's recent policy statements, see above;
•  it does not take into account recent Community Court decisions, such as the Wouters 
Case; and,
• it may contradict the normal approach to Treaty interpretation, explained above by 
Slynn.
An interesting legal point, but is it o f any real importance? Surely the consideration o f non­
economic objectives within article 81 does not arise very often? Such is the predominant view;23 
it is also in line with worldwide antitrust developments.26
19 McGowan and Wilks (1995), pages 160-162. This effect could have less impact now, due to decentralisation, but 
the Commission still has considerable authority in relation to Community competition policy. Alternatively, 
decentralisation may give the Commission the time to set a more overt competition policy.
20 Massey (1996X pages 122 and 123.
21 Gerber (1994), page 108.
22 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 3.
23 Monti (2004), page 406.
24 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 42. van Gerven (2004), page 434, makes the same point
-11-
However, this assertion is not reflected in formal Commission decisions under article 81 of the 
Treaty. In fact, we estimate that, between 1993 and 1 May 2004, public policy considerations 
were decisive (i.e. altered the result) in over 32% of formal article 81(3) decisions, see the pie 
chart below.25 67 *
The Importance of Public Policy in Article
As Amato has wisely said, the objectives of Community competition policy is not a new topic 
but today's context provides new and intriguing elements:
"It requires a  frank discussion, because it is doubtful that w e all agree on the goals o f
com petition. Generally, how ever, w e refrain from  discussing it openly, and am biguities
* «28 rem ain.
Ehlermann adds:
"An issue that has not yet been debated, and should be, is the borderline between article * 
85(1) [now article 81(1)] revisited and article 85(3) [now article 81(3)]. It is assum ed to be 
legitim ate to bring into the analysis under article 85(3) goals other than purely com petition 
goals. Is this a legitim ate assum ption? There has been practically no thorough analysis o f  
this issue until today, in part because o f  the fudging between article 85(1) and article 85(3).
25 See, for example, van der Woude (2002), pages 55 and 56; Lenz (2000), page 62 and Heimler and Fattori (1998), 
page 599.
26 See, Chapter One.
27 As these objectives are not always discussed overtly, some subjective interpretation is required. As a result, my 
categorisation of some decisions may be controversial. Nevertheless, these numbers are taken from Table 1 in the 
Annex. Table l's numbers are detailed and explained in Table 2 in the same Annex. Furthermore, whatever the 
precise numbers, the pie chart demonstrates that non-economic objectives were important in a far from negligible 
number o f cases. This underlines the importance of this thesis.
Shelkoplyas (2003), page 229 and Monti (2002), page 1091, suggest that the amount of public policy in article 81 is 
increasing. My research does not support the idea that, o f late, non-economic objectives have been decisive in 
article 81 more often (either absolutely, or as a percentage o f  decisions), see Annex; although, market integration 
has been used more often in article 81(1) o f late. However, the Commission often relies on non-economic objectives 
in its reasoning more overtly. This might be the effect that Monti and Shelkoplyas refer to.
2S Ehlermann (1998), page 3.
However, once the borderline is clearly drawn with respect to the difficult notion of a 
restriction or distortion of competition, this becomes the fundamental question."29
This thesis attempts to force the issue, in light of the paucity of recent, systematic, English 
language analysis in the area.30 We have seen that the way one interprets the competition 
provisions can fundamentally affect their implementation. Previous analysis often focused on 
the effects of interpreting a provision in a certain way, see below, as opposed to discussing 
whether said interpretation fits within the Treaty's framework. A systematic approach to 
interpretation also demands that we constantly update our analysis of Treaty provisions. Ideas 
and interpretations that may have seemed adequate twenty years ago no longer seem 
appropriate, in light of the Treaties o f Maastricht and Amsterdam.31 This is due to the addition 
of many new policy heads, such as environmental protection and public health. Finally, it is 
important to examine the interaction o f public policy within article 81 as a whole. Recent 
studies discuss its interaction with specific policies.32 Our approach locates article 81 within the 
Treaty as a whole. This is important, due to the systematic element, mentioned above.
The thesis is in three sections. Part A, briefly mentioned above, asks whether non-economic 
objectives should be considered in antitrust and what the theoretical limits should be, see 
Chapter One. Then, Chapter Two examines article 81 of the Treaty in particular. It provides a 
systematic analysis of the Treaty, Community Court judgments and Commission practice.
The conclusions of Chapters One and Two appear somewhat different. Chapter One argues, in a 
legal vacuum, that the consideration of non-welfare objectives is warranted, but only under 
strict conditions. Chapter Two reveals a Treaty, and Community institutions, that readily 
embrace the consideration of these objectives. It reveals no limits to this balance. There are, of 
course, some. Article 81(3) of the Treaty, for example, demands that four conditions be fulfilled 
before exemption can be granted. Other limits are discussed in Chapter Four. Part C examines 
the issue in more detail and suggests ways of injecting our theoretical insights into the 
Community system.
Given that non-economic objectives should be considered in article 81, Part B discusses how 
and where public policy balancing is currently performed there, as well as how important non­
economic considerations have been in the Commission's analysis. It is vital to understand 
precisely what is happening today, to assess whether changes are needed. Sections B's findings 
are disturbing. Non-economic objectives are considered in both article 81(1) and (3), see
29 Ehlermann (1998), page 480.
30 Monti (2002) is an excellent recent exception. However, as explained below, we disagree on many points.
31 Even Bouterse (1994) seems outdated now.
32 For example, Cseres (2004) (consumer protection); Vedder (2003) (environmental policy); and Sauter (1997)
(industrial policy).
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Chapters Three and Four, respectively. There is no guidance, or consistency, about when one 
paragraph is more appropriate than the other. There is no explanation of what objectives might 
be considered relevant and why. In fact, the very consideration of these objectives is often 
disguised. Nor are we told how much weight these values should be given. Even the appropriate 
balancing mechanism is unclear, Chapter Five. There is much work to do, and, as explained 
above, answers are urgently needed. '!?.■ !-'
"...[S ]ince  the foregoing objectives will not always be in perfect harm ony, there is a 
requirem ent for a careful balancing o f these sometimes com peting ob jectives in the 
adm inistration of com petition law, and the need for an adm inistrative fram ew ork that 
ensures independent and effective decision-making in the implementation o f  the law .,,JJ
Part C makes some suggestions in this regard. The realisation that non-economic objectives can 
be relevant in article 81 decisions demands a fundamental reassessment of that provision. Part C 
draws together the problems raised above. It suggests a framework for the consideration of non­
economic objectives. It puts three elements at the heart of the proposal:
• the proposed system must respect the Treaty, unless amendments are proposed;
• businesses, decision-makers and consumers need clarity and transparency; and,
•  decision-makers must be able to consider relevant non-economic objectives within 
article 81.
Chapter Six discusses article 81(1) of the Treaty. It highlights two substantive problems in 
relation to this provision. First, the definition of a ’restriction o f competition'. The test proposed 
by the Commission and the CFI is unclear and unsatisfactory. An economic efficiency standard 
is suggested. Secondly, Chapter Six discusses the consideration of non-economic objectives 
within article 81(1) of the Treaty, arguing that this should not occur there. These two 
suggestions provide greater clarity, while, we argue, respecting the Treaty's telos.
Chapter Seven analyses the four tests under article 81(3) of the Treaty. It considers some of the 
implications of incorporating non-economic objectives within article 81 and suggests how this 
might better be done. In light of the balancing test under article 81(3)'s first condition and our 
conclusions in Chapter One, Chapter Seven also suggests that article 81(3)(a) should be 
reinterpreted, and that the other two article 81(3) conditions be removed. Finally, Chapter Eight 
provides a framework for balancing the non-economic objectives under article 81(3)'s first test.
Before concluding this Introduction, three further issues must be discussed. First, we noted 
above that although many competition lawyers object to the consideration of non-economic 3
33 Goldman and Barutciski (1998), page 415. Their discussion centres on balancing long and short-term efficiency in 
Canadian antitrust Nonetheless, their underlying point is relevant to balancing non-economic objectives in 
Community competition law too.
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objectives within competition law, they rarely articulate their reasons. However, one reason that 
has been cited o f late is that, post-decentralisation, Member States’ courts will frequently have 
to apply the whole of article 81 of the Treaty. It is often said that courts are inappropriate fora 
for the consideration of public policy balancing.34 Even if this is taken as correct, and there is 
some doubt about that,35 then it does not mean that public policy can no longer be considered in 
article 81 of the Treaty. If these arguments are right then, either the Treaty system as a whole 
must be re-considered, or Regulation 1/2003 must be considered ultra vires, for secondary 
legislation must respect substantive Treaty provisions/6 As a result, we ignore this issue and 
focus on ways to help the relevant actors weigh non-economic objectives within article 81 of the 
Treaty.
Secondly, antitrust, particularly antitrust discussions involving non-economic objectives, 
involves a combination of economics, politics and law. However, this thesis has been written by 
a lawyer, from a legal perspective. There is, accordingly, an emphasis on the interpretation of 
legal texts and case law, which in part eschews other contemporary approaches influenced by 
sociology and political science. As a result. Chapter One briefly discusses economic concepts, 
but principally to show that economics is not value neutral. It does not enter into complex 
economic analysis in pursuit of the balance. Economists must adapt their tools for the job the 
law requires. Nor does the thesis focus on arguments about whether or not non-economic 
objectives should be considered within article 81 at all. Once Chapter Two demonstrates that 
this should happen, as a lawyer, I accept this position and move on to discuss how best to do 
that in the Community legal order. Secondly, this thesis does not itself provide a meta-objective 
for balancing within article 81, although it makes suggestions in light of the Treaty. Nor, as a 
result, does it discuss specific weights to be attributed to the relevant objectives. In our view, 
these are political tasks, for which a lawyer is not well adapted.3.
Finally, this thesis restricts itself to a mainstream discussion o f public policy under article 81 of 
the Treaty'. It mentions articles 82 and the ECMR only briefly. Article 81 has been chosen
Whish (2003), pages 154-156: Shclkoplyas (2003), page 226; Jones and Sufrin (2001). page 191: Woods in 
Ehlermann (2001), page 638; Whish and Sufrin (2000), pages 151 and following; Wesseling in Ehlermann (1998), 
page 485. See also the references in Monti (2002), pages 1092 and 1093.
35 Obviously, judges (and national competition authorities) take political decisions too, see, for example, Sturgess and 
Chubb (1988), Chapter Six. One could argue that this sort o f more general balancing (see Chapter Seven) is 
different to weighing two competing objectives; but, Gyselen (2002a) also points out that the Member States1 courts 
already conduct a similar balancing process in relation to other Treaty provisions.
36 See, Case 48/72 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. the spouses WUkin-Janssen [1973], paragraph 6; Baquero Cruz (2002), 
pages 56 and 57, and the references made there; and Mestm&cker (2000), pages 414-416 "Article 83 regulations are 
to give effect to the principles enshrined in the competition rules. They cannot change these principles nor can they 
modify the Treaty."
37 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 110. That is not to say that none o f the choices I make affect the weight of 
non-economic objectives, just that I try to keep this to a minimum. I also make every effort to highlight such effects 
when they occur.
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because there is a rich body o f caselaw under this provision, it has also been an area of 
considerable focus of late for the Commission in its policy statements. Furthermore, within the 
field o f EC antitrust law, only the general context is really discussed. Exceptions to these rules, 
as in force in, for example, the agricultural and transport sectors, are highlighted only insofar as 
the general discussion requires/1* 31
31 Special rules relating to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, article 86, are not considered either.
- 1 6 -
PARTA: THE CONSIDERATICI OF NON-ECONOMIC 
OBJECTIVES IN ANTITRUST
- 17-
INTRODUCTION TO PART A
Competition policy cannot be rational until we decide what its underlying objectives are. Should 
the exclusive focus of antitrust be consumer welfare or ought we consider other public policy 
objectives there too? If the later, how should we deal with conflicts between these aims?
Part A approaches the debate from two perspectives. Chapter One conducts a theoretical 
analysis in a legal vacuum; which means that the assessment is not made within the context of a 
specific legal system. It poses (and answers) two core questions:
• why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare objectives? and,
•  when might it be appropriate to consider non-welfare objectives in competition policy?
Chapter Two changes the emphasis, examining the issue within the context of a specific legal 
system, the European Union, specifically article 81 of the Treaty. There is a consensus that non­
welfare objectives have been considered there in the past. However, Chapter Two re-examines 
the debate because academics often assume that the influence of political considerations on 
competition policy is unwarranted and recent Commission policy statements support this view. 
Chapter Two places article 81 in its Community context. It examines the Treaty as a whole and 
investigates how it deals with public policy conflicts. Then, it analyses how the Community 
Courts have interpreted the Treaty in relation to conflicts between public policy and 
competition. Finally, it examines the Commission's policy statements in more detail and asks 
whether they are reflected in its decisions.
The conclusions of Chapters One and Two appear somewhat different. Chapter One argues, in a 
legal vacuum, that the consideration of non-welfare objectives is warranted, but only under 
strict conditions. Chapter Two reveals a Treaty, and Community institutions, that readily 
embrace the consideration o f these objectives. It reveals no limits to this balance. There are, o f 
course, some, which are discussed in Chapter Four and Part C.
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CHAPTER ONE: IN THEORY (WHEN) SHOULD WE CONSIDER PUBLIC 
POLICY IN COMPETITION LAW?
1. Introduction
2. Why Might Competition Policy Incorporate Non-Welfare Objectives?
2.1. A special status for competition policy?
2.2. Welfare standards and their influence on public policy
2.2.1. !in ternal' influences o f the welfare standards
2.2.2. 1External'  influences o f the w elfare standards
2.3. Conclusion
3. When Might it be Appropriate for Competition Policy to Consider Non- 
Welfare Objectives?
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Exclusion v. compromise
3.3. Exclusion
3.3.1. The pros o f  exclusion
3.3.2. The cons o f exclusion
3.3.3. Conclusion
3.4. Compromise
3.4.1. The pros o f compromise
3.4.2. The cons o f compromise
3.4.3. Concl us ion
4. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions with a competition law, the stated objective of the legislation is to improve 
economic efficiency.39 Many economists believe that economic efficiency (welfare) should be 
the exclusive focus of competition policy. A leading textbook notes they:
"...generally view antitrust as a set of laws designed to promote competition and, therefore, 
economic efficiency."40
This view has been echoed by the World Bank.41 Hovenkamp has also said that no one in the 
mainstream United States debate:
"...would any longer assert that consumer welfare should not be the central or even 
exclusive goal of antitrust, or that antitrust should be concerned about unemployment, 
inflation or other macroeconomic issues."42
39 UNCTAD’s submission to OECD (2003), page 4.
40 Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1995), page 63. Also see, Motta (2004), section 1.3; Bishop and Walker (2002), 
pages 23-27; Posner (2001), page ix; Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (1998), page 82; Bork (1993), pages 89 and 
405 and Jorde and Teece (1992), page 4.
41 http://wwwl .worldbank.org/beext/faq/q8.htm
41 Ehlermann (1998), pages 12-13. See also, United States’ submission to OECD (2003), pages 2 and 5; Hovenkamp 
(1998), page 328 and Lipsky (1998), page 331. For a contrary view see, Fox (1998), page 15 and Laussel and 
Montet (1995), page 57 and the references there.
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The OECD Global Forum on Competition and UNCTAD both note that, increasingly, 
competition systems place greater emphasis on economic efficiency, rather than other public 
interests goals.43
That said, in many jurisdictions, competition policy also pursues ’non-efficiency’ objectives.44 
Canada’s competition law, for example, as explained by section 1.1. o f  its Competition A c t 
1986, was promulgated:
".. .to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and 
adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian 
participation in world markets while at die same time recognising the role of foreign 
competition in Canada, in order to ensure that the small and medium-sized enterprises have 
an equitable opportunity to participate in die Canadian economy and in order to provide 
consumers with competitive prices and product choices..."
Some argue that competition policy should only promote welfare. Others believe that it should 
also advance non-efficiency objectives. In the face of this disagreement, Chapter One poses two 
core questions. First, why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare objectives? 
Secondly, when might it be appropriate for competition policy to consider non-welfare 
objectives? Both questions are discussed from a theoretical perspective.
Section 2 deals with the first question, why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare 
objectives? The discussion is in two parts. First, some suggest that total surplus is a value- 
neutral concept, increasing the gains for society as a whole. They assert that even if this 
produces an outcome which is ’unfair*, this can be corrected by redistribution later. For example, 
Motta says:
"...this concept of welfare [total surplus] completely overlooks the issue of income 
distribution among consumers and producers...The welfare measure is a summarising 
measure of how efficient a given industry is as a whole and does not address the question of 
how equal or unequal income is distributed, which can be dealt with by other measures.
Note also that the rationale for not considering distributional issues is that in principle it is 
possible to operate redistribution schemes such that consumers and producers are both 
either better off or worse off."43
If this were true in practice, policies that advance total surplus (such as many competition 
policies46) might be given a special (privileged) status. Why? Because, so the argument goes, 
they make society as a whole better off, once any necessary re-distribution has taken place. As a
43 Respectively, OECD (2003), pages 3, 4 and 12 and UNCTAD (1995), page 6. See also, Ehlermann (1998), pages 
ix, 323,347 and 354.
44 Shyam Khemani (2002), page 11; Fox (2000) and UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition, pages 13-15.
45 Motta (2004), page 18. See also, Shyam Khemani (2002), page 15; Lyons (2002), page 1; Bork (1993), page I II ;  
Scherer (1987), pages 998 and 999; Williamson (1977), page 711 and Williamson (1968), pages 27 and 28.
46 Almost all jurisdictions with a competition law use it to improve welfare, although not always total surplus, see 
below.
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result, undermining a competition policy’s welfare standard would make everyone (collectively) 
worse off and should be considered rarely, if at all.
Section 2.1. argues that, in practice, no welfare standard is value-neutral.47 Consumer welfare 
may enhance consumer protection, this is less true of producer welfare. Total surplus' objective 
of making society as a whole better off is itself value-laden. What does ’better off mean, for 
example?48 The decision-maker advances different public policy goals as a result of the welfare 
standard it chooses. This undermines any special status claim, based on neutrality, that the 
competition rules might have. As a result, balancing various public policy objectives within the 
competition law may be acceptable in case of conflict.
Then, Section 2.2. highlights the potential for conflict between welfare and other important 
public policy objectives. It demonstrates how the pursuit o f welfare sometimes boosts, and 
sometimes undermines, other policy objectives. First, from an 'internal' perspective, Section 
2.2.1. and then from an 'external' perspective, Section 2.2.2.
Why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare objectives? If competition policy 
pursues goals in a similar way to other policies and if its goals conflict with other policy goals, a 
framework must be found for dealing with these clashes. This is not the whole story. Section 3 
considers the pros and cons of accounting for non-welfare public policy objectives within 
competition policy. It asks when it might be appropriate for competition policy to promote non­
welfare objectives because it is inefficient to resolve all conflicts in this way.
We must answer these two questions before discussing the objectives of competition law. This 
is because they provide theoretical insights into when it is rational to consider non-economic 
objectives in antitrust This is particularly relevant in Part C o f this thesis, when we ask when 
non-economic objectives should be considered within Community competition law.
2. WHY MIGHT COMPETITION POLICY INCORPORATE NON-WELFARE 
OBJECTIVES?
2.1 A special status for competition policy?
Section 2.1. provides a rough definition of consumer surplus, producer surplus and total 
surplus.49 Then it shows that all three welfare standards have public policy objectives embedded 
within them. This undermines the economists' claim that the total surplus standard is value-
47 Motta (2004), pages 17-22; Fox (1998), pages 11 and 12; Hovenkamp (1998), page 13 and Frazer (1990), page 
621.
48 See, Amull, Dashwood, Ross and Wyatt (2000), pages 540 and 541, and the references made there.
49 The textbooks referred to above contain more polished definitions, particularly Motta (2004), section 1.3. Also see, 
Bishop and Walker (2002), Chapter Two.
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neutral. In which case, where antitrust’s policy goals conflict with other public policy aims 
resolution through balancing may be appropriate.
Consumer surplus is the aggregate measure of the surplus o f all (relevant) consumers. Motta 
explains that the surplus o f a specific individual consumer is given by:50
"...the difference between the consumer's valuation for the good considered (or her 
willingness to pay for it) and the price, which effectively she has to pay for it"
Likewise, producer surplus is the aggregate measure o f the surplus made by all (relevant) 
producers. The surplus o f an individual producer is the profit it makes from selling the good in 
question. Finally, total surplus is the sum of the consumer and the producer surplus.
Economists point to a relationship between market power51 and three types of efficiencies. The 
first is allocative efficiency. Where costs are given and prices rise above52 marginal cost,53 the 
producer surplus increases, producers receive higher profits.54 The consumer surplus falls. The 
increase in the producer surplus is normally less than the fall in the consumer surplus caused by 
the higher prices. Therefore, price increases normally increase producer welfare at the expense 
of both consumer and total welfare.55
Posner suggests that the negative effects of market power may exceed the allocative efficiency 
losses:
"The existence of an opportunity to obtain monopoly profits will attract resources into 
efforts to obtain monopolies, and the opportunity costs of those resources are social costs of 
monopoly too..."56
Some o f these rents do not have any social value.57 Consumers also incur costs lobbying to 
counteract the firms' rent-seeking behaviour; enforcers would also face increased costs.58
50 Motta (2004), page 18.
51 A firm has market power when it can (profitably) raise prices above the competitive level, Motta (2004), section 
2.2.1. and Bishop and Walker (2002), pages 43-51.
s2 Or fall below marginal costs, Bishop and Walker (2002), page 25 and Fishwick (1993), page 16.
53 Marginal cost is the increment to total costs that results from producing an additional increment o f output, Motta 
(2004), page 447 and Bishop and Walker (2002), page 22. The marginal cost is hard to calculate in practice, see, for 
example, Motta (2004), page 116 and Brodley (1987), page 1030.
54 Motta (2004), Section 2.2.2. explains why.
iS This is not always the case, however. Imagine that the parties to a  joint venture agreement were, through the 
agreement, able to significantly cut their fixed costs, in relation to research and development, for example. As a 
result, there might be an increase in total surplus, as the parties could make larger profits; although, any price rises 
that the agreement permitted would reduce the consumer surplus. See, Fishwick (1993), page 56, for example.
56 Posner (1975), page 807. See also, Scherer (1987), page 1000.
57 Posner (1975X page 811. However, some rent-seeking does create socially valuable results, Posner (1975), page
811. Advertising may increase the information available to consumers, for example, Motta (2004), page 45.
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There is also a relationship between market power and productive efficiency.59 Firms with 
market power often exhibit less productive efficiency because, as they are exposed to less 
competitive pressure, they can make less effort to use (and find) the best available technologies, 
to improve their products and to innovate. This means higher costs for the firms and, normally, 
higher prices for consumers. Productive efficiency losses can be as large as allocative efficiency 
losses.60
Economists offer two theories for the relationship between market power and productive 
efficiency. First, managers o f firms with market power have less incentive to make effort and be 
more productive.61 Increasing competition reduces managerial slack. However, this is so only up 
to a point. Motta argues that "...increasing pressure in a market where there is already a great 
deal o f competition might reduce efficiency."62
Secondly, where competition exists, more efficient firms will survive and thrive, whereas less 
efficient firms will be forced to exit the market. So, competition increases productive efficiency 
by selecting the most efficient firms. As Motta points out:63
"This has also an additional implication for competition policy: if less efficient firms were 
protected or subsidised, this would prevent market competition from selecting the best 
firms, which will actually result in higher prices and lower welfare."
Furthermore, where firms incur (recurrent or start-up) fixed costs, the duplication o f these costs 
represents a static dynamic efficiency loss. This highlights another trade-off with allocative 
efficiency. More firms means more competition, driving prices down (allocative efficiency), but 
this involves a loss of economies of scale (productive inefficiency).64
s* Posner (1975), pages 811 and 812.
59 Productive efficiency occurs when a given set o f products are produced at the lowest possible cost, given current 
technology, input prices, etc., Bishop and Walker (2002), page 20.
40 Bishop and Walker (2002), page 26; Neven (1998), page 114; Scherer and Ross (1990), pages 668-672; Scherer 
(1987), pages 1002 and 1018 and Brodley (1987), pages 1026 and 1027.
61 Under atomistic competition, firms whose production costs are above those of their rivals will exit the market due 
to losses, Bishop and Walker (2002), page 20. Managers whose firms do not face this risk, or do so less 
immediately, might not have the right incentives to adopt the most efficient decisions about technologies. Why? In 
many firms there is a separation between ownership (shareholders) and control (managers). Managers do not only 
care about the firm's profits, but also "...their individual utility, determined by wage, career prospects, as well as the 
level o f effort and time they have to put into the job.", Motta (2004), page 47. See also, Scherer (1987), pages 999, 
1000 and 1004-1010.
62 Motta (2004), pages 47 and 48.
63 Motta (2004), page 51.
M Motta (2004), pages 51 and 52 and Scherer (1987), pages 1002 and 1003.
- 2 3 -
The third type of efficiency is dynamic efficiency?*5 To some extent, firms with market power 
, have less incentive to innovate than firms that face more competition. This is not a linear 
relationship however, because firms’ incentives to innovate are determined not only by the 
existence of competition, but also by the possibility o f appropriating the results of their 
investments.65 6 Where there is strong competition, appropriability is reduced and so is the 
incentive to invest and innovate.67 Dynamic efficiency losses may be even larger than allocative 
and productive efficiencies.68
We have discussed three welfare standards and briefly examined three types o f  efficiency and 
their relationship with market power. Now we briefly analyse the relationship between these 
welfare standards and the different efficiencies.
Consumer welfare is explicitly concerned with gains to consumers.69 Hovenkamp has said that 
enhancing consumer welfare is probably the exclusive goal of Federal antitrust law in the 
United States, see above. It is also an objective o f  Community competition policy.70 Indeed, 
focusing on consumer welfare in competition policy has widespread political acceptance.71
The consumer surplus test ignores increases in the producer surplus. Reductions in allocative 
efficiency are unacceptable, regardless of their effect on producer welfare, because consumers 
suffer. This is in direct contrast to the position under a producer welfare standard, which is 
concerned with gains to producers alone. As Motta notes,72 this illustrates the main interests 
behind the different situations:
65 This is the extent to which a firm introduces new products or processes of production, Motta (2004), section 2.4 
and Bishop and Walker (2002), pages 36-39.
66 See, Scherer (1987), pages 1010-1019.
67 Forcing firms to continually lower their prices and profits, reduces their incentive to innovate, invest and introduce 
new products. This is because, at marginal cost, they cannot recover their fixed costs, Motta (2004), page 21. 
Furthermore, managerial slack affects dynamic efficiency in the same way as productive efficiency, Motta (2004), 
page 48. There is a need to balance fierce allocative competition with some ability to appropriate the results of their 
research, see also, Fishwick (1993), page 39; Scherer and Ross (1990), Chapter 17 and Schumpeter (1942). Note 
that the extreme position adopted by Schumpeter has been refined later, see, for example, Faull and Nikpay (1999), 
pages 40-43; Areeda, Solow and Hovenkamp (1995); Gual (1995), pages 19-21 and the references made there and 
Scherer (1987), pages 1000-1002,1014 and 1019.
68 Neven (1998), page 114; Scherer (1987), pages 1002 and 1018 and Brodley (1987), page 1026.
69 Whish (2003), page 3 and Brodley (1987), pages 1020,1021, 1032 and 1033. Chapters Five and Seven discuss the 
definition of'consumers', in the Community context.
70 "The aim o f the Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means o f enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation o f resources.", Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
paragraph 33. See also, Chapter Two; Mario Monti (2004), page 7; Cscres (2004), page 231; Commission, Vertical 
Guidelines, paragraph 7; COM(98) 544, page 5; Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 12 and 
COM(96) 721, Executive Summary, paragraph 25 and Chapter V.
71 OECD (2003), page 5 and Lyons (2002), page 1.
72 Motta (2004), page 43.
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"An industry’s producers will try to lobby in favour of more protection and less competitive 
pressure, while consumers and users of the industry products will have an interest in 
backing proposals of more competition."
Increasing competition compels producers to sell closer to their marginal cost. A similar 
position emerges in relation to both productive and dynamic efficiencies. Consumers (and the 
consumer welfare standard) would advocate more competition. In a competitive environment, 
firms have an incentive to invest and innovate in both existing and future technologies. 
Successful investments allow them to reduce their costs (and thus their prices), undercutting 
other firms, forcing their less efficient rivals to exit. However, as noted above, there comes a 
point where increasing competition undermines the incentive to generate both productive and 
dynamic efficiencies. What is the effect of this on the producer and the consumer welfare 
standards?
Because both current and future welfare matter,73 a competition authority seeking to maximise 
consumer welfare will not increase competition at all costs. Under atomistic competition, 
maximum allocative efficiency occurs when prices equal marginal cost. However, if 
competition authorities force prices down to marginal cost then producers have less incentive to 
invest and innovate, see above. Possible future welfare gains are lost. Competition authorities 
need to balance the long-term need for innovation (and the future allocative benefits to be 
gained because of this) with the short-term allocative efficiency loss of letting prices rise above 
marginal cost; otherwise welfare (both consumer and total) may be undermined over time. 
There is disagreement about where this balance lies74 and thus, how much competition is 'good' 
for consumers.
Producers seeking to enhance their own welfare would also highlight the ambiguous effects of 
increasing competition on both dynamic and productive efficiencies. But they have an 
additional reason for doing so. Less competition may reduce their incentives to innovate, but it 
also means that they can appropriate a larger share of any gains they make through such 
innovation.
The decision to pursue either a consumer welfare or a producer welfare standard depends on a 
value judgment. This is based on an assessment of whether it is more important to protect the
73 Sec, Motta (2004), page 19; Mexican submission to OECD (2003), page 3; Faull and Nikpay (1999), pages 3S-40; 
Jorde and Teece (1992), page 4 and Brodley (1987), page 1033. Although the relative importance o f present and 
future welfare is a political question that should be clarified by the decision-maker, see Chapter Eight.
74 Motta (2004), page 57; Ahdar (2002), pages 350-353; Fels and Edwards (1998), pages .59-61; Fishwick (1993), 
page 19; Brodley (1987), page 1036-1041 and Scherer (1987), page 1011.
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interests o f consumers or producers.75 This, in turn, determines which efficiencies (and thus how 
much competition) the regulator considers beneficial.
As we saw above, many economists tiy to circumvent this political debate by focusing on total 
surplus.76 In their view this avoids the need for interpersonal comparisons and subjective value 
judgments about what is fair and equitable. Focusing on total surplus means that ’’society's pot” 
is bigger, so there is more wealth to share, including for any redistribution if the competitive 
outcome were felt unfair.77
If a total surplus standard makes everyone better off (after a hypothetical redistribution) should 
competition laws that pursue this objective be given some kind of special status protecting them 
from interference, even where they conflict with other policy objectives? The point being that 
reducing total surplus makes society worse off. A special status argument is hard to accept:
(i) First, it ignores the harm that might be done to other relevant policy objectives by the 
pursuit of this goal. We must at least ensure that the harm to other policies is less than 
the total surplus 'gain';
(ii) Secondly, the objective o f increasing society's economic wealth is itself a value-laden 
objective.78 It emphasises material wealth. Admittedly, this is an important political 
objective that governments invariably pursue. That said, other policy goals are also 
significant. Section 2.2. shows that this goal may undermine other objectives. It may 
come at the expense o f public health, for example, or the environment.
Once we realise that the total surplus objective is a value-laden concept, then arguments 
that it should be given a special status, where it conflicts with other public policy 
objectives, become even harder to defend.
(iii) Thirdly, there is reason to believe that the total surplus standard does, in fact, re­
distribute from consumers to producers (and their owners):79
75 Ahdar (2002), pages 342-347; Fox (1998), pages 11 and 15; Hawk (1998), page 16 and Frazer (1990), page 623. 
Neven argues that value judgments are not needed, Neven (1998), page 17. He says that there is merely good and 
bad economics. However, this argument does not stand up to dose examination once we understand that whose 
welfare we measure can radically affect whether or not we believe an agreement to be welfare enhancing.
76 Canada may have adopted a total welfare test, other countries have too, see, Mexican submission to OECD (2003), 
page 3; Lyons (2002), page 1; Shyam Khemani (2002), pages 14 and 15; Matte (1998), page 21 and Crampton 
(1997), page 60.
77 Although, even those economists that advocate the total surplus standard do not avoid difficult decisions. They still 
need to balance short-term allocative efficiencies with productive and dynamic efficiencies, see above.
78 Ahdar (2002), pages 348-350, and references made there and Brodley (1987), pages 1023, 1035 and 1036.
79 See, for example, Brodley (1987), pages 1035 and 1036 and Comanor and Smiley (1975): Some economists tiy to 
turn this issue on its head. They note that, increasingly, producers and consumers are not two isolated groups.
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(a) where producer and consumer welfare are considered equally important, then 
the interest group with the most power (resources) is likely to have a disproportionate 
effect on the outcome of an antitrust dispute.80 This is often the producers. As a result, 
the total welfare model is likely to give greater weight to producer welfare gains;81
(b) the strength o f the producers' bargaining position is reinforced by the fact that it 
is they that make the deals. However, these are dressed up, deals are done out of self- 
interest for the firms concerned;82 and
(c) the producers have informational,83 distributional84 85and timing advantages that 
may have an important effect on outcomes in antitrust disputes.
This may help to explain why the consumer welfare standard is the most popular 
welfare standard, from a political perspective as it helps tip the balance in favour of 
these weaker/ under-represented groups.83
(iv) Finally, the economists’ position assumes that even if the distribution created by the 
total surplus is considered 'unfair* a redistribution can be performed later (if this were 
considered necessary86). However, this redistribution can fundamentally undermine the 
actors' underlying incentives. As a result, economists tend to interfere at the 
redistribution level too, arguing that it should be kept to a minimum.87 Furthermore, 
redistribution is not always possible or convenient.
Consumers hold shares in firms, sometimes directly, often indirectly through pension, or other investment, funds. 
As a result, valuing the interests o f consumers above those o f producers affects consumers too, Lyons (2002), page 
1 and Motta (2004), page 21. First, not all o f the reduction in the consumer surplus is transferred to the 
shareholders, see above for the discussion on managerial slack, for example. Secondly, unless all consumers are 
shareholders then any re-distribution to consumers is likely be to the richer ones, Ahdar (2002), page 346. Finally, 
this is unlikely to be as efficient a means of re-distributing to consumers as a consumer welfare standard.
80 Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 19.
81 Motta (2004), page 21 and Lyons (2002), page 3 and the references made there and Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir 
(1995a), page xii.
82 Need to encourage consumers, employees, savers and shareholders to stand up against the strength o f producers, 
Amato (1997), page 125.
83 Motta (2004X page 21 and Lyons (2002), pages 2 and 3 and the references made there.
84 An anti-competitive agreement's effect on consumers is likely to be dispersed among many of them, while it is 
much less dispersed for producers. See, Motta (2004), page 20, for an example.
85 As to why this is necessary see also, Amato (1997), page 125. Lyons (2002), page 2, suggests other reasons too.
86 Which is not the case under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, because the redistribution is only hypothetical.
87 This is the implication o f Laussel and Montet (1995), page 58, for example.
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There is a lot of debate about which welfare standard is best.88 This section does not discuss 
this. Instead, it demonstrates that all three welfare standards demand value judgments based on a  
preference for either consumer or producer interests. Furthermore, even if we could agree on 
one standard, for example, consumer welfare, there is disagreement about how much 
competition is optimal for achieving this end. The amount of competition considered 'optimal' 
by the competition authority affects other policy objectives, as Section 2.2. explains.
The underlying point is that, like other policy instruments, competition policy’s welfare 
objective is value-laden and itself based on public policy objectives. It is a policy tool (like any 
other) and should not necessarily be given a special status where it conflicts with non-economic 
policy objectives.
22  Welfare standards and their influence on public policy
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how competition policy can either promote or 
undermine some non-economic policy objectives. Competition's direct benefits are summarised 
in UNCTAD's submission to OECD (2003), pages 2 and 3, which states that competition is a 
means o f creating:
"...markets responsive to consumer signals, and ensuring the efficient allocation of 
resources in the economy and efficient production with incentives for innovation. This is 
expected to lead to the best possible choice of quality, the lowest prices and adequate 
supplies to consumers..."89
Many believe that a consumer welfare standard90 also has other, indirect, benefits. The same 
UNCTAD statement continues:
t
"Efficient allocation and utilisation of resources also lead to increased competitiveness, 
resulting in substantial growth and development There is growing consensus that 
competition is an essential ingredient for enhancement and maintenance of competitiveness 
in the economy.”
Indeed, the Commission once said:
"...it will often appear that these Community policies [Community policies in general, not 
including competition policy] rely on competition for their effective implementation and
“  See, for example, Motta (2004), pages 18-22; Whish (2003), pages 18-20; Lyons (2002); Ahdar (2002); Bishop and 
Walker (2002), pages 25-27; Porter (2001), page 935 and Bradley (1987).
89 See also, Bishop and Walker (2002), page 11 and the Supreme Court o f the United States o f America in Northern 
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, page 4, for example.
90 This chapter focuses on the consumer surplus standard as it has been adopted in some influential jurisdictions, see 
above. Motta (2004), pages 18-22, argues that where consumer surplus is maximised over time it is similar to a total 
surplus standard.
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that enforcement of the competition rules supports the objectives pursued by these 
policies.”91
So, competition has many direct and indirect benefits. Sometimes competition's effect on other 
policies is ambiguous. It can also have negative effects (costs) on society, or certain groups 
within it. These might justify intervention in the market mechanism. They can include:
"...external costs and benefits, distributional effects and unemployment Elements of 
'market failure' arising from these welfare considerations are not generally corrected by 
competition policies - indeed such policies may aggravate them."92
Section 2.2. briefly illustrates how some public policy objectives are influenced by the 
consumer welfare standard.93 The analysis comes in two segments. Section 2.2.1. focuses on 
this issue from an 'internal' perspective.94 Then, Section 2.2.2. considers the 'external' 
perspective 95 by examining the relationship between competition and two other policy areas, 
market integration and employment policy.
2.2.1 'Internal' influences of the welfare standards
Section 2.2.1. focuses on the welfare standards' influence from an 'internal' perspective. It 
examines three areas of public policy: consumer protection, industrial policy and research and 
development. There is also a discussion about internalising externalities, environmental policy 
is used as an example.
91 Commission, RCP 1991, page 39. For example, see CES, Green Paper on vertical restraints, paragraph 1.2., which 
argued that the importance of the Community competition policy on vertical restraints was "...confirmed by the fact 
that producer-distributor agreements (or vertical restraints), designed to enhance the efficiency o f distribution 
between companies and to facilitate penetration of new markets, contribute significantly to achieving two basic 
objectives of competition policy: promoting the integration o f Member State economies in a single internal market, 
and maintaining effective competition throughout the Community's territory - which arc both preconditions for 
European economic competitiveness, economic and social cohesion, and promoting consumer well-being." This is 
also supported, to some extent, by economic thinking, for example, Brodley (1987), page 21, has said "...the pursuit 
of the correctly defined economic goals o f antitrust will generally advance the social and political objectives o f the 
law as well."
92 Fishwick (1993), page 21. See also, Poiares Maduro (1999), pages 466-470 and Fishwick (1993), pages 21-25.
93 The discussion is necessarily brief because, as pointed out in the Introduction, this thesis does not argue in favour 
of including (or excluding) industrial policy, or other public interest objectives, within Community competition 
policy. This has been discussed many times and references to relevant works are provided. Instead, this thesis 
discusses, where inclusion is necessary, albeit politically or economically, how best to do i t
94 This means that emphasising specific elements of the consumer welfare test might enhance (or undermine) policy 
objectives other than 'consumer protection', defined in a wide sense, see below. In this way, the internal logic of the 
consumer welfare standard can be used to directly promote certain public policy goals, when making the welfare 
assessment.
95 This means that the consumer welfare standard might enhance (or undermine) policy, objectives that are not 
considered within i t
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Consumer protection
We have already seen how competition policy can contribute towards certain types of consumer 
protection.96 For example, it can help protect consumers' economic interests by helping to  
ensure low prices.97 This was one of the Canadian Competition A ct 198$s objectives. This is 
particularly the case where a consumer welfare standard has been adopted. That said, there is an 
equilibrium to be achieved between long and short-term consumer welfare, see above.
Industrial policy98
We saw in the introduction that one of the objectives o f the Canadian Competition Act 1986 is 
"... to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets..."99 This chapter has 
already hinted that welfare, especially a producer welfare standard, could be used to promote the 
competitiveness of industry. Section 2.1. showed that this might also be achieved through a 
long-term consumer welfare standard. The largest gains to consumers can occur as a result o f 
dynamic efficiency gains by firms. These most likely occur when firms can appropriate some o f  
the benefits of their research and development, i.e. not when prices equal marginal cost.
Some suggest that the best form of industrial policy is competition itself:
"In its recent com m unication on industrial policy the Com m ission recognised th a t a  healthy 
system o f competition w as one o f  the most effective w ays to  promote industrial change and 
improve the com petitiveness o f  European industry."100
Economists would normally agree. Motta argues, for example, that:
" . . . i t  is unlikely that firms in a particular industry are able to grow healthily i f  sheltered 
from  competition, subsidised, o r exempted from  anti-cartel laws."101
But how much is optimal? Some advocate an interventionist approach in order to develop and 
strengthen national industries on the domestic and even the international stage. This might be
96 See also, Commission, RCP 2001, pages 3 and 18-21 and Commission, RCP 2000, page 8. See also, Cseres (2004); 
Hovenkamp (1998), page 426 and Averitt and Lande (1996*7).
97 Wide definitions of consumer protection refer to consumers' economic situation. For example, article 153(1) o f the 
Treaty states that in order to "...promote the interests o f  consumers... the Community shall contribute to protecting 
the health, safety and economic interests o f consumers..." [my emphasis] See also, Stuyck (2000), page 399.
98 For a more detailed analysis see Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995).
99 In the European Union, the ECMR lists some of the criteria that should be taken into account by the Commission 
when deciding whether or not a merger is compatible with the Common Market These include the structure of 
markets outside the European Union, implying some kind of industrial policy criterion, article 2(1 Xa), and the 
development o f technical and economic progress, article 2(1 Xb).
100 Commission, RCP 1990, page 13. See also, Vickers (2004), page 5; Commission, RCP 1999, page 19; COM(90) 
556, page 5; Commission, RCP 1991, pages 11,223 and 260; Press Release, IP/94/809 and Commission, Immunity 
Guidelines, paragraphs 1 and 2.
101 Motta (2004), page 29. His second chapter also discusses competition policy’s role in promoting productive 
efficiency. See also, Gual (1995), page 19, arguing for competition, within certain limits.
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implemented, so the argument goes, by reducing domestic firms' exposure to competition, to 
some extent. Traditionally, this involves, for example, controlling market-entry or capacity 
expansion, channelling investment, providing subsidies and incentives to the state’s own 
industries or allowing them to collude in research and development, or even later stages of 
distribution and marketing. In the Republic of Korea, for example, the government promoted the 
development of large conglomerates as a means of achieving economies of scale in mature 
heavy industries. One UNCTAD report states that the:
"...interaction of government policy and inter-firm rivalry stimulated the growth of 
technological capabilities and exports."102
Some argue that consumer welfare maximisation might actually undermine industrial policy 
sometimes. This argument is particularly strong if  there are market failures. Gual explains:
"...industrial policy measures designed as responses to market failures will conflict with the 
competition policy objectives in strategic or structural adjustment sectors. Typical examples 
are exemptions from competition policy that allow firm co-ordination or state subsidies 
designed to phase down capacity in mature industries."103
There are strong arguments emphasising that, in general, competition has a positive effect on 
industrial policy. That said, at times some consumer surplus standards might undermine 
industrial policy objectives.104 This is because it can lead to sub-optimal investment in research 
and development, or it may fail to allow for necessary strategic or structural adjustment. This 
problem might be overcome/ reduced by focusing on long-term consumer welfare benefits, i.e. 
by reducing competition to some degree in the short term. In this way, consumer protection and 
industrial policy can achieve an equilibrium within the consumer welfare standard.
Research and development (RAD)105
We have seen a relationship between the amount of competition and firms' investment in R&D. 
Competition generally provides incentives for firms to innovate and invest in productive or 
dynamic efficiency enhancing technology.106
102 UNCTAD document TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.l, page 14. The efficacy of this type of industrial policy has been 
questioned, see Townley (2004), pages 132 and 133, and the references made there; UNCTAD, Corporate Policies 
in the Republic o f Korea and Chang and Choi (1988). The Treaty adopts a similar stance, see article 157(3). So does 
UNCTAD. The report cited above continued "...there have been numerous policy failures...and infant industry 
protection has often led to the creation o f permanent infants."
103 Gual (1995), page 20. More generally see, Gual (1995), pages 18-21, and the references to Motta (2004), above.
104 Despite claims to the contrary by the then Commissioner Bangemann, Press Release, IP/94/809.
105 For a more detailed analysis, see Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995).
106 "...free markets subject to effective competition provide the best possible guarantee for offering consumers a good 
choice of quality products and services at reasonable prices. Furthermore, in many industries competition is one of 
the main drivers o f innovation and job creation.", Mario Monti (2002a), page 9. See also, Commission, RCP 2002, 
page 19; Commission, RCP 2001, page 3; Commission, RCP 1991, pages 44-46 and the Commission’s reply to the
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However, above a certain point, more competition undermines these incentives. In part this is  
because firms perceive less benefit in investing in this way, due to the reduced appropriability o f  
their investments. Martins reports that relatively high mark-ups are found in innovation markets. 
High concentrations may be inevitable due to the high fixed costs:
"...concentrated industries have a higher R&D/ turnover ratio and propensity to patent."107
There is a balance to be achieved, push R&D and risk reducing allocative efficiency, at least in 
the short term; or, focus on the short term allocative efficiency gains and risk reducing the scope 
for investment in R&D, as prices fall to marginal cost. The Commission is explicit:
"Cooperation in R&D may reduce duplicative, unnecessary costs, lead to significant cross 
fertilisation of ideas and experience and thus result in products and technologies being 
developed more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. As a general rule, R&D 
cooperation tends to increase overall R&D activities...
Under certain circumstances, however, R&D agreements may cause competition problems 
such as restrictive effects on prices, output, innovation, or variety or quality of goods."108
Once again, the consumer surplus standard normally encourages R&D investments. However, 
there comes a point where this relationship does not hold and R&D investments may be 
threatened by increasing competition. The decision about how to balance these positive and 
negative effects also has both consumer protection and industrial policy implications, see above.
Internalising externalities109
We have seen that different welfare standards (or indeed emphasis within these) can be used to 
promote different objectives. However, there are many policy objectives that these standards
European Parliament's, Report o f the XIXtk Report on Competition Policy 1990, in Commission, RCP 1991, page 
223.
107 Martins (1996), page 71.
l0S Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 41 and 43. See also Gual (1995), page 19, "Research joint 
ventures (RJVs) may be institutional forms that can suitably deal with the contradictions between static (and 
dynamic) efficiency and appropriability externalities. RJVs allow small firms to undertake R&D investments which 
otherwise may be beyond their capabilities and may also avoid duplication of R&D. Additionally, RJVs might 
increase R&D investment by way o f  internalising at least part o f the appropriability externalities... It is often feared, 
however, that these gains in efficiency can be counteracted by strategic effects which work in the opposite direction. 
Competition could be reduced in R&D markets, and the same could happen in output markets. Nonetheless, recent 
work on this topic shows that co-operation both in R&D and the product market can lead to social welfare 
improvements. In the presence o f substantia] spillovers, R&D investments increase and, although output is reduced, 
the overall welfare effect is positive."
109 For a more detailed analysis, see Nadeau (2003); Pearson (2000) and Petrakis, Sartzetakis, and Xepapadeas 
(1999).
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simply ignore.110 This happens when a specific objective is not included in the parties' pricing 
decisions. As the Dutch Ministry o f Economic Affairs explains:
"External effects occur when an action by one party or a transaction between parties has 
(positive or negative) consequences for another...who is not directly involved in that action 
or transaction. An example of a negative external effect is the passing on of the 
consequences of pollution caused by a production process to the surrounding community.
An example of a positive external effect is the transfer of knowledge (education, research 
and development), which also benefits third parties."111
That said, it is often possible to ensure that these extra costs and benefits are internalised by the 
parties to the agreement. This might be done by providing, for example, an appropriate 
compensation mechanism so that the parties to the agreement can be forced to compensate third 
parties for the costs that they have unilaterally imposed upon them. However, this may not 
always be appropriate.112 In such a case, it may be beneficial113 for the state to force the parties 
to the agreement to internalise these other costs.114 Taking environmental protection as an 
example, we briefly show how this might be done.115
The state concerned could fine companies that emit more than X tonnes o f sulphur dioxide each 
year, for example. One problem with this kind of regulatory solution is that it does not 
encourage firms to reduce their pollution below X. This is not a problem where the regulation 
sets the limit at the most efficient point. However, this is difficult to calculate and is likely to 
change in different industries. Adjusting for these problems would impose significant costs on 
both the legislator and industry.116
Due to these difficulties, states are increasingly turning to market-based instruments as a 
supplementary implementation tool. Market-based instruments are generally considered to be 
both more effective at reducing pollution as well as more efficient.117 Such instruments may 
include taxing pollution118 and tradable emissions vouchers.119 These force producers to include
1,0 Pearson (2000), Chapters 2 and 3, explains why this is so for environmental considerations, for example.
,n Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Liberal Professions, page 19. See also, pages 19,41-48, 50-52 and 83.
112 Think, for example, of a situation where the costs imposed by the parties on each 'victim' are so small to that a 
lawsuit is not a paying proposition, even where cumulatively the costs are large.
113 Other mechanisms (e.g. class actions) might still be more efficient m this case, see Posner (1998), Chapter 21.
1,4 Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Liberal Professions, page 51 and Posner (1998), pages 401-403.
115 For a more detailed analysis see Vedder (2003), Chapters 2 and 3; Posner (1998), pages 410-416 and Hahn and 
Hester (1989), pages 109-153.
116 Posner (1998), pages 410 and 411.
117 Vedder (2003), page 48.
MS Posner (1998), pages 410-416.
1,9 Posner (1998), page 416 and Hahn and Hester (1989).
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all (or at least part) o f the environmental cost of production in their price. As a result, demand 
moves away from environmentally 'costly' goods to those that cause less damage.
In relation to environmental protection, the Commission has said that if environmental 
considerations are internalised then:120
"...competition will quite naturally generate the most efficient allocation of resources 
possible, by prompting business to reduce costs. This will benefit both the environment and 
the economy in general."
However, while this is true, as the Commission acknowledged in the next paragraph, the 
problem is that:
"Commission environmental policy is founded on the 'polluter pays' principle; the 
effectiveness of the principle depends in particular on the proper operation of the price 
mechanism, which ought to translate into costs the negative effects of a particular process 
on the environment, so that prices can perform their signalling function which forms the 
basis of the market economy."
To the extent that environmental considerations have yet to be properly internalised then the 
market's price mechanism does not perform its proper signalling function. These Commission 
statements are more indications of where the Commission would like to be, as opposed to a 
serious assertion that environmental considerations are fully taken into account by economic 
efficiency considerations in anything but a minority o f cases.121
Two points need to be made as regards externalities. First, it is not possible to internalise all 
objectives. This might be because procedurally it is too difficult to price them or there is no 
agreement over the value o f  these policy objectives, for example. Secondly, internalising 
objectives in this way may have implications for other policy objectives. For example, forcing 
firms to adopt expensive environmental standards may affect their international competitiveness 
compared to firms from jurisdictions without these obligations. This could undermine industrial 
policy, for example.122 So the decision whether or not to internalise externalities is itself based 
on a balance between various policy objectives.
2.2.2 'External* influences of the welfare standards
Section 2.2.2. focuses on welfare standards' influence on non-economic policy objectives from 
an 'external* perspective. It examines two public policy aims: market integration and 
employment policy and demonstrates that competition can affect these policy goals in both a 
positive and a negative way.
120 Commission, RCP199U page 54. See also, Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 163-165.
121 However, some progress has been made as regards greenhouse gas externalities, see http://www.euractiv.com/cgi- 
bin/cgintexe/l?204&OIDN=l505795.
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M arket integration
Market integration is not an objective pursued in many jurisdictions. One exception is 
Community competition law, which regards market integration as an important objective. The 
Commission has said:
"The protection of competition is the primary objective of EC competition poi icy... Market 
integration is an additional goal..."12 23
Why is market integration considered so important?
"Such prohibitions [those on exports and imports] jeopardise the freedom of intra- 
Community trade, which is a fundamental principle of the Treaty, and they prevent the 
attainment of one of its objectives, namely the creation of a single market."124 125
Chapter Three asks why it is important to achieve the single market. It shows that the 
Community is rarely explicit and is not consistent in its approach. Waelbroeck believes that the 
original focus on free movement of goods in the Spaak Report was "...a  means of increasing 
competition, which itself was seen as a means of enhancing economic efficiency."123 The 
Commission has recently supported this interpretation in relation to article 81 as well:
"The objective of article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Competition and 
market integration serve these ends since the creation and preservation of an open single 
market promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the 
benefit of consumers."126
The Commission is certainly right to highlight the link between an open single market and the 
efficient allocation of resources. However, an economic welfare approach will not always 
promote market integration as pursued in the Community. Motta provides a welfare analysis of 
a firm seeking to price discriminate between different Member States. He shows that:
122 Scholz and Stâhler (1999). Energy policy, for example, may also be affected, Bouterse (1994), pages 34 and 35.
123 Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 7.
124 Joined Cases 100-103/80 SA Musique Diffusion Française and Others v. Commission [1983], paragraph 107. See 
also, Commission, RCP 1994, paragraph 10; Commission, RCP 1992, paragraph 2; Commission, RCP 1991, page 
15 and Commission, RCP 1990, page 11.
125 Waelbroeck (1987), page 302.
126 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 13. See also, Schaub (2002X page 38; Commission, Vertical 
Guidelines, paragraph 7; CES, Green Paper on vertical restraints, paragraph 1.2 and Commission, RCP 1992, 
paragraph 2. The Commission has used economic efficiency as a justification, as well as economic freedom and 
consumer protection, see Chapter Three. This chapter assumes that market integration is there to increase economic 
efficiency. To the extent that this is not the case, the welfare test is even less likely to. consistently achieve the 
relevant objective. In relation to consumer protection, for example, see below.
- 3 5 -
u t A i
"...aper se rule, which forbids firms to price discriminate across countries is not justified 
on economic welfare grounds, and in some circumstances might even work (paradoxically) 
against the objective of market integration.”127
Employment polity
Some also argue that pursing economic efficiency will help achieve the Community 
employment policy and through this increase economic and social cohesion.128 The Commission 
has said:129
"Competition policy can contribute to the success of an overall employment policy.
Through its effect on the structure of markets, it directly influences the competitiveness of 
the European economy and its rate of growth and hence helps to orient the Union’s 
macroeconomic framework towards employment The Commission’s endeavours through 
its competition policy to open up markets in the Union are making a major contribution to 
the completion of the single market that guarantee of more trade and faster growth...The 
general strengthening of the competitiveness of our economy is supporting growth and 
employment The liberalisation process generates rivalry among businesses looking for new 
products and services, an effect which is likely to stimulate job creation and consumer 
demand. The Commission’s policy on the opening-up of such markets to competition will 
thus ultimately have a favourable impact on employment"
In the next paragraph, however, the Commission clarified that the pursuit of economic 
efficiency does not always increase employment in the short term'.
"Of course, more competition also leads to restructuring, with the weakest going to the 
wall, which inevitably results in the short term in plant closures and job losses. In such 
circumstances there can be no getting away from the fact that measures to promote 
competitiveness are in some cases, at least in the short run, job-destroying.”
The pursuit of economic efficiency should lead to higher employment rates in the long term. 
That said, in the short term, it might destroy jobs. What is the appropriate response? US antitrust 
rules were implemented more leniently during the Great Depression. The idea being that price 
agreements would help firms to avoid bankruptcy, easing social tensions caused by 
unemployment. It is unclear whether this policy reduced unemployment.130
127 Motta (2004), page 23. See also his Chapter 7; Bishop and Walker (2002) paragraph 1.04 and following; Korah 
(2000) page 13; Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 20,37 and 38; Neven (1998), pages 8 and 118 
and Korah (1986), page 91. These economic arguments apply equally in the long-term. For a  contrary (unsupported) 
view, see Ehlermann (1998), page x.
128 CES, Green Paper on vertical restraints, paragraph 1.2., cited above and Commission's reply to the European 
Parliament's, Report o f the XIXth Report on Competition Policy ¡990, in Commission, RCP 1991, pages 223 and 
224.
129 Commission, RCP 1997, page 8-9. See also, Commissioner Monti who has said "...in  many industries competition 
is one o f the main drivers of innovation and job creation.", Mario Monti (2002a), page 9; Commission, RCP 1999, 
page 7; van Miert (1999), pages 1 and 5; Massey (1996), pages 93-95 and Commission, RCP 1994, page 3.
m  Motta (2004), pages 26 and 27.
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That said, many advocate ameliorating the short-term negative employment effects with specific 
employment policies that might restrict competition. When he was the Commissioner for DG 
Competition, van Miert said:131
"Beyond growth-based solutions, to which competition policy can actively contribute, a 
social response must be found to these short-term effects because, as Mr Santer has said, 
Europe cannot be just an economic project. I am a firm believer in the social dialogue: not 
only does it meet human needs, but it fits in with a new way of thinking about economic 
efficiency."
2.3 Conclusion of Section 2
Competition policy and the welfare standards which support it are based on value premises. As 
such, it is a normal policy tool. When it conflicts with other policy objectives these conflicts 
must be dealt with and not simply ignored. Competition policy should not be imbued with some 
special status, protecting it from intervention, whenever it conflicts with other policies.
Consumer welfare is an extremely important goal that can help us achieve many public policy 
objectives. It can also undermine them due to market failures. However, the existence of a 
market failure is not the end of the story. Efforts to resolve these failures may cause other 
unforeseen (and potentially greater) costs. This may lead to important welfare reductions. 
Section 3 discusses the pros and cons o f balancing competing goals with the consumer welfare 
standard.
3. WHEN MIGHT IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR COMPETITION POLICY TO CONSIDER 
NON-WELFARE OBJECTIVES?
3.1 Introduction
Consumer surplus, producer surplus and total surplus are not value-neutral, see above. 
Furthermore, consumer welfare can promote, as well as undermine, other public policy goals.132 
Therefore, it might sometimes be appropriate to account for consumer welfare's effect on other 
policy objectives within competition policy. Section 3 asks two questions in this regard:
•  Should competition policy take account o f other public policy objectives? And;
•  If the answer to the last question is 'yes', when should it take account o f these other 
public policy objectives?
Areeda and Hovenkamp argue against the consideration of policy objectives (other than 
consumer welfare) within US antitrust law:
131 Commission, RCP1997, page 9.
132 The same is true of other policy objectives. For instance, certain measures taken to protect the environment may 
themselves distort competition, Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council [1991], paragraph 23 and OECD (2003), 
page 3.
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"As a matter of general legislative policy, competition is hardly foundational, and 
government may often wish to intervene to mitigate its harsher effects. But antitrust’s 
purpose is to see to it that competition is promoted whatever its collateral consequences, not 
to make legislative judgments about when relief from the excesses of competition is 
appropriate."1̂
Contrast this with the position adopted by Canada in its Competition A ct 1986, cited in th e  
Chapter One’s Introduction, the objectives of which are myriad. A report by the OECD’s  
Secretariat said that, in most countries considered, the objectives of competition policy was:
"...to maintain and encourage the process of competition in order to promote efficient use 
of resources while protecting the freedom of economic action of various market 
participants. Competition has been generally viewed to achieve or preserve a number of 
other objectives as well..."13 34
Section 3's two questions are dealt with simultaneously because they are intertwined. T he 
structure of the discussion is as follows: Section 3.2. outlines procedures for 'resolving* 
conflicts. There are essentially two: exclusion (as emphasised by Areeda and Hovenkamp in th e  
US framework) and compromise (as we saw in Canada's competition act). Then, Section 3.3. 
considers the pros and cons o f exclusion in more detail. Section 3.4. does the same fo r 
compromise. In light of this discussion, Section 3.5. answers the two questions posed above and 
concludes.
The answers to these two questions provide a valuable theoretical framework for the discussion 
of antitrust's objectives. We cannot discuss the substantive antitrust rules until we understand 
the objectives that should guide our decisions. That said, theoretical frameworks cannot be used 
in isolation but must be applied to a specific legal system. In relation to Community competition 
policy this is discussed again in Part C o f this thesis, which debates how best to account for 
other policies within antitrust.
3.2 Exclusion v. compromise
Imagine that two public policy objectives, A and B, pursued in a certain country, conflict. What 
is meant by 'conflict'? Conflicts manifest themselves in two ways:
•  only one o f A or B can be achieved at the same time. The choice is between achieving
objective A and not achieving objective B at all, or vice versa. The conflict then 
becomes a question o f which of these two policy objectives should be sacrificed. We 
call these first order conflicts; or
133 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), paragraph 100b. Others have made the same point, see, for example, Buigues, 
Jacquemin and Sapir (1995a), page xxii.
134 OECD (2003), page 2. See also, South African submission to OECD (2003), pages 5-7 and Shyam Khemani 
(2002), page 11.
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•  it is possible to achieve some o f A and some o f B, but not all o f both. The conflict then 
becomes a question o f how much of these two policy objectives should be maximised.135 
We call these second order conflicts.
First order conflicts rarely arise in practice. They are not relevant to the discussion in this thesis, 
because all of the objectives discussed here are divisible.136 When this thesis refers to conflicts it 
is referring to second order conflicts, unless it expressly states otherwise.
There are two ways of dealing with conflicts. We could balance objectives A and B within the 
implementing provisions, whenever they conflict. One objective might have more weight than 
the other in this balance, but nevertheless, to some degree, both factors would be considered. 
Through this balance we arrive at a compromise. The decision-maker could balance both 
consumer welfare and other relevant policy aims when applying competition law.
Compromise is complex. The outcomes of compromise are hard to predict. The resulting lack of 
legal certainty discourages innovation and investment. The more competing objectives that need 
to be considered when an implementing provision is applied, the more complex this exercise 
becomes. The benefit is that this approach provides the possibility of a perfect balance in every 
case, which this thesis calls the "optimal balance".137
Another conflict resolution strategy is to allow one of the objectives to exclude (or trump) the 
other. This means that, for example, whenever objective A and B conflict we only take account 
of one of them. When applied to competition laws, this would mean that the law would be 
applied solely in order to achieve, for example, consumer welfare. This would be so even where 
consumer welfare undermined other goals, such as environmental policy.
Exclusion is drastic. The pursuit o f consumer welfare might seriously undermine environmental 
considerations in a specific case, and yet this is considered irrelevant when applying 
competition law and sometimes outside of this too. Exclusion has the advantage of clarity and is 
favoured by those who see competition law as an end in itself.
Sometimes both compromise and exclusion interact. For example, when deciding whether to 
allow objective A or B to exclude the other, one has to balance their importance to a certain
1,5 A similar situation occurs where objectives A and B do not themselves conflict, but where they cannot both be 
fully achieved for some other reason, for example, due to our limited resources. This type of'conflict* is included in 
our second order conflict definition.
136 Chapter Eight briefly discusses this issue.
137 The 'optimal' or 'perfect' balance is an end result;  as opposed to mere and market-balancing which are processes. 
Obviously, the 'optimal balance* can never be 'found', because there is a knowledge problem. So references in this 
thesis to 'achieving the optimal balance' should be read as getting as close to this as is possible with the resources 
and knowledge available to the decision-maker.
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extent. Nonetheless, the two approaches are distinct. Balancing in this sense is not the same as 
compromise.
Conflicts between welfare maximisation and other public policy objectives can be resolved in 
other ways. For example, externalities may be internalised. This might be done in relation to 
environmental policy, for example, see above.138 A second method for dealing with conflicts is 
to use legislative tools outside of competition policy.139 This might mean, for example, giving 
financial or other aid to those that act in a certain way, or penalising those that do not. These 
'incentives' can be used to achieve other policy aims.140 Some of the benefits o f doing this rather 
than distorting competition are discussed below. However, such intervention is not always 
possible and it can undermine the competitive process.
3.3 Exclusion
Section 3.3. discusses the pros and cons of exclusion as a means of resolving second order 
conflicts. Section 3.3.1. considers three purported advantages o f exclusion: it encourages more 
efficient agreements; it enhances legal certainty; and, it assists the convergence of competition 
policy objectives worldwide. Then, Section 3.3.2. analyses exclusion's negative side. States 
increasingly encourage corporate social responsibility to achieve public policy ends. Exclusion 
undermines this effort as well as the achievement of the optimal balance.
3.3.1 The pros of exclusion
Restricting competition policy's goal to the welfare objective purportedly encourages more 
efficient agreements. Appreciable agreements between undertakings are assessed under a pure 
consumer welfare test. Only those that enhance this goal are allowed. So, firms have an 
incentive to enhance consumer welfare, or at least not to reduce it, in their agreements.
That said, does excluding public policy objectives from the competition assessment increase 
efficiency o vera ll The OECD Secretariat has said that the inclusion of multiple objectives 
within competition law increases the risk of conflicts.141 Is this correct? Imagine that only two
13s There is some slight o f hand here. Where externalities are internalised, a conflict still exists, but it is resolved 
within the very mechanism for defining welfare and so it may appear as if  no conflict remains.
139 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), paragraph 100b, cited above, advocate this approach. The European Union 
accepts this as a  method. The application o f national competition law "...m ay not lead to the prohibition of 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States but which do not restrict competition within the meaning o f  article 81(1) o f the Treaty, or which 
fulfill the conditions of article 81(3) o f the Treaty...", article 3(2) o f Regulation 1/2003. However, article 3(3) of the 
same regulation continues that, without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, this 
does not preclude "...the application o f provisions o f national law that predominantly pursue an objective different 
from that pursued by articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty." The full effect o f this provision remains to be seen.
140 The State aid provisions aim to do this, see articles 87-89 of the Treaty.
141 OECD (2003), page 2.
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objectives (consumer welfare and environmental protection) are relevant. Exclusion means that 
the environmental considerations are ignored in the competition assessment. However, where 
exclusion operates it is likely that environmental considerations will be pursued through, for 
example, specific environmental legislation.142 Therefore, firms must still ensure that their 
agreement complies with both the environmental and the competition rules. As a result, 
exclusion does not necessarily enhance efficiency overall.I43 In fact, it might be more efficient 
to deal with these issues in an integrated way, see below.
Exclusion enhances legal certainty.144 Legal certainty is important145 for two main reasons.146 
First, uncertainty is the enemy o f business.147 It is vital that undertakings are aware o f the legal 
framework within which they operate.148 This allows them to better plan their affairs. Reducing 
the certainty/ predictability of a competition assessment "...increases the risk that firms may be 
breaking the law when they have been trying in good faith to abide by it."149 The legal 
consequences of breaching the competition provisions can be severe.150 Firms’ innovation and 
investment decisions involve business risks. They are less likely to accept these business risks in 
the presence of further legal risks with large sanctions.151 Enhancing legal certainty reduces the 
legal risks, facilitating innovation and investment.152 Legal certainty also reduces administrative 
costs and the costs imposed awaiting legal advice.153 Secondly, competition policy will only
142 If they are not, then environmental protection is completely ignored. This means less conflicts and more efficient 
agreements; however, this comes at the cost of jeopardising this policy objective, see below.
143 Although, it might still do so where the most efficient instrument is used, Section 3.4.2.
144 Areeda and Turner (1978), paragraph 105.
145 The importance of this may change due to the procedural mechanism in different jurisdictions. The shift from a 
system of ex ante administrative exemption in the Community on 1 May 2004, for example, theoretically increases 
the importance of legal certainty for undertakings now that the certainty provided by a Commission decision 
(admittedly it was rare to get one) cannot be relied upon.
146 Regulation 1/2003, recitals 21,22 and 38 and article 16; Commission, Guidance Letters Guidelines, paragraphs 1 
and 2 and COM(90) 556, page I. The Community Courts have repeatedly underlined the importance o f legal 
certainty, see, for example, Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak v. Commission (1990], paragraph 36, and the cases referred to 
there.
147 Holmes (2000), page 79, citing Jacques Bougie, Chief Executive Officer, Alcan Aluminium Limited.
148 Edward (2002), page 129; Commission, RCP1993, page 52 and Schaub (1996), page 79.
149 Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 18 and 19. See also, Bell (1983), page 26.
ls0 In relation to contracts governed by English law, for example, see Whish (2003), page 291 and 292. In relation to 
the financial penalties that can be imposed see Regulation 1/2003, Chapter VI.
151 Jenny (1993), page 186 and Coarse (1960).
552 Regulation 1/2003, recital 38.
IS3 Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 19. These can be important, although they are small in relation 
to the benefits to the economy of competition policy, Gardner (2000). The smaller they are the better, provided that 
this is not achieved at the expense of an even larger loss to society as a whole, COM(96) 721, paragraph 86. For a 
brief indication of some business costs related to possible changes in the UK competition regime see, DTI (2002), 
pages 13-15. For other benefits of legal certainty see, Jebsen and Stevens (1995-6), pages 450 and 460 and Scalia 
(1989), page 1179.
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receive the support of business, policy-makers and the general public when they understand 
it.154 Without the support o f these actors competition policy cannot be effective;155 in which case 
the efficiency benefits that competition policy delivers are less likely to be achieved.156
Does exclusion really enhance legal certainty? Exclusion ensures that there is only one 
consideration in the competition law, consumer welfare.157 Where the competition rules are 
unclear, undertakings need only be guided by one over-arching objective, consumer welfare. 
They do not have to assess whether the agreement's welfare benefits outweigh other public 
policy goals. Predicting the balance between two objectives within one policy instrument is 
difficult, see Chapter Eight. So, legal certainty, in relation to the competition provisions, 
increases. Assume now that the other relevant policy objective is environmental policy. If this 
were pursued using legislation with a 'pure' environmental goal then, in cases o f ambiguity 
within that rule, predicting the outcome of the decision would be easier too. It may be difficult 
for firms to ensure that their agreement complies with both the competition provisions and the 
environmental rules, but they do not have to balance the two objectives themselves.158 As a 
result, legal certainty is enhanced overall}*9
Finally, exclusion reduces firms' compliance costs. This is particularly important as more 
jurisdictions adopt competition laws.160 Antitrust laws increasingly emphasise consumer 
welfare, rather than other public policy goals, see above. As these rules harmonise across the 
globe, compliance costs decrease.161 Why? Where a contract triggers competition laws' 
jurisdictional tests in multiple jurisdictions, transactions are cheaper if the competition 
assessment is similar in all of them.162 163Fewer lawyers are needed both before and after the 
transaction. Furthermore, as competition law converges transactional delays and uncertainty
154 Commission, RCP1993, page 103.
155 Commission, RCP 2002, pages 20-22; Commission, RCP 1992, page 15 and Commission, RCP 1991, pages 11 
and 57.
156 Commission, RCP 2001, page 5.
157 That is not to say that the consumer welfare standard is easy to apply. We saw above that this is not the case. See 
also, Amato (1997), page 123 and Jebsen and Stevens (1995-96), page 460.
158 Hopefully the public authorities balanced these two objectives when they enacted both sets o f rules.
159 Amato (1997), pages 122 and 123 and Jacobs (1993/2), page 44.
160 Calvani (2003), page 415; Whish (2003), page 1 and Dabbah (2003), pages 1 and 2.
161 Calvani (2003), page 415. See Dabbah (2003), pages 4-6 and the references made there, for other benefits of 
convergence.
162 Value judgments are still needed when implementing a pure consumer welfare model, see above. So, the various 
jurisdictions may interpret an agreement's anti-competitive effects differently even when they try to achieve the 
same objective.
163 By way .of example, in its proposed merger with Honeywell, General Electric had to notify the merger in over ten 
jurisdictions. The substantive legal tests were different in many o f these.
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are reduced,164 making agreement easier to attain. This aids the development of international 
commerce.165
That said, how much difference does 'exclusion' make towards the reduction of costs? The 
aforementioned benefits apply to the competition assessment. However, as noted above, if, for 
example, there is no room for environmental considerations in the competition assessment, 
states are likely to implement specific environmental laws. Firms must comply with these rules 
in the relevant jurisdictions too.166 This implies that exclusion may have little impact on cost 
reduction. That said, competition authorities are particularly renowned for their attempts to 
extend the extra-jurisdictional reach of competition law.167 168 Excluding environmental 
considerations from the competition analysis may, in fact, reduce firms’ compliance costs 
overall, simply because competition laws often have a larger jurisdictional reach than their 
environmental counter-parts.
3.3.2 The cons of exclusion
Compromise can achieve an optimal balance between policies in every case, although reducing 
legal certainty carries a cost. Under exclusion, potentially important policy objectives are 
completely ignored. Even where they are protected with other legislation, the balance between 
different policy objectives is less likely to be optimal, see Section 3.4.3. and, in practice, where 
different policies are implemented independently insufficient attention is paid to their impact on 
other relevant policy objectives.
A second disadvantage of exclusion is that it limits access to an important policy tool. Many 
states increasingly emphasise corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR encourages 
companies, on a voluntary basis, to integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders.
The move towards CSR is driven by citizens, consumers, public authorities, investors and 
companies themselves in response to the damage caused by economic activity to the 
environment and the fabric o f society.169 Take the Community, for example, the Commission 
considers CSR fundamentally important:
164 COM(2001) 745, paragraph 160.
165 Kaczorowska (2000), page 124 and Jenny (1998), page 29.
166 This problem would be reduced if environmental protection (and other relevant) requirements were harmonised 
across the globe as well. However, there is less impetus for this than for the harmonisation o f competition laws.
167 See, for example, Dubbah (2003), Chapter 7; Whish (2003), Chapter 12 and Goyder (2003), Chapter 23.
168 COM(2002) 347, page 5 and COM(2001) 366, paragraphs 8 and 20-26.
169 COM(2002) 347, page 6 and COM(200t) 366, paragraph 10.
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"CSR can. „make a contribution to achieving the strategic goal of becoming, by 2010, "the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" 
adopted by the Lisbon Summit of March 2000..."170
CSR is promoted throughout the Community even though both the Council and the Commission 
recognise that it undermines economic efficiency:
"Its objective is to ensure a balanced approach to sustainable development, which 
maximises synergies between economic, social and environmental dimensions."171
Both Institutions accept the need to integrate CSR into other Community (and Member State) 
policies to further the awareness, dissemination and adoption o f such practices.172 This should 
include competition policy. The Commission has called this integrated approach "...the lynch 
pin in the process of establishing sustainable social and economic development patterns."173
Both the Commission and the Council recognise the need for firms to work together to better 
meet shared CSR objectives.174 175The Commission believes that co-operation agreements have 
three main advantages over legislation:
"They can promote a pro-active attitude on the part of industiy, they can provide cost- 
effective, tailor-made solutions and allow for a quicker and smoother achievement of 
objectives."173
The Council and the Commission agree that firms must work together to balance economic, 
social and environmental interests. This co-operation can achieve better, 'tailor-made* solutions 
more quickly and cheaply than legislation. Yet, if the Community refuses to take environmental 
and social factors into account in Community competition policy, the drive for CSR will be 
undermined. This is because undertakings risk fines for including CSR criteria in appreciable 
agreements under the competition rules where this undermines consumer welfare. This is 
particularly ironic when both the Council and the Commission expressly accept that welfare is 
often undermined through CSR and yet still advocate its use. Undermining consumer welfare is
170 COM(2002) 347, page 3. See also, Council, on CSR, pages 3 and 4; COM(2002) 347, pages 4, 7 and 8 and
COM(2001) 366, paragraphs 2, 6, 9 and 13-19. See, http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-
bin/cgint exe?204&OIDN=2000470&-tt=cs for a list of recent Community CSR initiatives.
171 COM(2002) 347, page 20. See also, Council, on CSR, page 3 and Grimeaud (2000), page 209. It is also there 
because the Commission believes in 'shared responsibilities', see Gyselen (1994), pages 244 and 245.
172 Council, on CSR, pages 3 and 4 and COM(2002) 347, pages 7 ,8 ,18  and 19 and Grimeaud (2000), page 209.
173 Cited in Baldock (1992), page 1.
174 Council, on CSR, page 4; COM(2002) 347, pages 10, 12 and 17; COM(2001) 366, paragraphs 42-60 and 
COM(96) 561. This is supported by other academic work too, see, Bouterse (1994), page 40, and references made 
there and Jacobs ( 1993/2), page 43.
175 COM(96) 561, page 3. See also, OECD (2003a), pages 3 ,4 ,1 5  and 62.
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not always justified by CSR objectives; however, sometimes it is, even where the welfare 
effects are appreciable. Exclusion means it must always be ignored.
3.3.3 Conclusion of Section 3.3.
Exclusion increases legal certainty and can help reduce firms' compliance costs. That said, the 
importance of these effects should not be exaggerated. Many of the problems that are overcome 
by providing greater clarity in competition law through exclusion are not eliminated, they are 
merely transferred elsewhere. Furthermore, exclusion robs us of an important policy tool. CSR 
is invaluable in achieving a balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, article 
2 of the Treaty, maximising synergies between economic, social and environmental dimensions.
3.4 Compromise
Section 3.4. considers the advantages and disadvantages of compromise. Section 3.4.1. focuses 
on the benefits o f achieving the optimal balance. Section 3.4.2. discusses a 'disadvantage' of 
compromise by highlighting the benefits of using the optimal policy instrument.
3.4.1 The pros of compromise
When compromise takes place within the competition analysis of a specific agreement, the 
decision-maker considers consumer welfare as well as other relevant policy objectives. He or 
she can ensure that the optimal balance between conflicting goals is achieved in the specific 
case in question. In contrast, where non-economic public policy considerations are excluded 
from the competition law analysis they are ignored. This means that public policy objectives, 
potentially o f great significance, think o f national security or environmental protection, could be 
jeopardised.
The benefits of compromise can be great, see the discussion about CSR above. Yet, balancing in 
every case is not ideal. Why not? Sometimes it is difficult to balance the relevant objectives and 
to predict the optimal balance.176 This uncertainty has a cost, see above. This is an important 
objection but it should not be over-stated. Predictability is not a legal system's only value, the 
'right* decision is important too. Where the advantages of considering the non-welfare objective 
within competition policy are small, then the benefits of legal certainty may make exclusion 
preferable.177 However, rather than entirely rejecting compromise we should overcome this 
specific objection. One way o f doing this is through the appreciability doctrine.178 This allows
176 COM(1999) 587, points 17-21 and Amato (1997), page 118. Chapter Eight suggests some ways o f increasing the 
facility and the predictability of compromise as a process.
177 Jacobs (1992/3), page 44.
178 Another idea is to only integrate policies in major legislative proposals. This was suggested with environmental 
impact assessments, for example, Commission, From Cardiff to Helsinki, page 5. Major pieces o f legislation are 
likely to have a large impact in many policy areas, justifying the cost o f conducting the impact assessment That
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us to ignore objectives that the agreement affects in a non-material way. Chapter Eight develops 
this idea.179
Another issue is that compromise allows the decision-maker to adopt a seamless approach to 
legislation. If this were not the case then the legislator would not be neutral vis-à-vis the 
different regulatory or legislative techniques which States choose to pursue various policies. 
Neutrality of this sort has many advantages.180
3.4.2 The cons of compromise
Compromise allows the decision-maker to achieve the perfect policy balance in competition 
cases,181 although sometimes we might temper this with an appreciability doctrine. That said, 
delegation theory tells us that the objectives assigned to a competition law might be more 
completely achieved if drawn narrowly.182 As a result, a potential downside of compromise is 
that it may mean that none o f the conflicting objectives are satisfactorily achieved. This may be 
worse than adequately achieving one o f them, even where the other is ignored.
Furthermore, commentators often argue that many non-economic objectives are applied 
arbitrarily and subjectively.183 Why contaminate the competition policy's welfare calculations 
with such goals?184 This is not so much an argument against compromise, but against the 
consideration of non-economic objectives.185 Taken to an extreme this would mean that many 
such objectives could never be implemented. True, the inclusion of these goals can undermine 
legal certainty. But this is not the legal system's only objective. Anyway, it is not as if welfare 
standards can be applied objectively either. A better response to these issues, rather than side­
lining non-economic policies, may be to fmd more predictable and objective ways of applying 
them, see Chapter Eight.
said, while decisions in competition cases are not major pieces of legislation they can have considerable effect due 
to their value as precedents for other decisions. As a result, this ’solution' may be less helpful in our area.
179 This might be combined with die promotion o f these non-welfare objectives through other legislative provisions.
180 These are outlined in Gyselen (1994), pages 245-246,250-252,256 and 257.
181 As mentioned above, there is a knowledge problem and so the 'optimal balance' can never be perfectly achieved. 
However, I mean that compromise allows the decision-maker to approach this, in the sense that the test would allow 
it (i.e. even if  this is impossible to ensure).
182 Neven (1998), page 8.
183 Schaub (1998), page 126 and Hawk (1998), page 355. The World Bank and OECD (1999), page 1, notes the same 
argument
184 Hovenkamp (1998), page 421 and Areeda and Turner (1978), paragraph 109a. There is another set o f arguments 
that do not rule out the presence o f non-economic arguments in competition policy but say that the subjective nature 
of judgments involved with these objectives should affect the institutional structure of the decision-making body, 
see Ehlermann (2001) and Ehlermann (1998), for example. In the Introduction I explain why I do not discuss this 
issue.
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Finally, there is another issue that impacts upon our assessment, is compromise the best way of 
* achieving the optimal balance? The answer is not always positive. Why? Economists rank 
different policy instruments (such as subsidies, taxes and tariffs) according to how efficiently 
they achieve non-economic objectives.185 86 The instruments are ranked by their relative costs. 
Costs arise due to the distortions that the instruments introduce into the economy. As a general 
proposition:
"...the optimal (or least-cost) method of doing this is to choose that policy intervention that 
creates the distortion affecting directly the constrained variable."1*7
Distorting or restricting competition to realize specific non-economic objectives is normally an 
inefficient way o f achieving the end in question.188 It can be costly189 and is sometimes 
ineffective.190 Economists advocate the use of optimal policy instruments; the best one to use 
depends on the non-economic factor being pursued.191 As Motta explains:192
"This does not imply that objectives or public policy considerations other than economic 
efficiency are not important, but simply that if a government wanted to achieve them, it 
should not use competition policy but resort to policy instruments that distort competition 
as little as possible."
As a starting point this is eminently sensible. That said, sometimes, certain ends could best be 
achieved by undermining competition. Three are mentioned here and they are: (a) no 
alternative; (b) jurisdictional issues; and, (c) short term benefits. First, objectives such as 
fairness, social cohesion and the protection of political democracy may require restrictions of 
competition if  they are to be achieved.193 Even where this is not the case, as mentioned in the
185 Although the related issue of commensurability is discussed in Chapter Eight
186 Bhagwati (1971) and Srinivasan (1996) and the references made there. There is even evidence that Adam Smith 
did this, see Elmslie (2004).
187 Bhagwati (1971), page 77.
188 Arecda and Turner (1978), paragraph 105, argue that considering non-economic objectives would "...involve the 
courts in essentially political decisions for which there are no workable legal standards, and would often place them 
in a regulatory or supervisory role for which they are ill-equipped." It is difficult to balance non-economic 
objectives. The absence of workable legal standards is certainly a handicap, Chapter Eight suggests a framework. 
However, the reference to ’political decisions' is disingenuous because: (i) political decisions are made even within a 
'pure1 economic framework; and (ii) courts regularly make political decisions, for example, Member States’ courts 
balance articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty and Bell (1983), Chapters I, II, V and X.
189 Dutch Ministry o f Economic Affairs, The Liberal Professions, pages 23, 46-48, 50, 67-69 and 81-91; Ahdar 
(2002), page 348; Hovenkamp (2002), page 4; Jenny (1993), pages 218-219; Areeda & Turner (1978), paragraph 
105. Elzinga (1977), pages 1195 and 1196 and Williamson (1969), pages 105-118.
190 OECD (2003), page 4; Motta (2003), sections 1.3.1. and 1.3.2. and Fauil (1998), page 12.
191 Motta (2004), page 18; Ahdar (2002), pages 342, 343 and 347; Townley (2002) and Bhagwati (1971), pages 78- 
81, which discuss more efficient ways of achieving various policy goals than distorting competition.
192 Motta (2003), page 30.
191 Jenny (2000), page 24. Also see, Bouterse (1994), page 62.
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discussion on CSR above, agreements sometimes allow a particular goal to be achieved more 
effectively, cheaply and completely than legislation.194 They may also be preferred as they are 
better at raising awareness on particular issues and changing behaviour in general.195 CSR 
received strong European Union backing because time is o f the essence in dealing with many 
social and environmental problems.196 Sometimes compromise is even the most efficient policy. 
Gual writes that:
"Imposing the cohesion restriction [article 159 of the Treaty's policy linking clause, see 
Chapter Two] might lead to the choice of non-optimal policies in trade and competition, 
protecting or subsidising a particular industry on the grounds of cohesion. Nevertheless, the 
optimality of the free-raarket adjustment can also be disputed. In the presence of market 
imperfections (for example, imperfect foresight) and/or externalities (geographically-based 
pecuniary externalities), adjustment support could be justified on efficiency grounds, 
without having to resort to distributive considerations which are best left to strict 
redistribution (cohesion) policies."197
That said, prudence is needed here. Economic history teaches us that government failures are 
more important and more frequent than market failure. Intervention in this manner should be 
exercised with caution.198
A second, admittedly rarer, issue is that a jurisdiction may not have the legal capability to  
achieve the ends by other means.199 For example, in the European Union certain matters are 
reserved to the exclusive competence of the Member States. If the Community were obliged to  
take account o f Treaty objectives in areas of exclusive Member State competence (such as 
culture) then it might only be able to do this by distorting competition.200 This argument may 
seem unconvincing at first.201 Jurisdictional obstacles are often there to check uninhibited
194 COM(2001) 486, pages 16 and 17; Grimeaud (2000), pages 212-215; Commission, From Cardiff to Helsinki, page 
2; COM(96) 561, page 3; Bouterse (1994), page 74; Jacobs (1993/2), page 43 and Baldock (1992), pages 2-4 and 18 
and European Parliament Resolution A3-0170/92.
195 A point made in relation to voluntary environmental agreements sometimes, OECD (2003a), pages 10, 18 and 50.
196 Public choice theory also highlights power and motivational difficulties that a state might face if  it were to try to  
achieve environmental or other policy goals through alternative legislative tools. Explicitly it refers to the problems 
of 'capture', see Petersmann (2003), page 52, and the references made there. Section 3 also discussed other rent- 
seeking behaviour issues. It is unclear whether these issues are best solved by compromise within competition law 
(which might also be tainted by 'capture') or by resolving the issue o f capture at a more fundamental level, see 
Petersmann (2003), page 52 and following.
197 Guai (1995), page 39. see also, Sandmo (2000), pages 11-19.
191 Mavroidis (1995), page 120.
199 Even where the Community has the relevant competence, it has not always been given the appropriate tools to 
achieve the objective in the most efficient way possible, Guai (1995), page 39.
200 On this point and others like it, see also; Ariflo (2004), page 20; Jacobs (1993/2), pages 41 and 42 and Baldock 
(1992), page 18, attempt to overcome perceived procedural 'problems'.
201 In a similar vein, Vogelaar (1994), page 546, argues that voluntary environmental agreements are beneficial 
because legislating often demands political compromise, which often makes legislation less effective. However, this
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competence. It may be more appropriate to change the competence (if this were considered 
necessary) as opposed to changing the substance of the legal provision.202 That said, imposing a 
duty on the Commission to consider, for example, cultural policy when applying the 
competition rules would limit its ability to undermine this policy area which the Member States 
have intentionally reserved to themselves.203 Rather than taking affirmative action in a reserved 
area, the Community would be recognising a Member State interest.204 This could have 
significant benefits otherwise the Member States may ignore the need for competition in their 
cultural legislation and the Commission may ignore cultural benefits in its competition 
decisions.205
Finally, although an objective could, theoretically, be achieved more efficiently using another 
policy instrument, there might be practical reasons (at least in the short term) why distorting 
competition is the best way of achieving certain ends at a given moment in time. For example, 
there may be political obstacles to agreeing specific environmental legislation such as a lack of 
time in the legislative programme, even where a measure has universal support. As we saw 
above in the CSR discussion, agreements between undertakings may achieve a given level of, 
for example, environmental protection, more quickly than could be achieved by legislating.206 It 
may be acceptable to allow compromise in these areas until appropriate legislation is enacted.207 
This issue is discussed further in Chapter Seven, in a Community context.
Even where these arguments apply, one should critically examine arguments that undermine 
competition to achieve policy ends to see whether they could be achieved more efficiently in a 
different way within the required timeframe and given the powers of the specific decision­
is one o f the costs o f democratic institutions and it is not a convincing justification for ignoring the legislature, in 
my view.
202 Monti (2002), page 1092, notes the argument that the "...increase in Community policies in achieving other 
Treaty objectives directly...mean that the need for competition law to be deployed indirectly to achieve other Treaty 
aims is gone." This is only true if the Community now has all the powers needed to achieve all relevant objectives. 
This is not the case, see, Chapter Seven.
203 Cunningham (2001), pages 136 and 137.
204 Such a  mechanism is necessary if Member States arc to reserve certain policy areas to themselves. Cunningham 
(2001) also argues that it is in line with subsidiarity, page 161.
205 It is likely that clarity and consistency increase where a single body is able to reconcile different policy objectives, 
Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995a), page xvii.
206 This might create a  moral hazard problem. This means that if  the legislator sees that the courts (or the 
Commission) deal with these difficult balances effectively then they may see even less need to face difficult, 
controversial and unpopular compromises in the future. This may lead to even more uncertainty in the long run. 
That said, legislators are unlikely to forego the considerable power that this moral hazard implies for long.
207 The Commission has suggested this approach, for example, see, SEC(92) 1986, page 6.
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making body.208 The choice o f  undermining competition to achieve other objectives must be 
clear and adequately justified.209
3.4.3 Conclusion of Section 3.4.
There are two ways of balancing consumer welfare and non-economic policy objectives. One 
method is by using competition law to enhance consumer welfare and rules aimed specifically at 
achieving the non-economic objective at issue to further that. This enhances legal certainty for 
the undertaking and is often the most efficient way of achieving both consumer welfare and the 
relevant non-economic objectives.
That said, compromise within competition policy allows the decision-maker to achieve the 
perfect balance, although sometimes we might temper this with an appreciability doctrine.210 As 
a result, sometimes compromise is preferable. This may also be the case where for 
jurisdictional, speed or other reasons achieving the non-economic objective through alternative 
legislation is not possible, either at all, or in the short term.
4. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER ONE
Chapter One debates two questions: why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare 
objectives? and when should competition policy consider non-welfare objectives? It adopted a 
theoretical perspective. Only by answering these questions can we place competition policy 
within a  judicial framework and understand how it can and should interact with other areas o f 
law.
The first question, why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare objectives?, is 
relatively easy to answer. Competition policy invariably has a welfare objective, normally 
consumer welfare. Consumer welfare, like all other welfare goals, is value-laden. It promotes 
consumer protection, in a wide sense. Furthermore, the pursuit of this policy objective through 
competition policy can affect other important policy objectives. Sometimes it reinforces them, 
sometimes it undermines them. Allowing competition policy to take account of these 
interactions means that other public policy goals, such as public safety and national security, 
would not necessarily be jeopardised because of welfare objectives.
208 The institutional design of the decision-maker is relevant to this discussion but is outside the scope of this work. 
See OECD (2003), pages 2 and 4; Mexican submission to OECD (2003), pages 3-5; Monti (2002), page 1093; 
Poiares Madura (1999), pages 466 and 470; Mitchell and Simmons (1994), pages 41-84 and Baldock (1992), pages 
5 and 18.
209 Dutch Ministry o f Economic Affairs, The Liberal Professions, page 24 and Fox (2000), page 594.
2,0 A major disadvantage of legislating specifically for the non-economic objective is that legislation o f this kind is of 
general application. As a result, the optimal balance is unlikely to be achieved in every case. The disadvantages of 
this must be compared with the improvements provided by increased legal certainty.
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That does not mean that competition should always be compromised for non-economic policy 
objectives. Understanding when this might be appropriate was Section 3’s task and is the reason 
for the second question, when should competition policy consider non-welfare objectives? The 
answer to this question involves a difficult balancing act.
Ignoring non-economic policy objectives when applying competition law can create significant 
benefits, in terms of enhanced legal certainty. This encourages firms to invest and innovate. 
That said, at a certain point the benefits that enhanced legal certainty brings are outweighed by 
the importance o f the policy goals it undermines. Even then, it may still be better to focus on a 
pure welfare test in competition policy if these non-welfare objectives can be adequately 
protected through other legislative tools.
In conclusion, no one body of law can protect everything that people value. All policy 
objectives cannot (and should not) be 'regulated' through competition policy.211 Often 
competition law is entirely inappropriate for that purpose (or other policy tools are much more 
efficient). Indeed, where competition policy pursues a consumer welfare standard it is often 
better to ignore non-economic policy objectives when implementing the competition law.212 
However, this robust conclusion should be reconsidered where the benefits that enhanced legal 
certainty brings are outweighed by the importance of the policy goals at stake and these 
interests: (i) cannot be protected through alternative legislation (either in fact or for 
jurisdictional reasons); or (ii) have not actually been protected by alternative legislative tools.213 
However, if these other goals are incorporated into competition policy:
"...it is incumbent on the regulators to make these as transparent, and open to examination, 
as is possible."214
2n Arifio (2004), pages 13-16; Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 6 and 96 and Bork (1993), page 429.
212 Van den Bergh (2002), page 56.
213 It may be increasingly important to integrate certain other Treaty objectives within Community competition law 
after 1 May 2004 (at least in the short term) because, by way o f example, the environmental problems in Central 
Europe are very serious, sec Beckmann (2001), and environmental protection is scarce in these countries.
214 Furse (1996), page 258.
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Many public policy objectives have been considered in article 81 of the Treaty. The Council, 
Commission, Community Courts and European Parliament have all endorsed this, see below. 
Community competition lawyers generally recognize that public policy is relevant in article 
81.215 So, why investigate whether public policy objectives should be taken into account there?
This chapter asks whether public policy objectives should be considered in article 81 for two 
reasons. First, as Sauter notes, in academic discussion it is often assumed as self-evident that the 
influence of political considerations on competition policy is unwarranted.216 By placing article 
81 in its Treaty context and explaining the alternatives to compromise, this chapter (and Chapter 
One) shows that public policy's influence is warranted there.
2,i See, for example, Goyder (2003), pages 121-123; Monti (2002); B&C (2001), paragraphs 1-075-1-081; Whish
(2001) , pages 15-19; Korah (2000), section 1.3.2.; Ritter, Braun, and Rawlinson (2000), page 17; Faull and Nikpay 
(1999), paragraphs 2.14-2.16; Mercier, Mach, Gilliéron and Affolter (1999), pages 130-132; Ehleimann (1998), 
pages 356,359-385 and 489; Amato (1997), page 114; Sauter (1997); Bouterse (1994) and Verstrynge (1988), page 
5. For a  contrary view see Schaub (1998), page 9.
216 Sauter (1997), page 120. See, for example, Ehleimann (1998), pages x and 9; Wißmann (2000), pages 143 and 
144; Burrichter in Ehlermann (2001), page 46; Tesauro (1998), page 223; Marenco (2001), page 500; Schaub
(2002) , page 46 and Gyselen (2002a), pages 185-187. For contrary views see Monti (2002) and Amato (1997), 
pages 113-124.
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Secondly, the Commission now says that the purpose of article 81(3), the article 81 paragraph 
where objectives are normally balanced, is:
"...to provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and 
not to allow the application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations."217
It is not certain what is meant by "political considerations" but its context implies that this 
means non-economic objectives.218 The Commission has reaffirmed this stance more recently, 
see below. Does this indicate that the generally accepted position is changing? Given the 
importance of the Commission's role in the development of Community competition policy, see 
below, this statement, and others like it, must be carefully examined.
To decide whether the presence of'political' considerations in article 81 is warranted, the article 
must be placed in its Community context.219 Section 2 looks at the Treaty as a whole and 
examines how it deals with public policy conflicts. Then, Section 3 analyses how the 
Community Courts have interpreted the Treaty in relation to conflicts between public policy and 
competition. Throughout this discussion the pros and cons o f both exclusion and compromise 
must be borne in mind, see Chapter One. In its policy statements, the Commission has said that 
public policy is irrelevant in article 81. Section 4 examines the Commission’s policy statements 
in more detail and asks whether this attitude is reflected in its decisions. Section 5 concludes.
Why is it important whether public policy objectives should be considered within article 81? 
Competition policy cannot be made rational until we decide what its underlying objectives are. 
Undertakings need to know whether public policy arguments can be raised in article 81 
proceedings. Decision-makers need to know whether they can/  should consider public policy 
issues. This question is particularly pressing today, see the Introduction.
2. THE TREATY
The Treaty creates a problem of conflicts in two ways. First, through the hierarchy of its 
articles. Secondly, because o f the presence of policy-linking clauses. Section 2.1. examines both 
of these. Then, Section 2.2. asks how the Treaty deals with the conflicts that it has created.
217 Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 57. Sec, also, paragraph 72, although note the logical 
implication of paragraph 56.
2IS See, Monti (2002), page 1090 and references made there.
2,9 Verouden (2003), page 530; Souty (2003), pages 23 and 43; Hildebrand (2002), pages 2 and 11; Baquero Cruz 
(2002), page 5; B&C (2001), paragraph 1-051 ; Korah (2000), page 6; Ritter, Braun, and Rawlinson (2000), page 17; 
Wesseling (2000), pages 18 and 32; Craig and de Burca (1998), page 89; Ehleimann (1998), pages xvt and 551; 
Amato (1,997); Sauter (1997), pages 116-122; Gyselen (1994), page 242; Bouterse (1994), pages 2 and 48; van 
Miert (1993), pages 120; Schröter (1987), page 657; Slynn (1985), page 393 and Pescatore (1974), page 41.
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2.1 How do conflicts arise in the Treaty?
2.1.1 Hierarchy
Article 2 outlines the purposes of the Treaty: 1
"The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic 
and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social 
protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a 
high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States."
Article 2 sets the task that the Community seeks to achieve. This consists o f a number of 
"ultimate aims" such as the "...harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities..." and "...equality between men and women..." Article 2 contains at least nine 
"ultimate aims", all of which are broad, inter-related goals. These "ultimate aims" are to be 
achieved by, amongst others, implementing the common policies and activities referred to in 
articles 3 and 4.220 21
Article 3 provides an open list of over twenty Community activities for "...the purposes set out 
in article 2 ..." These activities range from a common commercial policy, an internal market and 
a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted, to environmental
protection, a common transport policy, development co-operation and strengthening consumer
• 221 protection.
The provisions o f article 3 form part of the general principles of the common market, which are 
enlarged upon and applied by the later Treaty provisions. Taken in isolation, article 3 sheds no 
light on the relationship between these different policies.222
For our purposes, article 4 is divided into two parts. The first paragraph says, amongst other 
things, that for the purposes set out in article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as 
provided in the Treaty, an economic policy:
220 One must not only look to articles 2, 3 and 4 for the objectives o f the Treaty. The Preamble is another important 
source o f  information, as are the later Treaty provisions. Advocate-General Warner highlighted this in Case 97/78 
Fritz Schmalla [1978], page 2323. General principles of law may also be relevant, see the VB VB/VBBB Case, 
paragraph 34 and the opinion of Advocate-General Verloren van Themaat, page 79, including references.
221 Respectively, article 3(1 )(b), (c), (g), (I), (f), (r) and (t).
222 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 66.
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"...w hich is based on the close co-ordination o f Member States' econom ic policies, on the 
interna! market and on the definition o f  common objectives, and conducted in accordance 
with the principle o f an open market economy with free competition."
Article 4(2) expands on this saying that, as provided in the Treaty:
"...these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing o f  exchange rates leading to the 
introduction o f  a  single currency, the ECU, and the definition and conduct o f  a  single 
monetary policy and exchange rate policy the primary objective o f  both o f  which shall be to 
maintain price stability and, w ithout prejudice to this objective, to  support the general 
economic policies in the Community, in  accordance w ith the principle o f  an open market 
economy with free competition."
The later Treaty provisions implement the article 3 (and 4) activities which, in turn, seek to 
achieve the purposes set out in article 2 o f the Treaty. This idea of hierarchy brings, buried deep 
within it, the seed of a problem, related to the broad nature of the article 2 aims. The "ultimate 
aims" or purposes highlighted in article 2 can conflict with one another, in the sense that one 
aim can sometimes only be achieved at the expense of another.223 For example, the promotion of 
both a high level of employment and social protection may conflict. By improving workers’ 
conditions o f employment we often increase unemployment.224 Even if  there were no conflict of 
this type, different aims often compete against each other. A society with finite resources cannot 
pursue all aims totally, but must prioritise a few.
Article 3 currently contains an open list of over twenty activities that the Community will 
conduct for the purposes set out in article 2. These activities cannot be implemented blindly, but 
must be balanced against each other, as well as with those in article 4, in order to reflect the 
article 2 balance. For example, "...a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is 
not distorted...", article 3(1 Xg), might well conflict with "...a policy in the social sphere 
comprising a European Social Fund...", article 3(IX)).225
This potential for conflict between the underlying Treaty aims affects the implementing 
provisions such as article 81. Somehow these implementing provisions must deal with the 
conflicts generated within articles 2, 3 and 4. Section 2.2. discusses how they might deal with 
conflicts after we have examined the policy-linking clauses.
223 Case 27/74 Demag AG  v. Finanzamt Duisburg-Sud [ 1974], Advocate-General Reischl, page 1056.
224 See, Debating the Minimum Wage, The Economist, 1 February 2001.
225 The Albany Case, paragraphs 54-60 and paragraph 2 of the Judgment's Summary and Case 139/79 Maizena v. 




There are seven policy-linking clauses in the Treaty.226 One such clause is article 152(1):
"A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community policies and activities."
Article 159, relating to economic and social cohesion, another policy-linking clause, reads:
"The formulation and implementation of the Community's policies and actions and the 
implementation of the internal market shall take into account the objectives set out in article 
158 and shall contribute to their achievement"
The Community policies relating to environmental protection, employment, culture, public 
health, consumer protection, economic and social cohesion and development policy all make it 
clear that each of them should be taken into account by the Community in the definition and 
implementation of its other policies and activities.227
There is widespread agreement that the policy-linking clauses are there to ensure that other 
Treaty rules, for example the free movement provisions or those relating to competition, take 
account of these other objectives228
The requirement to take account of these policy aims (such as the environment) within Treaty 
policies and activities that pursue different aims (such as competition), may also lead to 
conflicts, as defined above, that need to be dealt with in the definition and implementation of the 
later Treaty articles.
22  How does the Treaty deal with conflicts?
When discussing the Treaty's hierarchy one might argue that the competition rules, amongst 
them article 81, are solely there to create "...a system ensuring that competition in the internal
226 The European Convention, if it becomes law, may extend this principle. See articles HI-1, "The Union shall ensure 
consistency between the different policies and activities referred to in this Part, taking all o f the Union's objectives 
into account..." Although articles III-4 and M-5 preserve specific policy-linking clauses too.
227 Respectively articles 6, 127(2), 151(4), 152(1), 153(2), 159 and 178 o f the Treaty. Similar points are raised by 
rules, such as Declaration 29 to the Amsterdam Treaty on sport, which may try to achieve a similar end.
228 For example, in relation to article 151(4) (cultural policy), see, Council, Resolution on Fixed B ook Prices 2; 
Council, on culture's role in the EU 's development, recital 2; Council, Resolution on Fixed Book Prices I and 
Council, Decision on Fixed Book Prices and Cunningham (2001), pages 122, 123 and 158-163. General 
Community lawyers readily embrace this conclusion, see, Vedder (2003), pages 3-16 and 169; Wasmeier (2001); 
Wyatt and Dashwood (2000), page 579; Jans (2000), pages 276 and 277; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 
(1998) page 128; Craig and de Bürca (1998), page 565; Commentaire Megret (1996), pages 12 and 251 and Brittan 
(1992), page 57. That said, commentators such as Barendt and Hitchens (2000), page 167 and Arifio (2004), page 7, 
suggest that article 151(4) o f the Treaty "...has been interpreted more as a  reminder to the Community o f Member 
State sovereignty than as an encouragement o f  Community action." Some competition lawyers (often tentatively) 
agree that the policy-linking clauses mean that competition law should take non-economic objectives into account, 
see, Monti (2002); B&C (2001), paragraph 1-040; Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs .2.14-2.16 and 2.145 and 
Ehlermann (1998), page xvi.
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market is not distorted...", article 3(1 )(g). Other chapters in the Treaty contribute to achieving 
other article 3 activities. The (independent) achievement of these activities will accomplish 
article 2's purposes, as a whole. Competition policy may then be seen as an instrument aiding 
the attainment of the Treaty objectives while also constituting an end in itself}29 This would not 
eliminate conflicts; but, it would ensure that they remained ’external' to article 81, and 
competition policy as a whole. Conflict would be dealt with by exclusion, not compromise.
Does the Treaty’s structure support this argument? If it did, one would expect each article 3 
activity to have specific Treaty articles implementing it. This is the case for most o f them. 
However, article 3(u) asks for "...measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and 
tourism." Civil protection and tourism are not mentioned elsewhere in the Treaty.29 30 As a result, 
these activities can only be achieved through later Treaty provisions, which also aim to achieve 
other article 3 activities at the same time. This does not necessarily mean that all of the later 
Treaty provisions implement all of the article 3 activities. It does mean that some must 
implement more than one article 3 activity.
There is also explicit support for using the later Treaty provisions to pursue various article 3 
activities. For example, the Declaration on Article 175 o f the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, reads:
"The High Contracting Parties are determined to see the European Union play a leading 
role in promoting environmental protection in the Union...Full use should be made of all 
possibilities offered by the Treaty with a view to pursuing this objective, including the use 
of incentives and instruments which are market-oriented and intended to promote 
sustainable development."
At least some of the later Treaty provisions must account for conflicting values. There is no 
indication of whether compromise is always necessary though. Exclusion is certainly not ruled 
out by Section One of the Treaty. Now we examine the later Treaty provisions.
The substantive Treaty provisions ’deal’ with conflict in four ways. Occasionally, the Treaty 
expressly allows some values to exclude others. For example, under article 296(1 Xb) the 
provisions of the Treaty, including the competition rules,231 shall not preclude any Member 
State from taking such measures as it considers necessary for "...the protection of the essential
229 See, for example, Commission, RCP 1996, point 2 and Kirchner (1998), pages 514 and 516 (although he is 
unclear on this point, see pages 517 and 518). The Commission's arguments referred to above, page 1, may also be 
based on this logic. See also, Lenz (2000), pages 44 and 45, who rejects this approach. Heimler (1998), page 599, 
proffers a slightly different argument "...although the competition rules are enforced within the genera] framework 
of achieving the fundamental objectives of article 2 of the Treaty... such general considerations cannot override the 
legal effect o f single provisions." This argument is undermined by the Community Courts use o f the teleological 
approach, see below.
230 In addition, article 3 of the Treaty is not a closed list of all Community activities.
231 See, Commission, RCP 1993, points 324-326 and Houttuin (1994), page 61.
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interests o f its security which are connected with production of or trade in arms, munitions and 
war material...” Here the Member States’ protection of the essential interests o f  their security 
are allowed to exclude competition within a certain field.232
Exclusion is an extreme way of settling conflicts. Normally, where the Treaty expressly uses 
conflict resolution, it opts for a balancing process (compromise). For example, the values 
pursued by article 28's principle of free movement o f goods must be balanced against the policy 
criteria listed in article 30.233
Thirdly, we saw above that the policy-linking clauses lead to certain conflicts within the Treaty. 
Do these clauses explain how to resolve these conflicts? With two exceptions, these clauses 
essentially state that the specific policy in question, such as environmental policy, must be taken 
into account in both the "...definition and implementation..." of other policies.234 What does the 
definition/ implementation distinction in the policy-linking clauses relate to? Is it discussing 
exclusion and compromise? For example, environmental policy, article 6, could be integrated 
into competition policy, both (i) by defining conflicts away through exclusion (definition); and, 
(ii) by balancing objectives through compromise (interpretation). If this were the case, the 
policy-linking clauses would allow both exclusion and compromise, except in relation to 
development policy and culture, where compromise is probably preferred.
This explanation of the definition/ implementation distinction cannot be correct. True, the 
policy-linking clauses express no explicit preference for exclusion or compromise. That said, 
the academic literature generally assumes that the policy-linking clauses imply compromise.235 
This assumption is justifiable because policy-linking clauses must favour compromise. Why? 
Imagine that the Community has to take a decision where environmental protection and 
consumer protection conflict. There are policy-linking causes in relation to both o f these areas,
232 Note article 298 of the Treaty, however.
Another example of competition values being trumped, to the extent that article 81 has been excluded, can be seen 
in the Common Agricultural Policy, article 36 of the Treaty combined with Council Regulation 26/62, Applying 
Certain Rules o f Competition to Production ofand Trade in Agricultural Products, article 2(1).
233 See also, for example, customs duties (article 9) or the customs union (article 25), article 27 implies compromise 
in certain areas; article 39(1) (free movement of workers) balances other objectives through article 39(3) and (4); 
article 43 (freedom o f establishment) balances other objectives through articles 45 and 46; article 49 (free 
movement o f  services) balances other objectives through article 55; article 56 (free movement of capital) balances 
other objectives through articles 58 and 59; article 61 (visa, asylum and immigration policies) balances other 
objectives through article 64; and, article 71(1) (transport policy) balances other objectives though paragraph 2.
234 The two exceptions are article 151(4) o f the Treaty (culture) which says "The Community shall take cultural 
aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty..." and article 178 (development policy) 
which says "The Community shall take account o f the objectives referred to in article 177 in the policies that it 
implements which arc likely to affect developing countries."
235 See above, and Krämer (2003), pages 8 ,19  and 21; McGillivray and Holder (2001), Section IV; Grimeaud (2000), 
pages 216 and 217; and Loman, Mortelmans, Post and Watson (1992), pages 195 and 196.
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articles 6 and 153(2). They can only both be considered (as their policy-linking clauses demand) 
if compromise is used to resolve the conflict, see Chapter One.
If this is correct, what does the definition/ implementation distinction relate to? Baldock 
suggests that it is a procedural distinction. Decisions with significant environmental impact can 
be taken at different 'levels' o f the policy process. A Community action plan might define 
policy, but this must also be implemented by regulations, decisions, etc. Baldock argues that the 
definition/ implementation distinction means that environmental considerations should be 
addressed at every stage of the policy process.236 Some support can be garnered for Baldock 
from the fact that the policy-linking clauses refer to both definition and implementation, see 
Chapter Seven.237
The final method 'adopted' by the Treaty for dealing with conflicts is silence. For example, 
article 28 deals with the free movement of goods. Where there are conflicts, certain objectives, 
those listed in article 30, must be balanced against the benefits of removing quantitative 
restrictions on imports and measures of equivalent effect. But what happens when article 28 
conflicts with objectives that are not listed in article 30? These heads of exemption are often 
widely written, 'public policy' is one in article 30, for example. But do they include all relevant 
objectives? If article 28 conflicted with an objective, such as environmental protection, the 
policy-linking clause in article 6 would demand compromise. But how would this take place? Is 
environmental protection 'public policy* for the purposes of article 30? Also, what about 
objectives that are not found in policy-linking clauses and do not fall within one o f the heads of 
exemption? The Community Courts provide some answers, see Section 3 of this chapter.
Another article where balancing is possible is article 81. Article 81(1) prohibits, as incompatible 
with the common market, agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between 
Member States and have as their object or effect the restriction o f competition within the 
common market. Such agreements are void, article 81(2), unless saved by article 81(3):
"The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of any 
agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any decision or category of 
decisions by associations of undertakings; any concerted practice or category of concerted 
practices, which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
m  Baldock (1994), page 7. See also, Commentaire Megret (1996), page 251.
237 Not everyone agrees. The wide language in these policy-linking clauses states that, for example, environmental 
policy should be integrated into the definition and implementation o f the Community policies and activities. Krämer 
says it is doubtful whether this refers to all individual measures. Krämer (2003), page 21. This is in line with the 
interpretation in relation to conducting impact assessments, see COM(2002) 276 final, pages 5 and 6 and also the 
implication from an early Council document, Council, Guidelines fo r Community Cultural Action, paragraph 7. This 
is commented on and criticised in Cunningham (2001), pages 139,140 and 145-150.
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which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such 
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question."
Paragraph 81(3) allows for a balancing process.238 We have seen above that article 81 may not 
only pursue the values sought by article 3(1 Xg), hut we are not told whether it pursues all of the 
article 2, 3 and 4 values, or only some. Exactly which objectives can be considered in article 
81(3) is open to debate. It is not phrased as widely as article 30, for example. This is especially 
important with objectives pursued by the policy-linking clauses which, as we have seen, 
demand compromise. Some o f  these, think of the human rights aspect of development policy, 
article 178, for example, do not seem to fall within article 81(3)’s natural meaning.239
2.3 Conclusion of Section 2
The Treaty objectives conflict to a certain degree. This is as a result of both the hierarchy of the 
Treaty and the policy-linking clauses. These conflicts can be dealt with in two ways. By 
allowing one conflicting objective to exclude the other; or, by compromising between the 
conflicting objectives in order to aim at an "optimal balance".
The optimal balance has a price. This is the lack o f clarity that is the natural result of this 
process. This lack of clarity increases the more objectives must be balanced and the more 
diverse they are. The benefit of exclusion is clarity. The price is the exclusion o f  an (often) 
important factor. Exclusion becomes less satisfactory as a  solution to conflicts the more 
important the trumped values are and the wider the "footprint" of the excluding value. 
Compromise is highly political, but it must not be forgotten that exclusion is too.
The early provisions in Part One o f the Treaty exhibit a slight preference for compromise, but 
are essentially ambiguous on this point. This is unsurprising. They are there to establish the
238 In the Commission's view, article 81(3) o f the Treaty "...expressly acknowledges that restrictive agreements may 
generate objective economic benefits so as to  outweigh the negative effects of the restriction o f competition.", 
Commission, Article 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 33. This is incorrect Article 81(3) merely says that, when its four 
conditions are fulfilled, exemption may be granted. It does not speak o f weighing 81(3) benefits against article 
81(1). It is possible that the authors o f the Treaty meant that any agreement fulfilling article 81(3)’s criteria (no 
matter how marginal the promotion of economic progress, for example, and no matter how great the restriction o f  
competition), would be acceptable.
Compromise can be achieved in many different ways, see, for example, Aleinikoff (1987), pages 995-1004. That 
said, the Commission and the Community Courts use the balancing method, see the Consten an d  G rundig Case, 
page 348; the VBVÔ/ VBBB Case, Opinion of AG Verloren van Themaat, page 88; Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Ford- 
Werke a n d  F ord o f Europe v. Com m ission (1985], paragraphs 33 and 34; Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 
Stichting C ertificatie K raanverhuurbedrijf and  Federatie van  N ederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven v. Commission 
[1997], paragraph 194 and Case T -l 12/99 M étropole Télévision (M6) and  O thers v. Commission [2001], paragraphs 
73 and 74. See also, Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraphs 11, 33 and 43; Whish (2003), page 151; 
Goyder (2003), page 121; Hildebrand (2002), page 231 and B&C (2001), paragraphs 3-019 and 3-025. That 
framework is adopted here.
239 See, for-example, Ehlermann (1998), page xv. Having said that, others describe article 81(3)'s wording as, for 
example, 'extremely broad and vague', Kirchner (1998), page 516. We discuss the Community Courts' views below.
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Treaty’s objectives, rather than explain how they will be implemented. The later Treaty 
provisions are clearer. The vast majority either provide for compromise or are silent. The Treaty 
rarely explicitly advocates exclusion. It is unclear what should happen in relation to values that 
the Treaty does not expressly tell us either to ignore or to balance. Perhaps, there is only silence 
where conflicts were unforeseen? If not, and these objectives were not meant to be considered, 
why were they not expressly excluded? Given the potential costs o f exclusion, see Chapter One, 
as well as the prevalence of compromise in the Treaty (when compared to exclusion), should we 
presume that, in cases of silence, compromise is to be preferred? The policy-linking clauses 
certainly demand compromise. But what o f objectives that are not dealt with by such clauses?
Article 81 allows for a balancing exercise. Yet, its language does not seem wide enough to 
incorporate all objectives. Is this relevant? That depends on how the Treaty is to be read. 
Section 3 examines the Community Courts’ judgments to see how they deal with these issues, 
particularly in relation to the competition objective and article 81 of the Treaty. Have the 
Community Courts interpreted article 81 widely enough to incorporate other objectives, 
including those supported by policy-linking clauses? If not, we must solve conflicts through 
exclusion.
3. THE COMMUNITY COURTS
One of the first points discussed in the last section was whether policies might be ends in 
themselves. Does competition policy, for example, solely aim to create "...a system ensuring 
that competition in the internal market is not distorted...", article 3(1 Xg)? I f  so, any conflicts 
between competition policy and other article 3 activities would be dealt with by way of 
exclusion, not compromise. We saw that at least some of the Treaty's substantive provisions 
incorporate compromise, rather than exclusion. We were not sure whether competition policy 
(and article 81) was one of them. The ECJ answered this question back in 1966. It held:
"Article 85 [now article 81] lays down the rules on competition applicable to undertakings 
in Part Three of the Treaty which covers the 'policy of the Community'. It aims at bringing 
about the 'activities of the Community* mentioned in article 3 and in particular the 
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted', 
and this is in order to arrive at 'establishing a Common Market' which is one of the 
fundamental objectives set out in Article 2."240
The first point to note is that the ECJ accepts the hierarchical Treaty "system" embedded in 
articles 2, 3 and 4, as outlined in the last part of this chapter.241 Secondly, the ECJ holds that 
article 81 aims to bring about the activities mentioned in article 3, and thus the purposes of
240 Case 32/65 Italy v. Council and Commission [1966], page 405. Many other judgments say the same, for example, 
the L edere Case, paragraphs 8 and 9; Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and  Continental Can v. Commission 
[19731, paragraphs 24 and 25 and Case 14/68 W alt Wilhelm  v. Bundeskartellam t [1969], paragraph 5.
241 Joined Cases C-78/90 and C-83/90 Compagnie commerciale v. Receveur p rincipa l [1992], paragraphs 17 and 18.
article 2.242 In particular, but not exclusively, those mentioned in article 3(1 Xg)* It is not clear 
whether article 81 aims to bring about all of the article 3 activities, including those introduced 
after 1966. But, the fact that it aims at more than one means that at least some conflicts must be 
resolved within article 81, through balancing (compromise).
To my knowledge, the Community Courts have not expressly commented upon the effect of the 
policy-linking clauses on article 81. They have been given the opportunity of doing so on a 
number o f occasions.243 There is limited case law on policy-linking clauses generally. However, 
the ECJ implies that they demand compromise, as opposed to exclusion. In Germany v. 
European Parliament and Council,244 Germany argued that consumer protection required a high 
level o f protection (article 153(2)), which the directive at issue had not achieved. The ECJ held, 
paragraph 48:
"...although consumer protection is one of the objectives of the Community, it is clearly 
not the sole objective. As has already been stated, the Directive aims to promote the right of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the banking sector. Admittedly, there 
must be a high level of consumer protection concomitantly with those freedoms; however, 
no provision of the Treaty obliges the Community legislature to adopt the highest level of 
protection which can be found in a particular Member State.”
Remember that with exclusion, only one objective is achieved, the other is completely ignored, 
see Chapter One. If the objectives must be achieved 'concomitantly*, then conflicts must be 
resolved through compromise and not exclusion. This is in line with Section 2's argument, that 
policy-linking clauses logically demand compromise.
The objective of free competition conflicts with other Treaty objectives. Due to the way that 
they interpret the Treaty, the Community Courts imply that at least some of these (probably 
those supported by the policy-linking clauses but perhaps also other objectives needed to 
achieve the article 2 goals) should be dealt with via compromise, within article 81. Section 2 
argued that the Treaty's structure supports this interpretation.
242 This interpretation has considerable academic support, see, Verouden (2003), page 530; Vedder (2003), page 169; 
Wyatt and Dashwood (2000), pages 539-542; van Miert (1999), page 2; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 
(1998), pages 109-132; Sauter (1997), page 120; Jebsen and Stevens (1995-6), pages 458-461; van Miert (1993), 
page 120; Commentaire Megret (1992), pages 8-17; van der Esch (1991) and ESC, Opinion on the Twenty-second 
Competition Report, page 367.
243 For example, the French court referred to both article 151(4), the policy-linking clause relating to culture, and 
Council, Decision on Fixed Book Prices / ,  in the questions that it sent to the ECJ in the Echirolles Case, paragraph 
13. The ECJ did not refer to either and, in the end, the article 81 issue was not relevant in the case because there was 
held not to be an affect on trade between Member States, paragraph 24. Advocate-General Alber made a similar 
choice, see paragraphs 41-46 o f  his Opinion.
244 Case C-233/94, Federal Republic o f Germany v. European Parliament and Council (1997]. See also, Case C- 
180/96 R United Kingdom v. Commission [1996), paragraph 63.
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To the extent that compromise is necessary, can it occur within article 81?245 If so, how (and 
where) would this take place? Article 81 's wording does not seem wide enough-to incorporate 
all objectives. Is this relevant? Section 3.2. examines the Community Courts' approach to 
compromise within article 81.
Before discussing compromise, Section 3.1. discusses exclusion. Outside of the express 
exclusionary provisions, such as article 296(1)(b), what have the Community Courts decided? 
When should competition policy exclude other objectives and when should it be excluded? Is 
our emphasis on compromise (over exclusion) supported by the Community Courts* case law?
3.1 Exclusion
Should competition policy exclude?
The Treaty deems competition important.246 Article 2 calls for "...a high degree of 
competitiveness...” Competition or competitiveness are also referred to in, amongst others, the 
Preamble and articles 4 ,27(c), 98, 105 and 136. The ECJ also considers competition important:
"...if Article 3(f) [now article 3(1 Xg)] provides for the institution of a system ensuring that 
competition in the Common Market is not distorted, then it requires a fortiori that 
competition must not be eliminated. This requirement is so essential that without it 
numerous provisions of the Treaty would be pointless."247
Assume that objective A conflicts with article 81's objectives, as we understand them. We do 
not know whether A can be balanced within article 81 yet. We must decide, whether to resolve 
the conflict through compromise or exclusion. Is 'competitiveness* important enough to exclude 
other objectives in case of conflict? If article 81 could exclude (ignore) other objectives, this 
would have an enormous impact on article 2's balance. This is because article 81 is applicable 
throughout most o f the economy.248 249
245 Here I refer to the problem of interpreting the substantive article. Chapter Seven discusses specific limits on what 
should be considered within article 81, imposed by the doctrines of'competence' and 'direct effect’.
246 Tizzano (1998), page 484 and Waelbroeck (1998), page 585. Nevertheless, while this has been underlined by 
certain specific Treaty articles, see below, it might be advisable to include a policy-linking clause in favour of 
competition next time the Treaty is amended, OECD (2003), pages 3 and 7. This approach has been adopted, with 
varying degrees o f  success in, for example, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire and the U SA  sec, UNCTAD 
document TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.l., paragraph 34 and Côte d'Ivoire, RCP 1996. Komninos (2005) DRAFT, 
page 5, argues that the ECJ has already gone some way down this road, see Case C-17/90 Pinaud W ieger v. 
Bundesanstalt fü r  den Güterfernverkehr [1991], paragraph 11. See also, Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), pages 112 
and 113.
247 Case 6/72 Europem ballage Corporation and Continental Can v. Commission [1973], paragraph 24. This was an
article 82 case, but the ECJ makes it clear, paragraph 25, that its comments apply to both articles 81 and 82.
249 Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2,06. See, for example, Joined Cases 209 to 213/84 M inistère pu b lic  v. Asjes 
[1986], paragraphs 27-45.
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Exclusion is dealt with, at least in part, by the Échirolles Case. Before discussing the judgment 
we must put ’competition* into a  Treaty context. We examine article 4 o f the Treaty, which 
provides the background to this decision. Note that ’competition' is not defined anywhere in the 
Treaty. This issue is discussed further in Chapter Six.
Article 4 says that economic and the monetary policies have both been introduced for the 
"...purposes set out in article 2 ..."  Note also the emphasis given to this point in one of the 
implementing articles, article 105(1), the objectives of the European System o f Central Banks 
(the "ESCB”). Article 105(1) says that the primary objective o f the ESCB is price stability but, 
without prejudice to this objective, the ESCB shall "...support the general economic policies in 
the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement o f the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Article 2." This seems to imply some sort of balancing act.
But what of the language at the end of article 4(1) and (2), which states that these economic and 
monetary policies must be conducted "...in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition."? The same sort of language can also be found in the 
implementing articles 98 (economic policy) and article 105(1), both o f which command the 
relevant actors to:
"...act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out 
in article 4."
Do these provisions demand that an open market economy and free competition somehow take 
precedence over (exclude or trump) other objectives? This is a hard question to answer. 
However, some clues can be found in the Échirolles Case, which involved article 1 of French 
Law No. 81-766 of 10 August 1981 (the "Law") on book prices. The Law said, amongst other 
things, that the publisher or importer of a book must fix its price and the bookseller must 
normally sell the book at between 95 and 100% of that price. The case was brought by 
Association du Dauphiné and others, booksellers, who attacked the sale, by Échirolles 
Distribution SA, which runs a business under the name Centre Leclerc, of books at a  price more 
than 5% below that fixed by the publisher or importer.
The French court refen-ed a number of questions to the ECJ, under article 234 o f the Treaty, 
essentially asking whether articles 3(lXc) and (g), 4, 10, 7 (now repealed), 14,98, 99(3) and (4) 
o f the Treaty precluded the application o f national legislation such as the Law.
There had already been a reference to the ECJ in relation to the Law. There the ECJ held:249
249 The Leclerc Case, paragraph 20.
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"...the purely national systems and practices in the book trade have not yet been made 
subject to a Community competition policy with which the Member States would be 
required to comply by virtue of their duty to abstain from any measure which might 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. It follows that, as Community law 
stands, Member States' obligations under article 5 of the EEC Treaty [now article 10], in 
conjunction with articles 3(f) and 85 [now articles 3(1 Xg) and 81], are not specific enough 
to preclude them from enacting legislation of the type at issue on competition in the retail 
prices of books, provided that such legislation is consonant with the other specific Treaty 
provisions, in particular those concerning the free movement of goods."
Échirolles argued, paragraphs 17-19, that the Law created a non-competition area, which was 
wider than it needed to be to achieve its intended objectives. It added that the ECTs judgement 
in the Leclerc Case made specific reference to the state of Community law at that time. That 
judgement was given before the creation of the internal market on 1 January 1993. Échirolles 
added that the introduction o f provisions on the internal market "...may mean that the above- 
mentioned system is incompatible with the relevant provisions o f the EC Treaty."
The ECJ replied that article 3 lays down the general principles of the common market, which 
are to be applied in conjunction with the later Treaty provisions. This includes, since the SEA, 
the objective o f an internal market, articles 3(1 )(c) and 14 of the Treaty. The ECJ found, 
paragraph 24, that as the Law involved a purely national system, see paragraph 20 of the Leclerc 
Case above, and as article 81 had not been amended since that judgment, the ECJ could not call 
into question its previous judgment. The ECJ continued, paragraphs 25-26:
"As regards Articles 3a, 102a and 103 [now articles 4,98 and 99] of the Treaty, which refer 
to economic policy, the implementation of which must comply with the principle of an 
open market economy with free competition (Articles 3a and 102a), those provisions do not 
impose on the Member States clear and unconditional obligations which may be relied on 
by individuals before the national courts. What is involved is a general principle whose 
application calls for complex economic assessments which are a matter for the legislature 
or the national administration.
The answer to the question referred to the Court must therefore be that Articles 3(c) and (g)
[now article 3(1 Xc) and (g)], 3a and 5 [article 10], the second paragraph of Article 7a [now 
article 14] and Articles 102a and 103 of the Treaty do not preclude the application of 
national legislation requiring publishers to impose on booksellers fixed prices for the resale 
of books."
The ECJ held that articles 4 and 98's obligation, in relation to economic policy, that Member 
States and the Community act in accordance with the principle o f an open market economy with 
free competition, does not impose on the Member States obligations that can be relied on before 
the national courts. The ECJ added that, despite the comparatively clear language of those 
articles, the call for an open market economy and free competition is merely a "general 
principle" which calls for complex economic assessments, i.e. it is an objective to be balanced, 
in this case against culture. A similar conclusion likely applies to the comparable wording 
within article 105(1) of the Treaty, and other similar Treaty articles, see above.
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The ECJ did not expressly state that when the Community institutions are legislating in this area, 
articles 4 and 98 merely oblige them to balance the principle of an open market economy with 
free competition against other relevant objectives. It is likely that this is the case;250 especially 
given the Commission’s wide discretion in relation to the implementation o f  the competition 
provisions, see below. This was certainly Advocate-General Alber’s view. In the Echirolles 
Case he said that, paragraph 41, reference should be made to article 151(4) of the Treaty:
"...under which the Community has to take cultural aspects into account in its action, 
which therefore includes the way in which it takes action in the field of competition."
Articles 4 and 98's wording highlights the importance o f an open market economy and free 
competition. It may give 'free competition' extra weight when it is balanced against other 
objectives.251 However, it should not be read as promoting the concepts of an "...open market 
economy and free competition..." such that they trump or exclude other objectives.252 This 
appears to be the right decision when the provision is placed in its Treaty context. As Advocate- 
General Mischo explains:
"It does not follow from those provisions [articles 4 and 98]...that Community law places 
greater value on the principle of free competition than it does on the other principles. The 
fact is that the European Treaties simultaneously pursue several objectives, which must be 
reconciled."253
The competition provisions themselves support this position. Some, such as articles 86 and 87 
expressly take account of other objectives. Articles 81, 82 and the ECMR do not expressly 
exclude the incorporation of the other article 2 and 3 purposes and activities.254 Indeed, th e  
language of articles 81 and 82, as well as the ECMR, allows for the incorporation of other 
policy objectives into them. In article 81 this occurs in both paragraphs (1) and (3), see below 
and Part B. This paper does not discuss article 82 or the ECMR in detail but article 82 allows fo r
250 See, for example, Sauter (1998), page 54 and Barents (1990). For a contrary view, see MestmScker (2000), pages 
409 and 410, where he interprets article 98 as binding the economic policy of both the Community and the Member 
States. MestmScker does not justify this view and it seems contrary (at least as regards the Member States) to the  
clear wording of the ECJ in the E chirolles Case.
251 "The principle of undistorted competition must now be considered o f equal rank with industrial policy, R&TD 
policy, social policy, regional policy, environmental policy and further activities introduced by article 3.", Streit and  
Mussler (1995), page 24. Some argue that articles 3, 98 and 157 imply that competition now enjoys a higher status 
than industrial policy and trade policy, Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 67.
252 Monti (2002), page 1093; Schmid (2000), pages 164 and 165 and Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 67. F o r 
arguments against this view see the references in Schmid (2000), page 164.
253 Joined cases C-49/I998, etc., F inalarte Sociedade de C onstrugao C ivil v. Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse d e r  
B auw irtschaft [2001], Opinion, paragraph 46. The ECJ did not discuss articles 4 and 98 in this case. See also  
Edward in Ehlermann (2001), pages 566 and 567.
254 Subject to what I say below, nor do they expressly state that they will incorporate these aims. However, this is n o t 
the style o f the Treaty. As we have seen, the policy-linking clauses state that the Community must take account o f  
them in its policies and activities, none of them say that they will take account o f others. This must be implicit 
though, otherwise the effect o f these provisions would be significantly reduced.
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the balancing of other objectives through the notion of "abuse".235 The decisions under the 
Merger Regulation were able to take account of "considerations of a social nature", a  similar 
stance is likely under the ECMR.25 56
Should competition law be excluded?
Assume that an implementing provision (let's call this article X) does not incorporate 
competition objectives within it. Imagine that article X applies in a specific factual situation and 
the application of the competition provisions (amongst them, article 81) are excluded. In this 
scenario, where articles 81 and X would have conflicted, competition values are also excluded.
We have seen that the Community Courts consider competition to be important. If they were to 
allow competition to be trumped (excluded) by other objectives, then this key objective would 
be ignored. The Treaty has provided for this only on some narrowly defined grounds, see above. 
Unsurprisingly, the Community Courts are reluctant to allow competition to be trumped or 
excluded outside of these. In the CFI's words:
"It should also be recalled tha t...w here  the Treaty intended to  remove certain activities 
from the am bit o f  the com petition rules, it made an express derogation to that e ffe c t”257
Despite this, the Community Courts have allowed competition to be excluded even though the 
Treaty did not expressly provide for it. One example is the Albany Case,258 which originated in 
the Netherlands. In this case a conflict existed between the competition provisions, in this case 
articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty, and the social provisions which encourage collective 
bargaining, article 136 and following.
In Dutch law, employers are often obliged to affiliate their employees to a compulsory sectoral 
pension fund. The Minister for Social Affairs, at the request of a group of employers' 
associations and trade unions deemed by the Minister to be sufficiently representative, can issue 
a decree requiring all groups of persons belonging to a given sector of the economy to be 
affiliated to a sectoral pension fund. In the absence of a specific request the Minister has no such 
power. All persons falling under the decree, together with their employers must abide by the
255 See the concept o f "objective justification" in cases such as Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991], paragraphs 
102-119. This point was not raised on the subsequent appeal to the EGJ. See also Verstiynge (1988), page 5.
256 See, for example, Commission decision, Mannesmann/ Vallourec/ f/va, decided under the Merger Regulation, 
Banks (1997) and recital 23 and articles 2 and 21 o f the ECMR. Indeed, article 2(l)(b) contains wording which is 
very similar to article 81(3) of the Treaty. On the consideration o f national interests there, see, Mohamed (2000).
257 Case T-61/89, Dansk Pelsdyravlerforemng v. Commission [1992], paragraph 54. See also, Case T -l44/99 Institute 
o f Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office v. Commission [2001], paragraph 67; the Pavlov 
Case; the Asjes Case and Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer e. V. v. Commission [1987].
258 See also, Case C-222/98 Hendrik van der Woude v. Stichting Beatrixoord [2000], paragraphs 22-27. The 
Community Courts sometimes use other mechanisms to exclude competition too. See, for example Townley (2005), 
on the concept of an undertaking in Community competition law.
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rules o f the relevant sectoral pension fund. The obligations to pay the contributions are legally 
enforceable.
The Textile Industry Trade Fund (the "Fund") was one of these sectoral pension funds. Albany 
was an undertaking operating within its industry. Albany also set up its own supplementary 
pension plan managed by an insurance company. This was much more generous than the Fund’s 
pension. The Fund changed and made its pension plan better but Albany still thought its own 
pension plan made better provision for its employees. So it asked to be exempted from the Fund. 
The Fund refused.
Albany brought an action against the Fund concerning Albany’s refusal to pay to the Fund 
contributions for 1989 on the ground that compulsory affiliation to the Fund, by virtue of which 
these contributions were claimed, was contrary to articles 3(lXg), 81,82 and 86 of the Treaty.
The ECJ noted that article 3 of the Treaty contained a number of different activities, paragraph 
54, and that article 137 o f the Treaty provides that the Commission is to promote close co­
operation between Member States in the social field, particularly in matters relating to the right 
of association and collective bargaining between employers and workers, paragraph 55. This 
might lead to relations based on agreement between management and labour at the European 
level, article 139, paragraph 56.
The ECJ then went on to emphasise, paragraphs 57 and 58, that the Agreement on social 
policy239 states that the objectives to be pursued by the Community and the Member States 
include improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between 
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high 
employment and the combating o f  exclusion. Article 4 of that Agreement says that agreements 
may be concluded as a result o f the dialogue between management and labour at the 
Community level. The ECJ continued, paragraphs 59 and 60:
"It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective 
agreements between organisations representing employers and workers. However, the 
social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if 
management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty 
when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment."
"It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which 
is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective 
negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue 
of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty." 259
259 Community Agreement on Social Policy with the exclusion of the UK (1992).
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The ECJ found a conflict, paragraph 59, between the social policy objectives and the 
competition policy objectives, as pursued by article 81. The ECJ allowed the social policy 
objectives (as implemented by article 137) to trump the competition law ones (as implemented 
by article 81), in collective agreements between management and labour, though not those 
conducted outside o f such a relationship,260 which aim to improve the conditions of work and 
employment.
Both the ECJ and Advocate-General Jacobs favoured exclusion over compromise.261 But was 
there even a conflict? The ECJ thought so, ”... certain restrictions of competition are inherent in 
collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers." However, 
while the Treaty facilitates collective agreements, it does not demand that they restrict 
competition. Thus, under cases such as Âhlstrôm Osakeyhtiô v. Commission, a conflict has not 
been created.262 There the ECJ found no conflict as US law allowed, but did not require, conduct 
which infringed article 81 o f the Treaty. It is questionable whether collective agreements 
inherently include (by their nature and purpose) restrictions on competition such that trade 
between Member States is appreciably affected. Therefore, it is arguable whether, by their very 
nature, the social policy objectives and the competition policy objectives conflict.
However, possibly foreseeing this issue the ECJ went on "... the social policy objectives 
pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were 
subject to article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty..." As a result, the ECJ advocated the 
complete exclusion o f the consideration o f competition objectives, via article 81, from this sort 
of agreement. But did the Treaty's authors think that subjecting these collective agreements to 
competition law would seriously undermine their social policy objectives. Probably not. It 
seems contrary to articles 136-145 of the Treaty to per se exclude these social rules from the 
ambit o f competition law. Article 136 says that implementing measures should take account of 
"...the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Community economy..." Article 140 adds 
that article 136's objectives are to be achieved "...without prejudice to the other provisions of 
this Treaty..."263
It is anomalous to deal with the issue in this way,264 given the emphasis on competition in other 
decisions, as well as the ability to balance such considerations within article 81 itself, see
260 The Pavlov Case, paragraphs 68-70 and the opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, paragraphs 96-99.
261 Although Advocate-General Jacobs tries to deal with this risk by re-introducing a balancing element later in his 
analysis, paragraphs 190-194 of his opinion.
262 Joined Cases 89/85, etc., Âhlstrôm Osakeyhtiô v. Commission [1988], paragraph 20.
26j The Community Agreement on Social Policy with the exclusion o f the UK (1992) makes a similar point.
264 See, the, opinion o f Advocate-General Lenz in Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football 
Association v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995], paragraph 273.
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below.265 Albany? s far-reaching exemption of social law from competition law's scope is not 
indispensable for achieving labour policy goals and pre-empts any discussion o f  the welfare 
effects o f collective bargaining.266 Two important Treaty objectives were at stake, instead o f  
taking them both into account, one was ignored.
The Albany Case demonstrates the impact of exclusion. As noted above, outside o f this the 
Community Courts have been reluctant to allow for the trumping of competition policy.267 The 
Treaty seems to confirm this stance. It is clear why. Undertakings are now able to appreciably 
restrict competition between Member States through collective agreements between 
management and labour, which aim to improve the conditions of work and employment. This 
might even include the level of salaries, the Albany Case9 paragraph 63.
3.2 Compromise
Sometimes objectives conflict. The Community Courts are reluctant to use trumping to deal 
with competition policy conflicts, at least insofar as article 81 and competition are concerned. 
This is probably due to the perceived importance o f  this policy objective, as well as to the size 
of article 81's footprint. And yet, the Community Courts cannot ignore these conflicts. This 
implies that compromise should take place within article 81, see above.
One might question whether it is possible to balance all relevant values within article 81, in light 
of that provision's wording. It is. Even where the Treaty is silent, the Community Courts have 
principally dealt with conflicts by way of compromise. They have done this by adopting a  
purposive or teleological approach to Treaty interpretation. As Craig and de Burca explain:268
"...the Court tends to examine the whole context in which a particular provision is situated 
- which often involves looking at the Preamble to the Treaties... - and it gives the 
interpretation most likely to further what the Court considers that provision in its context 
was aimed to achieve. Often this is very far from a literal interpretation of the Treaty...even 
to the extent of flying in the face of the express language."
This applies to the values pursued by the policy-linking clauses. Neither the provisions on 
freedom o f establishment, nor those on freedom to provide services, expressly incorporate 
consumer protection objectives, yet we saw above that in Germany v. European Parliament a n d
265 On this point Advocate-General Jacobs is against me, see his opinion in the Albany Case, paragraph 178.
266 Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2000), pages 501-508.
267 Even i f  Albany is an extension of the principle that the competition rules can only be derogated where the Treaty 
makes express provision, it may be a limited one. The references to 'agreement’ in article 137 and 139 are the only 
references to agreements between private parties in the whole Treaty, with the exception o f article 81.
268 Craig and de Burca (1998), page 89. See also, Wyatt and Dashwood (2000), pages 197-200; Fennelly (1997), page 
250 and de Wilmars (1986), pages 16-20 and the cases cited there.
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Council the ECJ implied consumer protection into them as a result o f the policy linking clause, 
article 153(2) of the Treaty,269
It also applies to other (non policy-linking clause) values. The free movement of goods 
provisions are illuminating in this regard.270 Against article 28’s clear wording, the Community 
Courts have ’found1 an open list of mandatory requirements.271 These are in addition to article 
30's express exemptions.272 The interests protected by the mandatory requirements must be 
recognised in Community law.273 Within these limits, they are repeatedly invoked to defend 
national public interests.274
When the Community Courts decided to balance within article 81 they were confronted with 
two problems. First, article 81 of the Treaty does not, on its face, encourage the balancing of all 
relevant objectives, in particular many o f those pursued in the policy-linking clauses. Secondly, 
they had to balance the desire for an "optimal balance” with legal certainty. Legal certainty is 
particularly important to private actors because they do not participate in the decision-making 
process to the same extent as public ones. This means that they find it more difficult to assess 
the content of particular policies and to weigh them. The interpretation of article 81 is 
considered next. The second issue is dealt with in Part C.
As noted above, article 81 of the Treaty does not, on its face, encourage the balancing of all 
relevant objectives. The Community Courts have dealt with this problem in two ways. They 
have implied a balancing exercise into both article 81(1) and (3). Chapter Six discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of using these two paragraphs.
269 It is possible that this issue was not argued before the court and so the precedent value o f the case may be 
diminished in this respect. The ECJ reads the policy-linking clause as demanding compromise. This suggests that 
article 153(2)'s reference to 'defining and implementing' refers to procedural, not substantive, issues.
270 Mortelmans (2001), page 618 and Aubiy-Caillaud (1998), pages 22 and 23. It happens in other areas too, for 
example, Craig and de Burca (1998), Chapter 17 and Snell (2002), pages 181-194. For a justification for the 
mandatory requirements, see Craig and de Burca (1998), pages 628 and 629.
271 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolvenvaltungfur Branntwein [1979], paragraph 8.
2721.e. this is not done through a wide interpretation o f ‘public policy' in article 30.
273 While the Community Courts demand the 'final s a /  on what objectives are acceptable, Oliver (2003), paragraph 
8.37, this requirement is, in fact, unimportant Snell (2002), page 191 notes "...it may be doubted whether the Court 
in actual fact exercises any review at this level. It has never refused to accept the possibility that a certain non­
economic ground o f justification... could save an indistinctly applicable measure."
374 See, Oliver (2003), paragraph 6.74 and Chapter 8 and Mortelmans (2001), page 622. Amongst the mandatory 
requirements are cultural policy, fairness o f commercial transactions, consumer protection, environmental 
protection, pluralism of the media; fostering certain forms of art; and social order, see, Oliver (2003), Chapter 8; 
Snell (2002), page 192 and Craig and de Burca (1998), Chapter 14.
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3.2.1 Balancing (compromise) within article 81(1) o f  the Treaty
It is generally agreed that, in Wouters, the ECJ balanced different values275 within article 
8I(1).276 Many point to the similarity between judgments like Wouters and the mandatory 
requirements under article 28.277 In Wouters, the agreement at issue was the Dutch Bar Council's 
1993 Regulation, prohibiting lawyers in the Netherlands from forming partnerships with non­
lawyers, unless the Bar Council had given its consent.278 Mr Wouters, and another lawyer, 
wanted to enter into a partnership in a  firm o f accountants. The Bar Council refused their 
application. So, they questioned the compatibility o f this rule with article 81. The ECJ found 
that the rule restricted competition, paragraphs 86-94. There was also an impact on trade 
between Member States, paragraphs 86, 95 and 96. That should have been the end of the 
matter.279 But the ECJ continued,280 paragraph 97:
"However, not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association 
of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them 
necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the 
Treaty. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, account must 
first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of 
undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of 
its objectives, which are here connected with the need to make rules relating to 
organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure 
that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of justice are 
provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience...It has then 
to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in 
the pursuit of those objectives."
275 In that case the ECJ balanced professional ethics and competition, but it did not restrict the balancing to these 
values and it seems likely that others would be considered there, Cooke (2005) DRAFT, pages 8 and 9.
276 There have been many other instances o f  balancing under article 81(1), from the introduction o f the concept o f 
'workable competition', the M etro I  C ase, paragraph 20 (discussed in Bouterse (1994), pages 24 and 25); to the 
notion o f  ancillary restraints (B&C (2001), paragraphs 2-112 and 6-170-8-183) and, possibly, the rule of reason 
(B&C (2001), paragraph 2-063). See also, Whish (2003), pages 117-123.
277 See, Komninos (2005) DRAFT, page 9 and the references made there; Baquero Cruz (2002), page 153; Monti 
(2002), section 5; Mortelmans (2001) and O’Loughlin (2003), for example. The ECJ's references to 'unfair 
commercial practices' in Joined Cases 100-103/80 SA M usique D iffusion Française v. Com m ission [1983], 
paragraphs 89 and 90 intentionally echo the mandatory requirements case law. The ECJ did the same in Wouters, 
paragraph 97, although by now the mandatory requirements also apply to freedom of establishment, Snell (2002).
27s In this respect, Wouters is a departure from previous caselaw, which demanded some form of articulation of the 
public interest objectives by the public authorities, see Gilliams (2005) DRAFT, page 28.
279 The horizontal agreement did not fall within a  block exemption, nor had it been notified to the Commission 
(Whish (2003), page 123), a  condition for considering article 81(3) at that time, see above. Gilliams (2005) 
DRAFT, page 25, says that the agreements were notified to the Commission, but only after the commencement o f  
the disciplinary proceedings, see also Cooke (1995) DRAFT, page 10.
280 In W outers, the ECJ may be refining the CFI's judgment in Case T-144/99 Institute o f  Professional 
R epresentatives before the European P atent O ffice v. Com m ission [2001], paragraphs 77-79 and 90-100.
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The mechanism that the ECJ follows when considering these national interests is important. It 
balances these national interests against the restriction on competition,281 using what seems to be 
a proportionality test, see Chapter Three. This should be compared with the Albany Case, 
where, as we saw above, the ECJ solved the conflict through exclusion.282
Therefore, in certain cases, one can balance non-competition objectives283 against a restriction 
of competition and conclude that the former outweigh the latter, with the consequence that there 
is no infringement o f  article 81 (1) of the Treaty.284
3.2.2 B(dancing (compromise) within article 81(3) o f the Treaty
The second paragraph that the Community Courts have used to balance within article 81 is 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. The relevant part of article 81(3) says that agreements which infringe 
article 81(1) may be exempted if  they contribute:
"...to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress..."
We saw above that article 81 incorporates more of the article 3 activities and policies than those 
of article 3(l)(g). But does it include all, or only some of them? If  it were the intention of the 
Treaty's signatories that article 81(3) be used to balance all objectives, article 81(3) might have 
been more clearly written. It does not seem to allow for many objectives to be taken into 
account, see above. That said, article 81(3) has not been altered since 1957, when the Treaty's 
aims and objectives were narrower than they are today.285 As the relevant objectives have 
broadened, the Community Courts have interpreted article 81(3) of the Treaty more widely. 
They have done this in two ways. First, by interpreting article 81(3)'s text expansively. 
Secondly, by moving away from the literal wording altogether and conducting a general public 
policy test there.
281 Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 17; Subiotto and Snelders (2003k page 12; Whish (2003), page 121 and 127 and 
Goyder (2003), pages 94 and 95, agree that the ECJ conducts a balancing test here. Vosscstein (2002), page 859, 
agrees that this may be the case. Alternatively, he suggests that because the rule improved the quality o f  legal 
services, it enhanced "...consumer choice and thus [was] pro-competitive." In fact, agreements to improve the 
quality o f  services in this way often reduce consumer choice, for better or for worse, see, Fletcher (2005) DRAFT, 
paragraphs 12-15 and Scarpa (2001), section C. Monti (2002), pages 1087 and 1088 criticises this part of Vossestein 
(2002), on other grounds.
282 See also, Vossestein (2002), page 856. Monti (2002), pages 1086-1090, may disagree. He says that W outers is an 
example o f "national interests excluding the application of article 81 altogether". This is the language of exclusion. 
That said, Monti is unclear on this point. He also refers to a balance, page 1086, and to the free movement 
provisions' mandatory requirements, which comprise a balancing test, see above.
283 See, Case T-l 12/98 M étropole télévision and O thers v. Commission [2001], paragraphs 72-78, which only says 
that there should be no balancing o f  pro-com petitive aspects in article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Although, the W outers 
Case, appears to look at pro-competitive aspects within article 81(1), paragraphs 86-94. On this point, also see, 
Subiotto and Snelders (2003), page 11 and Vossestein (2002), pages 856-859 and Chapter Six.
284 Whish (2003), page 121 and Forrester and Maclennan (2003), pages 547-551.
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First, the Community Courts and the Advocate-Generals interpret article 81(3)'s first condition 
widely. For example, in the Metro I  Case, where the legality o f SABA's selective distribution 
system for electronic equipment such as radios, televisions and tape recorders was at issue, the 
ECJ said, paragraph 43:
"...the establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes a stabilising 
factor with regard to the provision of employment which, since it improves the general 
conditions of production, especially when market conditions are unfavourable, comes 
within the framework of the objectives to which reference may285 86 be had pursuant to Article 
85(3) [now article 81(3)]."2'7
It is a wide interpretation o f article 81(3) of the Treaty that exempts agreements under this head, 
in part, because they help stabilise employment.288 By inserting the word .general... " the ECJ
is more easily able to interpret "...conditions of production..." widely. The ECJ added that this 
agreement, which allows for the establishment o f supply forecasts for a reasonable period, 
constitutes a stabilising factor with regard to the provision o f  employment "...especially when 
market conditions are unfavourable..." By focusing on the benefits when market conditions are 
unfavourable the ECJ's argument seems even more acceptable. But it does not necessarily make 
sense to focus upon the "bad times". The Commission's exemption ran for four and a half years. 
It would be better to look at the agreement’s overall impact on employment over this longer 
timeframe. However, the effect o f adding this phrase is to allow the ECJ to interpret article 
81(3) o f the Treaty yet more widely.289 As Advocate-General Jacobs reminds us:290
"Both the Court and the Commission have on occasions recognised the possibility of taking 
account of social grounds.. .in particular by interpreting the conditions of article 85(3) [now 
article 81(3)] broadly..."
All four categories in article 81(3)'s first provision can be interpreted widely.291 We have seen 
an interpretation of improving the production o f goods, what about their distribution? Do
285 See, Wesseling (1997), pages 38-47, and the references made there.
286 Since this case was decided, article 127 (employment policy-linking clause) has been introduced. Does this change 
’may’ to ’shall? If  so, this conflicts with the discretion to apply article 81(3) o f the Treaty, see Chapter Seven.
287 The ECJ refers to this point favourably in Joined Cases 209/78, etc., Heintz van Landewyck Sari v. Commission 
[1980], paragraphs 176 and 182. Also see, Case 42/84 Remia v. Commission [1985], the opinion of Advocate- 
General Lenz, pages 2564 and 2565.
288 Note also that this the ECJ is not merely using article 81 for the purposes o f ’negative integration’. A  true, creative, 
’policy’ head is at work here. For a discussion on ’negative integration’ see, Craig and de Burca (1998), page 17 and 
chapter 14.
289 Also see, Bouterse (1994), Chapter 6, in relation to monetary policy and improving the production o f goods.
290 The Albany Case, paragraph 193.
291 Goyder (2003), pages 59,119 and 120 says the four article 81(3) heads are .broad statements o f principle to be 
read in the context of the remainder o f article 81 and the other Treaty provisions..." See also, Wesseling (2000), 
pages 2 0 ,3 9  and 109-111; Vogelaar (1994), page 543; Bouterse (1994), pages 26-28; Art (1994), pages 25 and 26 
and de Roux and Voillemot (1976), page 96.
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agreements to promote the dissemination of television programmes fall within this head?292 If 
so, programmes relating to the different Community cultures might benefit from an exemption, 
remember article 151(4) of the Treaty? What of improving technical progress? Some suggest 
that this expression allows for the exemption of agreements that improve our ability to protect 
the environment, such as agreements to make cleaner cars, remember article 6 of the Treaty.293 
Research and development agreements contribute to technical and economic progress.294
These judgments, widening article 81(3)’s wording, are important. It cannot be argued that these 
citations are unconsidered statements by the courts.295 True, the ECJ relied on two other factors 
(as well as employment) in Metro 1 to support the Commission's conclusion that the conditions 
of production were improved. Nevertheless, the employment discussion was central to the 
judgment and cannot merely be described as obiter,296 The ECJ*s later statement in support of its 
Metro /  judgment in Van Landewyck was also considered, although, strictly speaking, it was 
obiter}*7 Finally, in Matra, although the CFI does not discuss social criteria,298 the core o f its 
decision is based upon industrial policy arguments, paragraphs 109 and 110.
So the Community Courts interpret these heads generously. Might they allow new heads of 
exemption too, including those o f the policy-linking clauses? Advocate-General Darmon opined 
that article 81(3) exhaustively lays down the objectives which justify exemption.299 Despite this, 
the Community Courts seem willing to extend these four heads. Sometimes this has been 
express. In one line of caselaw300 the Community Courts attempted to include the article 30 
heads of exemption within article 81(3) of the Treaty, particularly in relation to intellectual 
property rights. Advocate-General Reischl, opined that the Sirena Case held:
292 Services are included within the term 'goods', Case 45/85 Verbandder Sachversicherer v. Com m ission [1987J, 
paragraph 58.
293 See, Jans (2000), page 278 and Jacobs (1993/2), pages 53-56.
294 See, for example, Commission Regulation, Research and development agreem ents, recital 10 and the Nungesser 
Case, paragraphs 55-57. R&D is encouraged in articles 163-173 o f the Treaty. Bouterse (1994), pages 27 and 28, 
even argues that economic progress has been used to achieve public health goals.
295 For a contrary view see Gyselen (2002a), page 185. He refers to Commission decisions, Synthetic F ibres and 
FordV Volkswagen, discussed below, and the M atra Case, in support, but does not explain how they support him.
296 The obiter dictum/ ratio decidendi distinction seems to have been accepted in Community law, see Case T- 
224/2000 Archer D aniels Midland and Other v. Commission [2003], paragraph 200.
297 This is because the case was ultimately decided on whether competition was eliminated. Thai said, the ECJ 
discussed including social considerations within article 81(3) over the course o f five paragraphs.
298 This was for procedural reasons, the CFI said the Commission had not based its decision on social reasons, 
paragraph 107; not because social reasons are irrelevant in article 81(3) of the Treaty.
299 Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v. Com m ission [1987], page 430. See also, Kjolbye (2004), pages 570 
and 571.
300 Case 40/70 Sirena v. Eda [1971], paragraph 5 and Case T-69/89 Radio T elefis Eireann v. Com m ission [1991], 
paragraphs 66-71. See also, Case 402/85 G. B asset v. Société des auteurs [1987], paragraphs 18 and 19.
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"...even in competition law the principles of article 36 [now article 30] were applicable as 
the emanation of a general legal doctrine. That view can only be understood to mean that 
the rules of competition law must yield to the extent to which this is necessary in the 
interests of safeguarding the rights under article 36...”'>01
The accepted position today is the one proffered by the ECJ in the Consien and Grundig Casey 
page 345, where it argued that the article 30 exemptions did not apply to article 81, but implied 
that the existence of intellectual property rights, as opposed to their exercise, did not fall within 
article 81 at all, because o f article 295 of the Treaty.
While the Sir ends line o f caselaw is not particularly convincing, the Community Courts have 
accepted the extension o f these four heads of exemption. This can be seen in areas such as 
economic efficiency, increasing employment (articles 125-130 of the Treaty, especially article 
127(2)), public safety (article 152 of the Treaty, especially article 152(1)), consumer protection 
(article 153 of the Treaty, especially article 153(2)), industrial policy, fair-trading, and the 
ECHR.301 02
The Community Courts have normally gone out o f their way not to explicitly widen the 
'interpretation' of these four heads more generally. However, the CFI has explicitly done so as 
well:
"...in the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption 
under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."303
This is very wide. It would certainly incorporate the objectives pursued by the policy-linking 
clauses into the article 81(3) test. It is probably even wider than that. Other objectives that have
301 Case 262/81 Coditel v. Ciné-Vog F ilm s [1982], pages 3406 and 3407. If Advocate-General Reischl is correct then 
one might ask whether the exemptions in, for example, article 55 o f the Treaty might also be relevant.
302 See, for example, economic efficiency, Case 48/69 Im perial Chem ical Industries v. Com m ission [1972], 
paragraph 115, which emphasises both productive and static efficiencies; employment, Case 42/84 Remia v. 
C om m ission [1985], paragraph 42; public safety, Joined Cases T -213/95, etc., SC K  and F N K  v. Com m ission  
[1997], the CFI appears to be alluding to this, see paragraphs 3 and 194; consumer protection, see the arguments 
of the Plaintiff Case 249/85 A lbako M argarinefabrik v. Bundesanstalt fu r  landw irtschaftliche M arktordnung  
[1987], page 2348 and Case C-376/92 M etro SB-G roßm ärkte v. C artier [1994], see the opinion of Advocate- 
General Tesauro, paragraph 33, "...considerations relating to consum er protection., .should not be unconnected with 
the interpretation of article 85 [now article 81] of the Treaty."; industrial policy, the M atra Case, paragraph 109; 
fair trading, Case 249/85 A lbako M argarinefabrik v. B undesanstalt fü r  landwirtschaftliche M arktordnung [1987] 
ECR 2345, paragraph 16 and page 2348 (although see Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 47) and 
ECHR, the VBVB/VBBB C ase, paragraph 34.
303 Joined Cases T-528/93, etc., M étropole Télévision v. C om m ission [1996], paragraph 118. Also, see the W outers 
Case, Opinion of A dvocate-G eneral Léger, paragraphs 107 and  113; Joined Cases 46/87, etc., H oechst v. 
Com m ission [1989], paragraph 25; Case 85/87 Dow B enelux N V  v. Com m ission [1989], paragraph 36; Joined Cases 
97 to 99/87 Dow Chem ical Ibérica SA  a nd  Others v. Commission [1989], paragraph 22, articles 3(1 )(g), 81 and 82 
are there "...to  prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest..." and B&C (2001), 
paragraph 3-044. See also, Case 14/68 W alt Wilhelm and O thers v. Bundeskartellam t [1969], paragraph 5 and Evans 
(1985), page 101.
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already been considered or may be ripe for inclusion include establishment of undertakings, 
freedom of intra-Community trade; protecting intellectual property rights; equality of 
opportunity, fair-trading and legitimate self-protection, regional policy (see articles 158-162 of 
the Treaty, especially article 159) and culture (see article 151 of the Treaty, especially article 
isiw).301
3.3 Conclusion of Section 3
The Treaty emphasises compromise over exclusion. Values promoted in the policy-linking 
clauses should be incorporated into (balanced within) other policy areas. However, it is not 
certain whether all objectives must be balanced in every decision taken under the Treaty. The 
Treaty does not specifically state whether there is room for compromise within article 81. That 
provision's wording does not seem wide enough for all relevant values to be considered within 
it. However, the emphasis on balancing competition against other objectives was reinforced by 
the Maastricht Treaty, which changed one of article 2*s goals from "...a harmonious 
development o f economic activities..." to "...a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities..."304 05
As demanded by article 220, the Community Courts have filled in some o f the Treaty's gaps. 
They are generally reticent to allow decisions to be taken while relevant values are ignored. This 
is also true in competition policy. The Community Courts are slow to exclude competition. 
Furthermore, while competitiveness and competition are important Treaty objectives, they do 
not trump other values, but must be balanced against them.
304 See, for example, establishment of undertakings, Case T-30/89 H ilti v. Commission [1991], paragraph 100, 
although this was an article 82 case the ECJ has said that articles 81, 82 and the ECMR pursue the same general 
objectives, Case T-22/97 Kesko v. Commission [1999], paragraph 106; freedom of intra-Community trade, Joined 
Cases 100-103/80 SA Musique D iffusion v. Commission [1983], paragraph 107; protecting intellectual property 
rights, Case 395/87 M inistère public v. Tournier [1989], paragraph 31; fair competition, Case 32/65 Italy v. 
Council and Com m ission [1966], page 405, see also Anderman (1998), pages 19-21; equality of opportunity, Case 
C-18/88 Régie des télégraphes v. G B-Inno-BM  [1991], paragraph 25, this was an article 82 case but, as seen above, 
articles 81 and 82 have been held to pursue the same objectives; fair trading, Case 249/85 A lbako M argarinefabrik 
v. Bundesanstait fu r  landwirtschaftliche M arkiordm m g [1987], paragraph 16 and page 2348; legitimate self­
protection, Joined Cases 100-103/80 SA M usique D iffusion v. Commission [1983], paragraphs 89-90, not allowed 
in this case as the breach o f article 81 was not the only means of ensuring the undertaking's survival. At page 1946, 
Advocate-General Slynn implied that the act from which the undertaking w as defending itself should also not have 
been lawful if this defence is to be allowed; although the ECJ did not demand this in an action under article 60(2)(b) 
of the ECSC Treaty, Case 16/61 Acciaierie F erriere v. High Authority [1962], at page 303; regional policy, Case T- 
96/92 Com ité C entral d ’Entreprise v. Com m ission [1995] and Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic 
and O thers v. Com m ission [1998]. As noted above, the ECMR. pursues similar objectives to articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty; monetary policy, Bouterse (1994), Chapter 6; and culture, Joined Cases 209/78, etc., H eintz van 
Landewyck v. Com m ission [1980], paragraph 135.
305 Furthermore, article 1-3(2) of the European Convention now reads: "The Union shall work for the sustainable 
development o f Europe based on balanced economic growth..." Article II1-1 also reads "The Union shall ensure 
consistency between the different policies and activities referred to in this Part, taking all o f the Union's objectives 
into account..." Articles III-4 and III-5 preserve specific policy-linking clauses too.
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In order to allow public policy balancing within article 81, the Community Courts have 
construed that provision against its natural meaning. Instead o f focusing on article 81's wording, 
they have employed the teleological approach, as they do throughout the Treaty. The 
Community Courts have done this in relation to both article 81(1) and (3). Many values can now 
be balanced within article 81, including those that the policy-linking clauses embrace. These 
values do not form a closed list, although certain limits are discussed in Chapter Seven.
From the Community perspective, the Community Courts are right to open up article 81 of the 
Treaty in this way. The Treaty obliged them to choose between exclusion and compromise. The 
Community Courts have been able to imply many objectives into article 81. This allows for the 
balancing o f other objectives, which deals with the fundamental conflicts problem in a way that 
takes adequate account of the policy-linking clauses, the relative importance o f  competition and 
the structure and objectives o f the Treaty as a whole. It also allows the decision-maker to be 
clearer, it need not twist its reasoning into the straight-jacket of article 81's concrete wording, 
particularly important in a multi-lingual community. This encourages open and transparent 
decisions.
Black letter lawyers will not agree.306 They will argue that the Community Courts are wrong to 
re-interpret the Treaty in this way, that they have crossed the line between interpretation and 
legislation.307 Such changes should be made by way o f  Treaty amendment.308 That may be so, 
but this is a pragmatic solution and the Member States have had adequate opportunity to amend 
the Treaty if they found the Community Courts’ interpretative approach unacceptable. Quite the 
contrary, the Council, made up of the Treaty's signatories, has constantly reaffirmed the need to 
take account of other policy objectives within article 81, see above.309
As we saw in the last chapter, economists are unlikely to agree with me either. Many believe 
that article 81 should only have economic efficiency as an objective and that all other policy 
objectives, to the extent that they should be pursued at all, should be attained using the optimal 
instrument. This will rarely be competition policy. But the Treaty creates conflicts and these 
cannot be ignored. Economists would seldom agree that competition policy should be
3<>6 See, for example, the implications of Fox (1998), pages 478 and 479.
307 For a general critique of the Community Courts' adoption of the teleological approach, see, Craig and de Burca 
(1998), pages 86-95, and the references there.
304 Note the more general concern o f the Bundeskartellamt in this regard, in Wilks (1996), page 157.
309 The most 'anti-competitive' block exemption ever is Council Regulation, Shipping Cartels, see Townley (2004). 
Also see the discussion on fixed book price agreements, above. The principle has also been accepted by other 
Community bodies, see, for example, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on the 
Commission's RC P 1994, respectively paragraph 25 and paragraph 3.3.; Economic and Social Committee, Opinion 
on the Tw enty-fifth Report on C om petition, in Commission, RCP 1996, page 381, paragraph 2.5 and European 
Parliament, R esolution on the X X V Ith report by the Commission on com petition policy -  1996, in Commission, RCP 
1997, page 368, point 2.
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compromised or excluded and so they must argue that, to the extent that they conflict with it, 
competition must exclude the other objectives. If these other objectives cannot be (and are not) 
pursued by some other instrument, see Chapter One for why this might not be possible, they 
will not be taken into account at all. And yet that would be to ignore the Treaty's concrete 
wording, and, even worse, its underlying principles. Chapter Seven argues that article 81 can be 
interpreted so as to better accommodate both the views expressed in this chapter and those in 
Chapter One. Nevertheless, distorting competition may sometimes be the only possible solution, 
in law or in fact.
This chapters’ introduction asked whether the influence o f political considerations on 
competition was warranted? Chapter One discussed this from a theoretical perspective and 
concluded that this would sometimes (though rarely) be the case. This chapter shows that, when 
the question is viewed within the Treaty context, public policy’s influence on article 81 is 
warranted.310
4. THE COMMISSION
In this part, we focus on the second issue raised in the Introduction. In recent policy statements 
the Commission has said that the competition rules should not be set aside because of 'non­
competition' (political) considerations. This is contrary to the structure of the Treaty, contrary to 
the position adopted by the Community Courts and involves a fundamental re-organisation of 
the hierarchy of Treaty objectives, as analysed above.
The Commission, principally DG Competition, is an important actor in relation to article 81.311 
It guides the development of Community competition policy and has been given a lot of 
discretion for this purpose, see below and Chapter Seven.
The rest of this chapter examines: (i) the changing position adopted by the Commission in its 
policy statements; and (ii) whether the views that the Commission expresses in its policy 
statements are reflected in its decisions. What the Commission says in its decisions is 
particularly significant because it is these that bind the Member States' courts and competition 
authorities.312
Initially, the spotlight is thrown on 1993, the first complete year o f the internal market and the 
year of the Treaty o f Maastricht, where most of the policy-linking clauses were adopted. The 
Commission's policy statements and decisions in 1993 are compared with those of 2000/2001,
310 The limits of this are discussed in Chapter Four and Part C. In a Community context, these limits are currently 
wider than Chapter One (theory) might advocate. Chapter Seven tries to reconcile these positions.
3.1 Wilks (1996), page 164 and Gerber (1994), page 132-135,137, 140 and 143-147.
3.2 Regulation 1/2003, recital 22 and article 16.
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when Commission notices described 'major developments’ in its analysis of vertical and 
horizontal restraints under article 81,313
4.1 1993
In 1993, the Commission dedicated a whole chapter o f its Report on Competition Policy (Part 
One, Chapter IV) to the incorporation o f other Community policies into competition policy. At 
paragraph 149 the Commission said:
"Competition policy is an instrument which complements the Community's other policies.
This chapter of the Report therefore looks at the role which competition policy can play in 
the implementation of such other policies."
The Commission emphasised the fact that competition policy has something to give to 
environmental policy, paragraph 163. This is because o f the benefit of introducing into the price 
mechanism the polluter pays principle, internalising externalities, paragraphs 164 and 165. 
Indeed, in SEC(92) 1986 the Commission said that, whenever possible, integration of 
competitiveness and the environment requires a strategy that "...should be built around 
solutions based on the competitive functioning of markets."
But the Commission added that environmental policy also affects competition policy, paragraph 
171. At paragraph 170 it says:
"...the Commission will examine carefully all agreements between companies to see if they 
are indispensable to attain the environmental objectives...The Commission in its analysis of 
individual cases will have to weigh the restrictions of competition in the agreement against 
the environmental objectives that the agreement will help attain, in order to determine 
whether, under this proportionality analysis, it can approve the agreement."
The same duality is noted in respect o f  cultural policy, paragraphs 175-177. The Commission 
says that it can help to preserve plurality in the media by "...ensuring that competition between 
firms is not distorted and that some firms do not try to oust others through anti-competitive 
practices", paragraph 176. In paragraph 177 it reconciles the concerns of cultural policy with 
the application o f the competition rules in relation to resale price maintenance systems for 
books. The Commission says that while it could not agree to prices, pricing methods or 
conditions of sale being established collectively by all publishers, it could countenance a system 
where these mechanisms were individual and purely vertical.314
m  Rivas and Stroud (2001), pages 935 and 942.
3,4 The same applies in relation to competition policy and completion o f  the internal market, including social and 
economic cohesion. The Commission says that firms must not be allowed to reconstruct the barriers between 
Member States using territorial protection. The Commission tries to equate preventing barriers to intra-Union trade 
with economic efficiency, paragraph 154; also note, COM(93) 632, pages 28-31. Although the Commission 
implicitly, acknowledges that there is a balance between allowing some territorial protection, which might be 
welfare enhancing and enforcing interpenetration o f  markets, see Motta (2004), Chapters 1 and 6.
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The Commission clearly states that competition policy plays a role in the Community's other 
policies. This occurs in two ways. First, the Commission uses the market mechanism to help 
achieve the other objectives, see Chapter Five. Secondly, the Commission will sometimes 
distort competition to achieve other ends. Chapters Three and Four illustrate this mechanism in 
more detail.315 These statements are in line with the framework provided by the Treaty and the 
Community Courts, discussed above. They also dovetail with the Commission's approach in 
other policy areas.316 Although it is dangerous to talk of patterns in such a small sample, the 
same attitude is also prevalent in the decisions taken by the Commission in 1993.
In the OJ 1993, 16 article 81 decisions were reported.317 Some were argued, and based, on 
economic criteria;318 others focused on restrictions of economic freedom.319 One decision 
considered economic criteria and the fact that interpenetration o f the national markets was 
prevented through absolute territorial protection.320 In four decisions321 the Commission 
explicitly invoked non-economic objectives in its article 81(3) analysis. In three of these, Ford/ 
Volkswagen, VIK-GVSt and EBU/Eurovision System, non-economic objectives may have been 
decisive.
Once again, we see the same attitude in relation to industrial policy "The aim o f  competition policy is to improve 
the international competitiveness of Community industry." Commission, Framework for State Aids fo r R&D, 
paragraph 1.4, including the encouragement of SMEs and R&D, paragraphs 155-161. Competition aids them, but 
can also be restricted in order to help them if necessary.
3,5 The Commission had already pointed to links between competition and other Community policies before 1993, 
see, Commission, RCP 1976, pages 9 and 10; Commission, RCP 1979, page 11; Commission, RC P1982, pages 9, 
10 and 12-15 and Commission, RCP 1990, pages 16 and 17. Sometimes the Commission went further, signalling 
that it was prepared to restrict competition in order to achieve other policy objectives, see, Agence Europe, 10 
November 1978; Commission, RCP 1980, pages 9-11; Commission, RCP 1982, pages 12-15; Commission, RCP 
1988, page 16; Commission, RCP 1991, pages 11, 12 and 39-48; Commission, General Report 1992, pages 74 and 
75 and Commission, RCP 1992, pages 13 and 47-58. While the Commission emphasised that competition was an 
important objective in its own right (Commission, RCP 1991, point 42) this did not mean that competition policy 
could be "...pursued in isolation, as an end in itself, without reference to the legal, economic, political and social 
context", Commission, RCP 1992, page 13. This point is also discussed by Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat 
(1998), pages 839 and 840; Bouterse (1994), pages 34-36,62-66 and 77 and Hornsby (1987).
316 See, for example, Taking the environment into account in other policies, Commission, General Report 1990, 
pages 214 and 215; Commission, General Report 1991, pages 198 and 199; Commission, General Report 1992, 
pages 4, 5 and 199 and Commission, General Report 1993, pages 1-5,166 and 167. The Commission believed that 
the policy-linking clauses demanded the balancing of, for example, environmental protection, within other policies, 
see, Commission, General Report 1991, pages 198 and 199.
317 The number cited here (16) does not marry with the figure quoted in the Annex (5). This is because, the Annex 
discusses the decisions taken in a particular year. The figure quoted here (16) relates to those decisions that were 
published in the Official Journal in 1993, regardless o f when they were taken.
3,8 For example, Commission decisions, Langnese-lglo and SchôUer Lebensmittel.
319 For example, Commission decision, CNSD, this was an article 81(1) case.
320 Commission decision, Zero/ Montedison, this was an article 81(1) case.
321 Commission decisions, Ford/ Volkswagen; VIK-GVSt, EBU/Eurovision System and Fiat/Hitachi.
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In its Ford/ Volkswagen decision, the Commission considers a ’foundation agreement' between 
two motor vehicle manufacturers, Ford and Volkswagen, setting up a joint venture company for 
the development and production o f a multi-purpose vehicle (MPV) in Portugal. The 
Commission found a restriction on competition but gave an individual exemption, paragraphs 
24-41. Why? The Commission placed a lot of weight on the industrial policy aspects noting 
"...the establishment of a new and most modem manufacturing plant using the latest production 
technology...", paragraph 25, as well as an advanced MPV, paragraph 26. Rationalisation of 
product development and manufacturing is mentioned, paragraph 25, but, on pure competition 
grounds, it is very doubtful that this joint venture should have been cleared.322 The emphasis is 
essentially on technical progress. The environmental improvements in the product as well as its 
prospective low emissions and fuel consumption are also given weight in this regard, paragraph 
26.
The Commission also notes, paragraph 36, in relation to the indispensability o f restrictions, that 
the project is the largest ever single foreign investment in Portugal, leading to the creation of 
some 15,000 jobs. This, says the Commission, helps to promote the harmonious development of 
the Community through reduced regional disparities as well as furthering market integration. 
The Commission ends:
"This would not be enough to make an exemption possible unless the conditions of article 
85(3) [now article 81(1)] were fulfilled, but it is an element which the Commission has 
taken into account."
The language is unhelpful. Either the Commission relied on this issue, or it did not.323 It seemed 
confident about incorporating the other Community policy objectives, it might have been more 
confident in relying on this, especially in the light of the Remia Case.324 Was it because 
Portugal’s gain came about, at least in part, at the expense of Germany? The Commission could 
have spelt out the fact that it was European employment and social cohesion that was important. 
This would have been considered veiy provocative.
Commission decision, VIK-GVSt,325 involved a set o f agreements where the German electricity 
generating utilities and industrial producers of electricity for in-house consumption undertook to 
purchase a specific amount o f German coal up to 1995 for the purposes of generating electricity. 
The agreements were part of an initiative to support the German coal-mining industry and were
m  Jones and Sufrin (2001), page 194 and Amato (1997), pages 58-62, imply the same thing.
323 We have seen that on appeal, the CFI said the Commission did not rely on employment criteria. Not everyone 
agrees, for example, Hildebrand (2002), page 240, says "The creation o f  jobs in a poorly developed area was 
considered to be a  decisive criterion to qualify for exemption." Furthermore, the CFl's view does not lie well with 
the Commission's submissions in that case, see the conclusion to this chapter.
324 In the appeal to the CFI the Commission gave this aspect more weight, see the Matra Case, below.
32i See also, Houttuin (1994), pages 63-65.
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actively supported by the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs. The whole set of agreements 
was related to simultaneous State aid negotiations. Specifically, two agreements were 
considered. One between the General Association of the Coal-mining Industry (GVSt) and the 
Association of the German Public Electricity Supply Industry (VDEW), the other between 
GVSt and the Association of Industrial Producers of Electricity (VIK). The Commission found 
that the agreements restricted competition, paragraph 24, but granted an exemption.
The Commission found that article 81(3) was fulfilled. Electricity cannot easily be stored. So, 
electricity production and demand must be in constant equilibrium. Therefore, safeguarding the 
procurement of primary energy sources is particularly important. The agreements make energy 
sources available in the form o f coal and thus "... promote security of energy supply in the 
Federal Republic o f Germany.", paragraph 31. In fact what was at stake was not that so much, 
but the security of energy supply in Germany o f electricityfrom German coal.
The third relevant matter is Commission decision, EBU/ Eurovision System. This related to the 
company statutes o f the European Broadcasting Union, an association of radio and television 
organisations, other rules governing the acquisition of television rights to sporting events, the 
exchange of sports programmes within the framework of Eurovision and contractual access to 
such programmes for third parties. In order to be a member of the EBU an undertaking must be 
within the European broadcasting area, provide a service of national importance; be at least 
trying to cover the whole of their national territory and must provide a mix of programmes, 
including a substantial proportion under their own editorial control. The EBU has 67 active 
members and 54 associate members (those not in the European broadcasting area), from 47 
countries.
The Eurovision System (ES) is a network for the exchange of television programmes, including 
sport programmes, which also operates a system of joint acquisition of television rights to 
international sporting events. AH interested members that want these rights to international 
sporting events then jointly acquire them and share the fee. Members cannot bid for rights 
against the ES. If two members from the same country want the rights they have to split them 
amongst themselves. Programmes made in the Eurovision area are produced by a member in the 
country concerned and are then made available to all members via the Eurovision programme 
exchange system. This is done free, on the understanding that it will be reciprocal. If the 
programme is made outside the Eurovision area, sometimes they pay a fee, shared between 
those that broadcast it, although sometimes reciprocity exists there too. There is also some 
administrative and technical co-ordination provided by the EBU's permanent staff. The EBU 
have agreed to grant access to Eurovision sports programmes, on conditions to be freely 
negotiated, but not less favourable than agreed with the Commission, paragraphs 36-40.
- 8 3 -
The Commission found restrictions on competition between the EBU members as sometimes 
countries have more than one member and so they would normally compete for rights, also 
some companies broadcast in other countries too so there would be competition there. 
Competition is essentially eliminated here, paragraph 49. There was also a distortion of 
competition regarding non-members as they cannot participate in the EBU savings, paragraph 
50, allowing EBU members to strengthen their market position, paragraph 51.
In relation to article 81(3) the Commission found a number o f benefits and granted an 
exemption. Regarding the joint acquisition and sharing o f the rights these reduce transaction 
costs and ensure that negotiations are carried out in the most competent manner (using local 
experts etc.), this benefits smaller members, paragraph 59. It also encourages programme co­
ordination at the national level, as members negotiate to share the events, which often means 
more complete coverage, paragraph 60. At the international level it facilitates cross-border 
broadcasting, as members generally get the rights not just in their country, contributing to the 
development of a single European broadcasting market, paragraph 61. Participation in a 
transnational dedicated sports channel (a joint venture between a consortium from EBU and 
News International/ Sky) also enables EBU members to provide a broader range o f sports 
programmes (including minority sports), giving viewers a broader choice, but also bringing 
money to the organisers of minority sports and contributes to the development o f a single 
European broadcast market, paragraph 62. In relation to the exchange of the television signal the 
Commission said that it resulted in considerable rationalisation and cost savings, helping 
smaller broadcasters especially. It also encourages dissemination because if  an event is in a 
country and the local broadcaster is not interested, e.g. no national champion involved, it still 
sends the signal to others, leading to more sports programmes, especially minority ones, 
paragraph 63. The administrative and technical co-ordination is also very helpful, paragraph 64. 
It also provides for a reliable common network, which also leads to rationalisation etc., 
paragraph 65. The access rights for non members reduces the restriction on competition as well 
as providing a one stop shop and increasing demand for second transmissions o f events, 
paragraphs 66 and 67.326
Economic considerations were important in this decision. However, this comes through most at 
the end of the decision. The Commission emphasises arguments relating to SMEs, cultural 
exchanges and the aiding of the cross-border broadcasting in this process. Is this because these 
factors were more important?
326 See also, Forrester (1998), page 376.
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Both Commission practice and policy seem327 in line with the Treaty, the Community Courts* 
caselaw under article 81 and the Commission's policy statements. The Commission considers 
many other objectives in its analysis, primarily under article 81(3) of the Treaty. This is often 
done by balancing objectives outside o f the market mechanism, i.e. essentially by reducing 
competition.
In my view, there are two problems with the decisions. First, the Commission could be clearer 
about the weight o f factors in the balance and the mechanism it uses for taking these issues into 
account and balancing them, Sections B and C discuss this issue. Secondly, the Commission 
could provide more help on which types of objective are relevant, for example, is it only Treaty 
objectives or should Member State values be considered too, see Chapters Four and Seven?
4.2 2000
The Commission's policy statements reaffirmed the need to balance competition objectives with 
other values (within article 81) after 1993 too.328 That said, by 1997 the Commission’s policy 
statements were somewhat ambiguous. The Commission announced its intention to modernise 
Community competition law.329 It hailed its Communication on vertical restraints as an example 
of its innovative stance. This communication, said the Commission:330
"...breaks with a method which was differentiated by industry and category of agreement, 
and has become extremely complex. It is based on the economic analysis of the effects of 
vertical restraints; exemption is to depend on the market power of the firms involved."
What does the fact that the basis is now economic analysis mean? It may indicate that, the only 
relevant issue when analysing vertical restraints, and maybe even article 81 as a whole, is their 
effect on economic factors? Let's call this the 'pure economic approach'.331 On the other hand, it
327 1 cannot say stronger than 'seem'. The Commission votes on these competition decisions as a college, this is a 
closed political process. It might be that, in order to guarantee the vote o f the Commissioner for research and 
innovation, certain extraneous words are added to the decision, highlighting the importance o f  innovation, as in 
F ord/ Volkswagen. This might be so, even if the decision was taken solely on efficiency grounds. This is probably 
not what happened in the three decisions discussed here, as the heart o f the exemption logic does not seem to be 
efficiency orientated. Nevertheless, if  this process takes/ took place, it shows that DG Competition have not 'won' 
the argument that article 81 decisions should ignore non-economic objectives.
328 See, Commission, RCP 1994, pages 19-21 and 23-26; Commission, RCP 1995, pages 40 and 41; Commission, 
R C P 1996, pages 7, 8, 17, 18 and 32-34, at page 9 Commissioner van Miert called for "...a balanced competition 
policy which pays due regard both to the pressing need for economic efficiency and to the general interest"
329 See the references in Commission, RC P 1998, pages 20-22, for example.
330 Commission, RCP 1998, page 21.
331 Ehlermann (2000a), page 549, offers a refinement of this position. He says "It would probably be an exaggeration 
to assume that, according to the Commission, non-economic considerations are to be totally excluded from the 
balancing test required by article 81(3). Such an interpretation would hardly be compatible with the Treaty, the 
Court of Justice's caselaw, and the Commission's own practice. However, the passage quoted [Commission, White 
Paper orr M odernisation, paragraph 57, see this chapter's Introduction] is a clear indication that non-competition- 
orientated political considerations should not determine the assessment under article 81(3). I fully subscribe to this
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could refer to the fact that the old system of analysis and block exemptions was very rule-based. 
The old system differentiated between the category o f  agreement that was involved, the number 
of parties, etc.332 Perhaps the Commission means that it will move towards economic analysis, 
as opposed to the straight-jacket segmented approach o f old, while maintaining the relevance o f 
other objectives within article 81 ? Let's call this the 'mixed economic approach'.
Sometimes the Commission's policy statements only infer a  mixed economic approach.333 This 
would still be an important shift, as the Commission's economic analysis has often been 
criticised.334 The Commission has emphasised the fact that recent judgments of the Community 
courts are forcing it to apply better economic reasoning in its decisions.335 It is attempting to 
respond to this challenge.336 This is welcome. Such a change would also bring Community 
competition law more into line with other jurisdictions' competition policy. This is important for 
undertakings in an ever-shrinking world, see Chapter Six. A mixed economic approach would 
not affect the analysis in this thesis, except insofar as it is considered in Chapter Six.
However, as we saw in the Introduction to this chapter, at times the Commission has gone 
further and advocated a pure economic approach. This is the implication in the last sentence of 
the previous citation, for example.337 A pure economic approach would be a major policy shift
approach." Monti (2002) adopts a similar position. That said, if political considerations can never set aside 
economic ones (determine the assessment), then their presence in article 81(3) is largely academic.
532 See, for example, Verouden (2003), pages 526 and 527 and the references made there; Bishop and Ridyard (2002), 
page 35; van der Woude (2002), page 41; Whish (2000), page 889 and Nazerali and Cowan (1999), page 159.
333 See Forrester and Maclerman (2001), pages 380 and 381. See, for example, COM(96) 721, paragraph 86; 
Commission, RCP 1998, pages 19 and 20; Commission, RC P 1999, pages 7 and 23; Commission, RCP 2000, 
paragraph 23; Mario Monti (2003a) and Mario Monti (2003), "In making this revision, we have shifted from a 
legalistic based approach to an interpretation o f the roles based on sound economic principles."
334 See, Verouden (2003), page 565 and references mentioned there; Whish (2003), pages 1 and 2; Hildebrand (2002), 
page 161; Whish (2000a), pages 889-892; Venit (1998), pages 567 and 569 and Neven, Papandropoulos and 
Seabright (1998).
333 Commission, H orizontal G uidelines, paragraph 6.
336 Commission, RCP 2000, Introduction by Commissioner Monti.
337 Also see, Mario Monti (2002), "We should all now ensure that these [competition laws] are effectively used to 
foster competition in the interest o f  consumers, and not as a disguised instrument of industrial or social policy or, 
even worse, as a protectionist instrument"; Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraphs 13, 21 and 33, T he 
aim of the Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare and o f ensuring an efficient allocation o f resources." Paragraph 42 appears to be broader in scope "Goals 
pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four 
conditions o f article 81(3)..." This was probably not the intention. Paragraph 43 reiterates: "The Community 
competition rules have as their objective the protection of competition on the market and cannot be detached from 
this objective." See also, Regulation 1/2003, recital 9; Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraphs 7 and 136 and 
Commission, H orizontal G uidelines, paragraphs 4, 32, 102, 103, 132, 151-153 and 169-170; although note 
paragraphs 192-194 and 197, in relation to environmental agreements. See also, Commission, RCP 1999, page 19; 
COM(98). 544, pages 4, 5 and 22, which only mentions consumer welfare and market integration objectives, 
"Competition roles are economic roles...", page 22 and Commission, Transfer o f Technology B lock Exemption 
Evaluation R eport, paragraph 31.
and would clash with both the Treaty framework and the Community Courts' interpretation of it, 
see above.34 *38 It would also conflict with the Commission's increasing acceptance (at least 
outside o f competition policy) o f the need to integrate the different policy areas.339
If the Commission has adopted a pure economic approach, I have not seen it justify this shift, 
although sometimes it implies that article 81 (and the other competition provisions) are merely 
there to implement article 3(1 )(g) o f the Treaty.340 There is rarely any discussion about the 
significance of the policy-linking clauses in such a reading o f the Treaty. However, when they 
are highlighted, the implication is that they do mean that other objectives should be considered 
within article 81.341 It is hard to reconcile these two positions. The fact that there is ambiguity 
on this fundamental issue is unacceptable. There is veiy little discussion about this in the 
literature. Many academics simply conflate the issues and assume that the Commission now 
advocates a pure economic approach, possibly tempered by the market integration objective.342 
The last Director-General of DG Competition reinforced this:
"Political, social or environmental aspects, in my view, have no place in the direct 
application of competition law."343
In conclusion, it is unclear whether a pure economic approach has now been adopted. The 
Commission may not even have made up its own mind on the issue. In the draft version of 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 38, after accepting that goals pursued by other
334 Wesseling (1999), pages 421-424. See also the citation above from Ehlermann (2000a), page 549.
339 See, for example, Commission, G eneral R eport 1997, page 3 (employment) and 5, 190 and 191 (environment); 
Commission, G eneral Report 1998, pages 2 (employment), 5,168 and 169 (environment), 87, 145-147 and 169-171 
(industry and environment); COM(1999) 587; Commission, General Report 1999, pages 3,136-138, 143, 144, 157- 
159 and 252 (environment); Grimeaud (2000), Section 2; Commission, G eneral Report 2000, pages 413 (in
general), 3, 168-170, 191 and 257 (environment), 5 and 263 (development policy), 82-85 (enterprise); 182-184
(energy); 207 (public health); COM(2001) 486; Commission, G eneral Report 2001, pages 2 ,3  (in general), 98-102 
(enterprise), 113, 143, 189-198, 211, 287 (environment), 205-207 (energy); Commission, G eneral Report 2002,
pages 24 (in general), 3 (employment and social cohesion), 106 and 109-113 (enterprise), 125, 153, 230 and 231 
(energy), 140 (economic and social cohesion), 153, 211-215 and 237 (environment), 219 -222, 248, 253 and 256
(public health and consumer protection); COM(2002) 276 and Commission, General Report 2003, pages 155 
(economic and social cohesion), 169, 186,224-226 and 229-232 (environment), 236 and 239 (energy), 258 (health 
and consumer protection), 293,297 and 299-301 (development policy).
340 Case C-35/96, Commission v. Ita ly  (1998), in paragraph 47 of Advocate-General Cosmas' opinion, the 
Commission is cited as saying that "...Community competition law is autonomous, not solely in relation to national 
law but also in relation to other rules o f Community law." Is this the implication in Commission, RCP 1999, page 
11, too? Also see, Commission, RCP 1996, point 2. That said, the Commission is not even consistent in this regard, 
see, COM(1999) 587, point 7 and Commission, RCP 1992, page 13.
341 The quote from Commissioner Monti from 1999, reported in Cunningham (2001), pages 156 and 157, strongly 
supports the integration of cultural objectives into article 81 because of article 151(4) of the Treaty, for example. 
See also, Commission, RCP 2000, pages 39 and 40, cited below.
342 Gilliams (2005) DRAFT, pages 25 and 26; Venit (2003), pages 578 and 579; Bishop and Walker (2002), 
paragraphs 1.04-1.09.
343 Schaub (1998), pages 9 and 10.
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Treaty provisions could be taken into account, to the extent they fell within article 81(3), the 
Commission added:
"It is not, on the other hand, the role of article 81 and the authorities enforcing this Treaty 
provision to allow undertakings to restrict competition in pursuit of general interest
_; „344aims.
In the final version of these guidelines this sentence no longer appears, see paragraph 42. The 
Commission does not explain this change. Perhaps it now believes that undertakings can restrict 
competition in pursuit of general interest aims? Perhaps it doesn’t want to draw attention to the 
debate? There is little point speculating. However, i f  a shift to a pure economic approach has 
occurred, three points must be discussed:
• Why did the Commission suggest such a change?
• Can the Commission change its policy like this?
• What has been the effect of the change on the Commission's article 81 decisions?
In relation to the first question, there are a number o f possibilities. DG Competition believes in 
the value o f  efficient markets, see Chapter One. Indeed, there is a general trend among 
competition authorities to focus their interpretation of the competition rules on economic 
criteria, see Chapter Six. Perhaps DG Competition is merely following suit? Increased emphasis 
on pure economic criteria has been pushed by the appointment of Commissioner Monti in place 
of the more pragmatic van Miert.34 45 Perhaps the Commission believes that economic criteria are 
easier for undertakings to understand, giving greater predictability to the competition rules than 
a political balancing test could ever bring? Chapter Six discusses whether or not economic 
criteria are in fact easier for undertakings to understand.
The second motivation may be that DG Competition is tired o f the short-termism o f the political 
interference that it receives, both from outside346 and from within347 the Commission. By 
highlighting the importance of economic factors, it may hope to reduce the level of such
344 This may reflect the position o f Ehlermann, cited above in Ehtermann (2000a), page 549. The Commission did not 
justify this assertion in paragraph 38, although it cited two cases to support i t  They were both irrelevant
345 Commissioner Monti has said "When I was appointed Competition Commissioner four years ago, one o f my main 
objectives was an increased economic approach in the interpretation and enforcement o f European competition 
rules.", Mario Monti (2003a). The Commissioner's influence was mentioned in the Introduction.
346 Schaub (1998), pages 475-476; Jenny (1998), page 25 and McGowan and Wilks (1995), pages 158 and 159.
347 See a brief discussion and references in Wilks (1996), pages 156-157 and McGowan and. Wilks (1995), pages 158, 
160 and 161.
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interference.348 Chapter Seven notes that some dialogue is important, especially where there are 
diagonal conflicts.
Another possibility is that the Commission is saying is that it wants, at the veiy minimum, to 
assess the economic value of these various Treaty objectives, so that it can simply calculate 
whether or not to allow an agreement mathematically? We will see its struggle to make this sort 
of calculation in the CECED decision, see Chapter Eight.
Alternatively, the Commission may emphasise the importance of economic criteria in order to 
make its decentralisation initiative more palatable for those that will have to implement article 
81(3) of the Treaty?349 This strategy risks offending those Member States, such as France and 
Germany, that believe that industrial policy's influence on competition law should be 
increased.350 But even they may favour change if the Commission overtly adopts a pure 
economic approach. Decentralisation is likely to increase the politicisation (as well as rent- 
seeking behaviour) that DG Competition so dislikes, see above.331 This risks skewing 
competition policy as it has thus far been defined by the Commission.352 Member States such as 
France and Germany may see decentralisation as the best way o f combating a pure economic 
approach by the Commission, as it brings power to their own courts and competition authorities, 
which they can more readily influence.
Finally, the Commission may feel that it is better to have a strong (economics-based) general 
rule for all. In many cases, agreements will have little appreciable effect on non-economic 
objectives. Furthermore, Chapter One and Part B show how pursuing economic efficiency can 
simultaneously help achieve many other objectives. Perhaps the Commission thinks that this is 
generally sufficient? Where it is not, Regulation 1/2003, recital 14 and article 10, reserves the 
Commission's right "...where the public interest of the Community so requires..." to find that
548 Burnside reports the current Commissioner for DG Competition as having said that one of his prime functions is to 
protect the Merger Task Force from political pressure, the same may apply to the rest of DG Competition, Burnside 
(2002), page 110.
349 Monti (2002), page 1092. This is also the implication of Jones and Sufrin (2001), page 192; Hawk (1998), pages 
324 and 325 and Ehlermann (1998), page xi.
350 See, Prem ier Forum Franco-Allem and sur la  Politique de Concurrence Européenne, in Bulletin Q uotidien 
Europe, Number 8627, 21 January 2004, page 13 and Bravura Nonsense and Creating European Business 
Champions, The Economist, 22 May 2004. See also, "Selon des sources diplomatiques, Paris et Berlin poussent M. 
Durao Barroso...de rétablir un certain équilibre au sein de la Commission, notamment au détriment de la direction 
de la concurrence, jugée trop libérale." M Barroso a été officiellem ent nom m é président de la Com m ission 
européenne, Le Monde, 29 June 2004 and La difficile émergence de l'entreprise européenne, Le Monde, 7 July 
2004.
351 Lafuente (2002), page 166.
352 Verstrynge (1988), page 5.
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article 81 does not apply.353 However, balancing would still be necessary even if only market 
integration and consumer welfare remained as article 81 objectives, see Chapter Eight.
Can the Commission change its application of article 81 in this way? Chapter Seven discusses 
this issue in some detail. The policy-linking clauses are directly effective, the Commission 
cannot simply ignore these and other relevant Treaty objectives. It has a duty under article 211 
of the Treaty to "...ensure that the provisions of this Treaty...are applied..." Nevertheless, the 
Commission has a wide discretion under article 81(3) and can decide what weight to give these 
values in the balance. This can dramatically affect their importance within article 81, see 
Chapter Seven. The same applies when the Member States’ authorities apply article 81. This 
makes our third question even more important.
Has the Commission's competition policy in fact changed? In the OJ 2000 there were 6 
Commission decisions under article 81. Some were purely argued and based on economic 
criteria354 One decision seems to have been based on both economic efficiency and freedom 
criteria355 However, in three decisions the Commission explicitly invoked non-economic 
objectives, which may have been decisive.356
The fust was GEAEJ P&Wy which concerned a co-operative joint venture357 to supply a new 
aircraft engine for the envisaged Airbus A3XX aircraft The Commission found that it breached 
article 81(1) o f the Treaty. The Commission cleared the joint venture under article 81(3). It 
noted the strict performance targets o f the new engine, paragraph 79, and said that co-operation 
would lead to a technically advanced engine, being less expensive in maintenance and cost per 
passenger and per mile covered and would have lower gas and noise emissions, the latter two 
are environmental considerations. The Commission also noted that the engine could be 
developed more quickly through co-operation358 and that this would also bring substantial cost 
savings, paragraph 80. The promised technical advances at a reduced cost were perhaps the 
most important criteria. If this were the case then the agreement could have led to more ex post
353 As early as 1993 the Commission seemed to envisage that it would concentrate on agreements raising particular 
political, economic or legal significance for the Community, leaving cases with less o f a Community public interest 
to the courts and competition authorities o f the Member States, Commission, J993 Co-operation G uidelines -  
National C ourts, paragraphs 13-15.
334 For example, Commission decisions, Inntrepreneur and FETTCSA.
3:3 Commission decision, FEG and T V , this was an article 81(1) case.
336 Commission decisions, GEAEJ P& W \ Eurovision  and CECED. Eurovision was successfully appealed, though not 
on grounds relevant to our discussion, Joined Cases T -185/00, etc., M étropole Télévision and Others v. Com m ission 
[2002].
357 The case was notified on 26 September 1996, this was before the Merger Regulation was adopted.
338 It is not clear why this is relevant because there was no aircraft with the specification for this engine yet and the 
Commission seemed to imply, paragraph 71, that the parties were potential competitors within the required 
timeframe.
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competition. This seems to penalise Rolls Royce, as it already had an engine that it intended to 
adapt, which is a lot cheaper to do. This may have been a short-term political decision, based 
more on Airbus' need for a cheap engine than anything else.
The next Commission decision o f interest was Eurovision. This dealt with the EBU agreements 
that we saw in 1993. The EBU’s rules had changed, although not really for our purposes. Once 
again, the Commission found a restriction of competition, paragraph 72. The Commission 
granted an article 81(3) exemption. It found an improvement in the production or distribution of 
goods, etc. in relation to the joint acquisition of rights for the same reasons as before, paragraph 
85, this also seems to be a cultural criterion. The Commission found that the agreement reduced 
transaction costs, for the same reasons as before, paragraph 86. There is some indication that the 
underlying issue for the Commission was either SMEs, or small countries (once again cultural). 
In my view, the cultural aspect is the most important for the Commission. Paragraph 87 
reinforces this suggestion:
"...as a result of this joint acquisition more sporting events are broadcast by a larger 
number of broadcasters. The resulting better coverage of the sporting events improves 
distribution."
The Commission finds that the sharing o f the Eurovision rights leads to improved distribution, 
for the same reason as before, paragraphs 88 and 89. As regards the exchange of the Eurovision 
signal the Commission said, paragraph 105:
"As a result of the reciprocity and solidarity principles of the Eurovision system as set out 
in the EBU statutes, any EBU member will be obliged to produce free of charge the 
television signal for events taking place in its country, even if it is not itself interested in the 
event, in order to enable other interested EBU members to show the event. This leads to 
more sports programmes being produced and shown on television. Therefore, distribution is 
improved."
The same definitional point about distribution occurs here, as was noted above in the 1993 case.
Finally, Commission decision, CECED, examines an agreement between CECED, a Brussels- 
based association comprising manufacturers of domestic appliances and national trade 
associations, and its members. These companies made up some 95% of the relevant market, 
paragraphs 8 and 24. The agreement concerned the market for domestic washing machines in 
the European Economic Area. The Commission found that the agreement breached article 81(1) 
as the parties to the agreement bound themselves "...to cease producing and/ or importing into 
the Community..." certain categories of washing machines on criteria relating to their energy 
efficiency, paragraphs 19 and 20, reducing consumer choice and technical diversity, paragraph 
32. The agreement will, said the Commission, appreciably raise production costs, paragraph 34, 
this might reduce demand, paragraph 35. It will also reduce the demand for electricity, 
paragraph 36.
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The Commission cleared the agreement under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. As the agreement was 
designed to reduce washing machine energy consumption, the machines that would be produced 
as a result would be more technically efficient, indirectly leading to less pollution from energy 
generation. The Commission called this more "economically efficient", paragraph 48. The 
Commission remarked at the speed of these changes, paragraph 49. The Commission also 
underlined that R&D was likely to focus on improved energy efficiency; thus, in the long run, 
there would be more product differentiation on this category, paragraph 50. The Commission 
focuses on economic benefits to consumers. It noted a higher initial purchase price but thought 
that savings on electricity bills would compensate for this, paragraph 52. It added that there are 
also collective environmental benefits. It noted article 174 o f the Treaty, paragraph 55, and 
added:
"Agreements like CECED's must yield economic benefits outweighing their costs and be 
compatible with competition rules..."
The Commission then looks at the economic costs of pollution. It mentions the cost o f  avoiding 
the carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide emissions, which the energy efficiency will cause and 
said, paragraph 56:
"On the basis of reasonable assumptions, the benefits to society brought about by the 
CECED agreement appear to be more than seven times greater than the increased purchase 
costs of more energy-efficient washing machines. Such environmental results for society 
would adequately allow consumers a fair share of the benefits even if no benefits accrued to 
individual purchasers of machines."
The Commission concludes that the expected improvements to energy efficiency, the cost- 
benefit ratio of the standard and the return on investment for individual users suggest that the 
agreement will contribute significantly to technical and economic progress, paragraph 57.
The Commission's public policy statements have potentially changed dramatically since 1993. 
However, there does not seem to have been a change in the Commission’s decision-making 
practice over the same period. Of course formal decisions are only a small part of DG 
Competition's workload as most cases are dealt with informally.359 60 But precisely because of the 
signalling impact o f its decisions, one would expect the Commission to pay special attention to 
the language that it uses there, see below.
The GEAE/P&W  decision seems primarily based on political criteria o f a sort that do not often 
arise. Eurovision is interesting for two reasons. It is essentially the same case as the 1993 one, 
so it provides an interesting point of comparison. The Commission adopts a similar logic in both
359 Although the Commission noted that this would be more efficiently tackled at the stage of electricity generation, 
paragraph 5 1, see article 174 o f  the Treaty "...environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source..."
360 See, Commission, RCP2001, page 53, figure 2,
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decisions.361 The 2000 decision actually discusses the transaction cost and other 'economic* 
savings less than it did in 1993. This may be because it is more willing to rely on other policy 
objectives, although it could be because the Commission felt that it had already made out its 
case in 1993.362 While the Commission does consider economic criteria, it mentions improved 
transaction costs,363 this does not appear to be the focus of the case. The focus is SMEs or small 
countries,364 and the cultural policy dimension. The Commission discusses improvements of 
distribution, not as in better modes of communication but in terms of more distribution. This is 
important as it may make it easier to consider cultural criteria into article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
Article 151(4) says that the reason that the Community shall take account o f cultural aspects is, 
in particular, to "...respect and promote the diversity of its cultures." Agreements that 
encourage/ facilitate the dissemination and appreciation of this diversity are surely instrumental 
to this goal, see article 151(2) o f the Treaty.
The CECED decision is also important. The Commission's mechanism for introducing the 
environmental issue is through the improvement to technical progress. It is easy to define this in 
terms of environmental goals, and the Commission seems happy doing this,365 it is the first thing 
it discusses. Then, paragraph 48, the Commission twists this into an economic efficiency 
argument. This seems contrived. The agreement does not add new, more energy efficient 
machines, at least in the medium term. The paternalism that the Commission exercises in 
removing consumer choice to spend more now on a machine and less later or vice versa is less 
convincing from an economic perspective as there is no discussion about the current time value 
of money, nor the fact that consumers do not, in fact, seem to prefer to spend more now and pay 
later. It gets worse. The Commission assesses the cost of cleaning up the pollution that would 
have been caused if  the predicted number of consumers that the agreement will force to switch 
to the new efficient machines did not take place. It estimates this at seven times the increased
361 Other Commission decisions also demonstrate continuity in their use of Community objectives under article 81. 
See, for example, (i) International Energy Agency, OJ 1983 L376/30 and OJ 1994 L68/35 (national security and 
consumer protection, paragraphs 29 and 6 respectively) and (ii) Bayer/BP Chemicals, OJ 1988 LÍ50/35 and OJ 
1994 LÍ 74/34 (industrial policy, paragraphs 28-31 and 6 respectively).
362 Tactically, it would have been sensible for the Commission to rely more on other policy goals in 2000, considering 
the wide discretion it is given there and the pending appeals.
363 Although there does not seem to be any discussion of the effect that these systems might have on reducing revenue 
for firms that put on sporting events and thus reducing distribution.
364 To the extent that the Commission relies on the solidarity principle to show that they are able to offer a  better 
service.
365 See, Commission, RCP 2000, pages 39 and 40, "Article 6 of the EC Treaty stipulates that Community policy on 
the environment must be integrated into other Community policies. Environmental concerns are in no way 
incompatible with competition policy, provided that restrictions of competition are proportionate and necessary for 
achieving the environmental objectives pursued." The Commission says that the principle is clearly illustrated by 
the CECED decision where it took account o f the positive contribution to the ELTs environmental objectives, for the 
benefit o f present and future generations.
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purchase costs. But no one would have to pay these environmental costs. The externalities are 
not internalised.366
The decision is dressed up in economics. That said, environmental factors probably had some 
impact, see Chapter Four. Once again, even on this basic issue the decision is unclear. This is 
unacceptable. Furthermore, if environmental policy is the real reason for this decision, why 
didn't the Commission just say so? To my knowledge the Community Courts have not expressly 
countenanced the inclusion of environmental policy considerations in article 81, but there is 
every reason to suggest that they would, see above.
4.3 Conclusion of Section 4
Has the Commission changed its position since 1993? Its public statements on the objectives of 
competition policy seem to have changed. They almost exclusively emphasise the economic 
effects o f agreements. This chapter suggested five possible reasons why the Commission might 
advocate a shift to a pure economic approach, if  indeed it has. In my view, the need to convince 
Member States' courts and competition authorities that article 81(3) would not be too hard for 
them to apply was very influential. This is because the Commission, White Paper on 
Modernisation makes the clearest call for a pure economic approach. If this is the case, then, 
now that Regulation 1/2003 has been adopted, the Commission may distance itself from such a 
strong position.367 We saw some evidence of this in paragraph 42 o f the Commission, Article 
81(3) Guidelines, above. However, this is not the whole story. The Commission's language 
shows that economics, and within that consumer welfare, is becoming its preferred tool for 
article 81 analysis, see the Introduction and Chapter Six. Well and good. But where this fails to 
achieve the "optimal balance", the Commission must be prepared to promote other objectives by 
distorting competition, see also Chapter Seven.
The Commission still seems to be pursuing many objectives within its decisions. I say seems to 
be, because it does not always admit it and often tries to disguise the fact.368 It considers
366 At paragraph 55 o f  its decision, the Commission refers to the European Parliament and Council Decision, review 
o f Towards Sustainability \ which says that environmental agreements must respect the competition rules. This is 
circular. Before this provision can be interpreted we must decide whether environmental considerations can be 
balanced within article 81. If we adopt a pure economic approach, then only two types o f environmental agreements 
are possible. Those that have non-appreciable restrictions and those that are efficiency enhancing (and also comply 
with the rest of article 81(3)). However, if  we decide that a mixed economic approach is the correct one, as the 
Community institutions seem to have done, then saying that environmental agreements must respect the competition 
rules adds very little at alt and simply begs the question, how much environmental protection is acceptable under 
these rules?
367 The Commission has said that decentralisation will not alter the substantive content of articles 81 and 82, 
Commission, RCP 2002, page 25. Komninos (2005) DRAFT, pages 1-4 and Venit (2003), pages 546 and 575-579, 
greet this assertion sceptically.
36< This is criticised in Amato (1997), page 62 and Korah, V., in Ehlermann (1998), pages 525-541.
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objectives protected by the policy-linking clauses, as well as those found more generally in the 
Preamble and article 2 of the Treaty.
Those agreements that justify a formal Commission decision are probably more likely to require 
this difficult balancing o f objectives.369 However, if the Commission's strategy were not to take 
account of these anymore, where better to show that than in its decisions?370 This is even more 
the case since 1 May 2004, given the importance placed on Commission decisions. If  
decentralisation is to work properly, there must be trust between the Commission and the 
Member State bodies371 Without honesty, there cannot be trust, see Chapter Eight.
In its policy statements, the Commission has been neither clear, nor consistent, about the 
importance of'non-economic* objectives within article 81. This issue is highly controversial and 
it is likely that different voices within the Commission are pulling in opposite directions. Part C 
makes many policy recommendations about how the Commission should resolve this issue. It is 
urgent that the Commission rapidly develops a clear policy, in line with the Treaty and the 
Community Courts* jurisprudence. In the meantime, the Commission should resist the 
temptation to descend into blind opportunism, as that complicates the position for all actors. 
What do I mean by blind opportunism?
The VBVB/VBBB Case (1984) involved two booksellers and publishers associations that were 
seeking to overturn a Commission decision, which had found some of their agreements 
incompatible with article 81. The ECJ asked the Commission to define, page 48, the scope of its 
powers to take account of the specific cultural nature of the product and the market in question, 
under article 81(3) of the Treaty. The Commission, in order to justify its decision not to grant 
an exemption, replied:
"As far as the specific cultural nature o f  the product is concerned the Com m ission feels, as 
far as concerns the choice o f  objectives w hich  may play a  part in connection with the 
application o f  article 85(3) [now article 81(3)], that it cannot depart from  the criteria which 
it lays down; at the m ost it might have regard to  purposes closely bound up w ith the criteria 
set out in that article.
The specific cultural nature o f  the product cannot be related to  the concept o f  improving 
production or distribution. Article 85(3) does not permit the Com m ission to  conduct a 
cultural policy."
369 Commission, 1993 Co-operation Guidelines - National Courts, paragraphs 13 and 14.
370 Bouterse (1994), page 33, Bouterse, citing Sporman (1968), page 133, argues that one reason why the 
Commission actually takes a decision in this area is because they are test cases and that this "...implies that the 
decisions which were issued have a significance which goes beyond the facts of the relevant case." Forrester and 
Norall ( 1993), page 428, agree.
371 Bos (1995), pages 410 and 411.
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The Commission undermined its position in the Matra Case (1994), paragraph 96, by arguing, 
this time trying to justify an apparently generous exemption decision, that:
"...it is possible to take into account, as regards the contribution to economic and technical 
progress, factors other than those expressly mentioned in those provisions. They include, 
for example, the maintenance of employment and, in that regard, the applicant cannot 
establish a correlation between the opening of the Setubal site and the closure by the 
founders of industrial sites elsewhere in Europe. Accordingly, regional policy concerns may 
be taken into consideration, for the purposes of article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the 
Treaty, in conformity with the requirements of article 130A [now article 158] of the EC 
Treaty."
Both transparency and consistency are needed, and they are needed now.
5. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO
This chapter set out to answer two questions. In a Community context, is the influence of 
political considerations on article 81 warranted? Secondly, given its continued importance under 
Regulation 1/2003, what is the Commission’s view about the place o f such objectives within that 
provision?
Both the structure o f the Treaty and the presence of the policy-linking clauses create the 
possibility of conflicts in Community law. The Treaty normally prefers compromise, but 
sometimes it is silent. The Community Courts have had to fill these gaps. While doing so, they 
had to choose between exclusion and compromise. In the vast majority o f cases, including those 
related to article 81, they have chosen compromise.
The Community Courts have facilitated the work of article 81 decision-makers by interpreting 
article 81(3) very widely, such that all Community public interest issues can probably now be 
taken into account there and certainly the objectives set out in the policy linking clauses. This 
allows the decision-maker to aim at an "optimal balance" of the various objectives that are 
relevant in each case.372 1 believe that, in a Treaty context, this is the right approach to take.
Chapter One’s conclusions and those in this chapter do not appear to mesh perfectly. 
Nevertheless, we cannot be categorical about this until the limits o f article 81's balance are fully 
investigated, see Chapter Four and Part C. Chapter One’s conclusions colour some of my policy 
recommendations, particularly those in Chapter Seven.
Then I examined the Commission's position. It is creating a lot o f ambiguity by publicly 
implying that public policy concerns are irrelevant in article 81 decision-making. The 
Commission is not able to make such a  policy change as it is bound by the Treaty and the 
Community Courts’ judgments. That said, the Commission has considerable discretion about
372 Chapter Seven discusses which objectives can be considered.
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how to balance different values within article 81, see Chapters Seven and Eight It is acceptable 
for the Commission to focus on economic analysis within article 81; however, this must be 
tempered by other approaches where this does not adequately take account of other relevant 
objectives.
In practice the Commission seems to be following the Community Courts' lead in its decisions. 
Many objectives are regularly considered within article 81, see Part B for a detailed analysis of 
how and where the Commission does this. Chapters Six and Seven make policy 
recommendations about how best to do this, in line with the Treaty. Chapter Eight provides a 
framework for the balancing process within article 81.
The Treaty aims to achieve a number of goals. These include economic and social cohesion, 
environmental protection, public health, consumer protection, industrial policy and culture. 
Competition lawyers often focus solely on their area, forgetting the context of the rules that they 
apply.373 This is a mistake.374 In the words of van Miert:
"Competition policy has so long been a central Community policy that it is often forgotten 
that it is not an end in itself but rather one of the instruments towards the fundamental goals 
laid out in the Treaty - namely the establishment of a common market, the approximation of 
economic policy, the promotion of harmonious development and economic expansion, the 
increase of living standards and the bringing about of closer relationship between Member 
States. Competition therefore cannot be understood or applied without reference to this 
legal, economic, political and social context."375 376
The Treaty tries to achieve its aims using a variety of tools. One of these, an important one, is
■ • M(£
competition law. But, as with all systems of governance, conflicts arise between objectives. 
The Treaty itself balances competition considerations against other basic goals both within and 
without the Treaty provisions on competition. The highest court o f appeal in this system, the 
ECJ, regularly hears cases in all areas of the Treaty. The ECJ seeks to 'find' a system for the 
Treaty, taking into account, where relevant, non-competition rules and objectives too.377 As 
competition lawyers we must do the same.
373 Gerber (1994), pages 99 and 100.
374 Bengoetxea, MacCormick, and Moral Soriano (2001), at page 47. See also the Albany Case, paragraph 60 and van 
der Esch (1991).
375 van Miert (1993), page 120.
376 Toggenburg (2003), page 10.
377 Judge Edwards, talking about the European Court o f Justice's legal reasoning, says that the judge's role "...cannot 
be confined to that of providing a technocratic literal interpretation of texts produced by others...the judge must 
proceed from one case to another seeking, as points come up for decision, to make the legal system consistent, 
coherent, workable and effective." Edward (1996), pages 66-67.
-9 7 -
CONCLUSION OF PART A
Part A approached the question, should antitrust laws consider public policy objectives outside 
o f welfare?, from two perspectives. Chapter One conducted a theoretical analysis in a legal 
vacuum, explaining when it is rational to consider non-economic objectives within competition 
policy. Chapter Two changed the emphasis, examining the question within the context of a 
specific legal system, article 81 o f the Treaty.
Chapter One debated two questions: why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare 
objectives? and when should competition policy consider non-welfare objectives? Only by 
answering these questions can one understand how competition policy can and should interact 
with other areas o f law, in the abstract.
The first question, why might competition policy incorporate non-welfare objectives?, was 
relatively easy to answer. Competition policy invariably has a welfare objective, normally 
consumer welfare. This is value-laden, promoting consumer protection, in a wide sense. The 
pursuit of this policy objective through competition policy can affect other policy objectives. 
Allowing competition policy to take account of these interactions means that a better balance 
can be attained with other public policy goals, such as public safety and national security. That 
does not mean that competition should always be compromised for non-economic policy 
objectives.
A second question asked, when should competition policy consider non-welfare objectives? 
Ignoring non-economic policy objectives when applying competition law can create significant 
benefits, in terms of enhanced legal certainty. This encourages firms to invest and innovate. 
That said, sometimes, the benefits that enhanced legal certainty brings are outweighed by the 
importance of the policy goals it undermines. Even then, it may still be better to focus on a pure 
welfare test in competition policy where these non-welfare objectives can be adequately 
protected through other legislative tools, indeed this is often the case. However, this robust 
conclusion should be re-assessed where the benefits that enhanced legal certainty brings are 
outweighed by the importance o f  the policy goals at stake and  these interests: (i) cannot be 
protected through alternative legislation (either in fact or for jurisdictional reasons); or (ii) have 
not actually been protected by alternative legislative tools.
Chapter Two asked whether Community competition provisions consider public policy 
objectives outside of welfare. It concluded that both the Treaty's structure and the presence of 
the policy-linking clauses create the possibility of conflicts in Community law. The Treaty 
normally resolves these conflicts through compromise, but sometimes it is silent. The 
Community Courts have had to fill the silence. In the vast majority of cases, including those 
related to article 81, they have chosen to compromise, i.e. to encourage the balancing of
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different policy objectives within specific articles. This is because they view competition policy 
not as an end in itself, but as an instrument in a wider system for achieving the Treaty's 
fundamental goals. The Community Courts interpret article 81 broadly and many public interest 
issues can now be considered within it. This includes those protected by the policy-linking 
clauses, as well as those promoted in the Preamble, article 2 of the Treaty, etc.
The Commission is creating a lot of ambiguity by implying that public policy concerns are 
irrelevant in article 81 decision-making. It is not able to make such a policy change as it is 
bound by the Treaty and the Community Courts' judgments. That said, in practice, the 
Commission seems to be following the Community Courts' lead in its decisions.
Chapter One and Two's conclusions are somewhat different. Chapter One argues that the 
consideration o f non-welfare objectives is warranted, but only under strict conditions. Chapter 
Two reveals a Treaty and Community institutions that more readily embrace the balancing o f 
these objectives within competition law.378 This raises two further questions: why does the 
practice revealed in Chapter Two differ from Chapter One's theoretical matrix? and how can 
these two positions be reconciled?
There are many reasons why Community competition law does not correspond to Chapter One's 
theoretical framework. Briefly put, the Treaty was designed, and has since been amended, by 
politicians. They must 'sell' this 'product1 to their heterogeneous constituencies.
"The policy-makers try to maximise their election or re-election probabilities. This 
fundamental objective implies satisfying powerful interest groups, but also keeping an eye 
on the general interest, or at least the perception that the majority of voters could have of 
the major decisions."379
The short-term benefits of this approach are more apparent than the long-term costs. 
Furthermore, legislators often balance competing objectives when legislating. They may not 
recognise the potential costs involved. There may also be a touch o f political expediency in 
allowing politicians to promote many policy goals while sheltering under the umbrella o f 
'promoting competition'. Finally, for political reasons it would have been very difficult for the 
administrators of Community competition policy, the Community Courts and the Commission, 
to ignore other policies.380
The 'attacks' on the consideration of multiple objectives within competition policy have been 
largely influenced by economists.381 Their arguments are based on fundamental premises, often
378 This is confirmed when the other limits o f the balance are discussed in Chapter Four and Part C.
379 Laussel and Montet (1995), page 57.
380 Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995a), page xii and Laussel and Montet (1995), page 50.
381 For example, Gual (1995), page 23, writes that the policy linking clauses, particularly article 159 o f economic and 
social cohesion "...provides a major source of inefficiencies in EC policy-making, to the extent that this equity or
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ignoring the context into which these rules must be placed. The Commission and the 
Community Courts do not have this luxury. They are bound by the system that the politicians 
built. Perhaps another factor is at play as well? Competition laws (and the consumer welfare 
imperative) can affect many policy objectives. This affect is reciprocal. It is easy to implement 
an appreciability doctrine where these affects are small. However, outside o f this, balancing 
disparate policy goals through different pieces of legislation is extremely difficult because it is 
hard to develop general rules which achieve an optimal balance in all areas. The economists' 
recommendations often ignore these difficulties. Although legal certainty is undermined, where 
important objectives are at stake it is often easier to fmd the optimal balance on a case-by-case 
basis.382 Easier, at least for the politicians. But, as we have said, the politicians design the 
system.
Given this divergence, what solutions can be found? There is some flexibility within the 
Community competition law system and Part C of this thesis suggests ways o f incorporating 
Chapter One's policy recommendations within the Community legal order, to the extent that this 
is possible. Unless the Treaty is to be fundamentally re-written little more can be done. Before 
turning to Part C however, we need a more thorough understanding of how and where these 
policy objectives are considered in article 81. This is Part B’s role.
re-distribution mandate constrains the formulation o f policies in all domains and gives rise to the inefficient use of 
policy instruments." See also page 39 o f the same chapter.
3t2 This is aided by the use of impact assessments which seek to ensure that the effects on different policy areas are 
correctly assessed, see Chapter Eight
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PARTB: IIOW AND WHERE IS  PUBLIC POLICY BALANCING
PERFORMED IN ARTICLE 81?
INTRODUCTION TO PART B
This thesis has three objectives. Part A showed that, while not perfectly in line with economic 
theory, the Treaty, as interpreted by the Community Courts, demands that non-economic 
objectives should be considered within article 81. We saw that this position is supported by both 
the Council and the European Parliament. We also saw that, although its recent policy 
statements imply otherwise, the Commission regularly considers public policy goals within 
article 81.
The Commission's recent policy statements side-lining non-economic objectives, combined with 
an underlying trend (in jurisdictions without the Community legal framework) towards a pure 
economic welfare model has sown a lot o f confusion within the Community. Given that the 
consideration o f non-economic objectives has been such a  significant phenomenon, as well as 
the potential for this to grow in future, this thesis' second objective is to analyse how and where 
these non-economic objectives are considered by the Commission within article 81, as well as 
where the balance lies between different Treaty objectives. This is Part B's purpose.
Non-economic objectives are considered within article 81 via two mechanisms. We call the first 
mere-balancing. Chapters Three and Four deal with mere-balancing in relation to article 81(1) 
and (3), respectively.383 mere-balancing operates outside of the market mechanism. The 
Commission assesses the effect on competition and then balances it against other relevant 
objectives. Chapter Five looks at a different mechanism, market-balancing. Under market- 
balancing the Commission weighs some objectives within the economic efficiency test itself.
Why should we consider how and where non-economic Treaty objectives are considered within 
article 81? There are four main reasons. First, Part B provides details of how and where 
balancing takes place in order to establish, irrefutably, that, contrary to its policy statements, the 
Commission considers non-economic objectives within article 81. The details provided in Part 
B reinforce the arguments provided in this regard in Chapter Two.
Secondly, ex-Commissioner Monti regularly emphasised the need for greater transparency in 
Community competition law.384 Transparency is related to legal certainty. Legal certainty is 
important for undertakings, Chapter One. Decision-makers can increase compromise's 
transparency (and thus certainty) by explaining where the balancing takes place, how it is 
conducted and what the limits of the balance are. It is also important to provide clear guidelines
383 Chapters Three and Four consider a selection o f Treaty objectives. Each discussion starts with a brief analysis of 
the specific objectives under consideration. A brief discussion is sufficient because this thesis analyses the 
balancing mechanism in general, rather than specific policies in particular. For those who require more detailed 
explanations of such policies, see, Moussis (2003) and Collège d'Europe (1998), as well as the references that can 
be found there and in the relevant chapters below.
384 See, for example, Commission, RCP 2000, pages 8 and 9.
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for the Member States' courts and competition authorities which now apply article 81 in its 
entirety. The shear quantity of decisions where public policy has been considered further 
underlines the need for research in this area.
The idea that some balancing takes place within article 81(3) of the Treaty is reasonably 
uncontroversial and is apparently supported by that article’s structure, Chapter Four. However, 
there is relatively little discussion about balancing within article 81(1). This is important 
because of the differing burden of proof in relation to article 81(1) and (3) of the Treaty.385 This 
issue also affects whether article 81 can be applied at all. As a result, it is helpful to shed more 
light on how article 81(1) is applied, see Chapter Three. There is also little or no discussion 
about market-balancing as a concept in the legal literature. While economists take such trade­
offs for granted, lawyers generally proceed on the assumption that welfare analysis is a value 
neutral phenomenon. That this is not the case is important in and of itself, see Chapter One. 
Furthermore, such knowledge potentially provides lawyers with an additional mechanism for 
achieving the optimal balance. Chapter Five asks whether it is an appropriate mechanism.
Finally, the third objective of this thesis is to suggest how and where the balancing process 
should best be conducted, Part C. We decided to split this issue out from the discussion of how 
article 81 is currently interpreted, in order to increase the transparency of our critique. As a 
result, Part B's discussion of how and where the balance is conducted is relatively descriptive. 
That said, it highlights many issues which must be considered in Part C and provides analysis to 
support the later debate.
385 See Regulation 1/2003, article 2.
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CHAPTER THREE: HOW IS THE BALANCE IMPLEMENTED? - MERE-
BALANCING IN ARTICLE 81(1) OF THE TREATY
1. Introduction






22. Environmental protection 
2.2.1. Environmental protection 
2 2 2 . The balance?
2.2.3. Conclusion
2.3. Conclusion
3. Two Related Questions
3.1. Are there limits to article 81 ( 1 )'s balance?
3 2. Why does balancing take place within article 81(1) as 




The structure o f article 81 of the Treaty implies that any balancing should be done in article 
81(3), see Chapter Four. This repartition ’o f  competences' is affirmed by academics. Faull and 
Nikpay note that non-welfare rules are considered under article 81, however:
"...they will be relevant only to policy considerations, arising under article 81(3), as they 
do not have any impact on the notion of restriction of competition for the purposes of 
article 81(1)."386
Nevertheless, the Community Courts and the Commission sometimes consider non-welfare 
objectives within article 81(1) o f the Treaty.387 Chapter Three discusses this as well as two 
related issues:
• what limits are there on article 81(l)'s balance, for example, can competition be 
eliminated, as forbidden under article 81(3) of the Treaty? and;
* why does balancing take place within article 81(1) when article 81(3) seems more 
appropriate?
386 Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.14. Sec also, Whish (2003), page 123; Vedder (2003), pages 157 and 158; 
Shelkoplyas (2003), page 227; Deards (2002), page 622; Monti (2002), pages 1059-1062 and 1069 and following; 
Hawk (2001), page 304; Deckert (2000), pages 178 and 179, for a brief summary of views; Forrester (1998), page 
380; Siragusa (1997), page 285 and Vogelaar (1994), pages 531,535,543 and 545.
3,7 Schröter (1987), pages 659-661.
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Chapter Three cannot provide definitive answers to these questions, due to the lack o f relevant 
decisions, and the lack of clarity within those that there are. That said, it hopes to provide a 
helpful first step on the road to transparency* It does this by examining two non-economic 
objectives and investigates how they are balanced within article 81(1), Section 2. The focus is 
on market integration, Section 2.1.; and, environmental protection, Section 2.2.388 Section 3 
discusses the two related questions highlighted above. Section 3.1. asks whether article $l(l)'s 
balance carries limits; and, Section 3.2. asks why balancing takes place within article 81(1) as 
well as article 81(3).
2. COMPROMISE WITHIN ARTICLE 81 (1) OF THE TREATY
2.1 Market integration
First, Section 2.1. asks what market integration means. Then, it discusses why it is pursued. 
Next, economic efficiency gets the same treatment. Why is this important? Understanding why 
these objectives are pursued helps us to assess when conflicts exist and to better deal with them 
when they do. Also, where one objective achieves many ends, it is more important, which 
should increase its weight in the balance. Finally, the balance between market integration and 
economic efficiency in article 81(1) o f the Treaty is analysed. Where agreements restrict market 
integration, as defined by the Community Courts, then they risk breaching article 81(1) of the 
Treaty. Can an agreement, which restricts market integration, be 'saved' within article 81(1) of 
the Treaty if it enhances economic efficiency?389
2.1.1 Market Integration
The Treaty's Preamble resolves to eliminate the barriers dividing Europe. The Commission has 
called market integration the second objective o f Community competition policy, see Chapter 
One. The Community Courts also consider market integration important. In the Consten and 
Grundig Case, a German television manufacturer, Grundig, promised Consten that neither it, 
nor any of its other distributors, would sell either directly or indirectly in France. Grundig made 
this promise to encourage Consten to become its French distributor. The ECJ held that such a 
clause breached article 81 :
388 The Community Courts and the Commission have also balanced other objectives within article 81(1) o f the 
Treaty. Market integration and environmental protection were selected for discussion as they illustrate a number o f 
important points o f interest Furthermore, the caselaw is more developed for them than for other factors. Other 
objectives considered within article 81(1) include: (a) the proper practice o f the legal profession, the Wouters Cose, 
see Chapter Two; (b) the dignity and rules o f conduct o f representatives before the European Patent Office, Case T- 
144/99, Institute o f  Professional Representatives before the EPO v. Commission [2001]; and, (c) the integrity o f 
UEFA club competitions, Commission Communication, UEFA rule on *integrity paragraph 10.
389 I assume that economic efficiency is considered in article 81(1). This is unclear, see Chapter Six. If the Métropole 
télèvision Case and Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission [2003] are followed then my <' "*■ 
arguments about the overlap between economic efficiency and market integration should be ignored. Otherwise, the 
discussion remains essentially the same.
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"...an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national 
divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the most 
fundamental objections of the Community. The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at 
abolishing the barriers between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a 
stem attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct 
such barriers. Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] is designed to pursue this aim..."390
The market integration objective is regularly used in article 81(3) analysis. It is also the only 
Treaty objective, outside of economic freedom and economic efficiency, that many academics 
cite as a constituent part of the article 81(1) test, see below.
While it is clear that market integration is a valid objective of article 81,391 it is important to ask 
why this objective is being pursued. This helps us assess its weight in the balance. It also makes 
any conflicts more apparent
Preventing territorial protection is considered important in order to achieve the single market:
"Such prohibitions [those on exports and imports] jeopardise the freedom of intra- 
Coramunity trade, which is a fundamental principle of the Treaty, and they prevent the 
attainment of one of its objectives, namely the creation of a single market."392
But why is achieving the single market considered important? The single market is unlikely to 
be an aim in and of itself?393 Some say it promotes economic freedom.394 Others argue that 
economic efficiency justifies the market integration goal, see Chapter One. Recently, market 
integration has been touted as a way of achieving consumer protection goals. Commission, RCP 
1991, page 15, argues that barriers to economic integration in the Community are particularly 
bad because they:
"...shield an entire Community industry from exposure to effective competition and 
because they make the European consumer pay the price for cosy industry arrangements."
These views are increasingly common in Commission decisions and notices.395 Indeed, the 
Commission has even started to talk of a consumer right to buy anywhere in Europe:396
390 Page 340. The Community Courts have reaffirmed this on numerous occasions. See, for example, Case 8/72 
Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission [1972], paragraph 29 and Case T-9/92 Automobiles Peugeot 
and Peugeot v. Commission [1993], paragraph 42.
391 See, for example, Wesseling (2000), Chapter Four, B&C (2001), paragraphs 1-077 and 2-067 and Ehlermann 
(1998).
392 Joined Cases 100-103/80 SA Musique Diffusion Française v. Commission [1983], paragraph 107. See also, 
Commission, RCP 1994, paragraph 10 and Rapport des Chefs de Délégation aux Ministre des Affaires étrangères, 
page 16.
393 Collège d’Europe (1998), page 91.
394 Monti (2002), page 1063.
395 See also, Commission, RCP 1992, page 50; Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph J03{iv) and Commission 
decision, Distribution System o f Ford Werke AG, paragraph 43
-  1 0 6 -
“While most distribution agreements are pro-competitive and facilitate market entry, some 
lead to the setting-up of watertight national distribution networks which partition markets, 
in particular where distributors are prevented from supplying customers based outside the 
contract territory. In this way, national markets are artificially isolated from one another, 
limiting competition and price convergence. Such  agreem ents im pinge upon  the r igh t o f  
E uropean consum ers to  p u rc h a se  g oods in  th e  M em ber S ta te  o f  their cho ice  and result in 
their being denied the benefits of the internal market, particularly where there are price 
differences between Member States, [my emphasis]"
The Institutions are rarely explicit and are inconsistent in their approach. Market integration is 
variously justified as it increases economic freedom, economic efficiency or consumer 
protection. To the extent that market integration helps achieve all three, it should be given a lot 
of weight, as these are important Community objectives.
Whatever the underlying rationale for pursuing it, from the very beginning market integration 
has been applied formalistically, without assessing whether it actually contributes to these 
underlying goals.396 97 For example, sometimes obstacles to the free movement of goods actually 
contribute towards the integration of national markets.398 They would still be found to 
undermine the market integration goal. In the Consten and Grundig case, discussed above, 
Advocate-General Roemer said:399
"The possibility cannot be excluded that such an examination of the market might have led 
to a finding that in the Consten-Gnmdig case the suppression  of the sole distributorship 
might involve a noticeable reduction in the supply of Grundig products on the French 
market and consequently an unfavourable influence on the conditions of competition 
existing there."
And he continued that prohibiting absolute territorial protection might stand in the way of the 
integration of the various national markets:
"...because it may lead to the possible consequence that foreign markets are worked over a 
smaller field and with less intensity (for example, in respect of after-sales service) than the 
national market which is more readily available to the producer."400
396 Commission, RCP ¡999, paragraph 53. See also, Verouden (2003), page 530; Commission, RCP 2000, paragraph 
93 and Commission decisions, VW, paragraph 189, and Opel, paragraph 160.
397 See, Wesseling (2000), pages 87, 97 and 98; Korah (1997), page 5; Pera and Todino (1996), page 137 and Korah 
(1986), pages 93 and 94.
398 See, for example, Commission decision, The Distillers Company Limited, where "...the condemnation be the 
Commission of the dual price system and o f the export ban designed by the company to hinder parallel imports led 
to  a  result opposite to that pursued by the Commission: the splitting of the brands under which Distillers sold the 
product in the UK and the Continent", Heimler and Fattori (1998), page 597. See also, Motta (2004), page 23 and 
Chapter 7; Van den Bergh (2002), pages 36,37,40; Korah (2000), pages 13 and 14; Wesseling (2000), pages 78,81 
and 98; Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 42 and van den Bergh (1995), pages 76-81 and 41.
399 The Consten and Grundig Case, pages 359 and 360-361, respectively.
400 See also, Neven (1998), page 117 and Heimler (1998), page 335.
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As we saw above, in its judgment the ECJ adopted more of a per  se approach in relation to 
absolute territorial protection. The ECJ seemed to want to stop barriers to trade above all. It did 
not discuss Advocate-General Roemer's point that this might reduce market integration, nor did 
it accept that reductions in economic efficiency were relevant, see Chapter One. It is hard to 
explain why the ECJ wanted to stop these barriers per se.401 Nor, can this formulism be more 
readily understood in light of the other objectives, such as consumer protection, that market 
integration is said to promote. As we have seen, imposing such an obligation might undermine 
the supply of some goods into certain territories, what would become of the consumer 
protection point then? Surely the Commission would not insist upon supplies everywhere?402
In conclusion, the Commission and the Community Courts are inconsistent in their justifications 
for the market integration objective. Furthermore, they tend to apply it in a formulistic manner, 
which can undermine the very objectives that they seek to promote. Nor can we just ignore this 
lack of clarity as, despite the arguments of some,403 the market objective is unlikely to disappear 
in the near future. The Commission and the Community Courts still turn to market integration in 
order to try to achieve/ maintain the single market.404 Formulism may even be more efficient 
where there is no competition culture.405 This is important, for as Whish emphasises:
"The accession of ten new Member States on 1 May 2004 means that the single market 
imperative will continue to have an influential role in competition law enforcement for 
many years to come."406
It is important to understand why market integration is being pursued. If, as seems likely, this is 
not just for efficiency reasons then the Commission must consider any trade-offs between this 
and economic efficiency and justify them in its decisions.407 If  the market integration imperative 
were solely about economic efficiency, then, these two objectives should not conflict at all.
401 Wesseling (2000), Chapter Four. Also see van der Esch (1980), page 75.
402 Although see, Waelbroeck (1987).
403 See, Shelkoplyas (2003), page 228; Wesseling (1998), page 485; Amato (1997), page 52; Massey (1996), pages 
98-100; Pera and Todino (1996), page 129; Forrester (1994), pages 460 and 461 and Verstrynge (1984), page 677.
404 See article 81(lX aH e) of the Treaty, Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 7 "Market integration is an 
additional goal o f EC competition policy."
405 Although, Forrester argues that this culture should be instilled where the applicant countries implemented the 
acquis communitaire before arrival, Forrester (1994), page 461.
406 Whish (2003) page 21. See also, Jones (2004), pages 18 and 49; Monti (2002), page 1092; Van den Bergh (2002), 
page 3 6; Gerber (2001), page 122 and Ehlermann ( 1998), page x.
407 Van den Bergh (2002), pages 37 and 41 and Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 20.
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2.1.2 Economie Efficiency
Chapter One discussed economic efficiency at length. It is an important objective in Community 
competition law. Indeed, the Commission has called it the primary objective of article 81, see 
Chapter One.
The CFI has said that economic efficiency concerns, while they can properly be raised in the 
article 81(3) analysis, should not be considered in discussions related to article 81(1) of the 
Treaty.408 It added that economic freedom, rather than economic efficiency, is the correct basis 
for intervention under article 81(1) of the Treaty.
However, there are reasons to believe that article 81(1) of the Treaty is not only triggered by 
restrictions on economic freedom.409 Why? First, the Commission has said that maximum resale 
price maintenance will not necessarily breach article 81(1) of the Treaty.410 Such clauses restrict 
economic freedom just as much as minimum resale price maintenance and so, at least 
sometimes, it seems as though other factors are relevant under article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Another example is provided by the Community Courts' attitude, in cases such as Fiatagri UK 
L td  and New Holland Ford Ltd. v. Commission,411 to information agreements. Information 
agreements sometimes restrict competition, even where they do not contain any restrictions on 
the parties themselves,412 or others.413 The courts' attitude can often be justified in terms of 
economic efficiency,414 but is harder to understand in terms of economic freedom.415
Some suggest that a balancing approach is employed in article 81(1) o f the Treaty to assess 
whether the agreement is pro or anti-competitive overall. This is otherwise known as a  rule of 
reason or welfare analysis. The Commission admits to having used the rule of reason. Analysis 
o f Commission decisions and notices supports this. See Chapter Six, for a discussion o f these 
issues.
408 Let’s assume this is what these cases say, although it is unclear, see Chapter Six. The Métropole Télévision Case, 
paragraphs 74-78. See also, Case T-65/98, Van denBergh Foods L td  v. Commission [2003], paragraph 107.
409 Whish (2003), page 117.
4.0 Commission, Vertical Guide lines, paragraph 47 and Commission decision, Nathan-Bricolux, paragraph 87. Whish 
(2003), page 632, says that the Community Courts have never ruled on this issue.
4.1 Case T-34/92, Fiaiagri UK L td  and New Holland Ford Ltd. v. Commission [1994], paragraphs 86-94 and 
Commission decision, UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, paragraphs 34-56. See also, Commission 
decision, 1FTRA Free Trade Rules on Glass, paragraphs 43-45 and Joined Cases C-89/85 etc. A Àhlstrôm Oy v. 
Commission [1993].
412 See, Schaub (1998), page 124.
413 See, Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 99 and 100.
414 Kuhn and Vives (1995).
415 Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 2.79-2.81. Marenco (1999), pages 1242 and 1243, argues that information 
agreements do effect the parties as they make price reductions by the parties less attractive (to them) and therefore, 
less likely. Such a  test would make the dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable agreements hard to spot
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In conclusion, as we saw in Chapter One, economic efficiency is a very important objective in 
its own right Furthermore, through economic efficiency the Commission hopes to create a 
system in which, over the long term, its industrial, environmental and regional policies will be 
achieved and, ultimately, that the well-being of the consumer in general will be ensured. There 
is no doubt about its importance in article 81 as a whole.
That said, there is some doubt about economic efficiency's place within article 81(1) of the 
Treaty. The Commission now implies that the full efficiency analysis should take place in 
article 81(3).416 However, even after Métropole télévision, practitioners ignore economic 
freedom and focus on economic efficiency within article 81(1) o f the Treaty, justifying this with 
a reference to the economic context of the matter.417 The Commission has not been very 
rigorous in separating out arguments based on economic freedom and those based on economic 
efficiency. Even before Métropole télévision, it had, on occasion, dealt with both economic 
efficiency and freedom points in the same decision.418 Economic efficiency will probably 
continue to be considered within article 81(1), even if  by a different name.
2.1.3 The Balance?
The attitude of the Community Courts and the Commission is that any attempt to impose 
absolute territorial protection through an agreement, that appreciably419affects trade between 
Member States, will restrict competition for the purposes o f article 81(1) of the Treaty, however 
this is achieved.420
For example, in Tretom and others421 agreements between Tretom, an undertaking that 
manufactured tennis balls, and some of its exclusive distributors were considered. The 
Commission found that since 1987 Tretom had set up, in concert with its exclusive distributors, 
both inside and outside the Community, an export ban in its exclusive distribution system,
416 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 11.
4,7 Discussion with James Venit, 28 May 2003.
41* See, for example, Commission decisions, international Private Satellite Partners, paragraphs 55-61 and FEG and 
TU, paragraphs 105-107,117 and 119.
419 See, Case 5/69 Franz yolk v. Établissements J. Vervaecke [1969].
420 Some might argue that Case 27/87 Erauw-Jacquery v. La Hesbignonne Société Coopérative [1988] and Case 
306/96 Javico International and Javico v. YSL Parfums [1998] undermine this statement. In Erauw-Jacquery the 
ECJ allowed absolute territorial protection. However, without this the licensor would not have been able to control 
the quality of his product, something that was essential on the facts. The overlap between competition law and 
intellectual property rights is a complex one and is not discussed in this paper. The ECJ did not consider the more 
interesting clause (i) that the French court asked it to analyse, which dealt more directly with territorial protection as 
discussed in this chapter. Javico involved absolute territorial protection from licensees in Russia and the Ukraine. 
At paragraph 19 the ECJ said that these restrictions "...must be construed not as being intended to exclude parallel 
imports and marketing o f the contractual product within the Community.
421 Commission decision Tretom and others appeal dismissed, Case T-49/95 Van Megan v. Commission [1996].
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paragraphs 13 and 16-21. The Commission found that this system breached article 81(1) of the 
Treaty. At paragraph 51 it said: .
"The general export ban and the barriers had the direct object and effect of restricting 
competition...This, in fact, constitutes an obstruction of the achievement of a fundamental 
objective of the Treaty, the integration of the common market."422
The Commission did not ask whether economic efficiency was enhanced, nor did it consider 
whether the distribution system, despite the territorial protection involved, would help integrate 
markets. It just cited market integration in the usual formulistic manner. Market integration was 
not expressly balanced against any other objective,423 the mere presence o f barriers was found to 
restrict competition.
Incorporating absolute territorial protection into agreements has, in effect, become a per se 
violation of article 81(1) of the Treaty.424 Such clauses are considered to have the object of 
restricting competition. The ECJ has said that:
"...there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears 
that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.”425
This applies even where the methods used to achieve such a territorial restriction are indirect, 
such as charging different prices according to the territory for which the goods are being 
delivered426 or a refusal to grant discounts for these goods.427 The balance is tilted in favour of 
market integration.
In the face of this strong approach, parties very rarely argue that economic efficiency benefits 
justify absolute territorial protection. One might expect such submissions to become more 
regular in the future, however. In the same year as it decided Tretom and others, the 
Commission implied that, where efficiencies would justify it, it might be prepared to allow them 
to out-weigh market integration:428
422 See also, for example, Case 22/71 Beguelin Import v. C .L  Import Export [19711, paragraph 12 and Case T-77/92 
Parker Pen v. Commission [1994], paragraph 37.
423 As a consequence, the importance of the market integration imperative was not assessed either, in terms of the 
objectives that it would achieve weighed against the objectives to be achieved if absolute territorial protection were 
allowed.
424 Support is given in the European Night Services Case, paragraph 136 and Manzini (2002), pages 398 and 399.
425 Consten and Crundig Case, page 342 and, for example, the Verband der Sachversicherer Case, paragraph 39.
426 See, for example, Commission decision, The Distillers Company Limited, section 2; appeal dismissed Case 30/78 
Distillers Company v. Commission [1980].
427 See, for example, Commission decision, Sperry New Holland, paragraph 55.
428 For other grounds of attack see Case T-41/96 Bayer v. Commission [2000] and Rey and Venit (2004), pages 154- 
160.
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"As far as vertical agreements...are concerned, the Commission’s position has always been 
to prohibit and take strict measures against practices that artificially partition markets. 
Concern to achieve a single market has predominated over all other aspects, including the 
fact that vertical agreements may in themselves have certain competitive advantages, such 
as allowing producers to operate more efficiently on new markets. The further stage 
reached last year in achieving the internal market allows a more flexible approach to be 
taken to this type of restriction."429
As the Commission acknowledged in its Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 114, the main effect on 
welfare of vertical territorial protection is a reduction in intra-brand competition. This is 
normally430 only problematic, from an efficiency perspective, where there is insufficient inter- 
brand competition, paragraph 119(1). Rather than always saying that absolute territorial 
protection breaches article 81(1) of the Treaty, a proper balancing exercise would examine 
agreements in this light.
In Glaxo Wellcome the parties argued that their attempts to block parallel imports into the UK 
were justified because, amongst other things» they produced efficiency gains. The Commission 
only dealt with the issues under article 81(3) of the Treaty, even though the point was also 
raised under article 81(1). On the facts, the Commission found that the agreement did not 
enhance economic efficiency so no balancing exercise was undertaken.431 Nevertheless, Glaxo 
Wellcome may signify a shift. We have seen above that the ECJ held that the practical effects of 
hardcore restraints need not be taken into account In Glaxo Wellcome the Commission seemed 
prepared to discuss these factors;432 although the implication is that the Commission will be 
hard to convince.
While I have not seen a case where absolute territorial protection was accepted under article 
81(1) of the Treaty433 it might now be possible to put even this into the balance and parties may 
be increasingly willing to make such arguments.434
.j  * .'i
425 Commission, RCP 1994, paragraph 10. The citation is very general. Nothing indicates that it would not also apply 
to absolute territorial protection, but the Commission does not specifically refer to this either.
4j0 A lack o f intra-brand competition can also lead to welfare loss, see Monti (2002), page 1066 and Chapter One.
431 Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome and others, now under appeal Case T-168/01. On the general merits of 
such economic arguments by pharmaceutical companies see, Rey and Venit (2004), pages 160-177. After its 
judgment in Case T-41/96 Bayer v. Commission [2000) the CF1 may now demand a proper economic analysis as to 
whether the territorial protection is welfare reducing, see Rey and Venit (2004), page 175.
432 Although not in article 81(1) as yet In this regard see Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 21-23,
433 A possible exception to this is the Coditel Case, paragraph 16, where the ECJ (in an unclear section of the 
judgment) in effect permitted absolute territorial protection in favour of licensees to exhibit a cinema film. The 
ECJ's reasoning seems to be based on economic efficiency, cultural and industrial policy grounds. At paragraphs 
17-20 the ECJ held that an exclusive licence might not infringe article 81(1) o f the Treaty where there was evidence 
of unreasonable exploitation. However, it has been argued that this case is limited to the special circumstances of 
film exhibitions, B&C (2001), paragraph 2-088, and may even turn on its own facts. .Nevertheless, Anderman 
(1998), page 70, seems to read this case as establishing a general principal.
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Absolute territorial protection is an extreme form of territorial protection. There are more 
limited forms. Two justifications for allowing these more limited forms of market integration 
will now be considered.
In Société Technique Minière, which was decided two weeks before the Consten and Grundig 
case, the ECJ considered an agreement where a French company, STM, had been given an 
exclusive right to sell certain machines in France that had been manufactured by a German firm, 
MU. STM had agreed not to sell competing machines and in return had been given an exclusive 
territory. Parallel imports were not restricted, nor were passive sales.* 435 The ECJ said, page 250:
"The competition in question must be understood within the actual context in which it 
would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute. In particular it may be doubted 
whether there is an interference with competition if the said agreement seems really 
necessary for the penetration of a new area by an undertaking."
The ECJ went on to say that agreements offering an exclusive right of sale did not, by their very 
nature, restrict competition within article 81(1) of the Treaty, page 251. So outside o f absolute 
territorial protection the agreement's effects should be taken into account as well.
In Société Technique Minière the ECJ spent some time discussing what features might be 
considered important within the actual context, page 250. These were elements such as the 
nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, o f the products covered by the agreement, the position 
and importance of the parties on the market for the products concerned, the isolated nature of 
the disputed agreement and the severity o f the clauses intended to protect the exclusive 
dealership.436 The reason for investigating all these factors in this case was to assess whether the 
agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new area.437 Despite this relaxation in 
the test, these, more limited, types o f territorial protection have only been allowed under article 
81(1) of the Treaty on a limited number of occasions.
There is a logic to this relaxation in terms o f the balance. As such clauses undermine market 
integration less than those seeking absolute territorial protection (qualitatively), it is easier to 
justify them where they promote economic efficiency.
454 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2) docs not necessarily rule this ou t Commission, Vertical 
Guidelines, paragraph 119(10), may even encourage it under certain limited conditions. Thanks to Giorgio Monti 
for this comment
435 The judgment is not clear on this point but this is the position taken by many academics, see, for example, B&C 
(2001), paragraph 2-065 and it is followed here.
436 Whish (2003), page 604 suggests that further help may be obtained from the Commission, Vertical Guidelines, 
paragraphs 163-170.
437 The ECJ in both the Consten and Grundig Case, pages 342 and 343 and the Pronuptia Case, paragraph 24, refers 
to the fart that there the product/ trade mark is already widely known when it finds that article 81(1) of the Treaty 
has been breached and thus there was no penetration o f a new area with a new product
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In the second example of a justification for restricting market integration, the Nungesser Case, 
the ECJ was more generous. The case concerned an agreement between the French national 
agricultural research institute (INRA) and Mr Eisele, trading as Nungesser. INRA exclusively 
assigned, to Mr Eisele, the right to produce and sell, in Germany, certain maize seeds it had 
developed. INRA undertook to prevent its seeds being exported to Germany, except via Mr 
Eisele.
As in Consten and Grundig, the ECJ held that absolute territorial protection was contrary to 
article 81(1) of the Treaty, paragraph 61. However, in a distinction which is more based on 
policy than logic,438 the ECJ added, in paragraphs 57 and 58, that:
"...in the case of a licence of breeders' rights over hybrid maize seeds newly developed in 
one Member State, an undertaking established in another Member State which was not 
certain that it would not encounter competition from other licensees for the territory granted 
to it, or from the owner of the right himself, might be deterred from accepting the risk of 
cultivating and marketing that product; such a result would be damaging to the 
dissemination of a new technology and would prejudice competition in the Community 
between the new product and similar existing products.
Having regard to the specific nature of the products in question, the Court concludes that, in 
a case such as the present, the grant of an open exclusive licence, that is to say a licence 
which does not affect the position of third parties such as parallel importers and licensees 
for other territories, is not in itself incompatible with article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the 
Treaty."
This judgment implies that economic efficiency arguments, here raised in the context of 
increasing competition by encouraging a new entrant, combined w ith  the benefits of innovation, 
may be enough to outweigh the market integration objective where only open exclusive licences 
are used, i.e. licences that allow for parallel trade between territories.439 The issue o f passive 
sales was not explicitly raised in the case and so it is not clear where the ECJ stood on them.
The balance in favour of introducing new products, as opposed to introducing old products onto 
new geographical markets, is tilted slightly further in favour of economic efficiency. In Société 
Technique Minière, the ECJ said that the restriction on active sales had to be really necessary 
for the penetration of the new area. In Nungesser, the ECJ says that, for new products, 
restrictions on active sales can be justified where the licensee was not certain that it would not 
encounter competition from other licensees or the licensor, and because of this might be 
deterred from accepting the risk of cultivating and marketing the product. This logic is in line
m  B&C (2001), paragraph 2-089.
4M In the Pronuptia Case, paragraph 24, the ECJ found that a certain amount o f  territorial protection which was not, 
on its face, absolute, breached article 81(1) o f the Treaty. This may have been because the products in question were 
of a well known brand. It has also been suggested that the ECJ felt that the exclusivity enjoyed by the franchisee, 
coupled with the location clause preventing a franchisee from opening a second shop might give rise to de facto 
absolute territorial protection, B&C (200IX paragraph 2-093.
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with the Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 174, where it says that the case in favour 
o f  exclusive distribution is strongest for
"...new products, for complex products, for products whose qualities are difficult to judge 
before consumption...or of which the qualities are difficult to judge even after 
consumption...
Perhaps the market integration/ economic efficiency balance will allow open exclusive licenses, 
for these sorts o f products too, based on this more limited justification?
Having said that, was Nungesser stating the case too strongly against market integration? It is 
often argued to turn on the specific facts o f plant breeders' rights. Korah points out that some 16 
years after Nungesser the Commission had never applied this precedent in any o f its 
decisions.40 41 O f late the Commission has attempted to clarify the position here too:
".. .vertical restraints linked to opening up new product or geographic markets in general do 
not restrict competition. This rule holds, irrespective of the market share of the company, 
for two years after the first putting on the market of the product. It applies to all non- 
hardcore vertical restraints and, in the case of a new geographic market, to restrictions on 
active and passive sales imposed on the direct buyers of the supplier located in other 
markets to intermediaries in the new market. In the case of genuine testing of a new product 
in a limited territory or with a limited customer group, the distributors appointed to sell the 
new product on the test market can be restricted in their active selling outside the test 
market for a maximum period of one year without being caught by article 81 (l)."442
This citation appears to give more protection to restrictions on market integration for entering 
new geographic markets with old products, than for entering new markets with new products. 
Did the Commission favour those entering new geographic markets because o f the market 
integration aspect? Such a stance does not seem to be in line with the caselaw discussed above, 
nor is it necessarily in line with economic theory.
440 See also, the Old Technology Transfer Block Exemption, recital 10. This "...rejects the Chicago school's overly 
liberal approach to vertical restraints by reflecting Comanor’s suggestion that vertical restraints are likely to be 
beneficial in the case o f new products or new entrants, but less so in the case o f  well-known products or strong 
brands.", Monti (2002), page 1064. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2) may be trying to 
collapse the distinction.
441 Korah, V., in Ehlermann (1998), page 528. Although there is sometimes some discussion o f the principle, see, for 
example, Commission decision, Velcro/ Aplix, pages 27-31.
442 Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 119. This is generous language. However, while it is clear that active 
and passive sales can be prevented, independent parallel importers can never be restrained, therefore, this position is 
not contrary to the Consten and Grundig Case, pages 342 and 343, such that Consten could benefit from absolute 
territorial protection. For the opposite view see, Monti (2002), page 1068. Bishop and Ridyard (2002), pages 35 and 
37 and Peeperkom (2002), pages 38 and 39, provide a general critique o f balancing these objectives under the 
guidelines.
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2.1.4 Conclusion of Section 2.1.
A balance seems to be taking place. The Community Courts found that the negative effects that 
absolute territorial protection has on the market integration objective could never be justified on 
economic efficiency grounds. As the restrictions on market integration lessened, the Community 
Courts are increasingly prepared to look at economic efficiency benefits and find that these 
outweigh the restrictions on market integration. Market integration and economic efficiency are 
important Community objectives, both in their own right and because of the other objectives 
they can promote.
This does not explain the complete prohibition on absolute territorial protection. Are the 
Commission, and the Community Courts, saying that because absolute territorial protection is 
invariably welfare reducing, it is more efficient to prohibit it per se? According to this logic 
some efficient agreements would fall within article 81(1) o f  the Treaty. These would be few and 
far between. Therefore, the opportunity costs o f this happening would be outweighed by the fact 
that the Commission would not have to go to the trouble and expense of investigating every 
case. This could enhance clarity and certainty, saving costs and enhancing welfare over the 
long-term.443 If this is their point then it is controversial.444
The Commission may now be prepared, on occasion, to ignore this per se rule. Why? Perhaps 
its economic analysis has become more sophisticated? Absolute territorial protection can have 
important welfare effects; in fact, the Commission has said that this should be the case unless 
there are restrictions on inter-brand competition. This could mean that more efficient 
agreements fall within article 81(1) than it previously thought. If the utility o f the per se rule 
falls in this way, perhaps it is no longer deemed appropriate?
Another reason could be that the balance has actually shifted. How could this happen? Surely 
the two competing objectives, economic efficiency and market integration have stayed the 
same? Possibly not. As the single market nears completion, market integration may diminish in 
importance, see above, although this is unclear since 1 May 2004. Economic efficiency is 
increasing in importance and is considered a fundamental objective in and of itself. Efficient 
markets also help achieve many other objectives, such as consumer protection.445 As these other 
objectives increase in importance, so too must a policy that promotes them.
443 Sec, for example, Easterbrook (1992), pages 129-130 and Easterbrook (1984), page 39.
444 "The price to be paid for the stubborn unwillingness to revise these strict prohibitions [market petitioning and 
minimum resale price maintenance] is high.", Van den Bergh (2002), page 40. For a contra^ opinion in relation to 
terri tonal, protection see, Rey and Venit (2004), page 176.
445 Which became an explicit Treaty objective after the Société Technique Minière and Nungesser Cases.
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Another possible reason why this per se rule may be crumbling is more fundamental. Perhaps 
there is no conflict at all? Consider the underlying rationale for the market integration objective. 
We have seen that market integration, as defined, may have become an end in itself. 
Alternatively, it may be being used as an aid to consumer protection. If this were true, then 
pursuing market integration, essentially removing barriers to inter-State trade, could still 
conflict with economic efficiency. However, market integration is often described as a means o f 
enhancing economic efficiency. To the extent that this is a shift in the reasons for pursuing it (or 
that the reasons become more widely accepted) there should be a corresponding shift in the 
balance. If market integration is only there to support economic efficiency then there will no 
longer be a conflict446 and there is no need to balance at all. Why refuse absolute territorial 
protection unless it is welfare reducing?447
The logic of the absolute territorial protection rule is hard to understand. Either it is a per se 
rule, or it is not. This distinction is important to undertakings. If it is a per se rule, there may be 
little point in them challenging it (except politically). If not, a challenge might make sense. The 
Commission and the Community Courts need to inject more clarity into the area. Simple 
guidelines that achieve economic efficiency in the majority of cases can be beneficial, reducing 
the need for expensive economic analysis. Using them could be a rational policy choice. But if  
this is the reason for the differences in approach noted above then these guidelines should be 
based on solid economics and this basis should be clearly explained to undertakings. Otherwise, 
in ambiguity's shadow, undertakings will continue to try to justify territorial protection on 
economic grounds. This, in turn, raises costs and is inefficient.
The Commission's latest statements imply that there may (no longer) be a per se rule. If this is 
true then it should clearly explain why market integration is being pursued. We saw above that 
there are many reasons why it could be justified. The main justification for pursuing market 
integration seems to be because it is welfare enhancing. If so, these two objectives do not 
conflict and, so, they should not be balanced. What about consumer protection? New rights,448 
such as that o f consumers to buy goods anywhere in the Community, should be based on solid 
foundations. It may benefit more people, especially the least well off, to have more choice on 
their doorstep, rather than the ability to go anywhere in the Community to buy the goods they 
desire. This argues in terms of allowing absolute territorial protection, as long as there is
446 van den Bergh (1995), page 77.
447 There could still be a place for perse rules. However, in light o f the developments in the Commission's economic 
thinking, see above, the justifications for a per se rule may no longer be made out.
448 To be fair to the Commission, the ECJ has spoken in similar terms. See the Suiker Unie Case, paragraph 27, where 
it held that practical co-operation amounts to a concerted practice within article 81 "...particularly if  it enables the 
persons concerned to consolidate established positions to the detriment o f effective freedom of movement of the 
products in the common market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers."
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sufficient inter-brand competition. To the extent that this is not the case, distorting competition 
is probably an inefficient way of achieving this end, see Chapter One. Even if the market 
integration objective is about objectives outside of economic efficiency there may still be no 
need for balancing. Consumer protection, for example, would normally be better advanced by 
following economic efficiency. We have seen that both the CES and the Commission argue that 
economic efficiency also leads to consumer protection and so even this new basis for market 
integration may not conflict with economic efficiency.
Even if  conflict still exists, the pendulum may shift towards economic efficiency for the reasons 
set out above. How will the caselaw develop in this area? Will the Commission be so receptive 
to allowing absolute territorial protection in product areas where it feels that the single market 
has yet to be achieved, especially since the expansion of the European Union?
22 Environmental protection
Section 2.2. examines how environmental considerations may have influenced some of the 
Commission's article 81(1) decisions. Before doing that we discuss the environmental protection 
objective and what it promotes. Economic efficiency has already been discussed, see above.
2.2.1 Environmental Protection449
Community environmental policy shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives, article 
174(1) o f the Treaty:
"...preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; protecting human 
health; prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems."
Environmental protection is an extremely important principle o f  Community law and is 
becoming more so.450 It is a well-developed policy in its own right. The Treaty o f Maastricht 
demanded a 'high' level of environmental protection. Commission, RCP 1992 calls 
environmental policy, as embodied in article 174 of the Treaty, a "...fundamental policy o f the 
Community.", page 52. Improving environmental protection can also further other goals. For 
example, the Commission points to a link between environmental protection requirements, 
employment policy451 and industrial policy.452 45
445 For a more detailed analysis of Community environmental protection see, Krämer (2003); Vedder (2003); 
McGillivray and Holder (2001); Jans (2000); Grimeaud (2000); McGowan and Wilks (1995) and Baldock (1992).
450 Demetriou and Higgins (2003), pages 196 and 197.
451 "Environmental policies can have a positive effect on employment, where the supply of environmental goods and 
services is more labour-intensive than the economic activities being replaced.", COM(200Q) 576, page 10. See also, 
Press Release IP/03/430.
-118-
A rtide 6 of the Treaty (discussed in Chapter Two) says:
"Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in article 3, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development."
Environmental protection is based on the precautionary principle, preventive action, the idea 
that environmental damage should be rectified at source, and the idea that the polluter should 
pay, article 174(2).
The Commission has referred to environmental issues within its article 81(1) analysis for some 
time.452 53 These references have become more frequent.454 Environmental considerations also 
feature prominently in article 81(3) o f the Treaty, see Chapter Four.
2.2.2 The Balance?
Environmental protection and economic efficiency/ economic freedom sometimes conflict, see 
Chapter One. In case of conflict, do an agreement’s possible environmental effects affect the 
appraisal of a restriction of competition for the purposes of article 81(1) of the Treaty? If so, 
where does the balance lie between these objectives?
Commission, Horizontal Guidelines contain guidelines on assessing the compatibility of 
environmental agreements with article 81(1) 455 The Commission said that, irrespective of the 
parties' market share, some environmental agreements are not likely to fall within the article 
81(1) prohibition, paragraph 176. For example, there will be no restriction of competition where 
no precise individual obligation is placed on the parties or if they are loosely committed to 
attaining a sector-wide environmental target. In this latter case the assessment focuses on what 
discretion the parties have as to the means that are technically and economically available to 
them to attain the environmental objective agreed upon. The more varied such means, the less 
appreciable the potential restrictive effects, paragraph 177. However, where environmental 
agreements appreciably456 restrict the parties’ ability to devise the characteristics of their 
products or the way in which they produce them, thereby granting them influence over each
452 This is not a  linear relationship. There may come a time where increasing environmental protection undermines 
industrial policy. See, for example, Council Resolution, on the automobile industry, recitals 1 and 6 and paragraphs 
4 and 5 and Council Resolution, strengthening Community industry, paragraph 3.
453 See, for example, Commission decision D'lteren motor oils, and Commission, R C P 1990, page SI.
454 See, for example, Commission, RCP 1994, pages 368-369; ACEA, RCP 1998, paragraph 131 and page 151; 
CEM EP, Commission Press Release IP/00/508 and Commission decisions Eco-Emballages and DSD and  others.
455 For some time the Commission had underlined the importance of agreements between private parties to achieve 
environmental ends, and increasingly favoured them, see London (2003), pages 26S-271.
456 But not where product and production diversity in the relevant market, is not appreciably affected, paragraph 178.
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others production or sales,457 then there may be a breach o f article 81(1) of the Treaty if the 
agreements covers a major share o f an industry at national or EC level,458 paragraph 181.459 This 
should not be the case where the importance o f environmental performance is marginal for 
influencing purchase decisions, paragraph 178.
A comparison can be made with how agreements on technical and other standards are dealt with 
under article 81(1) of the Treaty.460 Although the texts are very similar the Commission, 
Horizontal Guidelines split out the guidance on 'agreements on standards' and 'environmental 
agreements', sections 6 and 7, respectively. This may be because environmental agreements can 
be wider than agreements on standards; but it could imply that there is some difference in 
approach in these two areas.
Some agreements on standards breach article 81(1). In order to fall outside article 81(1) of the 
Treaty the standards must be objectively justified.461 The Commission would probably give 
short shrift to an agreement to sell more polluting engines. If  this is correct then, to the extent 
that environmental agreements are accepted, environmental goals must be objectively justifiable 
too.462 This suggests that environmental protection is relevant under article 81(1).463
Does the fact that environmental agreements are involved affect the Commission’s decision­
making? The short answer seems to be yes. Under the normal (non-environmental) caselaw, the 
parties to an agreement may set standards but they must be free to decide whether or not to 
apply them. The Commission considers this freedom important.464
457 Or where they reduce or substantially affect the output o f third parties, either as suppliers or as purchasers.
4SS Where some categories o f a product are banned or phased out from the market, restrictions cannot be deemed 
appreciable insofar as their share is minor in the relevant geographic market or, in the case of Community-wide 
markets, in all Member States, paragraph 178.
459 For instance, environmental agreements, which may phase out or significantly affect an important proportion of 
the parties' sales as regards their products o r production process, may fall under article 81(1) when the parties hold a 
significant proportion o f the market The same applies to agreements where the parties allocate individual pollution 
quotas, paragraph 182.
460 Standardisation agreements can have an industrial policy rationale, Rosenthal (1990), page 326. This is not 
discussed in this chapter, but their inclusion in the guidelines (as well as elsewhere) may evidence the consideration 
of another policy objective in article 81(1).
461 This is not absolutely clear from the caselaw but the implication is there, see, for example, Commission Notice, 
Retel, paragraph 9. See also, B&C (2001), paragraph 4-128.
462 In at least two matters in this area the Commission noted that the environmental agreements were in line with the 
Community's strategy to reduce CO2  emissions. See, ACEA , Commission, RC P 1998, paragraph 131 and page 151 
and CEMEP, discussed in Commission Press Release IP/00/508.
463 The fact that the environmental benefits are emphasised in the Commission’s Competition Policy Newsletter gives 
some credence to this point, see, Martinez-L6pez (2000), pages 24 and 25.
464 See, for example, Commission decision, V W F , page 24 and Commission, H orizontal Guidelines, paragraph 167. 
For an exception see, Commission Notice, Pasta manufacturers, paragraph 3(a). There the parties agreed to
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In the environmental field the Commission allows agreements to be slightly more restrictive. In 
ACEA, for example, the Association of European Automobile Manufacturers undertook, on 
behalf of its members, to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars by setting a reduction 
target of 25% by 2008.465 This was a cumulative reduction target for all ACEA's members, each 
member set its own level. The Commission found that this would encourage ACEA's members 
to develop and introduce new CCVefficient technologies independently and in competition with 
one another.466 Accordingly, it decided that ACEA’s voluntary agreement did not constitute a 
restriction of competition and was not caught by article 81 (l).467
The Commission has said that environmental agreements, which impose targets on individual 
firms, restrict competition within the meaning o f article 81(1) of the Treaty.468 The fact that the 
parties to the ACEA agreement were free to set their own levels seems to have prevented a 
finding of a breach of article 81(1). This is in line with the normal standards caselaw.
However, Société Technique Minière, see above, says that in order to judge whether there is a 
restriction of competition one must examine the clauses in their legal and economic context. 
What we should really ask is, do these general targets, in fa c t, have an effect on each 
undertaking’s product range and thus on consumer choice? As the Commission accepts, see 
above, this is most likely where: (i) the agreement covers a significant part of the products on 
the relevant market; and (ii) the agreement is likely to have a binding impact on each 
manufacturer.
In relation to the first point, in ACEA, the agreement must have covered a large part of the 
market, the Commission called it a 'first critical step'.469 No percentages are given, but this 
should certainly be the case today, because a similar agreement has now been concluded with 
JAMA and KAMA, see above. The Commission has also said that it will try to make similar 
agreements with the other major groups o f non-ACEA manufacturers present on the EU 
market.470 Each time it does this more of the market is covered. Furthermore, these agreements
undertake the relevant obligations in relation to their entire production o f pasta. I can find no final Commission 
decision in this matter but it is unclear why it was minded to be so generous in the notice.
465 A C EA  - COM(1998), paragraph 5(3).
466 The Commission also found that this collective effort by the European automotive industry would enable a 
significant reduction in CO2  emissions to be achieved in line with Elf policy, see ACEA  - COM(I99S), pages 2 and 
3, where the Commission said that the ACEA commitment was consistent with the Community’s strategy on C 02 
emissions from cars.
467 See also, JAM A/ KAMA, Commission, R C P 1999, pages 160*161 and CEMEP, cited above.
468 See, for example, EACEKf, which was closed by comfort letter; Commission, RC P 1998, paragraph 130 and page 
155 and Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 190.
449 ACEA  - COM(l998), pages 3 and 8.
470 ACEA  - COM(1998), pages 7 and 8.
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affect a large proportion of new motorcars. It is not entirely clear, but the implication is that, in 
1998, no European manufacturers sold cars with the low levels o f pollution promised in the 
ACEA agreement.471 In which case, the agreement probably affects all new cars manufacturers 
by the parties for sale in the EU.
In relation to the second point, in ACEA, the manufacturers likely intended these targets, in 
effect, to bind each and every one of them.472 The targets set are ambitious. It is unlikely that 
any one manufacturer can do much better than this target; allowing other manufacturers to make 
less effort in this regard. In addition, the Commission has said that if  the targets are not met then 
it will legislate instead.473 As a result, in fact, all manufacturers must try to attain the 
environmental levels set for all or most of the relevant cars that they produce.
It could be argued that C02 emissions do not affect customer choice and so do not have an 
appreciable effect on competition. Even if  that were so when the ACEA agreement was signed, 
which is doubtful, it is highly unlikely to be the case at the end of its term,474 it lasts for some 10 
years.475
Most, if not all, o f the manufacturers must meet the target for most, if not all, o f the cars that 
they produce for sale in the EU, if the agreement's environmental commitments are to be 
achieved. They will all be trying to do so because of the threat of legislation if they fail. These 
commitments probably apply to all of the new cars manufactured by a substantial part o f the 
industry. This would normally be considered a restriction on competition. The fact that it relates 
to an environmental commitment seems to have affected the article 81(1) balance.476
471 ACEA -  COM(1998), paragraph 3(1).
472 In Case T-4I/96 Beyer v. Commission [2001], paragraph 69, the CFI held "...the concept of an agreement within 
the meaning of article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] o f  the Treaty, as interpreted by the case-law, centres around the 
existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being 
unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties' intention."
471 ACEA - COM(1998), pages 2, 5 and 6. The OECD points out that such threats seem to contribute significantly to 
target improvement, OECD (2003a), pages 11 and 15.
474 See, for example, websites such as www.autotndustrv.co.uk/whatsnew/index.asp?seca:pr&kev=gl 1. The number 
of references to fuel efficiency (related to C 0 2 emissions) in car advertisements also belies this notion.
475 ACEA - C0M(1998), page 7.
476 Similar points can also be made in relation to the VOTOB and CEMEP agreements. In VOTOB, six independent 
operators offering tank storage facilities in the Netherlands to third parties agreed an agenda with the Dutch 
government to reduce vapour emissions from their tanks over a ten-year period. The Commission attacked a later 
decision by the undertakings to levy a uniform environmental charge to cover, in part, the cost of investment to 
reduce these emissions, Commission, RCP 1992, points 177-186. The restriction in competition as a result o f the 
voluntary agreement to reduce emissions itself would typically breach article 81(1 )(b> of the Treaty, Vogelaar 
(1994), page 545. Although there was no formal decision, the Commission held that it did not fall within article 
81(1) at all, Vogelaar (1994), page 551. For a different reading of VOTOB, see Vedder (2003), page 157.
In CEMEP the parties to the agreement accounted for some 80% o f Community sales and made a significant 
commitment, agreeing to reduce their joint sales o f  the least efficient category three motors by some 50%. These
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On the assumption that there is a balance, there have been too few cases to confidently assess 
where it might lie. It seems that environmental protection will be taken into account as long as, 
in law, the environmental agreement in question complies with the normal standards caselaw. 
The context is less o f an issue. It is not clear why the Commission adopts this distinction. If the 
Commission's reasoning were more explicit we would better understand the underlying logic 
upon which its decisions are based.
2.2.3 Conclusion of Section 22 .
Where environmental concerns are not internalised, conflict can occur between environmental 
protection and economic efficiency. What is unclear is whether conflicts can be resolved 
through balancing in article 81(1) of the Treaty. The inclusion of environmental protection 
objectives within the balance seems to allow standards to be adopted in a more demanding way 
than is the case without them. This implies that environmental protection is relevant within the 
article 81(1) balance.477 Nevertheless the position is not clear. Doubt on such a fundamental 
point suggests a lack o f transparency.
On the assumption that there is a balance, there have been too few cases to confidently assess 
where it might lie. However, the Commission's decisions suggest that the importance o f 
environmental protection, within article 81(1) of the Treaty, has changed over time. 
Environmental considerations were not considered there until the 1990s. Their growing 
influence within this provision roughly matches environmental protection's growing influence 
within the Treaty as a whole, Chapter Four. However, where environmental considerations are 
balanced against economic efficiency then it is not clear that their influence should be 
increasing. Why? While environmental protection is becoming increasingly important in the 
Community legal order (Chapter Four), as explained in Part A, economic efficiency is also 
becoming increasingly important, both in and of itself, and because it helps achieve other 
objectives that have been inserted into the Treaty over time.
Secondly, the negative welfare effect of the environmental restrictions in ACEA was probably 
quite important. The 'wrong' compromise (i.e. not the optimal balance) may be established if  a
motors currently account for 70% of Community sales. The Commission argued that competition did not take place 
on the basis o f efficiency in this industry. This is hard to believe as the buyers are sophisticated industry operators 
and energy efficiency is generally considered to be highly important for motors. Nevertheless, even if  this is true 
then it is unlikely to be so by the time the agreement expires, some three years later. Furthermore, the parties also 
agreed to classify all o f the motors covered by the agreement into one o f three levels o f energy efficiency. This will 
likely introduce competition on that criterion to the extent that it did not exist before. Why then, was a phasing-out 
commitment also considered necessary? I f  it was not necessary then should the agreement have been allowed to 
escape article 81(1) o f the Treaty?
477 One might also ask why the Commission refers to environmental issues within article 81 (1) if it is irrelevant in the 
analysis, Amato (1997), page 61.
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structured balancing process is not carried o u t The environmental benefits could be over­
valued, because environmental damage would not be rectified at any cost, Chapter Eight. On the 
other hand, the welfare costs may be underestimated if they are not properly assessed because 
efficient markets have many benefits outside o f welfare. More explicit reasoning is needed in 
article 81 decisions to clarify these issues.
2.3 Conclusion of Section 2
In Métropole télévision the CFI holds that the pro and anti-competitive effects of an agreement 
cannot be balanced within article 81(1). The rejection of a 'narrow1 rule o f reason in Community 
law also implies that non-economic objectives cannot be balanced there either. This view has 
been embraced by the academic community, see above, and coincides with the Commission's 
explicit views on the topic.478
Having said that, Métropole télévision was immediately followed by the Wouters judgment. 
There the ECJ seems to balance the restriction o f  competition against the proper practice of the 
legal profession and found that, as a result, article 81(1) was inapplicable. The Commission too 
may have changed its mind. This came across in its submissions in Wouters,479 as well as 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2) of which state:
"...a prohibition imposed on all distributors not to sell to certain categories of end users 
may not be restrictive of competition if such restraint is objectively necessary for reasons of 
safety or health related to the dangerous nature of the product in question."480
So, although there is considerable doubt about whether non-economic objectives can be 
balanced within article 81(1) there is increasingly reason to believe that they are. The first 
objective of Section 2 was to reinforce this point. That said, clarity would be significantly 
enhanced if the Community Courts and the Commission made a clear statement on this issue.
A second point should be highlighted in this regard. The objectives that have been discussed in 
article 81(1), both market integration and environmental protection, have operated in quite 
different ways. The former has acted to make an agreement that would not have been found to 
restrict competition, fall within article 81(1) o f  the Treaty. Environmental protection on the 
other hand, appears to have made an agreement that would have restricted competition fall 
outside article 81(1). The pros and cons o f this approach are discussed in Chapter Six.
478 See, for example, Commission, RCP ¡992, point 77 and SEC(92) 1986, Chapter D(iii). Although, Jans (2000), 
pages 275 and 276, suggests that these statements merely indicate that the competition rules apply to environmental 
agreements.
479 See the Commission submissions as reported by Advocate-General Léger, at page 1607 of his Opinion.
480 Although, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines are silent on balancing within article 81(1 ), as per Wouters.
- 1 2 4 -
Section 2’s second objective was to illustrate where the optimal balance fell in relation to the 
objectives covered. On the assumption that there is a balance, there have been too few cases to 
confidently assess where it might lie. More clarity emerges in relation to market integration as 
there have been far more cases in the area and the Commission has gone to greater efforts to 
provide explicit guidance here.
That said, compromise within article 81(1) has had a serious impact. In Wouters, the objective 
of protecting proper practice of the legal profession outweighed a restriction of competition, 
limiting production and technical development, that is expressly mentioned in article 81(1 Xb) of 
the Treaty. While environmental considerations did not outweigh a horizontal agreement to fix 
prices in VOTOB, the Commission, and possibly the ECJ, we await the judgment, seems to 
countenance the possibility that certain efficiency benefits might justify absolute territorial 
protection, which falls within article 81(1 Xe)-
3. TW O  R E L A T E D  Q U ESTIO N S
Section 3 discusses the two related questions that were highlighted in the Introduction to this 
chapter. Section 3.1. asks whether there are limits to article 81(l)'s balance; and, Section 3.2. 
asks why balancing takes place within article 81(1) as well as article 81(3)?
3.1 Are there limits to article 81(l)'s balance?
Section 2 argued that policy objectives are balanced within article 81(1) of the Treaty. A related 
issue is whether there are any limits to this balance. Assume that the optimal balance has been 
achieved between the two (or more) relevant policy objectives in the case in question, is this 
sufficient? By way of example, when the optimal balance has been assessed under the first test 
in article 81(3), three other tests must be fulfilled before exemption can be granted.481 No 
equivalent tests are listed in article 81(1), does this mean that only the optimal balance is 
relevant?
Due to the paucity o f caselaw and decisions one cannot be certain. In some matters, for 
example, ACEA, no other tests were imposed. This may be because the Commission claimed not 
to be balancing there. Other cases suggest that merely establishing that the optimal balance has 
been achieved is insufficient. For example, in Société Technique Minière, page 250, the ECJ 
held that:
"The competition in  question m ust be understood within the actual context in which it 
would occur in the absence o f the agreement in dispute. In particular it may be doubted 
whether there is an  interference with competition if the said agreement seems really 
necessary for the penetration o f a new  area by an undertaking."
481 The Matra Case, paragraph 85.
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Later, in Nungesser, the ECJ appeared to change the test somewhat, holding that, paragraph 57:
"...an undertaking established in another Member State which was not certain that it would 
not encounter competition from other licensees for the territory granted to it, or from the 
owner of the right himself, might be deterred from accepting the risk of cultivating and 
marketing that product; such a result would be damaging to the dissemination of a new 
technology and would prejudice competition in the Community between the new product 
and similar existing products.”
It is unclear from the judgment whether the difference in language is considered and relates to 
the specific objectives being weighed in the balance; or, whether Nungesser is intended to relax 
the earlier test. Since Nungesser, the Community Courts have reverted to the test outlined in 
Société Technique Minière and, increasingly, Nungesser looks like an aberration. For example, 
in institute o f Professional Representatives before the EPO v. Commission the CFI held that:
"...where it is not shown that the absolute prohibition of comparative advertising is 
objectively necessary in order to preserve the dignity and rules of conduct of the profession 
concerned, the applicant's argument is not capable of affecting the lawfulness of the 
Decision."482
As a result, on the facts, the CFI found that the Commission was right to find that the absolute 
prohibition breached article 81(1) o f the Treaty, paragraph 79. The Commission has adopted 
this test too. In relation to the VOTOB agreement, for example, it said:
"Although the Commission welcomes voluntary initiatives to improve the environmental 
conditions in a given sector, it has to ensure that undertakings competing in that sector do 
not resort to agreements which go beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal, to the 
detriment of competition."483
Likewise, in Commission Communication, UEFA rule on 'integrity\ paragraph 10, which was 
not a formal decision, the Commission said it was prepared to allow an agreement which 
contributed to legitimate objectives. However, it continued:
"In order to establish whether this preliminary conclusion can be upheld or not, the 
Commission has to know if such restrictions are limited to what is necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the UEFA club competitions and to ensure the uncertainty as to results. In other 
words, the Commission must confirm whether there are or not less restrictive means to 
achieve the same objective."
482 Case T -144/99 Institute o f Professional Representatives before the EPO v. Commission [2001], paragraph 78. 
Also see original Commission decision, EP1 Code o f Conduct and Commission, RCP 1999, pages 159 and 160 and 
the Gottrup-KIim Case, paragraph 35 " ... in order to escape the prohibition laid down in article 85(1) [now article 
81(1)] o f the Treaty, the restrictions imposed on members by the statutes o f co-operative purchasing associations 
must be limited to what is necessary to ensure that the co-operative functions properly and maintains its contractual 
power in relation to producers."
483 Commission, RCP 1992, point 177. Admittedly, it is unclear which part o f article 81 the Commission is referring 
to here. It could have been article 81(3), point 77 may imply that environmental issues are irrelevant in article 81(1). 
However, this is unlikely, see the earlier reference to Jans (2000) in Section 2 and, as noted above, environmental 
issues seem relevant in VOTOB.
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So, there is some evidence that, in addition to falling within the optimal balance, public policy 
objectives can only be accepted within article 81(1) where the restrictions on competition are 
necessary to achieve the objective, reflecting article 81(3)(a)'s reference to ’indispensable’. 
There is more recent support for this position from the ECJ. In Wouters the ECJ balanced public 
policy objectives within article 81(1) o f the Treaty, Chapter Two. Rules needed to ensure the 
proper practice o f the legal profession were weighed against a restriction on competition, using 
what seems to be a proportionality test.484
Let's briefly examine the ECJ's proportionality analysis in Wouters. The ECJ found a restriction 
o f  competition. This was the first interest in the balance. Then, paragraph 97 (cited in Chapter 
Two), the ECJ determined what the interests protected by the Bar Council rules were, see above. 
Next, it found that the 1993 Regulations were agreed with these interests in mind, paragraph 
105. Following that, the ECJ held that the 1993 Regulation could reasonably be considered 
necessary to achieve that objective in the Netherlands, paragraph 107. This is the first part o f 
proportionality test. Then, the ECJ held that the second part of the proportionality test was 
fulfilled. The ECJ's judgment here is quite weak, paragraph 108:
"...the Bar of the Netherlands is entitled to consider that the objectives pursued by the 1993 
Regulation cannot...be attained by less restrictive means..."
Finally, paragraph 109, the ECJ held "...it does not appear that the effects restrictive of 
competition such as those resulting for members of the Bar practising in the Netherlands from a 
regulation such as the 1993 Regulation go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure the 
proper practice o f the legal profession..." This is the final part of the proportionality test. As a 
result, paragraph 110, the ECJ concluded that the Dutch Bar Council's rule did not infringe 
article 81(1) of the Treaty.
One might ask whether the 'full-blown' proportionality test used in Wouters is the same as the 
earlier ’necessity' assessment discussed above?485 The proportionality test has two parts that 
have not been explicitly discussed in the caselaw seen above. First, it asks whether the measure 
is a useful, suitable, or effective means of achieving a legitimate aim or objective. However, this 
is probably relevant under article 81(1) too because, for example, in Glaxo Wellcome, the 
Commission did not weigh efficiency in the balance486 because it found that the agreement did
484 See, Baquero Cruz (2002), pages 152 and 153. De Burca (1993), page 113, reports the three parts of the 
proportionality test as: (1) was the measure a useful, suitable, or effective means of achieving a legitimate aim or 
objective? (2) was there a means of achieving that aim which would be less restrictive of the other interest (in our 
case competition)? (3) does the measure have an excessive or disproportionate effect on the other interest?
485 We might also ask whether the ECJ in Wouters applies the same test but to a different standard. It seems to have 
accepted the national assessments very readily. The interests in Wouters were national. Perhaps it was prepared to 
give the national authorities more leeway because of this? Chapter Seven discusses this point further.
486 Explicitly in article 81(3), but this might have been its implicit reason in article 81(1) too.
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not enhance it. In any event, this point is not normally explicitly argued in the proportionality 
test either because it is normally fulfilled. Secondly, the proportionality test also asks whether 
the measure has an excessive or disproportionate effect on the other interest? This is the direct 
balancing of interests, weighing environmental protection against economic efficiency, for 
example. Section 2 argued that such balancing takes place in article 81(1) of the Treaty.487 As a 
result, the balancing exercise within article 81(1) seems, at least, extremely similar to the 
proportionality test. This is unsurprising as the proportionality test features prominently in 
Community law.488
Some imply that there may be different limits to the article 81(1) balancing test. Whish, for 
example, believes that there is a link between the test that the Community Courts and 
Commission use here and the ancillaiy restraints doctrine.489 Whish distinguishes between two 
types o f ,ancillarity,.49° He classifies cases, such as Société Technique Minière and Nungesser, as 
instances o f commercial ancillarity. In these judgments the restrictions, which fell outside article 
81(1), were ancillaiy to a legitimate commercial operation. Whish distinguishes commercial 
ancillarity from judgments, such as Wouters, which he argues are based on regulatory 
ancillarity. He means that the restriction was not necessaiy for the execution of a  commercial 
transaction but rather was necessaiy in order to ensure a regulatory outcome. To ensure that the 
ultimate customers o f  legal services and the sound administration o f  justice were provided with 
the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience.491
If Whish is correct, it would potentially add492 two restrictions to the article 81(1) balance.493 
First, balancing within article 81(1) would only take place to achieve a regulatory end. This
487 For an explicit expression see, Commission decision, EPI Code o f Conduct, paragraph 40, "Even if  the 
Commission acknowledges that the merit o f the practitioner and the quality of services are essential elements o f the 
competition between members of a liberal profession, it considers that the term "competition" also covers other 
elements, such as fees...and advertising. The arguments presented by the EPI to the effect that these restrictions are 
necessary in order to ensure the profession's reputation do not justify obstructing access to clear and accurate 
information on the services in question, how much they cost and the conditions on which they are supplied so as to 
enable the client to choose freely which supplier o f services to engage, (my emphasis]"
m  Craig and de Burca (1998), pages 349-357 and De Burca (1993).
489 See also, Vossestein (2002), page 858. More generally on ancillary restraints see, Goyder (2003), pages 100-102; 
B&C (2001), paragraph 2-112 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 2.87-2.99.
490 Whish (2003), pages 117-124.
491 Forrester (2005) DRAFT, pages 16 and 17, suggests the inclusion o f  other factors in the article 81(1) test, such as 
non-discrimination and the majoritarian rule. However, these are merely suggestions and there is no evidence of 
them being applied so far.
492 1 say 'potentially add' because Whish (2003), page 119, says that the 'commercial ancillarity' that he refers to is a 
broader concept than the 'ancillary restraints doctrine' considered in Case T -l 12/99 Métropole télévision v. 
Commission [2001]. Î follow the CFI because it sought to explain the previous caselaw. Whish does not explain 
how his concept o f  ancillary restraint is broader than this. Perhaps, in line with Whish (2001), page 100 and 101 
(the last edition o f  this book where he discusses die issue) he believes that the ‘true* ancillary restraints test is 
whether the restrictions which seek to achieve a  legitimate purpose are proportionate? This is more like the test in 
Wouters, than that in Métropole télévision. That said, some of my arguments against using this doctrine apply to this
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might limit the types o f objective that could be balanced within article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Secondly, the restraint must be directly related, as well as necessary, to the implementation of a 
main operation.
It is not clear that the link with ancillary restraints doctrine is either helpful or appropriate. It is 
not helpful because the ancillary restraints doctrine is itself extremely imprecise, to the extent 
that Faull and Nikpay write that it begs more questions than it answers and is exceedingly 
difficult to apply.* 494 Linking Wovters and cases like it to the ancillary restraints doctrine may 
also be inappropriate. This is because Whish's categories of commercial restraints and 
regulatory restraints appear to be based on fundamentally different logic. In the CFI's words:
"If it is established that a restriction is directly related and necessary to achieving a main 
operation, the compatibility of that restriction with the competition rules must be examined 
with that of the main operation.
Thus, if the main operation does not fall within the scope of the prohibition laid down in 
article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty, the same holds for the restrictions directly 
related and necessary for that operation...If, on the other hand, the main operation is a 
restriction within the meaning of article 85(1) but benefits from an exemption under article 
85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty, that exemption also covers those ancillary 
restrictions."495
Therefore, the main operation must be examined under article 81(1) o f the Treaty. If  it falls 
outside that provision then any restrictions o f competition that are directly related to and 
necessary for achieving the main aim are also safe. The ECJ in Wovters did not assess whether 
the restraint was directly related to the legitimate aim496 and, crucially, it did not assess the 
legitimate aim itself under article 81(1) of the Treaty.497 Furthermore, as Whish accepts,498 the
stance too. They are that embracing the ancillary restraints doctrine may not: (1) be helpful as it is unclear; and (2) 
be appropriate because the idea of regulatory ancillarity is based on a different logic from that o f 'normal' 
ancillarity, see below.
49j Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision v. Commission [2001], paragraph 104, "In Community competition law the 
concept of'ancillary restriction' covers any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation 
o f a  main operation... "
494 Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 2.90-2.93. See also, Korah (2000), pages 63 and 64. For example, matters 
such as Case 161/84 Pronuptia v. Irmgard Schillgalis [1986], particularly paragraph 24, imply that this doctrine 
does not apply to all restraints. This view may change as a result of the appeal in Commission decision, Glaxo 
Wellcome and others, still pending.
495 Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision v. Commission [2001], paragraphs 115 and 116. See also, Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 28.
496 As we have seen, the ECJ assessed whether the restriction was a useful, suitable, o r effective means o f achieving 
the legitimate aim (the proper practice of the legal profession). It was even prepared to accept that there was not a 
means o f achieving that aim which would be less restrictive of competition, i.e. that it was 'necessary'.
497 The expressions 'ancillary', 'ancillary restraint' and 'directly related' are not used in the Wouters judgment
498 Whish (2003), page 121.
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ECJ in Wouters performed a balancing exercise. The CFI specifically rules that this does not 
take place in relation to ancillary restraints:
"...it would be wrong, when classifying ancillary restrictions, to interpret the requirement 
for objective necessity as implying a need to weigh the pro and anti-competitive effects of 
an agreement. Such an analysis can take place only in the specific framework of article 
85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."499
It may be better to view Wouters, and cases like it, as examples of balancing within article 81(1) 
of the Treaty, unrelated to the ancillary restraints doctrine. Furthermore, while one must 
probably show that the restriction:
• achieves the optimal balance; and
• is necessary to achieve the public policy objective;
there is no evidence of the parties having to show that competition has not been eliminated, nor 
that customers have got a fair share, as article 81(3) demands.500
3.2 Why does balancing take place within article 81(1) as well as article 81(3)?
Chapter Six argues that the best place for weighing non-economic objectives within article 81 of 
the Treaty is 81(3). Nevertheless, some balancing seems to occur in article 81(1). Why is this 
taking place there? As Whish writes, if  it were not for the procedural difficulties, analysis o f the 
policy objectives under article 81(3):
"...would seem to be the natural way to approach a case such as this, given the bifurcated 
structure of article 81."501
What is the procedural backdrop he was referring to and was it the relevant factor? The 
'agreements' at issue in Wouters (and Albany502) had not been notified to the Commission and 459
459 Case T -l 12/99 Métropole télévision v. Commission [2001], paragraph 107. Also see paragraphs 108-112 and 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 30.
500 Whish suggests that, in principle, Wouters'  reasoning could be applied to any regulatory rule adopted fo r the 
protection o f consumers. This argument is probably based on paragraph 97 of the judgment (that is the only place 
where 'consumers' is mentioned). However, as we have seen above, the rule may already be even wider than that, 
indeed this is also the implication of paragraph 97 too (which talks o f ensuring "...that the ultimate consumers of 
legal services and the sound administration o f justice are provided with the necessary guarantees..."). The 
Commission may have been balancing environmental requirements within article 81(1) in VOTOB, although, as 
stated above, this is unclear. In VOTOB the Commission looked at the benefit for society as a whole. Furthermore, 
as we saw above, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2), state " ...a  prohibition imposed on all 
distributors not to sell to certain categories o f end users may not be restrictive o f competition if such restraint is 
objectively necessary for reasons of safety or health related to the dangerous nature o f the product in question." The 
examination o f the effects is not limited to consumers.
WI Whish (2003), page 123.
S02 Cooke (2005) DRAFT, page 10 and 11, asks whether Albany was a one off. Would the result have been the same 
if decided-under article 81(3)? He believes that these public policy requirements could not fall within article 81(3); 
but why does Cooke find it easier to imply words into article 81(1) than 81(3)? He seems to explain why, page 10
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would have been void, article 81(2) of the Treaty.* 503 This would have caused a lot of uncertainty 
in relation to these and other professional regulations.504 By balancing in article 81(1), the ECJ 
ignored the letter o f the Treaty, but ensured that the referring court could achieve the 'right1 
result (or at least consider all relevant values505) when it decided the case at hand. Joliet insists 
that Community competition law has a tendency to interpret substantive law provisions in light 
of the procedural regulation, rather than adjusting the procedural framework to reflect the 
substantive rules.506 Perhaps for this reason the ECJ has been prepared to balance under article 
81(1), in extremis?
Now that those procedural rules are no longer in place, the notification regime has gone and the 
whole o f article 81 is directly applicable,507 can we expect to see the end of cases such as 
Wouters? The Commission casts some doubt on this conclusion.508 In at least two matters, 
Commission Communication, UEFA rule on 'integrity' and Commission decision, EPI Code o f 
Conduct the Commission was prepared to balance non-welfare objectives under article 81(1) 
when it could have used article 81(3) o f the Treaty. The ’precedent’ value o f these matters can be 
disputed.509 Particularly, when in matters such as Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome, the 
Commission seemed more prepared to discuss different objectives under article 81(3) when this 
was available. That said, as we have seen, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 
18(2), speaks of the consideration of health and other issues within article 81(1), under certain 
circumstances. These guidelines were written in light of the new procedural rules. Only time
"...it may well have been more difficult to embark on so radical a departure from existing jurisprudence." But, as 
explained in Chapters Two and Four, the departure would not have been so great.
503 They were horizontal agreements and did not fall within a block exemption. See, Regulation 17, article 9(1) and 
Case NV L’Oréal v. DeNieuwe [1980], paragraph 13. On what'void' means in this context see, Whish (2003), pages 
286-288; Goyder (2003), pages 138-140 and B&C (2001), Chapter 10.
SM Deards (2002), pages 624 and 625.
505 Wouters was decided at the same time as the Enron scandal, where accountants were found to have done ignored 
standards of conduct, Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 6. Perhaps the legal profession sought to distance itself from 
this?
506 Joliet (1967), page 174.
507 Regulation 1/2003, articles 1,5 and 6.
508 So do others, for example, Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 17, argues that Wouters "...w ill have descendants." See 
also, Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and Others v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman [1995], paragraph 77.
509 The UEFA matter did not go to a final decision. Perhaps the basis for the reasoning would have changed if it had? 
Commission decision, EPI Code o f Conduct was a final decision, that said, the Commission received the parties’ 
notification very late (it was sent in reply to a statement o f objections, see paragraphs 1 and 2 of the decision). 
Because exemption decisions could only apply from the moment of notification, Regulation 17, articles 4(1) and 
6(1), the agreements would have been void before then. This effect, which no longer holds after 1 May 2004, may 
have 'forced* the Commission to balance within article 81 ( 1 ) in way that it would no longer do today. On appeal, the 
CFI also accepted balancing in article 81(1), see above. It could have been motivated by the same reasons as the 
Commission.
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will tell whether, in fact, article S1 (1 )fs scope will be restricted in the future. Chapter Six 
explains why, in our view, mere-balancing should not take place within article 81(1) o f the 
Treaty.
3.3 Conclusion of Section 3
It is far from clear whether balancing is even taking place within article 81(1) of the Treaty. As 
a result, efforts to divine the content of further rules related to such balancing are fraught with 
difficulty and open to error. That said, there is at least an indication that where we wish to 
consider non-competition objectives within article 81, only those that are proportionate may be 
accepted.
As has been noted above, when balancing under article 81(3) four cumulative tests must be 
satisfied. This includes the two mentioned in relation to article 81(1), the pure balance and the 
necessity requirement, which together essentially make up the proportionality test. Does this 
mean that where a non-welfare objectives are balanced against competition under article 81(1), 
they are more likely to 'win' than when the same occurs under article 81(3)? No clear answer 
can be given at this stage, but it seems that while the institutions are less keen to balance under 
article 81(1), when this happens, non-economic objectives may be more likely to 'win'.510 The 
pros and cons of this outcome are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.
It remains to be seen whether Wouters and cases like it, will be repeated after 1 May 2004. If so, 
then this will likely strengthen the position of non-welfare objectives within the Treaty, 
compared to that of competition.
4. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER THREE
Chapter Six argues that the best place for a political balancing process is article 81(3) o f the 
Treaty. The Community Courts and the Commission have often said the same. This does not 
seems to accord with the reality o f the decision-making under article 81(1), so Chapter Three 
investigated further.
Chapter Three argues that a balancing process is taking place within article 81(1). That said, it 
does not seem to be widespread as yet, in the sense that it has not been applied to many 
objectives. Furthermore, factors such as environmental protection are rarely given much weight 
against the more entrenched article 81(1) objectives, such as, economic efficiency, economic 
freedom and market integration. Nevertheless, the balance does seem to shift somewhat in their 
presence. Finally, the four cumulative article 81(3) tests are not all applied within article 81(1) 
balancing. More concrete conclusions are impossible due to the lack of clarity in the cases and
510 Whish (2003), page 123.
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decisions. However, it may be helpful to list some general points that have arisen as a result of 
the discussion so far:
•  the Community Courts and the Commission should explicitly state whether public 
policy objectives can be balanced within article 81(1) of the Treaty.
If  they should be considered there then the Commission should explain:
•  which objectives can be balanced within article 81(1);
•  the content of each policy objective must be clearly stated.511 This helps us to ascertain:
o why the objective is being pursued. For example, if objective A is pursued to 
achieve objective B, then, when both arise in the same case and they appear to 
conflict, we should normally ignore the conflict and simply try to achieve 
objective B; and
o the importance of the objective, both in relation to its own qualitative important, 
but also because this might be enhanced where it also contributes to the 
achievement of other relevant objectives;
•  can balancing lead to a restriction of competition falling outside article 81(1) of the 
Treaty; as well as an agreement that does not restrict competition falling within that 
provision?
•  a clearer explanation of where the optimal balance lies between the relevant public 
policy objectives, as well as an explanation of why this is so, so this can be extrapolated 
out for other conflicts;512
•  if the optimal balance changes over time, for example, after a Treaty amendment, then 
this should be clarified by the Commission, or in the Treaty;
•  if per se rules are used, when balancing different objectives, these must be based on 
solid economic thinking. Furthermore, the fact that they are per se rules should be made 
clear, to discourage unnecessary litigation;
•  when it is appropriate to balance under article 81(1), as opposed to article 81(3) of the 
Treaty; and
511 See, for example, the Commission's comments regarding the lack of definition o f Community industrial policy in 
COM(90) 556, page 1.
512 This is particularly important as London says that there is not even agreement between DG Competition and DG 
Environment about where the balance is in environmental cases, London (2003), page 271.
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• whether article 81(3)'s four cumulative conditions must also be fulfilled when balancing 
under article 81(1) of the Treaty.
We now turn to the balancing under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Chapter Four examines mere- 
balancing; then, Chapter Five investigates a second method that the Commission uses to weigh 
different objectives, market-balancing.
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CHAPTER FOUR: HOW  IS THE BALANCE IMPLEMENTED? - MERE- 
BALANCING IN ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE TREATY
1. Introduction







2.7. Security of Energy Supply
2.8. Conclusion
3. What is the Balance?
4. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
Part B's Introduction said that two types of balancing take place: 'mere balancing* and 'market 
balancing*. Chapter Three analysed mere-balancing in relation to article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Chapter Four looks at mere-balancing within article 81(3) of the Treaty. Chapter Five considers 
the second type o f balancing, market-balancing.
Once it has been established that article 81(1) has been infringed513 then the agreement can be 
examined under article 81(3) of the Treaty.514 Public policy objectives may be (and have been) 
considered under article 81(3). As the CFI has emphasised:
"...in the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption 
under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty.,,SI5
In its analysis of mere-balancing under article 81(3)'s first test,516 Section 2 discusses how seven 
public policy objectives are weighed against restrictions o f competition. The objectives 
considered are: economic efficiency, Section 2.1.; market integration, Section 2.2.; 
environmental protection, Section 2.3.; consumer protection, Section 2.4.; culture, Section 2.5.; 
industrial policy, Section 2.6.; and the security o f the energy supply, Section 2.7. Article 81(3) 
o f the Treaty is used more frequently for mere-balancing than article 81(1). Many o f these
5,3 In order for the Commission to be considering article 81(3) of the Treaty, it must normally have shown that article 
81(1) has been infringed, see B&C (2001), paragraph 3-010 and Commission, Article 810) Guidelines, paragraph 
40.
514 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 11.
5,5 Joined Cases T-528/93, etc., Métropole Télévision v. Commission [1996], paragraph 118. See, also Chapter Two; 
Whish (2003), pages 152-156; Monti (2002); B&C (2001), paragraphs 3.042-3.045; Whish and Sufrin (2000), pages 
148-150; Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 2.129-2.153; Ehlermann (1998); Gerber (1994), page 140 and 
Bouterse (1994).
S16 Chapter Seven considers the presence of non-economic objectives within article 8 1 (3)’s other conditions.
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objectives are given a lot o f weight in article 81(3)'s balance. Section 3 examines the limits of 
the balance under article 81 (3).
Once again, the resolution of these questions is important in terms o f providing greater legal 
certainty to undertakings; and, helping the Member States’ courts and competition authorities to 
apply article 81 in an open and consistent manner.
2. COMPROMISE WITHIN ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE TREATY
2.1 Economic efficiency
While there is some debate about whether economic efficiency is relevant in an article 81(1) 
analysis, there is no such discussion in relation to article 81 as a whole. Although there are no 
references to the concept in the Community Courts’ article 81 jurisprudence517 the concept 
regularly occurs in the doctrine, see above, as well as in Commission Regulations and 
Notices.518
Economic efficiency carries a lot o f weight and is used in both a positive and a negative sense 
within article 81(3)’s balance. This means that if an agreement enhances economic efficiency 
then it is given extra weight in the balance. Agreements which are felt to reduce or undermine 
economic efficiency are less likely to be exempted, i.e. given negative weight in the balance. 
That said, many criticise the standard o f economic analysis in the cases and decisions519 and this 
could certainly be improved. The Commission is taking steps to do so, for example, with the 
appointment of the Chief Economist.
Chapter Five deals with economic efficiency in detail, as does the rest of Chapter Four. As a 
result, economic efficiency is not discussed separately here.
2.2 Market integration
Section 2.2. deals with article 81(3)’s market integration/ economic efficiency balance. Chapter 
Three discussed the goals of both the economic efficiency and market integration objectives. It 
was unclear what was meant by market integration and why it was pursued. The same lack of 
clarity is present in article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Market integration weighs heavily in the balance. 
Other objectives are also balanced against market integration within article 81(3), for example 
culture. These are examined later Section 2.
S1? With the exception o f  the Matra Case, paragraph 89, where the CFI merely summarises the parties' arguments.
518 See, for example, the New Motor Vehicle Block Exemption, recitals 4-6; the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption, 
recitals 5-7 and 13; Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 10, 27-29 and Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, paragraphs 13 and 33.




Under article 81(3) of the Treaty, attempts to impose absolute territorial protection through an 
agreement that appreciably affects trade between Member States will not normally be exempted 
and fines will likely be imposed.520 For example, the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption511 lists 
territorial protection as a hardcore restraint, preventing agreements containing absolute 
territorial protection from falling within it. Nor is absolute territorial protection acceptable under 
the New Technology Transfer Block Exemption, article 4. This was also the case under article 
81(1) of the Treaty, Chapter Three.
In Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome522 the parties argued that absolute territorial 
protection would increase consumer welfare, and contribute towards increased public health, 
industrial policy, economic and social cohesion and competitiveness, paragraphs 89-99. The 
Commission did not accept this argument on the facts. However, it did consider it in detail and, 
while its decision is slightly unclear on this point, see paragraphs 124 and 152 and page 186, it 
might well have allowed absolute territorial protection if it had been persuaded that this was 
justified on the merits.523
However, as with article 81(1), it is unclear whether economic arguments, such as Glaxo’s, will 
prevail. This is because we do not know why market integration is pursued. The Commission 
explains its position thus:524
"Market integration has also been promoted by current policy which ensures that 
distribution system s can never establish absolute territorial protection. Thus, even though 
the pro-competitive gains from granting territorial exclusivity are permitted, vertical 
agreements m ust still leave open the possibility o f alternative sources o f  supply. Markets 
cannot be sealed o ff  to prevent intermediaries exploiting price differences."
As we saw in relation to article 81(1), there are two possible reasons for such a statement. 
Either: (i) market integration is justified by the economic efficiency objective, and the 
Commission has merely created a per se rule, believing that absolute territorial protection nearly 
always undermines economic efficiency; or (ii) the absolute territorial protection prohibition is
520 The sole exception that 1 can find, and it relates only to indirect restrictions on exports to achieve absolute 
territorial protection, is Commission decision, Transocean Marine Paint Association (1967), page 14. This is an 
early exception to the general rule. Later Commission exemptions of this agreement did not allow absolute 
territorial protection, Commission decisions. Transocean Marine Paint Association (1974), page 20; Transocean 
Marine Paint Association (1980), paragraph 7 and Transocean Marine Paint Association (1988), paragraph 15. 
Commission decision, Sicasov, is not an exception to this rule as the purchasers in the relevant territory could 
export, see below.
521 The Vertical Restraints Block Exemption, recital 10 and article 4(b).
522 Now under appeal. Case C-168/01 P.
S2j Although such hope has been voiced before, Gyselen (1984), pages 649 and 650.
524 COM(96) 721, Executive Summary, page VII, paragraph 26. See also, Executive Summary, page VI; Case 27/77 
Tepea v. Commission [1978], paragraph 57.
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not purely based on an efficiency rationale* Perhaps it is based on consumer protection or 
integrationist grounds, see Chapter One?
An absolute prohibition is hard to justify under either head. In the Matra Case, the CFI held 
that:525
"...in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its 
effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid down in 
article 85(3) [now article 81(3» of the Treaty are satisfied..."
Unlike under article 81 (1) of the Treaty, per se rules are unacceptable under article 81 (3), unless 
they always achieve the optimal balance. Chapter One showed that an absolute prohibition on 
absolute territorial protection would not always be justified on economic efficiency, consumer 
protection or integrationist grounds.
More recently the Commission has been more clearly economic in its policy statements. As we 
saw above, the Commission, Vertical Guidelines emphasise an economic approach and do not 
prohibit absolute territorial protection per se. Furthermore, the Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines imply that market integration is there to achieve welfare ends.526 527 While the 
Commission seems convinced that absolute territorial protection is generally not efficient it is 
more open to persuasion. The ECJ's judgment in the appeal of Commission decision, Glaxo 
Wellcome should clarify these points* Perhaps the ECJ will define market integration in non­
economic terms? If not, the 'balance' should focus upon economic efficiency where absolute 
territorial protection is welfare enhancing, as there will not be a conflict at all.
As we have said before, absolute territorial protection is an extreme. Restrictions on both active 
and passive sales are possible under article 81(3) of the Treaty. This is not surprising because, to 
the extent that this is a balancing exercise, the less market integration is undermined, as 
formally defined, then the easier it should be to outweigh it. These more limited forms of 
territorial protection are more readily accepted here than under article 81(1).
Passive sales can sometimes be restricted. Although, as explained by the Commission, Vertical 
Guidelines, paragraph 50, this is not the case under the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption.521 
Nevertheless, it may well be possible to get an individual exemption if it could be shown that 
exemption were necessary in order to encourage the distributor to bear the costs o f entering a
525 The M atra Case, paragraph 85. Also see, for example, Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome, paragraph 153.
m  Paragraph 13. Furthermore, in its discussion o f the guideline's first condition, Section 3.2., the Commission 
focuses exclusively on efficiency issues. See also, paragraph 21.
527 The Vertical Restraints Block Exemption, article 4(b). The exceptions to this principle in article 4(b)-(d) are 
special cases, mainly related to selective distribution and are not exactly on pointalthough they do also relate to 
exclusive distribution.
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new product or geographic market.528 This is on the condition that the actors do not have too 
much market power in relation to customers and competitors.529 Under Commission, New 
Technology Transfer Block Exemption, the licensor can restrict his or her ability to make 
passive sales into a licensee's territoiy.530 Restrictions on passive sales by licensees into an 
exclusive territory reserved for the licensor are also possible;531 as are those into other licensees' 
territories.532 The Commission allows these restrictions on passive sales between a licensee and 
its licensor because:
"It is presumed that up to the market share threshold such restraints, where restrictive of 
competition, promote pro-competitive dissemination of technology and integration of such 
technology into the production assets of the licensee."533
It is easier to justify restrictions on passive sales under article 81(3) o f the Treaty than it was 
under article 81(1 ).534 This is partly because the Commission is more willing to accept a wider 
range o f economic efficiency arguments under article 81(3). This tendency may increase in the 
shadow of the Métropole télévision Case, see Chapters Three and Six.
As one might expect, exemption is even more likely for active sales restrictions (where there are 
no passive sales restrictions).535 Active sales bans are allowed under the Vertical Restraints
528 Sec the examples cited in Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 174.
529 See the examples cited in Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 163.
S3° Commission, Technology Transfer Guidelines, paragraph 99, up to the market share threshold of 30%. In relation 
to the market share thresholds see, Commission, New Technology Transfer Block Exemption, article 3.
531 Commission, New Technology Transfer Block Exemption, article 4(2)(bX0-
532 Where the territory has been allocated by the licensor to another licensee and this is the first two years that this 
other licensee is selling the contract products in that territory, article 4(2)(b)(ii). Non-reciprocal passive sales 
restrictions are also possible, even where the parties are competing undertakings, Commission, New Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption, article 4{lXc)(iv).
533 Commission, Technology Transfer Guidelines, paragraph 100. Similar reasons for the allowing the restriction 
between licensees too, see paragraph 101, " ...it is often the case that licensees would not enter into the licence 
agreement without protection for a certain period o f time against...passive sales into their territory by other 
licensees."
534 See, for example, Commission, Technology Transfer Guidelines, paragraph 101, "Restrictions on passive sales 
into the exclusive territoiy o f a licensee by other licensees... often fall outside article 81(1) for a period o f up to two 
years from the date on which the product incorporating the licensed technology was first put on the market in the 
exclusive territory by the licensee in question. However, to the extent that in individual cases such restrictions are 
caught by article 81(1) they are block-exempted."
53 s Some applaud the difference in approach to active and passive sales. They say that the main justification for 
territorial protection is to prevent free riders. As "...the most effective way for the free rider to use the marketing 
efforts o f another is through active sales...", allowing active sales and preventing passive sales makes sense, Monti 
(2002), page 1067. While this view holds under the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption, as we have seen, passive 
sales are allowed under Commission, New Technology Transfer Block Exemption, precisely because o f the free 
rider argument, see Commission, Technology Transfer Guidelines, paragraph 101. It is not clear that the distinction 
between the Commission's approach to active and passive sales is based purely on this reading of the free rider 
problem, but rather on a balance between policy objectives.
- 139 -
Block Exemption, where the restriction does not limit sales by the buyer's customers.536 While 
no explanation is given by the Commission as to why the balance should shift in favour of 
economic efficiency in this way, in a similar provision in the Exclusive Distribution Block 
Exemption, which the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption replaced, the Commission justified 
its position by saying, recitals 5 and 6:
"...exclusive distribution agreements lead in general to an improvement in distribution 
because the undertaking is able to concentrate its sales activities, does not need to maintain 
numerous business relations with a larger number of dealers and is able, by dealing with 
only one dealer, to overcome more easily distribution difficulties in international trade 
resulting from linguistic, legal and other differences;
...exclusive distribution agreements facilitate the promotion of sales of a product and lead 
to intensive marketing and to continuity of supplies while at the same time rationalizing 
distribution; whereas they stimulate competition between the products of different 
manufacturers; whereas the appointment of an exclusive distributor who will take over 
sales promotion, customer services and carrying of stocks is often the most effective way, 
and sometimes indeed the only way, for the manufacturer to enter a market and compete 
with other manufacturers already present; whereas this is particularly so in the case of small 
and medium-sized undertakings; whereas it must be left to the contracting parties to decide 
whether and to what extent they consider it desirable to incorporate in the agreements terms 
providing for the promotion of sales..."
These are efficiency arguments. Similar arguments are used in Commission, Vertical 
Guidelines, paragraphs 161-163.
Active sales can be restricted under Commission, New Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
even more easily than passive sales and they are not restricted in time.537
One example of the ease of justifying territorial protection under article 81(3), as opposed to 
article 81(1), can be found in Commission decision, Sicasov. Under the agreement, Sicasov 
groups together the breeders of plant varieties protected in France, paragraph 1. It is the only 
company in France to do this, paragraph 3. Among other things, Sicasov's role is to manage the 
plant varieties entrusted to it by its breeders. These breeders may give Sicasov the right to grant 
non-exclusive multiplication and sales licences or an exclusive production and sales concession, 
paragraph 2.
The Commission considered an obligation on licence holders not to export certified seeds 
directly from France for a period o f 4 years from the registration o f the variety in the common 
catalogue. The Commission said that this prevented licence holders both from conducting an 
active sales policy outside France and from meeting unsolicited demands from customers in
Sj6 Article 4(b). As long as the other provisions o f the block exemption are adhered to, for example the market share 
of the supplier must not exceed 30% o f the relevant market, article 2(1).
537 See, Commission, New Technology Transfer Block Exemption, article 4(2Xb).
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other Member States. This means that the only way that seeds can be exported is via a third 
party undertaking established in France, paragraph 62. The Commission found that this made 
purchases "...more difficult and less advantageous than those made direct from licence 
holders." This reduced competition in the other Member States in breach of article 81(1), 
paragraph 63.
The Commission then looked at article 81(3) and applied, by analogy, the Old Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption, paragraphs 70-73. The Commission felt that the prohibition on 
exporting certified seeds contributed to improving production and distribution and promoting 
technical and economic progress. Why? It explained, paragraph 74, that:
"First, it facilitates the dissemination of new varieties in Member States other than France 
by encouraging undertakings in those Member States to accept the risks involved in 
producing and/or marketing new varieties selected by the French breeders. Those firms will 
be more inclined to undertake the dissemination of new varieties if they can be certain that 
they will not have to contend with direct exports from France during the launch period. It is 
therefore appropriate to conclude that, during this period, French breeders should have the 
right to protect their licence holders and distributors (in Member States other than France) 
against direct competition from French licence holders by imposing on the latter contractual 
clauses prohibiting them from exporting certified seeds. Licence holders and distributors in 
Member States other than France, who will normally have a better knowledge of the 
respective markets than the French breeders, will be able to market seeds belonging to new 
varieties in optimum conditions and provide users with regular and adequate supplies.
Secondly, the export prohibition improves the organisation of the production and 
distribution of seeds in France by encouraging French licence holders to concentrate their 
efforts on French territory with a view to providing user farmers with regular and adequate 
supplies."
These benefits will be preserved as parallel exports from France are allowed, paragraph 75. The 
Commission also noted that the Old Technology Transfer Block Exemption allowed for the 
prohibition of active and passive sales, paragraph 74, which is the same under the new one, see 
above. The Commission added that there is no need to treat the holders o f plant breeders rights 
any differently from those holding any other intellectual property right, paragraph 51.
Why wasn't Sicasov cleared under article 81(1) of the Treaty, in the light of the similarities 
between the arguments used by the Commission in favour of exemption here and those used by 
the ECJ in favour of negative clearance in Nungesser, see Chapter Three? This is less important 
since 1 May 2004, although it is still relevant for certain purposes, such as the burden of 
proof.538 The issue is further discussed in Chapter Six.
Before concluding this part we should examine one more issue. Market integration is largely 
used as a negative factor to block what would otherwise be an acceptable agreement. Because of
S3< See, Commission Regulation 1/2003, article 2.
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this it is not normally examined alone in article 81(3), but rather in relation to another factor 
which it is being balanced against, such as economic efficiency or environmental protection.
However, there are some signs that the beneficial effects that an agreement allegedly has on 
market integration has, on occasion, been successfully argued in order to support an exemption 
which might otherwise not have been allowed, i.e. market integration can have positive weight 
in the balance too. One possible example o f this can be found in a Commission comfort letter, 
BDO Binder International. There the Commission held that an agreement between an 
international network o f accountancy firms fell within article 81(1) because it made it more 
likely that the parties would refer the case to the 'right* firm geographically rather than doing it 
themselves, although they were allowed to do the work themselves if  they wanted to under the 
agreement. However, the Commission found that article 81(3) was applicable. The article 81(1) 
interests were outweighed by the:
"...increased ability to compete on an international scale with larger competitors and of 
increased cross-border co-operation..."539
Without denying the relevance of industrial policy in this case, market integration seems to have 
a lot of positive weight in the balance as well.
2.2.2 Conclusion of Section 2.2.
Market integration is, to a large extent, being treated as formulaically as it was under article 
81(1) of the Treaty. There is still an absolute ban on absolute territorial protection. This makes 
little sense from either an economic or an integrationist perspective, especially where there is 
strong inter-brand competition. It is not even clear whether this position is based on a balancing 
on the merits or whether it is merely there to provide clarity because o f the belief that absolute 
territorial protection nearly always undermines consumer welfare. Such a ban is wrong in law.
The Commission seems more prepared to accept economic integration arguments outside of 
absolute territorial protection. Once again, one can clearly see the balance shifting as market 
integration, as formally defined, is infringed less and less. The Commission seems to see a 
conflict between market integration and economic efficiency. No satisfactory attempt is made to 
explain the weighting or to justify this shift.
Market integration is given more weight under article 81(1) than article 81(3). This may be 
because not all economic efficiency arguments are acceptable under article 81(1) o f the Treaty, 
post Métropole télévision. Commission decision, Sicasov shows that the Commission is willing
539 Commission, RCP 1991, page 335 and Press Release IP/91/602. See also, Commission decisions, Banque 
Nationale de Paris - Dresdner Bank, paragraph 18 and EBU/Eurovision, paragraph 61.
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to accept economic efficiency arguments within the framework o f article 81(3) to a degree that 
it is not willing to do in article 81 (I) of the Treaty.
Market integration has long been an important Treaty objective. It has been used to provide 
positive and negative weight in the balance. At one level at least, clarity is present with respect 
to absolute territorial protection, but it is difficult to understand the rationale for the 
Commission's position. As regards the rest, neither clarity nor justifications abound. The time 
has long since come to explain why market integration is important, whether there is a conflict 
with economic efficiency and to place this all within a formal balancing mechanism.
2.3 Environmental protection
While it is not exclusively the case, most environmental agreements are weighed in the balance 
against economic efficiency. Chapter One noted that these two objectives can conflict, where 
the environmental considerations have not been internalised.
Environmental protection is increasingly important in the balance.540 In Commission decisions 
from as far back as 1983541 it was considered within article 81(3) of the Treaty. However, in 
those decisions, made at around the time that environmental protection's policy-linking clause 
was added by the Single European Act 1987 (then article 130r(2)), environmental protection 
was probably a marginal consideration. Its inclusion does not seem to have had much influence 
on the outcome of the balance. The Maastricht Treaty 1992 inserted environmental protection 
into both articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty. In addition, the Treaty now aimed at a high level of 
environmental protection, article 130r(2). Furthermore, the wording of the policy-linking clause 
was beefed up. No longer was environmental policy merely a "component of other policies" but 
it was to be "integrated into the definition and implementation" of these other policies, article 
130r(2). Its growing importance in article 81’s balance is in line with its increasing influence as 
a Treaty objective.542 Shortly before the Maastricht Treaty's changes entered into effect, the 
Commission mentioned environmental protection within its article 81(3) analysis in at least 
three further decisions,543 there was also a 1994 decision which considered it.544 It has been 
considered in other decisions since then, see below. However, there is no indication that 
environmental protection has had decisive weight in these decisions. In other words, arguably,
540 Monti (2002), pages 1073-1075 and 1078, agrees.
541 Commission decisions, Carbon Gas Technologie, paragraph I of the article 81(3) discussion and BBC/Brawn 
Boveri, paragraph 23.
542 For a  more detailed discussion of the growing importance of environmental policy in the Treaty see, Wasmeier 
(2001), pages 160 and 161 and Vogelaar (1994), pages 530-534.
543 Commission decisions, Assurpol, paragraph 38; Ford/Volkswagen, paragraph 26 and Exxon/Shell, paragraph 68.
344 Commission decision, Philips-Osram, paragraphs 25-27.
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the environmental factor alone has not yet warranted exemption in a formal Commission 
decision, see below.
2.3.1 The Balance?
The Commission has said that improving the environment is regarded as a factor that 
contributes to improving production or distribution or to promoting economic or technical 
progress.545 It then tried to show the limit o f the weight o f  environmental protection in the 
balance. While accepting that these limits might be altered if  certain types of agreement were 
necessary to protect the environment, the Commission listed certain infringements on market 
integration and economic efficiency that environmental protection would not normally 
outweigh:
"The Commission intends, however, to remain very firm with regard to the principle of 
non-closure of national markets to foreign operators. It will also be very vigilant about 
problems of access by third parties to a system and about agreements which could result in 
a product being squeezed out of the market. The Commission also takes a negative view of 
multilateral tariff or price fixing resulting from an agreement on the environment; its 
assessment will, however, be on a case-by-case basis and will look at whether any such 
agreement is indispensable. The aim of environmental protection is not necessarily 
sufficient in itself to warrant an agreement on prices being regarded as indispensable."546
So, in 1995 the Commission delimited the outer boundaries o f the balance. Environmental 
protection considerations will not normally justify the closure of national markets, squeezing 
products out of the market and price fixing. It is not clear whether environmental protection will 
outweigh other restrictions on competition, but the implication is that it could.
545 Commission, RCP 1995, paragraph 85. See also, Gyselen (1994), pages 255 and 256. Commission, Horizontal 
Guidelines, paragraph 193, explains "Environmental agreements caught by article 81(1) may attain economic 
benefits which...outweigh their negative effects on competition. To fulfil this condition, there must be net benefits 
in terms of reduced environmental pressure resulting from the agreement, as compared to a baseline where no action 
is taken. In other words, the expected economic benefits must outweigh the costs." The Commission only refers to 
'economic benefits’. What about the environment? In fact, the Commission goes on to referto article 174(3) of the 
Treaty and European Parliament and Council Decision, review o f Towards Sustainability', article 7(d). These 
discuss the need to assess the costs and benefits o f  taking action, as well as developing economic evaluation 
techniques for doing so. So it seems that, when the Commission refers to 'economic benefits' in paragraph 193, it 
means ’net benefits in terms o f reduced environmental pressure resulting from the agreement*.
Based on Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 193, Komninos (2005) DRAFT, page 36, implies that 
'economic benefits’ means that the Commission only takes account o f  non-economic objectives which "...have 
economic parameters and can always be measured as such." Chapter Eight discusses the benefits of a common 
meter. Nevertheless, it also emphasises that these meters have limits. Decision-making cannot become a  simple sum 
and Komninos is undoubtedly going too far. How could one value, for example, the security of the energy supply? 
The Commission emphasises the need to develop economic evaluation techniques. However, non-economic 
objectives can be considered within article 81 even where this has not been done. In relation to impact assessments 
more generally the Commission, after explaining that it was desirable to quantify economic, social and 
environmental impacts in monetary terms, said "Impacts that cannot be expressed in quantitative or monetary terms 
should not, however, be seen as less important as they may contain aspects that are significant for the policy 
decision.", COM(2002) 276, page 16.
546 Commission, RCP 1995, paragraph 85.
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Before analysing the balance we should examine some Commission guidelines on assessing 
environmental protection's weight in the balance. In Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, 
paragraph 194, it said:
"...[the agreement's] costs include the effects of lessened competition along with 
compliance costs for economic operators and/or effects on third parties. The benefits might 
be assessed in two stages. Where consumers individually have a positive rate of return from 
the agreement under reasonable payback periods, there is no need for the aggregate 
environmental benefits to be objectively established. Otherwise, a cost-benefit analysis may 
be necessary to assess whether net benefits for consumers in general are likely under 
reasonable assumptions."
There is some confusion in the language, because paragraph 194 is probably discussing two 
article 81(3) tests, the optimal balance (test one) and that consumers must get a fair share of the 
resulting benefit (test two).547 These are not easy to separate out.
As regards environmental costs, the Commission considers effects on third parties (as well as 
the parties to the agreement and their customers). This is particularly important in relation to 
environmental issues. Why? Because, as externalities, see Chapter One, they are not adequately 
priced by the parties because they ignore the costs for third parties, which can be great.
In relation to the benefits side of the balance, the position is less clear. The Commission refers 
to two stages. First, do consumers individually have a positive rate of return under reasonable 
payback periods? EACEM  probably falls within this head, see below. The lifetime economic 
costs fell, as a result of the environmental improvements reducing electricity consumption. If 
this test is not fulfilled,548 then we must also check whether net benefits for consumers in 
general are likely. The first point is that if consumers as individuals do not benefit, then it is 
unlikely that consumers (collectively) will benefit either. This implies that paragraph 194's 
reference to 'net benefits for consumers in general* refers not to consumers o f the relevant 
products but to society at large. The Commission seems shy of admitting to the overtly political 
task of balancing public and private benefits. However, by assessing the benefits, for society as 
a whole, rather than the actual consumers of the product, the Commission makes it even easier 
to include non-welfare objectives in the balance.549 It is similar to adopting a total welfare 
approach for economic efficiency, i.e. not one based on a partial equilibrium, see Chapter Five.
547 Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 32-34. The same occurred in Commission decision, CECED, 
paragraphs 47-57. See also, Vedder (2003), pages 165-170.
548 Although in Commission decision, CECED, paragraphs 47-57, the Commission discussed both individual and 
collective effects. There the agreement fulfilled both categories. This seems unnecessary under the Commission, 
Horizontal Guidelines, as they now stand.
549 The Commission adopted a  similar argument in Press Release, IP/94/151.
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This distinction became more prominent in Commission decision, CECED, which seems to 
confirm this interpretation of'consumer*, see below.550 >
Now let's examine the balance. In Commission, RCP 1998, paragraph 130 and page 152, the 
Commission approved, by comfort letter, the agreement signed by the European Association of 
Consumer Electronics Manufacturera (EACEM) and sixteen of its members, all major 
manufacturers of television sets and video cassette recorders.551 The agreement was a voluntary 
commitment to reduce the electricity consumption o f this equipment when it is in stand-by 
mode. The manufacturers who entered the scheme undertook to meet certain targets on power 
use. This sort o f co-ordinated action, said the Commission, falls within article 81(1) of the 
Treaty.
The Commission exempted the agreement under article 81(3) o f the Treaty on the ground that 
the energy-saving and environmental benefits o f  the scheme clearly represented technical and 
economic progress. The energy saving could amount to 3.2 TWh a year from 2005, a report 
from DG XVII (Energy) said. The maximum cost per unit o f reducing the standby power use of 
a television or video recorder was estimated at ECU 3. No individual firm in the industry felt 
able to introduce lower power use in its products. Margins are low in the industry and the firms 
feared that consumers would not be prepared to pay in advance for power savings, although they 
would save money in the long term. The consumer electronics industry therefore devised the 
voluntary scheme in consultation with the Commission. This reduction in energy consumption, 
said DG Competition, will have a significant impact in terms of the management of energy 
resources, reductions in C 02 emissions and, accordingly, measures to counter global warming.
Environmental benefits clearly flow from this agreement. Furthermore, DG Competition may 
have focused exclusively on these benefits to justify exemption. Not only that, but the reason 
the consumer electronics industry gives for needing the agreement, the fact that these energy 
savings will push up the purchase price by about ECU 3 and that consumers would not be 
prepared to accept this, implies that environmental protection has been accepted in the face of 
static economic efficiency losses. Neither they nor the Commission feel able to trust consumers 
to take account o f the reduced operating costs o f  this equipment in their purchasing decisions.552
550 Although it should be stressed once more that the Commission has merged article 81(3)'s first and second tests 
here and the issue is unclear. Furthermore, one may question whether paragraph 194 should present the individual 
and society assessments as alternative, as opposed to cumulative, tests. This may undermine article 81(3)’s second 
test, see Chapter Seven.
551 Also see, the Commission's position in Spa Monopole/GDB, reported in Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 240.
552 This is in stark contrast to  the position adopted in Commission decision, CECED. There the Commission said, 
paragraph 12, “Electricity consumption is essential in the operation o f washing machines. It also accounts for a 
major share o f  operating costs during their long lifetime (12 years on average in the Community). Through the EC 
energy label, consumers can easily assess the cost-effectiveness of a choice amongst different energy categories. In
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Nevertheless, this voluntary agreement has not altered the balance that much. Although static 
allocative efficiency is reduced by the agreement, the effect should not be great because there is 
no agreement on price, nor is there agreement on which technology to adopt. Despite this, the 
matter was an important first step towards the use of environmental protection as a sole 
justification for exemption. That said, although the Commission noted the significant impact 
that the agreement would have, in terms of CO2 emissions, it also found that consumers would 
save in the long-term. This was because the small increase in the cost price was less than the 
future savings that they would make in their electricity bills. Economists prefer a dynamic, 
rather than a static, allocative efficiency assessment, see Chapter One. We do not have access to 
the Commission's data or reasoning and so it is difficult to be decisive, but it may be that the 
Commission decided the matter purely on economic grounds, i.e. that the lifetime cost would 
fall.
EACEM  should be compared with Commission decision, CECED, which came only two years 
later. CECED is, to our knowledge, the first formal Commission decision giving environmental 
protection significant importance in the balancing process.553 It concerned an agreement 
between CECED, a Brussels-based association comprising manufacturers of domestic 
appliances and national trade associations, and its members. These companies made up some 
95% of the relevant market. The agreement concerned the market for domestic washing 
machines in the EEA. The facts were discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.
The Commission found that the agreement breached article 81(1) as the parties to the agreement 
bound themselves "...to cease producing and/ or importing into the Community..." certain 
categories of washing machines on criteria relating to their energy efficiency, reducing 
consumer choice and technical diversity. The Commission believed that the agreement would 
appreciably raise production costs, probably also reducing demand. It would also reduce the 
demand for electricity. Despite this, the Commission cleared the agreement under article 81(3) 
o f the Treaty.
addition to economic factors, advertising campaigns often stress energy performance, thereby differentiating 
products, in a context where environmentally friendly products attract more and more consumers. Thus, energy- 
efficiency has an influence on purchasing decisions, and hence on competition between manufacturers." It could be 
that, as the Commission found in CEMEP (Press Release IP/00/508), no competition took place on this basis in 
relation to televisions and that is why it intervened. This is an unconvincing explanation however as some television 
adverts focus on energy efficiency.
553 Some believe that Commission decision, CECED was only decided on environmental grounds, see, for example, 
van Gerven (2004), page 430, "...the environmental benefits must have been decisive." and Lenz (2000), pages 65- 
71. Although, a lot of emphasis was placed on these considerations, other objectives were probably also relevant, 
see below. In fact, to my mind, no formal Commission decision has exempted based on environmental factors 
alone. Vedder (2003), pages 162-169 and Monti (2002), pages 1073-1075 and Vogelaar (1994), page 547, are 
ambiguous about what weight environmental protection has been given here, so far.
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The Commission raises two potential benefits. First, while these machines will cost more 
initially, money will be saved on electricity bills over their lifecycle. This argument is 
undermined by the fact that new energy efficient machines will not likely be introduced in the 
medium term. Secondly, the Commission notes the costs of otherwise avoiding the CO2 and SO2 
emissions which the energy efficiency will prevent. The Commission estimates that these 
savings will be some seven times greater than the additional consumer costs. This cannot be 
taken into account as an economic efficiency criterion because these costs have not yet been 
internalised. Therefore, the benefits can only be those of society, as opposed to the individual 
consumers concerned. Chapter Eight explains why invoking environmental considerations in 
this way is inappropriate.
2.3.2 Conclusion of Section 23 .
Where the environmental externality has not been internalised, environmental protection and 
economic efficiency can conflict. To the extent that these costs have not been internalised then 
some form o f balancing must take place.
Environmental protection is now an important element in the article 81(3) balance554 and the 
importance o f the Commission decision, CECED should not be overlooked. The parties agreed 
to limit production, in direct contravention o f article 81(lXb) of the Treaty5S5 A horizontal 
agreement this extensive is likely to result in the elimination o f a significant amount o f cheaper 
goods from the Community. This is likely to push up prices. Speculative dynamic efficiency 
gains have been chosen at the expense of concrete (at least short term) allocative efficiency 
losses.556 Not only that, but the environmental problem has not even been attacked at source, 
contrary to article 174(2) of the Treaty, i.e. the real problem is the effects o f electricity 
generation/ use. As the Commission accepts, this issue could be more efficiently reduced by 
looking at generators and not washing machines.557
Environmental protection was the Commission’s inspiration in CECED. What is debatable is 
whether environmental protection considerations have yet outweighed economic efficiency in
5S< Whish and Sufrin (2000), page 149, agree that environmental protection is given significant weight under article 
81(3), "Benefits to the environment led to an exemption..." There are many other examples o f environmental 
protection being considered in the balance. See, for example, Commission, RCP1998, paragraphs 133 and 134 and 
pages 152 and 153; Commission, RCP 2000, page 148; Commission, RCP 2001, page 36; Press Release, IP/01/850; 
Commission decision, DSD and others and Press Release, IP/01/1279.
555 Also see, the Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 2.
556 See, the Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 32.
557 Commission decision, CECED, paragraphs 51 and 55.
5SS See, Commission, RCP 2000, paragraph 97, "The Commission decision to exempt the agreement [In CECED] 
takes account o f this positive contribution to the ElTs environmental objectives, for the benefit of present and future 
generations."
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the balance. This seems unlikely. In CECED the Commission emphasised that the lifecycle 
costs had fallen.559 Nevertheless, environmental considerations will be increasingly important in 
article 81(3) in the future (as they were under article 81(1)). Why? First o f all, this seems to be 
the political will o f the Member States. The Declaration on article 175 o f the Treaty, attached to 
the Treaty o f Nice, said:
"The High Contracting Parties are determined to see the European Union play a leading 
role in promoting environmental protection in the Union and in international efforts 
pursuing the same objective at global level. Full use should be made of all possibilities 
offered by the Treaty with a view to pursuing this objective, including the use of incentives 
and instruments which are market-oriented and intended to promote sustainable 
development."
Perhaps because of this the way that the Commission conducts the balance now makes it easier 
to take account of factors such as environmental protection. For example, the Commission looks 
at the benefits to society as a whole, rather than just those 'directly affected' by the agreement.
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the Commission is becoming increasingly confident 
in its use of environmental protection in the balance; or at least the increasingly ready to rely 
upon it there. For example, in Commission decision, CECED the parties agreed to cease 
producing/ importing certain goods into the Community. As they make up some 95% of the 
relevant market this is likely to effectively squeeze such goods out o f the Community 
altogether. This is a significant amount of goods, some 10% o f washing machines sold in the 
Community at the date o f the agreement, paragraphs 13 and 66. This is in direct contravention 
o f  the Commission's own statements in this regard in 1995, see above.560
Thirdly, the two basic justifications that the Commission uses in EACEM  and CECED are 
essentially the same. First, while the agreement will increase the initial purchase price of the 
good, this will be compensated for by reduced electricity bills. Secondly, there will also be huge 
benefits to the environment However, in EACEM, the focus was very much on the first reason, 
which makes the environmental and economic efficiency conflict disappear. In CECED, while 
the Commission found that customers would make savings over the lifecycle of the washing 
machine, paragraph 52, it seems to put the greater emphasis on the greater benefits to society as 
a whole, paragraphs 47-51. Perhaps because the first set of benefits would not occur in the short 
term. This is also a sign of the Commission's growing confidence in environmental protection 
criteria.
559 In a more recent decision, Commission decision, ARGEV, ARO, a recycling scheme was cleared under 81(3) of the 
Treaty, but this also seems to have been done purely on economic considerations.
560 This implies that the balance may have shilled. The Commission may have also relaxed its original position in 
relation to agreements on prices and closure o f national markets to foreign operators, see Commission decision, 
Eco-Emballages and Biffpack. Difpakanâ Wastepack, in Commission, RCP 2000, page 148.
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Finally, in EACEM there was only a comfort letter while in CECED the Commission adopted a 
decision. This shows an increasingly confident Commission prepared to risk an appeal on an 
environmental point.
It is entirely appropriate to give environmental protection more weight, in light of the fact that a 
high level o f environmental protection is demanded in the Treaty, article 174(2) o f the Treaty, 
combined with environmental policy's policy-linking clause, article 6. This view is supported by 
the general absence o f the consideration o f such ’public goods' by businesses to date. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that, in the examples discussed, environmental 
protection is competing against economic efficiency. Here economic efficiency must, at the very 
least, be contributing towards the Community’s consumer protection, employment and 
industrial policies. These have increased in power and importance too. The lack of structure in 
the Commission’s balancing analysis may have led it to conduct an incomplete assessment, not 
giving enough weight to these other objectives. Time will tell.
2.4 Consumer protection561
The cases where consumer protection has been considered in article 81(1) of the Treaty are few 
and far between. This makes it hard to discern the weight that consumer protection would be 
given in the balance there, so Chapter Three essentially ignored it. Nor has consumer protection 
been expressly invoked many times within article 8I(3)'s balance.562 This part considers 
agreements where consumer protection conflicts with economic efficiency. First we briefly 
examine the consumer protection head itself.
2.4,1 Consumer Protection
Consumer protection has been defined extremely widely. Article 153(1) of the Treaty implies 
that the concept includes:
"...protecting the  health, safety and econom ic interests o f  consumers, as well 
as...prom oting th e ir  righ t to inform ation, education and to organise themselves in o rder to 
safeguard their interests."
Lane writes that while consumer protection has been recognised as a legitimate objective o f 
Community law, capable of justifying barriers to the free movement o f goods "...the Court has
561 For a more detailed analysis o f Community consumer protection see, Cseres (2004); Stuyck (2000); Weatherill 
(1997); Reich (1997); Averin and Lande (1996-7); Lonbay (1996) and Reich and Woodroffe (1994),
SS2 One reason may be that the second article 81(3) test says that agreements must allow "...consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit..." Perhaps consumer protection issues can be considered there? Chapter Seven discusses this 
provision. Sometimes the Commission collapses article 81(3)’s first two tests, 'technical or economic progress' and 
'a fair share o f the resulting benefit’, into the same discussion, for example, Commission decisions, CECED, 
paragraphs 47-57 and Visa International - Multilateral Interchange Fee, paragraphs 74-95 and Commission, 
Horizontal Guidelines.
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always given priority to the requirements o f the common/ internal market."563 In 1994 
Advocate-General Tesauro argued that:
"...considerations relating to consumer protection..,should not be unconnected with the 
interpretation of article 85 [now article 81] of the Treaty."564
Since then, we have seen the addition of article 153(2) of the Treaty, consumer protection's 
policy-linking clause. This was inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam and reads:
"Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Community policies and activities."
Consumer protection has, at times, been given positive weight in the article 81(3) balance, 
although only in conjunction with other factors.565 This part considers a decision where it was 
given negative weight.
2.4.2 The Balance?
In Commission decision, Grundig’s EC distribution system, the Commission (re)affirmed an 
article 81(3) exemption of an agreement between one of Europe's largest manufacturers of 
consumer electronics products equipment and its selective distributors.
According to the decision, the agreement contained two clauses that the Commission found 
restrictive of competition. An obligation on wholesalers and retailers to stock the entire range o f 
Grundig products and an obligation on retailers to display a representative selection o f these 
products, paragraph 35. The Commission said that these restrictions were justified by the nature 
of the products, paragraphs 36-41. It exempted the agreement. This is the end of the matter as 
far as the official decision is concerned, consumer protection was not discussed.
However, when discussing this decision, the Commission wrote:566
"...in the interests of better consumer protection, the Commission asked Grundig to amend 
its warranty terms so that, even where a defective item was purchased in another Member 
State, a consumer could have it repaired under warranty in the Member State in which he 
lived. To that end, Grundig intends to introduce a uniform, Europe-wide, contractual 
comprehensive warranty and has begun building up an appropriate network of repair shops.
It has undertaken, pending completion of the network, to honour all cross-border warranty 
claims on an ex gratia basis."
563 Lane (1993), pages 959 and 960.
564 Case C-376/92 Metro SB-Crofimarkte v. Cartier [1994], paragraph 33. Although Advocate-General Tesauro 
clearly refers to the whole o f article 81 in this quote the context of these comments imply that he is only really 
discussing article 81(1) o f the Treaty, see paragraphs 29 and 41 in particular. As mentioned above, this has not 
happened much within article 81(1).
565 See, for. example, Commission decision, CECED, paragraphs 47-57.
566 Commission, RC P1993, paragraph 243.
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The implication here is that, in the form originally notified to the Commission, the agreement 
contained an additional restriction o f competition for the purposes of article 81(1) o f the Treaty. 
Faulty Gnindig goods could only be repaired under warranty in the Member State in which they 
were originally purchased. Such a clause normally falls foul o f article 81(1).567
But what o f  the actual balance found in the Grundig's EC distribution system  decision? It seems 
that, originally, the Commission found at least three restrictions of competition. As we have 
seen, without the restriction relating to the guarantee, the agreement would have been justified 
under article 81(3) on the basis of pure economic efficiency criteria, paragraph 36. The fact that 
Grundig agreed to amend the agreement implies that without this change the exemption would 
not have been granted.
The implication is that in an agreement where the economic efficiency factors, in the 
Commission's mind, outweighed the restrictions on competition, the Commission was prepared 
to refuse an exemption purely on consumer protection grounds. No other grounds are mentioned 
in Commission, RCP 1993. This suggests that consumer protection can have a strong negative 
weight in the balance.
2.4.3 Conclusion of Section 2.4.
This matter raises a number of points. First, what was the motivation for preventing these types 
of clause? In ETA v. DKInvestment, paragraph 14, the ECJ said:
"A guarantee scheme under which a supplier of goods restricts the guarantee to customers 
of his exclusive distributor places the latter and the retailers to whom he sells in a 
privileged position as against parallel importers and distributors and must therefore be 
regarded as having the object or effect of restricting competition within the meaning of 
article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of die Treaty."
In this case, the issue was slightly different in that the guarantee only applied to customers of 
the exclusive distributor. In Grundigfs EC distribution system, as we have seen, the guarantee 
only applies in the country of purchase. However, what is interesting for our purposes is that 
both provisions affect consumer rights as well as affecting market integration, as formally 
defined.
In ETA v. D K  Investment, a case from 1985, the ECJ 'prohibited'568 the clause. It is not clear 
why, although the court uses the traditional language of the market integration objective. In the 
latter decision, of 1993, the Commission explicitly focused on consumer protection to justify its 
intervention, market integration is not mentioned. Does this change in emphasis point to a
567 See, Case 31/85 ETA Fabriques d'Ébauches v. DK Investment [1985] and Commission, Vertical Guidelines, 
paragraph 49.
568 As this was an article 234 reference the ECJ does not actually prohibit the clause in law.
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different basis for the challenge? In other words, now consumer protection justifies intervention, 
whereas before, although it is not clear, the ECJ’s motivation was probably market integration 
related? Alternatively, is the Commission explaining that the market integration objective 
justifies this action, based on the alleged consumer protection benefits, see Chapter Three?
Whichever of the last two suggestions is right, there is a hint o f an increase in importance (and 
weight?) of consumer protection in the balance, either directly, or as an underlying objective. 
The complete absence o f  a market intervention discussion, or language, in the Commission’s 
decision implies that consumer protection, and not market integration, was the objective upon 
which the Commission relied.569 The implication being that, at least since 1993, consumer 
protection is an article 81 objective in its own right.
The Commission is prepared to rely on consumer protection, although it has not got to the stage 
o f relying exclusively on this in a decision as yet.570 Is the growing influence of consumer 
protection justified and was it justified in 1993? Consumer protection was inserted into the 
Treaty as an article 3 objective (as well as given its own article demanding a high level of 
protection) by the Maastricht Treaty 1992, which came into force in November 1993. Just in 
time, the Grundig's EC distribution system decision was taken on 21 December 1993. Thus the 
basis for relying on consumer protection is certainly there. However, as Chapter One points out, 
consumer protection is probably better achieved by focusing on economic efficiency. This may 
mean that there should not be a conflict at all. Even if this is not the case here, efficient markets 
bring with them many other benefits, including many favoured within the Treaty. This should 
give economic efficiency a lot of weight. A proper balancing system would expressly take 
account of this. One wonders why, if  the Commission was confident o f  its balance, it did not 
include such reasoning in its decision.
On the other hand, before the Commission introduces consumer protection issues as a separate 
head into the balance, it should show that they are not already internalised by consumers. 
Although many o f these buyers will not be sophisticated, these products are often expensive and 
one might have expected purchasers to ensure that the warranty covered them, or at least take 
this issue into account when they considered the original purchase of the product. Presumably, 
people that buy from parallel importers get the product cheaper than those that buy directly from 
Grundig's distribution network?
Another point relates to the value of the policy-linking clauses. Consumer protection’s policy­
linking clause was not added until the Treaty o f Amsterdam in 1997. What effect do the policy-
569 One would be more hesitant to conclude this if  the ECJ in ETA v. DK Investment, had said that it based its decision 
purely on market integration grounds, but it was ambiguous. Furthermore, various Treaty revisions since 1985 have 
changed the optimal balance.
370 Note the comments in this regard in paragraph 19 of the decision, as opposed to the operative part
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linking clauses have? In Chapter Seven, we argue that they have an important legal certainty 
function. This is because they help litigants force the Commission to take account of these 
objectives in its decisions. But is that the limit o f their effectiveness? It may be that the 
consumer protection policy-linking clause gives the Commission the confidence to rely 
exclusively on this Treaty objective in its decisions in the future? As we will see when we look 
at the security of energy supply head, policy-linking clauses may be helpful, but are not 
necessary, in this regard.
In conclusion, consumer protection can be dealt with outside o f the specific balance with which 
this section deals, see Chapter Five. However, on occasion it has been considered within our 
framework. Consumer protection seems able to display either positive or negative weight in the 
balance. And, in at least one case, consumer protection was given significant weight in the 
balance. Indeed, it was given so much weight that it would have prevented the exemption of an 
agreement that was otherwise acceptable on economic efficiency grounds.
2.5 Culture571
Cultural issues have been raised in a number o f cases. This has generated a need to balance 
cultural policy against two other distinct Treaty objectives, namely market integration and 
economic efficiency.572 Lane says that the real threat to, especially the less widespread cultures, 
is often the "...homogenisation that is a necessary product o f the Treaty and the internal 
market."573 Indeed, culture has been defined as "...resistance to the transformation o f certain 
traditional values..."574 To the extent that economic efficiency leads to market integration there 
may be a conflict between it and cultural objectives too.575
2.5.1 Culture
Community action shall be aimed at, article 151(2) o f the Treaty:
"...improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and histoiy of the 
European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European 
significance; non-commercial cultural exchanges; artistic and literary creation, including in 
the audiovisual sector."576
Article 151(1) of the Treaty says:
571 For a more detailed analysts o f culture within the Community see, Tunney (2001); Bouterse (1994) and Loman, 
Mortelmans, Post and Watson (1992).
572 Fleming (2002), page 751.
573 Lane (1993), page 954.
574 Fukuyama (1992), page 215.
575 Although this need not always be the case, see Commission decisions, EBU/Eurovision System and Eurovision.
576 There is.ambiguity as to exactly what article 151 of the Treaty means by cultural protection, Tunney (2001), pages 
173-176.
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"The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, 
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage to the fore."577
Chapter Two noted that there is also a policy-linking clause for culture, article 151(4) of the 
Treaty. This stresses that:
"The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions 
of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its 
cultures."57*
Cultural issues have been discussed in several cases before the Community Courts, both 
implicitly579 and explicitly.580 There have been many "cultural battles" in the context of the free 
movement provisions.581 Article 30 of the Treaty allows restrictions on the free movement of 
goods for "...the protection o f national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological 
value... " Lane writes that close scrutiny o f the free movement cases shows that the Community 
courts are "...ill inclined to place the interests of cultural protection over those of the internal 
market."582 Nevertheless, the ECJ may have paid heed to article 151(4) o f the Treaty, which had 
just been added by the Maastricht Treaty, in the Keck and Mithouard case.583 This judgment 
paved the way for cultural "exceptions" to article 30.
Cultural arguments have also been raised under article 81(3) of the Treaty584 and the 
Commission maintains that:
"Protection of culture is...a concern that has always been borne in mind in applying the 
competition rules that effect businesses. Although culture is not mentioned by name in
577 There is a lot of confusion about exactly what is being promoted. Culture is not defined, see above, but it seems 
that one can take account o f Community (what is this?), national and regional cultures. Tunney notes that the word 
"flowering" is "...certainly different to preservation and conservation, and suggests a commitment to dynamism.", 
Tunney (2001), page 175.
578 Advocate-General La Pergola said of this provision, "...culture is regarded, in the Treaty, as a, so to speak, 
'transversal' value, which potentially touches upon every sector of activity within the Community.", Case C-42/97 
E uropean Parliament v. Council [1999], page 880.
579 Although it was not raised specifically in the case, the refusal to allow Germany to continue to apply its Beer 
Purity Laws in Case 178/84 Com m ission v. G erm any [1987] was considered an important attack on their culture.
Sï0 Case C -l80/89 Commission v. Ita ly [1991], particularly paragraph 20; Joined Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinéthèque v. 
Fédération nationale des ciném as français [1985], paragraphs 16,22 and 24.
5S1 For example, Case C -l 59/90 Society fo r  the Protection o f the Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan [1991].
582 Lane (1993), page 954, see also pages 955 and 956.
585 Case C-267 and 268/91 C rim inal proceedings against Bernard Keck and D aniel M ithouard [1993].
SM The Coöperatieve Strem sel Case, pages 861-862, the French Government appears to use cultural arguments in 
part; the Coditel Case, page 3391, the respondents used a purposive cultural argument; the VBVB and VBBB Case; 
possibly, Case T-66/89 Publishers Association v. Commission [1992], as the case turned on indispensability, 
apparently accepting the underlying cultural point, paragraph 72; and the Échirolles Case, Advocate-General Alber 
argues that article 151(4) means that "...the Community has to take cultural aspects into account in...the field of 
competition...", paragraph 41. France and Norway appear to agree, see, paragraph 15 o f the Opinion.
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articles 85 and 86 [now articles 81 and 82], the Commission takes account of the cultural 
dimension when investigating cases in the light of those provisions. Yet the aim is not to 
frame a policy on culture or to make value judgments in applying the provisions, but rather 
to assess business practices with due regard to the repercussions they could have on the 
Community's cultural policy."5®5
As it did in relation to environmental policy, the Commission seeks to disguise the fact that 
balancing these values demands political decisions. While competition law is certainly not the 
only, or the best, tool through which to pursue one’s cultural policy, Chapter One, the 
Commission cannot avoid making Value judgments' when applying the cultural provisions in 
article 81. Indeed, 'assessing business practices with due regard to the repercussions they could 
have on the Community’s cultural policy* means precisely weighing the benefit of these business 
practices against the cultural effects.
2.5.2 The Balance?
The principal area o f  tension is in relation to resale price maintenance agreements for books. 
Such systems are often characterised by the fact that the publisher, often in accord with other 
publishers, must fix a resale price for the books that he or she publishes and ensure that this is 
followed at the point o f retail sale.5*6 Such clauses are normally looked at in a negative light, 
because they restrict competition.58 687
The Commission accepted that there was a conflict between culture and market integration/ 
economic efficiency and sought to find a balance between these objectives in Commission, RCP 
1993, at paragraph 177:
"...the Commission is currently investigating several cases involving resale price 
maintenance systems for books. This is machinery set in place by publishers in several 
Member States to prevent active price competition between publishers and between 
booksellers...The Commission has in the past repeatedly stated that it could regard such 
resale price maintenance arrangements for books as compatible with the competition rules 
provided that they are individual and purely vertical. In other words, while the Commission 
cannot agree to prices, pricing methods or conditions of sale being established collectively 
by all publishers, it can, on the other hand, countenance a system whereby an individual 
publisher lays down the conditions of sale and retail prices of his books in the bookshops.
In taking such a stance, the Commission is of course conscious of the need to afford some 
form of protection to publishers of books produced in smaller print runs, a consideration 
which influences its analysis of the conditions of competition. A system of individual resale 
price maintenance protects booksellers offering ranges of books of more limited appeal, and 
therefore produced in smaller print runs. This is another important example of how the 
Commission reconciles the concerns of cultural policy with application of the competition 
rules.''
585 Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 175. See also paragraphs 176 and 177.
586 See, for example, the VBVB and VBBB Case, paragraph 6.
587 See Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraphs 47,111 and 112.
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Note that this is an important European competition rule that is potentially being breached. The 
ECJ has said that price competition is so important that it can never be eliminated.58® Here, the 
Commission is prepared to restrict competition for cultural aims. This could have a serious 
affect on the degree of price competition, see below.
However, the Council does not believe that the Commission's balance has gone far enough. This 
has led to some tension between these institutions. As discussed in Chapter Two, a Council 
decision, from 1997,589 addressed this specific issue. There the Council noted article 152 o f the 
Treaty, as well as the dual character of books as:
"...the bearers of cultural values and as merchandise; strongly emphasising the importance 
of a balanced assessment of the cultural and economic aspects of book..."
Then it went on to acknowledge:
"...the importance attached by a number of Member States to fixed book prices as a means 
of maintaining and promoting the diversity and broad accessibility of books, in the 
consumer's cultural interest, and that the national authorities of those Member States have 
accepted the restriction of competition entailed by fixed book prices on the grounds of 
general cultural importance..."
The Council goes on to note that it considers:
"...that the inclusion in the Treaty of article 128(4) [now article 151(4)] has created a new 
situation, the consequences of which must be clarified with respect to the application of 
Community competition rules to cross-border fixed book prices... "
The Council asks the Commission to study the significance of article 151(4) for the 
implementation o f article 81 of the Treaty that may concern cross-border fixed book prices. The 
Commission should indicate, if appropriate, the ways to enable fixed book-price regulations/ 
agreements within homogeneous linguistic areas to be applied, and submit its conclusions to the 
Council. By this it appears to ask the Commission to accept horizontal as well as vertical retail 
price maintenance agreements.
Commission, RCP 1997, refers to a study on publishing that the Commission had 
commissioned. This study has not been opened to the public. Nevertheless, there is a brief 
discussion, at page 361, where the Commission says:
The study had a number of questions to answer on the publishing market Its purpose was 
to find out whether systems of retail price maintenance for books have the positive impact 
on the market which their proponents believe they have. The questions put to the 
consultants concerned a number of European countries (with and without retail price 
maintenance) and the US and dealt with the growing number of publishers, concentration in
588 The M etro I  Case, paragraph 21.
5,9 Council, Decision on Fixed Book Prices. Also note European Parliament Resolution, on book prices in Germany 
and Austria and Council, Resolution on Fixed Book Prices 2.
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publishing, the structure of the retail sector, state subsidies for the book sector, the relation 
between hardback books and paperback books, price trends, title production and other 
matters. The study concludes that as far as the alleged advantages of book retail price 
maintenance are concerned, namely to further title production, to prevent concentration in 
publishing, to guarantee a wide network of retail outlets and to keep prices down for the 
consumer, countries with retail price maintenance have no substantial advantage, if any, 
over countries without”590
This study suggests that, at least in the area o f retail price maintenance for books, there is no 
conflict between cultural policy and market integration/ economic efficiency. In the light o f  this 
study will the Commission change the policy approach that it outlined in Commission, RCP 
1993, see above? The Commission's study's findings were contradicted by a European 
Parliament study.591 What will the Council (and the European Parliament) do next? What about 
the Member States' courts and competition authorities?
2.5.3 Conclusion of Section 2.5.
In conclusion, three points should be highlighted. First, the content o f  the cultural objective has 
not been properly debated, nor is the interaction between the objectives fully explained. There is 
ambiguity as to exactly what article 151 of the Treaty means by cultural protection. Even within 
that article there is a potential conflict between 'conservation and safeguarding' (presumably, the 
Member States’ cultures) and the 'need to improve the knowledge o f and dissemination of 
Member State cultures'. While fixed book prices may have been thought to achieve the former 
there is no discussion about how they affected the latter. This is particularly important because 
the dissemination o f  Member State cultures may coincide with the market integration 
objective.592 Not only that, but these agreements undermine economic efficiency (at least in the 
allocative sense) and this likely reduces market integration.
Secondly, cultural issues have been balanced against important Treaty objectives, namely 
market integration and economic efficiency. The Commission was unprepared to accept 
horizontal resale price maintenance. However, for cultural reasons, the Commission was 
prepared to exempt certain restrictions of competition, namely vertical resale price maintenance
590 In Press Release, IP/98/30, in relation to a matter where the Commission had released a statement o f objections, it 
noted, under the improvement o f production or distribution in article 81(3) o f the Treaty, that "It is not at all clear 
that the profits generated by the system o f  fixed prices are in fact being ploughed back into the production o f  less 
popular books with a  higher cultural value. And in countries where fixed prices have been abolished, such as 
Sweden, Belgium, Finland and the United Kingdom, the production and distribution of books have not been 
damaged."
591 European Parliament Resolution, on common book p rice-fix in g  across borders, which, on the basis o f article 95 of 
the Treaty, has issued a report containing a draft directive on the fixing o f book prices, European Parliament, R eport 
on Book Price F ixing D irective.
592 Commission decision, EBU /Eurovision System .
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between publishers and booksellers, that it would probably not otherwise have accepted.593 This 
gives cultural objectives a lot o f weight. This is particularly important because, while cultural 
considerations have always been present in the Treaty, culture as a general heading on its own, 
and its policy-linking clause, were only introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, the 
Treaty does not demand a high level of cultural protection. Sometimes, in order to protect a 
specific value, it must take priority over others that are normally considered more important 
This is a political task.
Finally, the 1997 Commission study suggests that the Council and the Member States are 
incorrect in their assertion that resale price maintenance for books furthers cultural aims in the 
way that they suggest. The Commission is less likely to tolerate exceptional distortions of 
competition in this area in future. This may lead to the revocation, at least in practice, o f the 
Commission's 1993 statement, cited above. However, it must be underlined that this is not 
because the balance has shifted between cultural and other values. The Commission 
increasingly believes that there is no conflict between these competing values in this area. It 
now seems to accept that the positive advantages that it believed flowed from book resale price 
maintenance have been shown not to flow at all. Indeed, the Commission seems to think that 
price competition is the best way to achieve the distribution o f books in line with cultural 
demands.
2.6 Industrial policy594
The Community's industrial policy is largely non-interventionist. Despite this, industrial policy 
has often been raised in the article 81(3) balance. When this has happened it has been given 
positive weight. The early cases often involved the restructuring o f entire industries.595 
Industrial policy has also been considered alongside other Treaty objectives as a tool to promote 
Community industry outside of a general restructuring.596 When this has happened, industrial 
policy has been an important, if not the dominant factor in article 81(3). Section 2.6. briefly 
examines the industrial policy head before investigating the balance in more detail.
593 See Commission, Vertical G uidelines, paragraphs 47, 111 and 112 and the Vertical S lo ck  Exemption Regulation, 
recital 10 and article 4(a). Exemption for vertical resale price maintenance is only granted exceptionally, B&C 
(2001), paragraph 7-077 and Commission decision, Nathan-Bricolux, paragraphs 110 and 111.
594 For a more detailed analysis o f industrial policy within the Community see, Amato (1997); Sauter (1997) and 
Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995).
595 Restructuring has been dealt with in detail elsewhere and is only referred to in passing below. Those requiring 
more detail see, Commission decisions, Synthetic Fibres and Stickling Baksteen, as well as Commission, RCP 1993, 
paragraphs 82, 84, 85(i), 88, 89, 158; European Parliament, Resolution on the Twenty-fourth Competition Report, 
paragraph 15; Bouterse (1994), Chapter 5 and Monti (2002), page 1072.
396 Ruth (2004), pages 2 and 3, "...the Community, and especially the Commission, have always pursued, with more 
or less rigour, a strategic competition policy." See also, pages 7 and 10.
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2.6.1 Industrial Policy 
Article 157(1) o f the Treaty says:
"The Community and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the Community’s industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a 
system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at: speeding up the 
adjustment of industry to structural changes; encouraging an environment favourable to 
initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Community, particularly 
small and medium-sized undertakings; encouraging an environment favourable to co­
operation between undertakings; fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of 
policies of innovation, research and technological development."
Community industrial policy is not (any longer597) principally598 aimed at the creation of 
'national’ giants. Rather, the Commission seeks to create a favourable business-friendly working 
environment.599 Importantly, article 157(3) o f the Treaty (added in 1992) adds:
"This Title shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the Community of any measure 
which could lead to a distortion of competition."
This is the only time that the Treaty makes such a statement. It is clearly an attempt to rule out 
the use of industrial policy in the article 81(3) balancing exercise,600 although possibly not an 
article 81(1) balance.601 The Commission has largely ignored it;602 industrial policy still affects 
the article 81(3) balance, although possibly less than it did before 1992. Whenever this happens, 
industrial policy has been an important,603 if  not the dominant factor604 in the article 81(3)
597 Amato (1997), pages 44,45 and 58-64.
59S Although the Commission's attitude in this area cannot be described as a pure liberal-market philosophy, see, 
Marques (2000), pages 49-56 and Chapters 3-5.
599 See, COM(90) 556, particularly page 5 and following; COM(93) 700 and Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 
156-161; RCP 1994, paragraphs 14 and 17, as well as Monti (2002), page 1072.
600 Sauter (1997), page 110.
601 If industrial policy were included in an article 81(1) balance and industrial policy 'won' then one may conclude 
that there was not a  restriction of competition at all. As a result, Title XVI of the Treaty would not have provided a 
basis for a measure leading to a distortion (or restriction) o f competition. Note however, that when the ECJ balanced 
under article 81(1) in the W outers Case, it found a restriction of competition, but decided that it was justified and so 
held that article 81(1) was not breached. The fact that it actually found a restriction o f competition in that case may 
undermine this argument.
602 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), pages 85, 92-95 and 106; Commission, RCP 1984, point 42 and RCP 1993, 
paragraph 158. This is ironic. It was the competition services of the Commission that pressed for the provision, 
Sauter (1997), page 112. Perhaps this indicates the political pressure they are under?
603 Examples include, Commission decisions, Carbon G as Technologie, paragraph 1 o f the 81(3) discussion and 
BBC/Brown Boveri, paragraph 23.
604 Examples include, Commission decisions, O ptical F ibres, paragraphs 59-61; O livetti/ Canon, paragraph 54; BD O  
Binder International, reported in Commission, RC P  1991, page 335; Philips~Thomson-Sagem , reported in 
Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 215; Commission decision, Exxon/Shell, paragraph 67; Lufthansa/ SAS, 
reported In Commission, RCP 1996, pages 120 and 121 and Commission decision, GEAE/ P&W. Also see, 
Commission Notice, G E C -Siem ens/ Plessey, paragraphs 20-22 and 27-29.
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exemption. It is one of the most important and heavily used objectives in the article 81(3) 
balance.605
The Commission stresses that both efficient markets and innovation are necessary for industrial 
progress.606 As well as contributing to industrial policy, increasing R&D should raise the 
standard of living and employment.607 Having said that, the Commission has made it clear that 
at a certain point the pursuit of R&D may undermine economic efficiency608 and thus industrial 
policy. The European Parliament and Council also point to a link between improved R&D and 
environmental protection.609
2.6.2 The Balance?
Industrial policy is considered within article 81(3) in the Matra Case. This CFI judgment was an 
appeal from Commission decision, FordV Volkswagen. This decision, discussed in Chapter Two, 
referred to an agreement between Ford and Volkswagen to build a manufacturing plant for 
MPVs in Portugal. Ford was the fifth largest supplier in the Community passenger car market 
(11.6%), Volkswagen was described as a leading supplier (15.5%). The joint venture would 
develop, engineer and manufacture the MPV. Ford and Volkswagen would distribute them 
separately under their own brand names.
The joint venture involved an investment of USD 2.9 billion, should last for about 10 years and 
would take place on a green-field site in Portugal. The parties sought an individual exemption 
on the grounds that the MPV market is low volume and neither party had been an important 
supplier in this market (Ford had about 1% and VW essentially had no share). The market was 
dominated by Renault (54.7%). The parties stressed that the vehicle would be produced in a new 
and modem plant and the joint venture would have positive effects on the infrastructure and 
employment in one of the poorest regions of the Community.
The Commission found a breach of article 81(1) because Ford and VW were important 
competitors in the European and world car markets and in view, paragraph 19 "...of their 
financial, technical and research capacities, either company is, in principle, capable of 
producing a MPV on its own." The Commission also felt that the joint venture would involve a 
substantial sharing of technical and other know how which could affect their behaviour on
605 See, for example, the Matra Case, discussed below, and Commission, RCP1993, paragraph 158.
606 COM(96) 463, page 8(iii). See also, Commission, RCP 1991, paragraphs 47-50. Hildebrand (2002), page 18, says 
"The crucial and complementary roles o f the technological and competition policies are both aimed at supporting 
the competitiveness o f European industry."
607 COM(90) 556, pages 3-5. Also see, COM(93) 632, pages 29 and 30 and Commission, RCP 1997, page 138.
608 See Chapter One.
609 See, European Parliament and Council Decision, review o f Towards Sustainabilityrecital 20, articles 2, 3(1X0 
and 8.
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neighbouring market segments, paragraph 21, although paragraph 38 contradicts this somewhat. 
This is important. The Commission obviously sees these as serious reductions in economic 
efficiency both on the relevant market, as well as others, in the long and short term.
The Commission granted an individual exemption. At paragraphs 24 and 25, it emphasised the 
fact that through co-operation the parties should be able to produce an advanced vehicle 
designed to meet the requirements o f European consumers. Co-operation will also lead to a 
rationalisation of the manufacturing process, enabling both parties to combine their know how 
in many areas.
When considering the exemption on appeal, the CFI raised two issues. First, the contention that 
the agreement would lead to a factory in Portugal which was the "...first application by a 
European car manufacturer of the enhanced form of manufacturing process recommended in 
1990 by the most authoritative researchers in the field o f technological development..." The 
CFI found that, paragraph 109:
"...an optimisation of the manufacturing process of that kind is in conformity with the 
meaning and purpose of the first of the four conditions laid down by article 85(3) [now 
81(3)] of the Treaty."
It is hard, though not impossible, for the CFI to adopt this position unless it reads article 81(3) 
in terms o f Community industrial policy, i.e. if  it is sufficient that the agreement leads to the 
improvement o f production or distribution in Europe, and/or leads to technical progress here. 
There was no technical progress on a worldwide scale, as better manufacturing processes 
already existed outside Europe.
This position is reaffirmed in paragraph 110 o f the CFI's decision, in relation to the second point 
that the agreement leads to technical improvements to the MPV itself. The CFI says that these 
improvements:
"...must be assessed in relation to the state of development of car construction techniques 
in Europe when the Decision was adopted."
Once again this seems very much like a European industrial policy argument. The agreement 
benefits from article 81(3) not because it leads to technical and production improvements as 
such; but because it leads to such improvement in Europe. This is particularly important in the 
context of this thesis. The Commission found, paragraphs 20 and 21 of its decision, that not 
only would the agreement lead to an extensive exchange and sharing o f technical know how but 
that:
"The development of new models is one of the key elements of competition in the car 
sector and a determining factor for the success of a manufacturer in the market. Any 
agreements between competitors likely to restrict this activity have to be regarded as
-162-
serious restrictions of competition. The joint development of an MPV by Ford and 
VW...means that neither...company would have any economic interest in independent 
activities in this field.,f
Therefore, not only is industrial policy the dominant, if not only factor,610 61to be considered 
under article 81(3) o f the Treaty; but, the Commission granted an exemption on this ground in 
the face of serious restrictions of competition, and allocative efficiency in particular. The CFI 
accepted this. This is the despite the direct wording of article 157(3) of the Treaty, see above.
Other decisions make the same point. For example, Commission decision, BT-MCI.6] 1 Under 
the agreement in BT-MCI, British Telecom (BT) was due to take a 20% stake in MCI, becoming 
the largest single shareholder, although it could not gain control. Newco (N) would be created, a 
joint venture company, to provide enhanced and value-added global telecommunications 
services to large companies. The parties would contribute their existing non-correspondent 
international network facilities to N, paragraph 2. N would initially focus on providing 
enhanced services, including data services, intelligent network services, global outsourcing 
services etc. These services were to be global in nature, paragraph 6. The Commission found 
that the current set o f national monopolies had not been able to achieve this adequately. Up until 
then telecom operators had co-operated to link their respective networks, customers were billed 
separately and in different countries, creating language and other problems, paragraph 7. BT and 
MCI hoped to take advantage of the liberalisation process and new technology to provide a 
better service, paragraphs 8-10.
The Commission found that the relevant geographic market was global, paragraph 15. There 
were a number of competitors, paragraph 17. The buyers are sophisticated and will only switch 
to N  if  it is cost-effective; they have a lot of bargaining power, paragraph 18.
The Commission found that both BT and MCI had the financial and technological capacities to 
enter the relevant market on their own. On top o f that, N*s creation means that they will 
probably not develop a competing set of products. The Commission found that: (i) the 
appointment of BT as exclusive distributor of N within the EEA; (ii) the obligation on the 
parties to get all global products from N; (iii) the non-compete provision as regards the activities 
o f N; and (iv) the "loss o f rights provision" as regards MCI's activities within the EEA meant 
that the agreement fell within article 81(1) of the Treaty, paragraphs 45^48.
The Commission found that N would provide cost savings which should generate competition 
between those seeking to supply it basic telecom transmission capacity, paragraph 53. N will
610 N o express efficiency arguments are raised except that production and development costs may fall. Even then no 
analysis is provided explaining why the reduction in competition caused by the elimination of one competitor will 
not increase prices.
611 See also, Commission decision, Atlas.
create a whole new network, which was considered to be a real advantage over the ’national 
systems plus’ approach used up until then, paragraph 53. The Commission said that the 
combination of BT and MCI technologies would allow N to offer new services more quickly, 
cheaply and of a more advanced nature than either parent could offer alone, paragraph 53. In 
addition, and as a related consequence, MCI technology, said to one of the best in the world, 
would be made available to N's European customers, paragraph 53. This would allow the 
Community's most important companies to achieve better telecom performance at the 
international level, which could enable them to better withstand global competition, paragraph 
53. The Commission's exemption decision is not limited in time.
It is more difficult to classify the Commission's arguments in this decision. It is a matter of 
emphasis. Did the Commission look to productive efficiencies and then examine some of their 
consequences; or, did it develop its industrial policy argument and then try to achieve it any 
which way? The second suggestion seems more accurate. Why? First, there is not a proper 
discussion of productive efficiencies and how these will be affected by the lessening of 
competition in the longer term. There is, debatably, no discussion of dynamic efficiencies at all, 
although the point that N will be able to create a new kind of network may undermine this point 
somewhat. Secondly, there is the relevance of the words "...as a related consequence..." These 
are suspicious and imply, in the context in which they are used, that the argument is used 
because of its consequence, that is, to get MCI technology in the EU.
This seems important to the Commission for two reasons. First, it will help BT, this is implicit. 
Secondly, it will help Community businesses "...to  better withstand global competition..." Note 
that it does not say respond to. "Withstand" has a defensive connotation. One might argue that 
the second point here is an economic efficiency (total welfare) point. Once again this is a matter 
of emphasis. Yet, the emphasis is on industrial policy per se, rather than achieving this through 
encouraging R&D and other goals through market-based mechanisms. The welfare discussion is 
non-existent. In any event it is difficult to understand the Commission's logic as N will also be 
supplying non-Community companies and it is hard to see why the improvement would accrue 
more strongly to Community undertakings. This is made particularly difficult because the 
Commission did not split up its arguments into cause (greater competition) and effect (more 
competitive EU companies). Rather it has mixed everything together, market and industrial 
policy points, in order to achieve an ultimate goal.
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2.6.3 Conclusion of Section 2.6.
It seems that industrial policy was one of, if not, the decisive Commission objectives in BT~ 
MCI. This is even clearer in Matra.612 Industrial policy, in the sense it is being used here, 
conflicts with economic efficiency. The Commission and the CFI were not seeking productive 
efficiency improvements per se. They were encouraging them because o f the advantages they 
would bring, in Europe, to European firms.
Where is the balance? In Ford/ Volkswagen, and apparently613 contraiy to the express wording 
of article 157(3) of the Treaty, the Commission allowed industrial policy to outweigh a serious 
restriction on competition.614 Industrial policy must, at times, have a lot of weight in the 
balance. Indeed, the weight that it has been given is even more spectacular given that, in matters 
such as these, the pursuit o f economic efficiency also has an industrial policy component. At 
least over the long-term, most economists would agree that the best form o f industrial policy is 
the pursuit of economic efficiency and efficient markets, see Chapter One. The Commission has 
accepted this;615 article 157(3) appears to do the same. This is not discussed by either the CFI, or 
the Commission.
Did they go too far? In order to assess this, one would have to find a suitable common meter. 
But what is the gain that the Commission and CFI were seeking to achieve in, for example, 
Matra? Not, says the CFI, the 15,000 jobs, so we can exclude them. Volkswagen's experience of 
using an advanced factory was one of the gains. This will mean more profits for Volkswagen, 
should they go into the balance? It also means more experience for European employees 
working in such an advanced factory. Does one price this as the cost of the course they went on 
to update their knowledge? The lack of clarity o f the content of the industrial policy goal makes 
such questions difficult to answer. And yet they are just the sort o f questions that need to be 
answerable if we are to have a rational policy, see Chapter Eight.
As we will see in Chapter Five, the Commission has also used the efficiency test itself to 
encourage industrial development. There is a similarity between the cases discussed here and 
those discussed in Chapter Five. As we saw in BT-MCI, the difference is often a matter of
612 A similar position can be seen in various block exemption regulations. See, for example, Commission, 
Specialisation Agreements Block Exemption and comments in Amato (1997), pages 63 and 64; and, Commission, 
Motor Vehicle Block Exemption and comments in Wesseling (2000), page 40 and LukofF(1986).
613 This argument is not watertight because article 157(3) o f the Treaty says that this title, i.e. Title XVI, cannot 
justify distortions of competition. It does not actually say that distortions o f competition cannot be justified for 
industrial policy reasons. However, such an interpretation would somewhat undermine the purpose of article 157(3).
614 Commission decision, FordV Volkswagen may also have been influenced by the employment and economic and 
social cohesion points mentioned later in the decision, see also, Wesseling (1997), page 39; Faufl and Nikpay 
(1999), paragraph 2.131 and Amato (1997), page 61. However, the CFI did not agree, see paragraphs 105-108 and 
139.
615 See, above, and for example, Commission, RCP1991, point 3 and COM(94) 319, pages 3 and 33.
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emphasis. Did the Commission base its decision on economic efficiency grounds or more 
explicitly on industrial policy grounds? Perhaps we have mis-interpreted the Commission in our 
reading of this decision? Perhaps these cases are best dealt with in Chapter Five? More clarity is 
needed in the decision-making practices of both institutions.
2.7 Security of Energy Supply
Security issues have not been raised very often within article 81. In essence, security issues 
normally either relate to the security o f the Community's energy supply, or, to that o f a 
particular Member State.
2.7.1 The Balance?
Sometimes, the protection of the security o f supply of certain important goods, should be given 
a lot of weight in the balance. One example o f such a situation is the International Energy 
Agency decisions,616 discussed in Chapter Two. The facts in brief. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) tries to respond to oil supply disruptions by ensuring the availability of oil stocks 
for use in emergencies, and by restraining demand and allocating available supplies among 
some 23 countries on an equitable basis according to an allocation process. The oil companies 
have agreed to co-operate with one another in the framework o f the International Energy 
Programme and in the operation of the IEA's emergency oil allocation system. The Commission 
found this to be a concerted practice as it had the object and effect of:
"...taking into account and balancing allocation rights and obligations. This means in some 
cases directing oil to destinations where it would not have gone had the IEA system not 
been activated."
The Commission added that there might also be an effect on market conditions from the 
information exchange that the oil companies operate within the framework of the IEA. Despite 
this, the Commission granted an individual exemption, saying, paragraph 6, that the changes 
aim at improving the reallocation process and that die concerted practice improves the 
distribution o f goods and promotes technical progress by reducing the inconvenience and 
sharing the difficulties in the case o f supply disruptions. As was made clear in the 1983 
decision, this could not be achieved by the market alone.
In times o f  crisis serious damage could be caused by disruptions to the oil supply. The 
Commission seems to have weighed the advantages of the market against the need for the 
security o f  supply in times of crisis. Security o f  supply carries a lot o f weight in the balance. 
Sufficient that, admittedly only in times o f crisis, it completely outweighs the market 
mechanism. The system may have an impact outside of times o f crisis too. This is another
616 Commission decisions, International Energy Agency (1994) and International Energy Agency (1983). See also, 
Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 95.
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example of an interest being taken into account by the Commission, and given heavy weight in 
the balance, without the need for a policy-linking clause.
The Commission is also prepared to consider security of supply in the balance outside of times 
of emergency. In at least two cases, the Commission gives weight to arguments that the 
agreements concerned would reduce the Community’s dependence on the supply of oil from 
non-Community sources.
Commission decision, Carbon Gas Technologie involved an agreement between three 
Community undertakings to set up a joint subsidiary, CGT, with one third of the shares each. 
CGT was there to develop, to an industrial standard, a combined pressure gasification process 
using run-of-mine coal, which has been summarily upgraded, and to commercially exploit this 
process. The German companies would make all their current and future know how available to 
CGT free of charge. There was also a five-year non-compete provision if  they left the joint 
venture, page 17. The Commission said that both clauses restricted competition, page 19.
The Commission conducted an article 81(3) analysis, in the course o f which it discussed a 
number of Treaty objectives, including industrial policy and environmental protection:
"...using the resulting gas in the conversion process of power stations should be more 
efficient and less harmful to the environment than direct combustion of coal. Mastery of 
this technology may also open up for that industry in the Community significant marketing 
opportunities outside the Community. This being so, the competent bodies have repeatedly 
stressed the need for the Community to concern itself as a matter of urgency with the 
development of coal liquefaction and gasification processes...The agreement contributes to 
the attainment of the above objectives.”
While these policy considerations were important in this case, the first objective that the 
Commission discusses, and the one that it seems to give the most weight, was security of 
supply:
"Since 1973, the importation of crude oil into the Community has, as regards availability 
and prices, been subject to recurrent or constant pressures. Even so, crude oil still accounts 
for almost 49% of the Community's primary energy consumption. Under these 
circumstances, it is essential that the degree of dependence on this source of energy be 
reduced and the pattern of the Community's energy supplies diversified through the 
harnessing of alternative energy sources, and in particular those available in the Community 
itself. In the search for greater diversification and self-sufficiency and hence greater 
stability of energy supplies in the Community, coal gasification in particular creates 
favourable conditions through improved exploitation of Community coal deposits."
The Commission acknowledged that each of the parties could have developed the technology 
alone. However, in an attempt to accelerate the development and production of this technology 
the Commission allowed short-term gains to prevail over the longer-term benefits of 
competition, even though competing technologies were being developed world-wide.
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The exemption decision is certainly more generous than the position under Commission, R&D 
Block Exemption that followed just two years after the decision. This regulation required 
discussion of the market shares of the parties and limits on the time of co-operation, under 
certain conditions, article 3, neither o f which are discussed by the Commission here.
The Commission is certainly being generous towards horizontal cartels in Commission decision, 
Carbon Gas Technologic. However, due to the fact that it involved, in part, an R&D agreement, 
one cannot be certain o f the weight given to these security o f supply issues. Industrial policy 
seems to have carried some weight. Furthermore, the Commission obliquely points to dynamic 
efficiency issues in the decision, see below.617
What would the Commission do if R&D and Community industrial policy were not at issue? In 
fact, just such a case has arisen in relation to the consideration o f national security issues under 
article 81(3). Once again this arose in the context o f security o f  supply. The matter is 
Commission decision, Jahrhundertvertrag and VIK-GVSt, which was discussed in Chapter Two. 
This decision involved a set of agreements where German electricity generating utilities and 
industrial producers of electricity for in-house consumption (auto-generators) agreed to 
purchase a specific amount of German coal for electricity generation. The agreements 
essentially form part o f an overall plan to support the German coal-mining industry and were 
promoted by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. The Jahrhundertvertrag is only 
applicable to companies within the former territory o f the Federal Republic of Germany before 
unification, paragraph 1. Two agreements form the basis of the Jahrhundertvertrag. Both were 
concluded in 1980, (i) the Supplementary Agreement on the sale o f German coal up to 1995, 
between the General Association o f the German Coalmining Industry (GVSt) and the 
Association o f the German Public Electricity Supply Industry (VDEW) (the GVSt/VDEW  
Agreement) and (ii) the Supplementary Agreement on the sale o f German coal to industrial 
producers o f electricity up to 1995, between GVSt and the Association o f Industrial Producers 
of Electricity (VEK) (the GVSt/VIK Agreement), paragraph 2.
The GVSt/VDEW Agreement replaced an earlier agreement (1977) between the parties. It lays 
down the arrangements for German coal-purchasing by the electricity supply companies 
between 1/1/1981 and 31/12/1995. The companies undertake to purchase and supply a fixed 
amount of coal, broken down into 5 year time frames. These commitments can be transferred to 
a limited extent, paragraphs 5 and 6. Prices are fixed by the Federal Minister for Economic 
Affairs, paragraph 7. The GVSt/VIK Agreement also replaced an earlier agreement (1977) 
between the parties. The parties agree (and did) to prevail upon their members to conclude 
individual contracts on coal procurement up to 31/12/1995, paragraph 8. There is an annual
6,7 The Commission adopted a  similar position in Commission decision, BBC/Brawn Boveri, paragraph 23.
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average delivery amount provided for in the agreement and individual supply agreements were 
concluded on the basis o f these amounts, paragraph 9. The price clause is similar to the 
GVSt/VDEW Agreement, paragraph 10.
The Commission noted that coal production in Germany had fallen over the last few decades 
and that price levels were a good deal higher than on the world market, paragraph 12. This 
meant that German coal needed state aids, paragraph 15.
The Commission found two restrictions of competition in the VDEW agreement. First, it 
committed the parties to long term purchases of German coal. The Commission found that the 
arrangement was exclusive, restricting competition between "...the electricity supply companies 
for primary energy sources." This means they have jointly deprived themselves of using other 
coal or other sources of power e.g. nuclear. Secondly, the purchasing commitment also means 
that to the extent that electricity is generated from the coal so purchased electricity imports from 
other member states are precluded, paragraph 24. The Commission also appears to find a 
restriction of competition in the GVSt/VIK Agreement, but it is not clear why, paragraph 27.
Nevertheless, the Commission exempted both agreements. They improve electricity generation 
and coal production as they provide certainty. Electricity cannot be stored so production and 
demand must be in constant equilibrium. Therefore, it is particularly important to safeguard the 
procurement of primary energy resources. The agreements do this for coal. "The supplementary 
agreements thus promote security of energy in the Federal Republic of Germany.", paragraph 
31, i.e. national security.
2.7.2 Conclusion of Section 2.7.
Commission decision, Jahrhundertvertrag and VIK-GVSt is interesting for a number of reasons. 
First, a Member State interest, as opposed to a Community interest, is taken into account in 
article 81.618 Secondly, the Commission's argument is strange. While it might be true to say that 
long term contracts were needed at this time of instability, it is hard to believe as these contracts 
had been in place since 1977 (and there is no mention of other Member States using them). 
Stability of electricity supply could just as well been achieved through the purchase o f non- 
German coal. Thirdly, the political nature of this case should not be underestimated. The 
German government was involved to a very high degree. This seems less a case of preserving 
electricity supply than protecting German mines and employment.619
618 Chapter Seven discusses this in more detail.
619 GVSt argued in this matter that the agreements were necessary as part o f Germany's strategy for safeguarding 
energy, preserving a national source of supply independent o f the international commodity markets; and that they 
were necessary for the prevention of social strife, speeding up the loss o f jobs in this industry "...might result in
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Nevertheless, just imagine that, on the facts, the Commission is right and these agreements did 
promote the- security o f energy in Germany, what weight has the Commission given this 
criterion in the balance? It has been given enormous weight. Agreements theoretically based on 
this objective have been allowed to undermine both economic efficiency and market integration 
(by sealing off the German market as they reduce the demand for electricity generated outside 
Germany, even that produced in other Member States). Perhaps the Commission did not base its 
decision exclusively on national security considerations. However, the fact that it is prepared to 
give that impression implies that it is comfortable with this balance. This means that it could 
decide this way again in other decisions too.
Third, from where did the Commission introduce this interest into the balance? It is not even 
referred to in the Treaty; although it might be considered necessary to achieve the article 2 
balance. There are no policy-linking clauses, no demands for a high or low level of 
consideration. It has come from nowhere and is allowed to displace fundamental article 81 
objectives, economic efficiency and market integration.620
The Community recognises the importance o f a secure supply of energy.621 The Commission is 
prepared to distort competition to ensure this security in times of need, but also to encourage 
technologies that are likely to reduce the reliance o f Europeans on oil imports. Even without the 
associated industrial policy and R&D considerations, the Commission may, in certain 
circumstances, undermine important Treaty objectives, such as economic efficiency and market 
integration, in order to achieve this end in the future. Once again, clarity could have been 
enhanced by the use o f a clear theoretical framework for the balancing.
2.8 Conclusion of Section 2
Article 81(3) o f the Treaty is an appropriate place to weigh competition considerations against 
other public policy objectives. Section 2 illustrated this process with reference to many of these 
objectives. This is not a  closed list, indeed Chapter Two refers to many more.
Unsurprisingly, many o f Section 2's observations were similar to those in Chapter Three. The 
balancing process is, as yet, unrefined. Many o f the objectives considered in article 81 are not 
clearly defined.622 Nor is there a proper analysis of their weight in the specific case and whether 
the achievement o f one aim might additionally contribute to another relevant goal (which should
tensions in the regions concerned that would be difficult to control." paragraph 19. Although these social arguments 
were not raised in the decision, they may have been decisive in the political importance o f this case for Germany.
620 Although, a combination o f political and economic factors have pushed the Commission to allow for the 
protection o f  national interests in other periods too, see Wesseling (2000), pages 36-41.
621 See, COM(95) 682, section 4.3.1.
622 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), pages 113 and 114.
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also affect the objective’s weight). In relation to environmental protection, the Commission has 
begun to explain how to assess an agreement's costs and benefits. There is a long wav to go. 
Legal certainty is promoted by explaining what you consider and how you consider it, Chapter 
Eight provides a framework for this.
The Commission is becoming increasingly open and confident in conducting what is, in effect, a 
political balancing act, under article 81(3) of the Treaty. However, it is more difficult to explain 
why the Commission has become more confident about using these other Treaty objectives. 
Also, why it is more prepared to rely on some objectives rather than others?
Many policy objectives have had a significant impact on the balance. Cultural considerations 
undermined price competition to a certain degree; the need to maintain the security of the 
energy supply seemed even more intrusive. Consumer protection and industrial policy both 
reduced economic efficiency in the short and medium term, undermining the fundamental 
parameters of competition in some industries. This has happened in relation to national as well 
as Community interests.
Most objectives have only been given positive weight in the balance. However, as the 
Commission becomes more open about the balance itself, there is some evidence that it is 
weighing a multiplicity of factors, some of which it gives positive and some of which have 
negative weight; see, for example, both market integration and consumer protection. Perhaps 
this is the birth of a full-blown public interest assessment, see Chapter Seven?
There is some evidence that the balance is changing over time, see market integration, 
environmental protection and consumer protection. This is understandable as the Treaty’s 
optimal balance is changing too. However, until the objectives are properly defined and their 
weight correctly apportioned, then these, quite proper, changes merely increase the test's lack of 
transparency.
There is some evidence that the balance may change between article 81(1) and (3). Certain 
objectives, such as economic efficiency, seem to be given more weight in the later provision. 
Although some explanation for this is given in Métropole télévision this cannot be the whole 
story, as the effect existed before then too. That said, some objectives have been given a lot of 
weight in article 81(1) as well. In light of Section 3 it may be better not to generalise 
conclusions about policy objective's actual weight in relation to article 81(3)'s balance here. One 
thing is certain though. Absolute per se rules, while acceptable under article 81(1). cannot be 
tolerated under article 81(3) o f the Treaty.
The final point relates to the distribution of power in the balancing process. The Commission is 
completely in charge, even after 1 May 2004, see Chapter Eight. It has been sensitive when
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considering certain Member State objectives within article 81(3). Yet, the Council and the 
European Parliament remained impotent in their attempts to force the Commission to change the 
weight it ascribed to cultural policy in the article 81(3) balance. Their efforts are even less likely 
to be rewarded since the Commission's 1997 study. As a result, the Council and the Parliament 
are considering using other policy tools to promote cultural values, which may be more 
efficient, see Chapter One. Although we commend the Commission's insistence on evidence to 
support the cultural claim, Chapter Seven advocates a more sensitive stance in relation to 
diagonal conflicts of this type.
3. WHAT IS THE BALANCE?
We have established that there is some kind o f balance taking place. But, this is not enough. 
What is the article 81(3) balance in each area? Due to a lack o f clarity in the decision-making 
process, this is hard to assess. The failure o f the Commission to adopt an explicit and rational 
balancing mechanism undermines the process and leads to ad hoc decision-making. The lack of 
control over this process by the Community Courts means that this is unlikely to be checked 
soon.
In some cases the Commission has explicitly said where the balance is. However, it is rarely so 
clear. We have only been able to find examples o f explicit balancing in the following areas:
• market integration/ economic efficiency, in relation to absolute territorial protection. 
Here the balance is unsatisfactory. Although there are clear statements on where the 
balance is, they are not justified by explanations about why it is there and indeed 
whether there is a conflict at all;
• the Commission also clearly defined the limits o f the balance in relation to cultural 
criteria. The Commission has never implemented this balance in the caselaw however;
•  the Commission provided examples of certain restrictions on competition with 
environm ental benefits that would not be tolerated. In later cases the Commission 
ignored the limits it first imposed. We do not know why. Has environmental protection 
some special status? Were the cases we discussed merely exceptions to the general rule, 
which remains unchanged? There has been no open discussion shedding light on this 
area.
So we turn to the process of induction from the caselaw. In order for this approach to provide 
clarity we need cases on both sides o f the balance, i.e. cases where, for example, environmental 
protection outweighs economic efficiency and cases where economic efficiency outweighs 
environmental protection. We can then deduce that the balance is somewhere between these 
extremes. In theory, with time, cases should fill the gaps building up a detailed picture of the
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balance. This has not happened either Implicit balancing is certainly more common than 
explicit balancing. But, thus far, there are not enough cases to generate a clear idea of where the 
balance lies. In part, this is due to the lack of clear reasoning in the decisions. More importantly, 
it is due to the complete absence of any cases where these non-economic Treat) objectives have 
’lost', see below.
What does the doctrine say?623 624Monti (2002) argues that there are three 'core' policies, 
economic freedom, economic efficiency and market integration. He describes how they interact, 
section 2.4. He goes on to discuss other policies that are also considered in article 81(3) of the 
Treaty, making it clear that he does not provide an exhaustive list. He looks at employment, 
industrial policy, environmental policy and consumer protection. Monti concludes that, pages 
1077 and 1078:
"The decisions show that there is a consistent approach when non-competition factors arc 
analysed: they are combined with the agreement’s contribution to the core values in article 
81 [economic freedom, economic efficiency and market integration]."614
In the next sentence Monti refines this point. He says, page 1078:
"The core values are never undermined, but on the other hand a reduction in competition is 
tolerated when this contributes to the achievement of a Community objective, provided that 
the agreement also improves efficiency, [my emphasis]”625
Monti seeks justification for the special status of the core policies in the caselaw. He argues that 
non-core objectives are only examined if efficiencies are first established, pages 1071 and 1072. 
But where is this justified? Monti provides no evidence to support this assertion when 
discussing employment. He does not raise the point in relation to environmental policy, which 
he believes is becoming more like a core policy; and his discussion of consumer policy focuses 
on other issues. In relation to industrial policy he relies on four Commission matters to support 
him. They are Optical Fibres, Olivetti/  Canon, GEC-Siemens/ Plessey and Continental■'
623 The limits o f the balance are rarely discussed in the English literature, Monti (2002), page 1058. Nevertheless, 
views similar to those proposed by him are often accepted uncritically, see, for example, Ariflo (20W), page 13; 
Bouterse (1994), page 104. Advocate-General Verloren Van Themaal, seems to adopt a similar position to Monti in 
the VBVB/VBBB Case, page 89, (although he may merely be referring to the subjective motivations of the parties 
here) but does not explain why the Treaty or the caselaw supports his conclusions.
624 See also Faull & Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.15 "...an anti-competitive agreement should not be allowed on 
environmental grounds alone." As Monti believes that economic freedom is considered in the article 81(1) analysis, 
he probably means that the first provision of article 81(3) demands that the agreement enhance either economic 
efficiency or market integration. This is unclear however, see below, where he only refers to economic efficiency 
considerations.
^  This more restrictive reading is also in line with a Monti makes earlier in the same paper, where he argues that in 
the language of'neo-classical economics' article 81(3)'s first condition’s wording "...refers to allocative, productive 
or dynamic efficiencies.", Monti (2002), page 1063.
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Michel in.626 Optical Fibres, Olivetti/  Canon or GEC-Siemens/ Plessey do not imply that 
efficiency requirements are needed. Although present in those cases the Commission does not 
say that without efficiency savings the parties would have lost. At paragraph 21 o f its 
Continental/ Michel in decision, the Commission found that it could not rely on Commission, 
R&D Block Exemption in the case at hand and, citing recital 10 o f that block exemption, said:
"The Commission must therefore examine whether the agreement may be granted an 
exemption by individual decision, such a decision having to take account n o t o n ly o f  th e  
criteria  sp e c ifie d  in  a r tic le  8 5 (3 ) [now article 81(3)], but also in particular of world 
competition and the particular circumstances prevailing in the manufacture of high- 
technology products. . [ m y  emphasis]
Does this support his case? Monti's argument focuses on the part in italics. He relies on the fact 
that the Commission seems to say that one looks first at the article 81(3) criteria. One does not 
consider industrial policy at this stage. If the agreement fulfils article 81(3), then one can look at 
additional criteria, such as industrial policy, page 1073. Alternatively, and this is where we 
disagree, the Commission may cite industrial policy (taking account o f world competition and 
the other factors mentioned in the underlined segment) as a particular kind of objective that can 
go into the article 81(3) balance. When the Commission is saying that one does not ’only take 
account* of the criteria specified in article 81(3) o f the Treaty, it may mean that one can take 
account o f other objectives within the balance, even if  they are not specifically mentioned there. 
The Commission made the same point in the M atra Case, for example.627
In order for Monti's reading o f this passage to be correct, the agreement must fulfil the article 
81(3) criteria first. Only then can industrial policy criteria be examined. However, if article 
81(3) has been fulfilled, then there is no reason to look any further. Or, in the words o f the 
Commission:
"The four conditions of article 81(3) are... exhaustive. When they are met the exception is 
applicable and may not be made dependant on any other condition."62*
This goes against Monti.629
Persuading the Commission that an exemption should be provided is probably easier if there are 
efficiency reasons in favour of the agreement. However, we have seen cases where the 
Commission granted exemptions based on, in the words o f Monti, non-core Treaty objectives,
6:6 Commission decisions, O ptical Fibres', O livetti/ Canon and C ontinental/ M ickelin. Also see, Commission Notice, 
G EC-Siem ens/ Plessey.
627 See, the M atra Case, paragraph 96 "...it is possible to take into account, as regards the contribution to economic 
and technical progress, factors other than those expressly mentioned in those provisions. They include, for example, 
the maintenance o f employment..."
628 Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 42. See also, Chapter Seven.
629 Note that Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines were released after the publication o f Monti (2002).
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where economic efficiency (let alone other core values) was not even discussed, for example 
culture,630 industrial policy631 and national security.632 This was sometimes even the case when 
the Commission thought that economic efficiency would be undermined, for example, consumer 
protection.633
There is no evidence that the core values must be combined with the other Treaty objectives. 
Nor has Monti adequately demonstrated that the core values cannot be undermined by a 'non- 
core' value. There are many examples o f 'non-core' policies justifying exemption on their own. 
One can even go further. In most cases it is not yet possible to see a balance at all.634 We saw 
above that where the Commission is going to rely on an implicit balance there have to be 
sufficient cases on both sides of the balance to allow us to discern where the balance is. This is 
not yet possible for a very surprising reason.
To our knowledge there are no Commission decisions635 where non economic efficiency 
objectives have been raised,636 and where the Commission accepted that they were in fact 
relevant, where these objectives did not win, i.e. tilt the balance in their favour.637 This is true in 
relation to all the objectives that we have investigated; see, for example, environmental 
protection,638 culture,639 public health,640 consumer protection641 and industrial policy.642
630 Where the Commission is prepared to allow vertical resale price maintenance, not on efficiency grounds, these are 
never discussed as a benefit, but as a way o f reconciling cultural concerns with the competition rules, Commission, 
RCP 1993, paragraph 177.
631 Industrial policy considerations are allowed to outweigh a serious restriction of competition, the Matra Case.
632 Where the Commission seemed prepared to allow national security considerations to justify what certainly appear 
to  be anti-competitive agreements, Commission decision, Jahrhundertvertrag and VIK-GVSt.
633 Exemption would likely have been refused on consumer protection grounds, even for an agreement that would 
have had positive economic efficiency effects, Commission decision, G ntndig's EC distribution system.
634 Rosenthal had a similar view some 10 years ago, see Rosenthal (1990), page 298. For a similar, and more recent 
view, in the area o f environmental protection, see London (2003), page 277; although note her attempts at divining 
what the rules are for recycling schemes, at page 276.
633 There are the Commission’s express statements on these issues, as illustrated above. However, these are obviously 
non-binding and, in practice, the Commission does not follow them itself see above.
636 A possible question mark must be raised here in respect of market integration. This is because it is unclear what 
this policy means, see Chapters One and Three. Under certain interpretations, however, one can also say that market 
integration always wins too.
637 It may be that, in some cases, the Commission forced the parties to renegotiate in the notification process, see, for 
example, Korah (1987). See below for notes on some cases where there was a clear discussion of the Commission's 
reasons for such changes. Also note, that the discussion here only considers article 81(3)'s first test, exemption has 
been prohibited under article 81(3)'s other three tests in relation to non-economic objectives.
638 For example, the Commission insisted on changes in a number of agreements. In Commission decision, Ansae, the 
Commission refused to allow an exemption based on environmental arguments. However, this was because, 
paragraph 23 "Those arguments have no bearing, however, on the marketing o f the product, with which alone 
Ansae's proposals arc concerned.", i.e. they were irrelevant The Commission also insisted on changes in 
Commission decision, Assurpol, paragraph 1. The reasons for these changes are not explained in the decision. Spa 
M onopoie/GDB, reported in Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 240, but here the Commission’s reasoning seems to
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This finding is completely counter-intuitive. One would have thought that these objectives 
would only have been raised in weak cases where the parties had no better arguments.643
have related to an elimination of competition, rather than the wrong balance. In Commission decision, Exxon/Shell, 
paragraphs 37-39, the Commission insisted on changes to the agreements but this was because the restrictions were 
not indispensable to achieve the article 81(3) objectives. In Commission decision Eco-Em ballages, paragraphs 60- 
62, the Commission insisted on changes but did not explain why these clauses would not have been exempted under 
article 81(3) o f the Treaty.
639 In relation to culture, the VBVB and VBBB Case, paragraphs 54-60, the ECJ merely found that the applicants had 
not shown on the merits that their agreement would contribute to technical or economic progress under article 81(3). 
The underlying Commission decision, Re VBBB and VBVB Agreement, found the same, paragraphs 48-53. For a 
contrary opinion to the one offered here see, Loman, Mortelmans, Post and Watson (1992), page 105 and, possibly, 
Bouterse (1994), page 104, which suggest that cultural arguments did not 'win' in the balance. Neither source 
explains why they believe this. In the Lecierc Case, the article 81 issue was not relevant because there was not an 
affect on trade between Member States, paragraph 20. In Commission decision, P ublishers Association - N et Book 
Agreement, paragraph 70 and following and the subsequent appeals, Case T-66/89. Publishers Association v. 
Commission [1992], paragraphs 71-118 and Case C-360/92P Publishers A ssociation v. Commission [1995], 
paragraphs 35-49, exemption was not granted because the restrictions were not indispensable. The Commission 
insisted on changes to the agreement in Commission decision, EBU/ Eurovision System , paragraphs 41-44, but the 
reason for this is not clear in the decision. In KVB - H anselsreglem ent, the Commission concluded that there was no 
effect on inter State trade, Press Release IP/99/668. In G erm an/ A ustrian Book Arrangem ents: Sam m elrevers the 
agreement did not apply to inter State trade, Press Release, IP/02/46I. Finally, in the ¿chirolles Case, the article 81 
issue was not relevant because there was held not to be an affect on trade between Member States, paragraph 24.
640 In relation to public health, some exemptions have been refused. In Commission decision, G rohe's distribution 
system , refusal was based on indispensability grounds, paragraph 20 and following, see also Commission decision, 
Ideal-Standard's distribution system , paragraph 19 and following. The Commission also insisted upon certain 
amendments in Commission decision, P asteur M erieux-M erck, paragraph 3. These appear to have been in order to 
restore competition to an appropriate level, see for example, paragraphs 102-113, but I question whether this 
decision was really about public health anyway. In many ways it looks like a pure economic analysis. The 
Commission also insisted that the duration o f  the co-operation be shortened in Commission decision, Asahi/Saint- 
Gobain, paragraphs 12, 30 and 31, but this was on indispensability grounds.
641 Does the ECJ undermine this argument when, in Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck v. 
Commission [1980], paragraphs 185, it says "...it may be seriously doubted whether the benefits in relation to 
distribution arising from the recommendation are likely sufficiently to compensate for the stringent restrictions 
which it imposes on competition in respect o f sales terms allowed the trade to justify the conclusion that it 
contributes to improving the distribution o f cigarettes within the meaning o f article 85(3) [now article 81(3)]."? It 
does not, for two reasons. First, at the beginning o f paragraph 185 the ECJ explains that this conclusion came as a 
result o f its previous discussion. This discussion related to the necessity o f the restrictions for achieving the desired 
social aim, article 81(3Xa). At paragraph 184 the ECJ found that the restrictions were not necessary to achieve the 
social aim. As a result, it is not surprising that the social aims were not ’likely sufficiently to compensate for the 
stringent restrictions'. In other words, the ECJ*s comments probably do not relate to the optimal balance. Secondly, 
the ECJ makes it clear at paragraph 186 that its comments are obiter dicta because the restrictions also eliminated 
competition.
642 In relation to industrial policy, Commission decision, O ptical F ibres, paragraphs 2-4, 57, 58 and 61-72, the 
Commission insisted on an amendment to the agreement as originally notified, but this seems to have been because 
the restrictions were not deemed indispensable. The fact that Coming was a  US entity may have also had an impact 
on the Commission. In Commission decision, Banque Nationale de Paris/  D resdner Bank, paragraph 15, the 
Commission insisted on an amendment to the agreement, but that seems to have been because they were worried 
about eliminating potential competition.
643 "I, for one, protest...against arguing too strongly upon public policy...It is never argued at all but when other 
points fail.", Burrough MJ, Richardson v. M ellish, 130 Eng. Rep 294,303.
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However, such a view underestimates the value of these other objectives in the Treaty system as 
a  whole and thus their weight in the balance.
For this reason, the caselaw and decision-making practice of the Commission and the 
Community Courts do not seem to support Monti. However, there are two more general 
criticisms of his view, based on principle. This is related to Monti's justification for treating 
economic freedom, efficiency and market integration as core article 81 aims.
M onti argues that because core factors are directly referred to in the text of article 81 
(competition and efficiency) or are central to the Community's task (market integration) then, 
prim a  faciey they should have more weight than other factors, page 1070. Is this right? No.644
First, article 81 (nor the Treaty as a whole) does not expressly refer to either economic freedom 
or efficiency. There is still enormous debate about what a restriction on competition actually is, 
see Chapter Six. Article 81(3)'s first condition does not expressly refer to economic efficiency 
either.645 Those drafting the Treaty could have been specific and used the terms economic 
efficiency and freedom if  they had agreed that they should have been considered in specific 
paragraphs. They did not. However, even if 'economic progress' were read as economic 
efficiency, Monti's point is undermined because "...improving the production or distribution of 
goods or...promoting technical or economic progress..." contains four separate heads. It is clear 
from the Treaty language that any one of these is sufficient646 to justify exemption. As one of 
the heads makes specific reference to 'economic progress’ there is an implication that the other 
heads refer to something different. This is particularly the case where these heads are interpreted 
broadly, as they are, see Chapter Two.647 In response to this, Monti might say that all four of 
article 81(3)'s first condition's heads refer to economic efficiency.64* However, it is far from 
clear that these heads only refer to economic efficiency, Chapter Two. To the extent that that
644 Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.15, justify their opinion that environmental considerations alone cannot 
outweigh a restriction o f competition by saying that the Treaty does not promote environmental protection over 
competition and because there are other ways of protecting the environment. In relation to the first point. Chapter 
Two argued there was no perm anent priority o f any Treaty objective over any other. That does not mean that 
sometimes one will triumph over another. If this were never the case then we could not resolve conflicts betw een 
objectives. If correct, this undermines their argument As regards their second point, the Treaty's structure and the 
policy-linking clauses indicate that its drafters did not follow this logic. The Community Courts have not mentioned 
such a  criterion to my knowledge. Chapter Seven discusses how one might be introduced.
645 Bouterse (1994), pages 127 and 128.
646 I f  there in sufficient quantity to outweigh the article 81(1) restriction and the other three article 81(3) conditions 
are fulfilled.
647 One might add that if  objectives such as market integration and economic efficiency are core values, why docs the 
Treaty, in Monti’s view, relegate them to mere exemption status? Monti believes that they are irrelevant under 
article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Furthermore, unless one considers why certain Treaty objectives are pursued then one 
cannot assess their weight in the balance. The justifications for market integration have changed. Its centrality to the 
Community’s task was altered in the transition from an economic to a broader Treary framew ork, sec Chapter One.
648 See the reference above to Monti (2002), page 1063.
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they do not refer exclusively to economic efficiency, see above, it is hard to understand how 
they can be read as demanding its presence in every case.
In any event, and this is the most important point, strict reliance on the wording of article 81 is 
not in line with the Community Courts' method of Treaty interpretation. Monti understands this. 
He believes that the approach he advocates:
"...respects the primacy of the core aims of article 81 while giving appropriate weight to 
the significance of other Community policies."649
One might question this. Before being exempted under article 81(3), agreements must fulfil 
three other tests. These are designed to ensure that sufficient weight is given to competition and 
consumer interests. Adding an additional requirement into article 81(3)’s first condition seems 
excessive. It also undermines article 81(3)'s structure somewhat, due to the presence of these 
other tests. Furthermore, Monti’s position does not properly reflect the teleological method o f 
interpretation. As Chapter Two argued, instead of placing emphasis on a provision's actual 
wording, stress is normally placed upon its structure and place within the Treaty hierarchy. 
Provisions must be interpreted in light of the Treaty as a whole. This is different from Monti's 
insistence on the primacy o f article 81's core aims. There is little evidence to show that the 
Treaty permanently prioritises650 any objectives in the way Monti advocates, see Chapter 
Two.651
The Community Courts have never held that article 81(3)'s first condition demands that some 
economic efficiency be present. Quite the contrary. As we saw in Chapter Two, the CFI has said 
many public interest objectives can be considered there. As we saw, in cases such as the Matra 
Case, the CFI has probably based its assessment entirely on industrial policy grounds.
Market integration, economic freedom and economic efficiency are important Community 
objectives. They are key in Community competition law and are referred to in the majority o f 
cases. The Treaty does not permanently prioritise other non-economic objectives over these 
values,652 even where there is a policy-linking clause.653 That does not mean that non-economic 
policy objectives cannot occasionally override these 'core* objectives. The Community Courts
649 Monti (2002), page 1071.
650 Although Monti's core objectives are o f particular importance in the Treaty hierarchy o f values in most cases.
651 This is not to argue that the competition provisions do not emphasise, for example, economic efficiency more 
than, for example, the Treaty provisions relating to environmental protection (which emphasise environmental 
protection more than the competition provisions). Indeed, I argue for just such an emphasis in Chapter Six. 
However, this is different from arguing, as Monti does, that certain objectives permanently trump other objectives 
within article 81.
652 There are some limited exceptions to this broad statement, see Chapter Two.
653 In relation to environmental protection, for example, see Jans (2000), pages 18 and 19 and Krämer (2000), page 
15.
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read the Treaty holistically. They interpret each Treaty article in light of the Treaty as a whole. 
This is due to the structure o f the Treaty itself, as well as the presence o f several policy-linking 
clauses, see Chapter Two. This understanding o f the Treaty, which is dominant in Community 
law, is incompatible with Monti's view that certain core values always trump non-core values, 
and can never be trumped by them (unless the non-core value is accompanied by another core 
value). The Treaty as a whole does not prioritise these three objectives (or any others) to the 
extent that Monti suggests.654 Nor do the Community Courts' caselaw655 or the Commission's 
decisions, see above. Politically it is inconceivable that the 'core' objectives could always ride 
roughshod over everything else, see Chapter One. The emphasis in the Community Courts' 
caselaw that the context must be taken into account in each case makes it almost impossible to 
permanently prioritise these three objectives in the way Monti suggests. Why? There are times 
when consumer protection, environmental protection or the security o f the energy supply, for 
example, are more important than economic efficiency. We have seen examples of this above.
To recap, no objectives can permanently trump other relevant objectives. Outside o f  this 
extreme, the Treaty, Community Courts' caselaw and Commission decisions provide little help 
about where the balance will normally lie (because there are no decisions where non-economic 
objectives are 'beaten'). What factors are important when deciding whether an objective will 
justify exemption? This is not at all clear. Those drafting the Treaty tried to give some guidance 
by including certain objectives within articles 2 and 3. They also inserted a number of policy 
linking clauses into the Treaty. Within some of those they added that 'a high level of protection' 
was to be achieved, in others they did not None of these distinctions are reflected in the 
caselaw, thus far.
Environmental protection must be given a high level of protection and has not unambiguously 
outweighed economic efficiency in a decision to date. Consumer protection need not be 
achieved to a high level and yet it has outweighed economic efficiency too. Furthermore, the 
Treaty specifically states that Title XVI, industrial Policy, should not provide a basis for 
distorting competition. And yet, industrial policy is one of the objectives that appears most 
regularly in article 81(3) discussions. Another strong article 81 objective, security of energy
654 Amato argues that the Maastricht Treaty affirms competition as an autonomous and fundamental principle, Amato 
(1997), page 45. Perhaps, but as the ECJ explained in the Echirolles Case, see Chapter Two, this does not impose 
unconditional obligations on Member States, nor we argued there, on the Community as a  whole.
655 When discussing the Matra Case, for example, Amato says "Over and above the substance of the decision, then, 
the principles of argument that result show surprising permeability of the antitrust principles, which are hybridised 
and weakened by the joint presence of industrial policy and social cohesion objectives. The original subsidiarity o f 
the competition principle in relation to other principles laid down by the Treaty thus displays continuing vitality that 
goes well beyond the capacity for these principles to act as a merely external limit, going instead as far as corroding 
the sense and logic of the antitrust machinery from within.", Amato (1997), page 62, see also page 114. Also note, 
Jebsen arid Stevens (1995-6), page 513, "The underlying assumptions of EU competition law do not make 
efficiency the sole, or even principal, criterion." Also see Chapter Two.
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supply, barely features in the Treaty and has no policy-linking clause at all. Nor, does the fact 
that certain Treaty objectives are areas of exclusive Member State competence seem to have 
made the Commission 'more generous' about weighing these issues in the balance. Indeed, the 
only clear constant seems to be that over time the Commission becomes increasingly bold about 
relying on these 'non-economic* objectives.
So what o f the future? A pattern is evolving. First, the Commission introduces an objective in a 
comfort letter, reporting it in its annual Reports on Competition Policy. Then it introduces it into 
a decision, but opaquely and in addition to other, well-established objectives. Then it appears on 
its own, but the decision is vague, giving the impression that it may have been decided on other 
grounds too. Finally, it stands alone.
The Commission should take account of the various Treaty objectives in the article 81(3) 
balance in light of the importance given to these objectives in the Treaty. Objectives like 
environmental protection should be given a high weight in the balance, objectives like culture, 
should be given less weight. Those amending the Treaty could give the Commission more help 
in this regard. They could define the weight to be given to economic efficiency, for example, as 
well as defining the non-economic objectives more clearly. They could also explain why certain 
objectives are being pursued, such as market integration. This would help establish when 
conflicts occur. Chapter Eight discusses this in more detail.
The result o f these suggestions may be to achieve the balance that Monti suggests. One cannot 
be sure until the greater transparency advocated above has been achieved. It is likely, however, 
that the non-core values should be given more weight than he suggests. It is implausible that, 
wherever the balance is finally set, there will be no exceptions to the general rule under the 
exigencies o f a specific case.
Non-economic Treaty objectives are relevant in article 81 analysis. As time goes on the 
Commission and Member States' authorities will become more accustomed to relying on these 
objectives. This does not mean that these objectives will always win. Time will teach the 
decision-makers to be more thorough in their balancing analysis, see Chapter Eight. They will 
likely take more account of the Treaty’s wording, see Chapters Seven and Eight. It may be that 
this process will be speeded up by judicial review, increasingly likely in the wake of 1 May 
2004. In this way we will see a true balance emerging. One that is clear, not because balancing 
is easy, but because the foundations o f this balance will have been exposed to the light.656
656 Mortelmans (2001), page 648, also criticises the Commission for failing to provide sufficient help in how to take 
account o f these non-economic objectives.
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4. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER FOUR
The Commission employs non-economic objectives (both Community and Member State 
interests) within article 81(3) o f the Treaty. These objectives have been used alone, as well as in 
combination with other objectives (both economic and non-economic). Sometimes they have 
had a decisive impact on the article 81(3) balance.
Having said that, many o f the problems related to the balancing process, as highlighted in 
Chapter Three, also apply in relation to article 81(3) of the Treaty. It may be helpful to list some 
general points that have arisen as a result o f Chapter Four's discussion:
•  The content of each objective must be clearly stated, as well as why it is being pursued;
•  Which objectives can be balanced within article 81(3), does this include Member State, 
as well as Community, objectives?
• How can one assess the weights of the different objectives in the balance? What is the 
effect/ relevance of the policy-linking clauses and the 'high' appellation, in relation to 
this?
•  When should balancing take place in article 81(3), as opposed to article 81(1) of the 
Treaty?
•  Is the weight given to the relevant objectives different in article 81(1) and (3), if so, 
when and why? •
•  Is there a full-blown public interest balance within article 81(3) o f the Treaty, and, if so, 
what is the specific mechanism for conducting this?
•  Are absolute per se rules appropriate within article 81 (3 ) of the Treaty?
So far, Part B has focused on mere-balancing within article 81 of the Treaty. Chapter Five now 
examines the second method of balancing used in article 81 of the Treaty, market-balancing.
CHAPTER FIVE: HOW IS THE BALANCE IMPLEMENTED? - MARKET­
BALANCING
1. Introduction
2. Three 'Components' of the Economic Efficiency Analysis
2.1. Consumer welfare (or producer welfare?)




3. Market Over mere-balancing
4. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapters Three and Four dealt with mere-balancing in article 81(1) and (3), respectively, mere- 
balancing operates outside of the market mechanism. We assess economic efficiency and then 
balance it against other relevant objectives. Chapter Five looks at a different mechanism, 
market-balancing. Under market-balancing one weighs some objectives within the economic 
efficiency test itself.
Chapter Five has two aims. First, to illustrate how the Commission balances (or could balance) 
different objectives within its economic efficiency analysis.657 Economic efficiency is not a 
value neutral concept, see Chapter One, and Section 2 highlights three 'components' o f the 
economic efficiency analysis. Chapter Five's second aim is to ask whether the Commission (and 
other decision-makers) should use mere or market-balancing for incorporating non-economic 
objectives within article 81, Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. THREE 'COMPONENTS' OF THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Section 2 highlights three 'components’ of the economic efficiency analysis. There are different 
kinds o f welfare, producer welfare, consumer welfare and total welfare, see Chapter One. 
Focusing on the former, may aid industrial policy goals; while, consumer welfare promotes 
consumer protection. Section 2.1. discusses this issue in relation to Community competition 
law. The Commission normally focuses on consumer welfare. However, sometimes, where 
there are important gains to Community producers, especially those in difficulty, it pays less 
attention to this concept.
Then we discuss the Commission’s emphasis on productive and dynamic efficiencies, rather 
than short term allocative ones, Section 2.2. This approach emphasises R&D. R&D is not an 
end in itself, but rather a conduit through which the Community can promote its industrial 
policy, employment and even environmental goals, see Chapter One. In the long term, the right 
level of R&D should bring substantial consumer benefits, see Chapter One.
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J Finally, Section 2.3. examines the Commission’s use of product and geographic markets outside 
of the one directly at issue in the proceedings. While this does not, in and of itself, aid the 
Commission's pursuit of any specific objectives, such an approach widens the search for the 
agreement's effects. This can allow more objectives to be considered in the discussion. It also 
provides a  more complete picture of the agreement's welfare effects.
2.1 Consumer welfare (or producer welfare?)
The decision to pursue either a consumer welfare or a producer welfare standard depends on a 
j value judgment. Is it more important to protect the interests of consumers or producers? The 
answer to this question determines which efficiencies are considered beneficial. A consumer 
welfare standard, for example, could simultaneously enhance consumer protection, and 
undermine industrial policy.
Chapter One showed how producer welfare and consumer welfare models conflict. In general, 
proponents of consumer welfare want more competition, compelling producers to sell close to 
marginal cost. Reductions in allocative efficiency are unacceptable because consumers suffer. 
This is in direct contrast to the position under a producer welfare standard, which is concerned 
with gains to producers alone. A similar picture emerges in relation to both productive and 
dynamic efficiencies. The consumer welfare standard advocates more competition. This forces 
firms to invest and innovate, enabling them to reduce their costs (and thus their prices), forcing 
out their less efficient rivals. However, at a certain point, increasing competition undermines the 
incentive to invest and innovate. Competition authorities applying a consumer welfare model 
must balance the long-term need for innovation (and the future allocative benefits to be gained 
by consumers as a result) with the short-term allocative efficiency loss o f  letting prices rise 
above marginal cost, to pay for this investment. Producers, seeking to enhance their own 
| welfare, highlight these ambiguous effects of increasing competition on both dynamic and
I productive efficiencies. But they have an additional reason for doing so. Less competition may
| reduce their incentives to innovate, but it also means that they can appropriate a larger share of
| any gains they make through such innovation.
j The Community Courts have not expressly said whether the consumer or the producer welfare




I 657 See also, Frazer (1990), pages 620-623.
* 658 That said, they have impliedly rejected the producer welfare model. In the Consten and Grundig Case, page 348,
1 the ECJ said that for the purposes of article 81(3)*s first test, improvements did not mean those accruing to the
1 parties, but objective advantages. In certain cases, the ECJ could be interpreted as saying that total welfare is the
* appropriate test, but this is almost certainly wrong. In Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission
 ̂ [1989], paragraph 25, the ECJ said that the function o£ amongst others, articles 3(g) and 81 was "...to prevent
 ̂ competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers."
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One cited it as saying that the aim o f the Community competition rules is to protect competition 
on the market as a means o f enhancing consumer welfare. One group of economic 
commentators has said, o f the Commission’s policy:* 659
"...the promotion of consumer welfare is one of the main goals of European competition 
policy. At least in its declared objectives, the choice has clearly been made to favour 
income redistribution from producers with market power to consumers."
Article 81(3)'s first test does not adopt a consumer welfare standard. That said, article 81(3)'s 
second test insists that consumers must get " ...a  fair share o f the resulting benefit..." o f an 
agreement. Chapter Four showed the Commission combining the first and second tests in its 
article 81(3) analysis. Even where this is not the case, some believe that the second test 
influences the rest o f the Commission's article 81(3) assessment such that a consumer welfare 
standard is, ultimately, demanded.660
To the extent that article 81(3)’s first two tests are combined, one would expect to see a test that 
favours consumer protection even more than would be appropriate under a 'pure' consumer 
welfare standard. Why? Under the consumer welfare standard, producer welfare increases are 
irrelevant, see Chapter One. Even if a producer welfare gain from a particular agreement were 
enormous, as long as there were some consumer welfare gain, the transaction would be allowed. 
This is not the position under article 81(3)'s second test, where consumers must get a fa ir share 
of any benefit. This implies that, in the scenario just outlined, Community law would insist that 
producers pass on not merely some (and not all of it either), but a fair share, of their welfare 
gain to consumers.
Sometimes, the Commission may follow this 'consumer welfare plus' standard. Commission 
decision, Grundig's EC distribution system, discussed in Chapter Four, could be an example of 
this. However, this approach is not normally in evidence and is not considered further here. 
Furthermore, the Commission has expressly said (without justifying its view) that:
"...the net effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the point of view of those 
consumers directly or likely affected by the agreement..."661
However, this is not necessarily a reference to a total surplus test Reich (1997), page 127, says that this passage 
"...tells us that competition law serves many purposes, one of which is the increase of consumer welfare." While 
this is not inconsistent with a total welfare test (which aggregates producer and consumer welfare, Chapter One), I 
am reluctant to place more emphasis on this passage, in light o f a relatively clear and consistent message from the 
Consten and Grundig lines o f cases, see B&C (2001), paragraph 3-023.
659 See, Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 12. See also, Van den Bergh (2002), page 42 and Bishop 
and Walker (2002), paragraph 2.22.
660 See, for example, Schaub (2002), page 33 and Heimler and Fattori (1998), pages 598-600.
661 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 85.
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If the Commission adopts the consumer welfare standard (supporting Community consumer 
protection goals), and invariably it does, then producer welfare gains would be irrelevant. That 
said, there may be a gap between the Commission's policy statements and its decision-making 
practice. Indeed, Forrester says there:
"...is little trace of real concern for the welfare of consumers as the direct beneficiaries of 
[Community] competition policy. There is, however, more concern for citizens as indirect 
beneficiaries, residing in a healthy economy."662
Could we go further and suggest that some Commission decisions are based upon a producer 
welfare standard? Take, for example, Commission decision, Iridium , which involved a joint 
venture agreement to provide global digital wireless communications services. The agreement 
included pricing 'guidelines' for gateway operators. The Commission found, paragraph 42:
"...the principle of uniform prices...seems appropriate to fulfil customers' needs."
Is the Commission's view that customers must tolerate consciously parallel rate fixing as the 
price to pay for making European industry competitive? Probably not,663 and it would be going 
too far to argue that a producer welfare standard has been adopted. The Commission explains its 
acceptance of horizontal price-fixing with reference to consumers. Having said that, its 
justification for the consumer improvement is unconvincing.664
The Commission often highlights producer needs/ benefits in its analysis.665 Many Commission 
decisions also show a readiness to accept minor, speculative and unquantified consumer 
benefits;666 particularly where this might benefit Community industry,667 and especially in high 
technology industries, where the Commission believes that Community undertakings are being 
left behind by those from abroad.668 As a result, while the Commission does not implement a
662 Forrester (1998), page 369. Others may agree. Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir state that, in general, lax Community 
competition policy was designed to boost profit margins, providing a breathing space for Community producers, 
Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995a), page XX. See also, Cseres (2004), page 235 and Laussel and Montet (1995), 
pages 62 and 63.
663 Forrester ( 1998), page 369, agrees that such an accusation is probably unfair.
664 The Commission said that consumers would be moving in different areas of the world but will want to receive a 
single bill. These guidelines help achieve the coherence o f  the system, which aids this process, paragraph 42.
665 See, Commission, Horizontal Guidelines; Commission, RCP 1994, pages 23-26; Commission, RCP 1993, pages 
90-92; Commission, RCP 1992, T h e  Commission is willing to facilitate...co-operation operations that allow firms 
to adapt and to improve their competitiveness in a global market" and Commission, RCP 1991, pages 44 and 45.
666 Reich (1997), pages 133-137. Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 104-106, also report that 
efficiencies are rarely quantified or given a serious hearing. In Commission decision, Philips/ Osram, the parties 
quantified the efficiency benefits, paragraph 26. That said, the Commission seems to have accepted their figures 
uncritically.
667 Forrester (1998), page 369, suggests that the explanation for Commission decision, Iridium  "... may simply be 
that the Commission considers that the consumer welfare criterion is not very important when considering high- 
technology alliances, especially when these will create European networks..."
668 See, Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 13 and 14.
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producer welfare standard (or even a total surplus), sometimes it gives the impression o f coming 
close. One example o f this is Commission decision, Olivetti/ Canon.669 The Commission 
examined a joint venture agreement, between Olivetti (Italian) and Canon (Japanese), to 
develop, design and manufacture copying machines, printers and fax machines. The agreement 
was exempted, paragraph 54, because in order to compete efficiently, producers needed the 
latest technology, requiring large R&D investments. The joint venture enabled the parties to 
spread these costs over more products. Community industrial policy was also aided by Canon’s 
know how transfer to the Italian firm, which should "...contribute to improving the 
technological patterns o f the EEC industry..." When it came to assessing customer benefits, 
paragraph 55, the Commission briefly said that they would benefit from new products and lower 
prices. The Commission did not go to much effort to check that this was true, nor to quantify 
these benefits, to ensure they outweighed clear restrictions on competition.
If the Commission were always pursuing a pure consumer welfare model one would expect less 
emphasis on producer welfare gains, unless we could be sure that there was sufficient 
competition to force the producers to pass such benefits on to consumers. There is no emphasis 
on the consumers' fa ir  share, as outlined above. That is not to say that the Commission ignores 
consumers or has adopted a producer welfare model. Indeed, this is improbable. However, by 
playing with the welfare advantages that accrue to producers (as well as consumers) and by 
readily accepting that producer benefits will be passed on to consumers, in certain cases, the 
Commission can effectively give great weight to industrial policy arguments within its 
economic efficiency test in article 81. That said, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines,670 
indicate that the Commission now wants more clarity in respect of what efficiencies are 
produced and their quantification. It also says that there can be no presumption that residual 
competition will ensure that consumers receive a fair share of the resulting benefit. It is, as yet, 
unclear how much this will affect the Commission's application of article 81 in practice.
2.2 Productive and  dynamic efficiencies (at the expense of allocative efficiencies?)
We saw that dynamic and productive efficiencies can often exceed allocative ones, Chapter 
One.671 The Commission672 promotes research and development co-operation through its
669 Also see, for example, Commission decisions, B P C L/ IC I, paragraph 35; Pasteur M érìeux-M erck, paragraphs 82- 
90; Forrester (1998), pages 369 and 370; Reich (1997), pages 133-137; Bouterse (1994), Chapter 5 (restructuring o f 
industry) and the M etro  I  C ase, paragraph 47.
670 Commission, A rtid e  81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 51,56-72 and 92-10!.
671 Technological competition is becoming increasingly important, Pitofsky (1998), page 333.
672 Often encouraged by others, see, for example, European Parliament, Resolution on the Twenty-fourth Com petition 
Report, paragraph 16.
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economic efficiency test.673 It hopes to achieve its industrial policy goals through such means, 
see Chapter One674 and also to increase employment.675 There are also prospective consumer 
protection gains. The Treaty supports some promotion of R&D through co-operation between 
undertakings, see articles 163 and 164. It does this both within article 81(1) and (3) of the 
Treaty.676
How does the Commission promote research and development through its economic efficiency 
test? It does this by emphasising dynamic, as opposed to (static) allocative, efficiencies, see 
Chapter One. The Commission acknowledges that there can be a trade-off. Commission, 
Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 41 and 43, state;
"Cooperation in R&D may reduce duplicative, unnecessary costs, lead to significant cross 
fertilisation of ideas and experience and thus result in products and technologies being 
developed more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. As a general rule, R&D 
cooperation tends to increase overall R&D activities...
Under certain circumstances, however, R&D agreements may cause competition problems 
such as restrictive effects on prices, output, innovation, or variety or quality of goods."
So the Commission has a choice. Push R&D and risk reducing allocative efficiency. Or, focus 
on allocative efficiency gains and risk reducing the scope for investment in R&D, as prices fall 
to marginal cost? Chapter One showed that consumers may favour a reduction in allocative 
efficiency in order to achieve dynamic efficiencies. This is because, in the long term, in a 
competitive industry, producers should be forced to pass any cost savings (which can be much 
greater than the short term allocative losses, see Chapter One677) on to consumers.678 The 
Commission often adopts a long-term view o f when the benefits might accrue.679 Furthermore, 
the Commission believes that Europe needs to 'catch up', technologically.680 Short term 
allocative efficiency losses, leading to R&D increases, and ultimately, long term allocative 
efficiency gains, can boost both industrial and consumer policy.
m  See, for example, Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), Chapter 4; Commission, RCP1991, pages 44 and
45 and Commission, RCP ¡985, pages 11-15.
674 See, Forrester (1998), pages 373-376 and 380.
675 See, COM(2003) 96, page 2 and Commission decision, Synthetic Fibres, paragraph 37. More generally see 
Commission, RCP 1993, pages 21-26; COM(93) 700, Chapters 2 ,4 ,5  and 8; COM(94) 319 and Commission, RCP 
1995, pages31-35.
676 In relation to article 81(1) see, Commission decisions, Iridium and ElopakZ Metal Box-Odin, for example. There 
are many examples of this within article 81(3), see, for example Commission decision, Ford/  Volkswagen, below.
677 One of competition's most important benefits is to drive productivity growth through innovation, Porter (2001), 
page 922.
678 Obviously, similar difficulties arise elsewhere. For example, in relation to Canada see, Goldman and Barutciski 
( 1998), pages 388, 414 and 415.
679 See, for example, Forrester ( 1998), page 369 and Bouterse ( 1994), Chapter 5,
^ T e m p le  Lang(1996), pages 551 and 552 and Korah (1987), pages 18 and 19,
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Examples of the Commission's attitude are hard to substantiate. This is for two reasons* First, 
because o f the lack o f clear, explicit, reasoning by the Commission, as well as the general 
absence o f thorough economic analysis. Secondly, because there is often just a difference of 
emphasis that would lead one to place a case in this section rather than in Chapter Four's section 
on industrial policy, or Section 2.1. above.681
The Commission often advocates very high levels of R&D682 and the attainment of these 
efficiencies within as short a time frame as possible.683 This can often only be achieved through 
research and development agreements, as opposed to by single firms. The Commission 
considers the possibility of dynamic efficiencies so important that it is often prepared to accept 
quite major reductions in static allocative efficiencies, in the hope that they will produce greater 
allocative efficiencies over the longer term.684 685
Commission decision, Ford/ Volkswagen, may well be an example o f this 685 This decision, as 
you will remember, referred to an agreement between Ford and Volkswagen to develop, 
engineer and manufacture an MPV. Ford and Volkswagen would distribute them separately 
under their own brand names. The Commission found a breach of article 81(1), noting serious 
restrictions on competition in the relevant market and in others, principally as a result o f 
allocative efficiency losses. Nevertheless, it was prepared to grant an individual exemption. At 
paragraphs 24 and 25, it emphasised the fact that through co-operation the parties should be able 
to produce an advanced vehicle designed to meet the requirements of European consumers. 
These are dynamic efficiency gains. Co-operation would also lead to a rationalisation o f the 
manufacturing process, enabling both parties to combine their know how in many areas, these 
may involve dynamic as well as productive efficiency gains.
The Commission has also been prepared to take account o f quite speculative gains in some 
cases, allowing it to rely on dynamic efficiency predictions even where they have not been 
clearly substantiated.686 One example is Commission decision, BPCL/  1CL BPCL and ICI 
agreed the mutual sale o f certain production units, technical know-how and goodwill for 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and low-density polyethylene (LDPE). BPCL also decided to close
681 I have placed the cases where I think that the centre o f  gravity in the reasoning lies. That said, sometimes the 
Commission's reasoning bridges my artificial categorisations and so some cases appear in more than one section.
682 See, ACEA and Commission decision, CECED, discussed in Chapters Three and Four, respectively.
683 For example, Commission decision, ENI/ Montedison, paragraph 31.
684 Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), page 13.
685 Other possible examples are Commission decisions, Synthetic Fibres, paragraphs 34 and 35 (paragraph 24 seems 
to accept that there will be some, though not 'abnormally sharp', price rises); BT/ MCI, paragraphs 34-42; ENI/ 
Montedison, paragraphs 22-31 (paragraph 33 accepts that there will not be short-term price cuts) and Bayer/ BP 
Chemicals, paragraphs 18-30 (paragraph 34 seems to accept that there will be short-term price rises).
686 Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), pages 104-106.
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some PVC and chlorine wedge production units, while ICI would close some of its LDPE and 
ethylene production units. They also agreed to change the capacity rights in a jointly owned 
ethylene cracker as well as other supply agreements between BPCL and ICI for polyethylene 
and ethylene. The Commission found a breach o f article 81(1).
In its article 81(3) analysis the Commission balanced an important loss of allocative 
efficiency687 against various productive efficiency increases as well an extremely speculative 
dynamic efficiency gain, the release of funds from reducing losses, that could be used for 
research and development. At paragraph 35 the Commission said:
"The implicit and reciprocal obligation not to compete enabled ICI and BPCL to close their 
respective LDPE, PVC, chlorine wedge and ethylene plants, thereby both reducing 
immediately the industry-wide surplus capacity existing in the EEC and also leading to 
more-efficient production.
If ICI and BPCL by renouncing competition with each other, and by specializing, thereby 
manage to keep each other’s customers in PVC and LDPE respectively, it will allow them 
to increase loading capacity both in the production of the product in which they are 
specializing and in ethylene. This increased loading will reduce unit costs and lead to more- 
efficient production. In addition, the closures stemmed a loss-making activity for both ICI 
and BPCL, thus releasing resources for investment, which will help promote technical 
progress. Finally, ICI and BPCL acquired each other's most-modem and efficient plant 
along with the technology in PVC and LDPE, respectively. This allowed ICI and BPCL to 
concentrate their production of PVC and LDPE, respectively, in the most-modem plants 
which, along with the increased loading, should lead to more-efficient production."
The Commission seems to go even further in its analysis in Olivetti/ Canon. There Olivetti and 
Canon proposed a joint venture to develop, design and manufacture copying machine products, 
laser beam printer products and facsimile products. The Commission found a restriction on 
competition but agreed to exempt the agreement. It was prepared to allow a reduction in 
allocative efficiency688 in order to allow the parties to increase their research and development 
expenditure. At paragraph 54 the Commission states:
"...on all the markets involved, and in which the parties are competing, the technology is 
fast-moving and the degree of competition high. In order to compete efficiently, the 
undertakings on those markets have to offer products which are the result of the most up-to- 
date technology, at competitive prices. Up-to-date technologies, however, require large 
investments in research and development. The expansion of production in the EEC which is
687 See paragraph 36.2, although the Commission claimed that price rises did not occur as a result of the agreement, 
but would have occurred anyway.
688 At paragraph 42 the Commission said that the "...setting-up of the joint venture restricts competition between the 
parent companies. These will no longer compete at the production stage (a) as to copying machines, for a segment 
which accounts for more than one-half of the low-range market, and (b) in future possibly also for the mid range 
and facsimile. This will result in identical production costs for both, with an inevitable influence at the sales 
stage...Each party will have less autonomy in determining its sale prices than it would have if its production costs 
were different from those o f the other parent company. The scope for competition at the sales stage is thus limited 
as a result of the joint venture."
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the effect of the joint venture enables the parties to spread the costs of these investments 
over a larger number of products: otherwise the costs of those products would be too high 
for producers to be able to sell them at a competitive price. The joint venture is therefore 
apt to avoid duplication in costs of development. Research does not fall directly within the 
scope of the joint venture. However, by virtue of the obligation on the partners to 
communicate to die JVC the continuing flow of their expertise, and on Canon the 
improvements of the research carried out independently, this research is tightly linked to 
the activity of the joint venture. Research will also be stimulated by avoiding the 
duplication of its costs.”689
The Commission also relies on productive efficiency gains in order to implement its industrial 
policy aims here.690 The focus on productive efficiency arguments is one way of justifying the 
restructuring decisions in relation to the various Community industries.691 This mechanism 
works in very much the same way as described in relation to dynamic efficiency. Indeed, 
productive and dynamic efficiency are often both discussed in the same case to justify the 
reduction in allocative efficiency.692 However, this can, at times, come dangerously close to 
negating competition as the main process of economic organisation.693
The emphasis on high levels of R&D and the acceptance o f quite speculative productive and 
dynamic efficiency gains by the Commission, have skewed its analysis away from allocative 
efficiency questions, at least in the short term. This is not to say that allocative efficiency is 
unimportant to the Commission; nor that this emphasis offers no benefits to consumers. 
However, by distorting its analysis the Commission incorporates industrial policy and 
employment objectives within the market-balancing mechanism,694 while promoting long term 
consumer protection goals.695 It is unclear whether Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
indicate a toughening o f this stance, see above. The wording seems to demand a more thorough
689 Other examples may include, Commission decisions, BT-MCI and Atlas.
690 Forrester (1998), page 364 and Amato (1997), page 115.
691 Commission decisions, Synthetic Fibres and Stichting Baksteen, as well as Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 
8 2 ,84 ,85(i), 88,89, 158; European Parliament, Resolution on the Twenty-fourth Competition Report, paragraph 15; 
Bouterse (1994), Chapter 5 and Monti (2002), page 1072.
692 See, for example, Commission decisions, BPCL/ IC1, paragraph 35 and Bayer/ BP Chemicals, paragraphs 27 and 
30 as well as the cases cited above.
691 Wesseling (2000), page 39; Amato (1997), pages 62 and 114 and Strcit and Mussler (1995), page 25.
694 See, for example, Schaub (1996), pages 76-78. This tendency may even increase because "...European 
competition rules are currently being revised in ways allowing for research and innovation aspects to be better taken 
into account when assessing market dynamics and competitive conditions.", COM(2003) 226, page 23. See also, 
Streit and Mussler (1995X page 25.
695 A longer-term consumer welfare perspective may also mean that other relevant objectives, for example, 
environmental considerations could be considered more readily. As Wasmeier explains "Because pollution 
generates enormous economic costs, in the long run it will be more reasonable from an economic stand point to take 
the necessary steps in tim e to prevent pollution from occurring. From this point o f view, fundamental environmental 
protection requirements...are basically in line with economic requirements.", Wasmeier (2001), page 163. Also see, 
COM(93) 632, page 42.
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and explicit quantification o f efficiencies, but this is difficult696 and we have seen that there is 
sometimes a discrepancy between policy statements and practice.
But this leads us to another question, which is where does the balance lie between allocative and 
dynamic and productive efficiencies? This is extremely difficult to assess, due to a lack o f 
clarity in the caselaw. One could argue that allocative efficiency considerations cannot be 
completely ignored in favour of dynamic and productive efficiency gains. The ECJ said in 
Metro I  that price competition is so important that it can never be eliminated.697 However, such 
a position would not lie easily with that of the CFI in Matra,698 holding that, in theory, any 
restriction on competition, that complied with the four article 81(3) tests, could be exempted.699
This lack of clarity makes even a tentative discussion of where the balance is foolhardy.700 It 
may be that the Commission is more ruled by political considerations in these cases, but an 
explanation of the underlying principles it follows is vital. More clarity is needed, as well as an 
urgent need for the Commission to analyse the effects that its previous decisions have had on 
competition. As one commentator puts it:
"The technology outcomes of co-operative R&D arrangements initiated in Europe during 
the 1980s have proved disappointing so far."701
A more structured, formal, efficiency analysis (and the enhanced certainty this generates) is 
more likely to ensure concrete gains to European firms.702
2.3 Total welfare?
An agreement may generate costs or benefits outside of its relevant product and geographic 
markets. Take liner-shipping conferences, for example. These are horizontal price-fixing cartels 
between shipping companies. The Commission defines the relevant market in such cases as liner
696 Some argue that a comparison of efficiencies and anti-competitive results is not workable on a case-by-case basis, 
see the summary o f the literature provided in Fisher and Lande (1983), pages 1657-1659. Other commentators are, 
to varying degrees, more optimistic, please see, OECD (1988), page 41 and Areeda (1992), page 37.
697 The Metro I Case, paragraph 21.
698 The Matra Case, paragraph 85. See also Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome, paragraph 153, now under appeal 
Case C-168/01 P.
699 Note that article 81(3)(b) only says that competition should not be eliminated. This is not necessarily solely price 
competition, see Metro 1 Case; but might also include, for example, R&D competition.
700 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 102-104, provide no new objective techniques for assessing 
this.
701 Paragraph 17, UNCTAD document TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.l. Also see Scherer (1992), pages 1,416-1,433. In 
part, this may be as a result o f Community trade policy, see Gual (1995), pages 38 and 39.
702 That is not to say that a good test will ensure that such gains are made. The failure o f the R&D could be for 
reasons other than the competition related issues, including the parties’ incompetence, for example. One might also 
point to the straight-jacket effect of many block exemptions, although this position is improving due to the use o f 
market share thresholds in some of the more recent regulations.
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trade services between, for example, the Community and the coast o f West Africa.703 These 
cartels can lead to higher prices for shipping goods on the routes where they operate. This 
increases the cost o f importing and exporting goods to Africa, for example, and thus affects the 
price o f all shipped products too. These goods make up a  different product market from the 
relevant product market in these cases. They may also have different geographic markets. 
Where shipping costs make up a large share o f the value o f these products, increases in these 
costs can significantly affect the quantity o f the goods sold. If we solely focus on the relevant 
market then the effects on the shipped goods would be ignored, see below. By broadening our 
investigation and examining the agreement's effects on other markets a complete picture can be 
built up of its costs and benefits. In this thesis, we call this investigation the total welfare 
approach.
There are other advantages of examining all the effects of an agreement. First, a partial 
equilibrium assessment singles out a product or group o f  products, ignoring the way they 
interact with the rest of the economy. One o f  the weaknesses of this type o f assessment is that 
the consumer welfare measurements it provides within that market are only valid if consumers 
spend a small fraction of their total income on the goods in question.704 Where this is not the 
case, ignoring the way this market interacts with the rest o f the economy distorts our assessment 
of welfare effects.
Secondly, a total welfare method could help reduce the beggar-thy-neighbour attitude of many 
legislators. For example, in relation to export cartels, the US ignores the effects on consumers 
outside its jurisdiction.705 Export cartels' negative effects are not ignored because of the use of 
the partial equilibrium approach. That said, such a framework does not force us to consider the 
global consequences of the anti-competitive behaviour to the extent that a total welfare 
approach does. This may alert us to be more accepting of the negative welfare effects abroad.
Outlawing export cartels in particular and the adoption of the total welfare approach in general 
should also lead to a  more co-operative relationship between competition authorities worldwide. 
This is because, to the extent this approach were followed in other jurisdictions too, the risk of 
conflicting decisions would be reduced.706 This should help reduce political tensions and 
increase co-operation between antitrust agencies worldwide.
703 See, Commission decision, Cewal, Cawac and Ukwal, paragraphs 12 and 13.
704 Motta (2004), pages 18 and 19 and Tirole (1988), pages 7-12.
TOS See, Motta (2004), page 29 and Hovenkamp (1998), pages 429 and 430.
706 See, for example, the Air Products and Air Liquide merger, which looked like it would be blocked in the US and 
was allowed in the EU (Commission merger decision, Air Liquide./  BOC)) due to the different effects in EU and US- 
related geographic markets.
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Finally, a total welfare approach would give the Community more credence when persuading 
developing countries to enact clear and transparent competition legislation. This is because it 
reduces the appearance of bias, and the impact of industrial policy on the assessment.707
Nevertheless, stepping outside of the partial equilibrium framework can dramatically increase 
political and evidentiary problems. For example, should the regulator approve a cartel which 
increases welfare worldwide, but results in a net decrease in welfare within its jurisdiction? This 
might be difficult politically.708 So may the application of an antitrust law that overtly examines 
effects in other jurisdictions. On the evidentiary front, such a change would place parties under 
an obligation to investigate the benefit, or otherwise, of a specific action in markets potentially 
unrelated to their own. This could be very time-consuming, as well as costly. For the decision­
maker too a total welfare approach poses evidentiary problems. It could potentially increase its 
reliance on jurisdictions outside of his or her seat This may make evidence gathering more 
difficult.709 That is not to say that none of these problems exist already. The extra-territorial 
application of antitrust is well known and sometimes political tensions can arise as a result o f 
decisions.710 That said, these tensions and difficulties would increase under a total welfare 
approach.
There is obviously a tension between the partial equilibrium framework and the wider total 
welfare approach. The latter gives a more complete picture of the agreement's effects, the 
former is quicker and easier for both the parties involved and the decision-maker to apply.
The Commission has not consistently preferred either method. Sometimes it implies that the 
effects of an agreement outside of the relevant product market are irrelevant.711 In other cases it 
has, often with the approval of the Advocate-Generals,712 investigated the effects that an 
agreement will have on different product markets.713 Similar confusion exists in relation to the
707 Townley (2004), pages 130-131.
708 Ross (1996-97), pages 644-652.
709 Townley (2004), page 134.
710 Think o f Commission merger decisions, Boeing/  McDonnell Douglas and General Electric/ Honeywell.
711 See for example, the Matra Case, Matra states, paragraph 64, that the decision allows the Founders the possibility 
o f  co-ordinating their behaviour in markets other than the MPV markets. The Commission implies this is irrelevant, 
paragraph 73, as does Ford, paragraph 81.
712 See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer in Case 32/65 Italy v. Council and Commission 
[1966], page 419.
713 Advocate-General Warner notes this in Case 61/80 Coöperatieve Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek v. Commission 
[1981], page 878. See also, Commission decisions, TAA, paragraphs 294*296, 302, 303 and 312; Bayer/  BP 
Chemicals, paragraphs 32-34; Continental/ Michelin, paragraph 27; KSB/Goulds/Lowera/ITT, paragraph 27; P&l 
Clubs (1999), paragraph 108; TPS, paragraph 114; as well as Commission, RCP 1990, page 31 and Crampton 
(1997), page 60.
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geographic markets to be considered. The Commission has looked at different relevant 
geographic markets in some cases,714 although it does not normally do so.
More recently, the Commission has sought to resolve this issue. Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, paragraph 43, comes out strongly in favour of the partial equilibrium approach:
"The assessment under article 81(3) of benefits flowing from restrictive agreements is in 
principle made within the confines of each relevant market to which the agreement relates.
The Community competition rules have as their objective the protection of competition on 
the market and cannot be detached from this objective. Moreover, the condition that 
consumers...must receive a fair share of the benefits implies in general that efficiencies 
generated by the restrictive agreement within a relevant market must be sufficient to 
outweigh the anti-competitive effects produced by the agreement within that same relevant 
market [footnote A). Negative effects on consumers in one geographic market or product 
market cannot normally be balanced against and compensated by positive effects for 
consumers in another unrelated geographic market or product market."
The Commission starts from the premise that the competition assessment must be made 
separately for each relevant market. This conclusion is based on two justifications:
• Community competition law has as its objective the protection of competition on the 
market; and
• the condition that consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefit confirms 
this approach.
Taking these points in turn, it is unclear what the Commission’s first statement means. Nor does 
the Commission justify i t  Can it be justified? As pointed out in Chapter Two, Community 
competition law’s objectives can only be understood in the context of the whole Treaty. The 
Treaty's Preamble and article 2, emphasise the need to strengthen the unity of the Community's 
economies and to confirm the solidarity which binds us with those overseas. This does not 
support the Commission’s statement. If anything, it leans towards considering the global effects 
of Community policies, although, in truth, there is little clear support for this either. Likewise, 
article 3(1 Xg) and article 81(3)'s first condition do not expressly or impliedly restrict the 
analysis to the relevant market.715
Perhaps the Commission is worried that positive effects on one market might coincide with the 
elimination of competition on the relevant market? This could cause significant harm. However, 
if this were its fear, article 81(3)'s fourth condition would allow it to block the agreement. 
Furthermore, imagine that an agreement is pro-competitive when examined from a partial
114 For example, in Commission decision, Glaxo Wellcome (now under appeal Case C-16S/01 P), the Commission 
defines the relevant geographic market as national, paragraph 114, and yet when it is discussing the welfare effects 
it looks across the whole EU and not just at the UK and Spain, paragraphs 184-186.
7,s This statement, in relation to article 3(1 Xg), is discussed further below.
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equilibrium perspective, i.e. on the relevant market. At the same time, it might significantly 
harm, or even eliminate competition in another market. If the Commission were able to move 
outside of a partial equilibrium then it could prevent this (unless it felt this prevented the 
achievement of article 81(3)'s first test). The total welfare approach gives the Commission more 
flexibility to assess the welfare (and other) effects as a whole.
What do the Community Courts say? The Commission relies on two judgments to support the 
partial equilibrium approach. Neither o f  them expressly consider the issue. At footnote A, 
paragraph 43, cited above, the Commission said:
"The test is market specific, see to that effect Case T-131/99, Shaw, [2002] ECR11-2023, 
paragraph 163, where the Court of First Instance held that the assessment under article 
81(3) had to be made within the same analytical framework as that used for assessing the 
restrictive effects, and Case C-360/92 P, Publishers Association, [1995] ECR 1-23, 
paragraph 29, where in a case where the relevant market was wider than national the Court 
of Justice held that in the application of Article 81(3) it was not correct only to consider the 
effects on the national territory."
The Commission's reliance on Shaw seems unjustified. The matter concerned a series of beer 
supply agreements between Whitbread pic and its tenants. These breached article 81(1), in part 
because of the cumulative effect of Whitbread's network and other similar networks of 
agreements.716 Nevertheless, the Commission exempted the agreements, holding that beer 
supply agreements of the type at issue generally lead to improvements in distribution.717 
However, in this case, the tied lessees paid relatively high prices for Whitbread products, and 
the Commission thought that these might undermine the improvement in distribution.718 
Whitbread argued that its relationship with its lessees should not only be judged by reference to 
the prices they pay, but the whole business relationship should be taken into account to see if the 
lessee could 'survive'. The Commission accepted this, finding that overall there had been an 
improvement in distribution.719
The applicants before the CFI were two o f Whitbread’s tenants. They argued that the 
Commission should not have exempted the agreements. Although it is unclear from the 
judgment, they appear to have argued that, when deciding on an individual exemption, the 
Commission should assess the existence of countervailing benefits at the individual level, rather 
than to Whitbread’s lessees as a group. The CFI disagreed. At paragraph 163 it held:
The disputed assessment of the countervailing benefits was made in the context of the 
examination of the grant of an individual exemption, after the finding that Whitbread's
716 Commission decision, Whitbread, paragraphs 106-138.
7,7 Commission decision, Whitbread, paragraphs 150-154.
718 Commission decision, Whitbread paragraphs 155-163.
719 Commission decision, Whitbread paragraphs 164-170.
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netw ork o f  agreem ents makes a  substantial contribution to  foreclosure o f  the m arket in 
question. T hat assessm ent therefore had to  be made w ithin the sam e analytical framework, 
tha t o f  the effect o f  the notified agreem ents on the functioning o f  the market, and hence on 
the situation o f  the tied  lessees taken as a  w hole, not on each lessee considered in isolation."
The CFI’s reference to making the article 81(3) assessment within the same analytical 
framework as the article 81(1) conclusions merely refers to the fact that the network of 
agreements was relevant in this case. One should look at the overall impact of all the notified 
agreements, in their economic context, as opposed to examining the impact on individual 
members o f the group in isolation.720 The CFI does not consider whether considerations outside 
of the relevant market are pertinent.
The Commission's reference to Case C-360/92 P, Publishers' Association, [1995] can also be 
criticised. This case involved a fixed book agreement covering the UK and Ireland. The CFI had 
previously held that the Publishers' Association, established in the UK, when arguing in favour 
of an exemption for their agreement, was not entitled to rely on any negative effects that might 
be felt in Ireland. In other words, the CFI had said, do not look at the relevant geographic 
market (the UK and Ireland), just look at the UK. The ECJ corrected this position by holding 
that nothing in article 81(3) makes it:
"...sub ject to  the condition th a t those benefits should occur only on the territory o f  the 
M em ber State o r States in w hich the undertakings who are parties to  the agreement are 
established and not in the te rrito ry  o f  o ther M ember States. Such an interpretation is 
incompatible w ith the fundam ental ob jectives o f  the Com munity and  w ith the very concepts 
o f  common m arket and  single m arket."
The ECJ's point is that one cannot look smaller than the relevant market. To do so would make 
no sense in economic theory, because the relevant geographic market is the area on which 
competition takes place.721 The ECJ does not say that one cannot look at other markets as well. 
Having said that, it does not say one can. So, it seems that there is a  stalemate? However, in 
CGM v. Commission, the CFI, expressly advocated looking outside the partial equilibrium, at 
least in relation to the relevant product/ service market:722
" ...reg ard  should naturally be h ad  to  the advantages arising from the  agreement in question, 
no t only for the relevant m ark e t...b u t also , in  appropriate cases, fo r every other m arket on 
w hich  the agreem ent in question m ight have beneficial effects, and even, in a more general 
sense, for any service the quality o r efficiency o f  which m ight be im proved by the existence 
o f  tha t agreem ent... Article 85(3) [now article  81(3)] o f  the Treaty envisage^] exemption in
720 The Commission even makes this point when citing Shaw in, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 87.
721 Vickers (2003a), pages 99 and 100.
722 Lugard and Handler (2004), pages 418 and 419, reach similar conclusions. See also, Geradin (2004), page 15.
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favour of, amongst others, agreements which contribute to promoting technical or economic 
progress, without requiring a specific link with the relevant market"723
CGM  v. Commission concerned intermodal transport services encompassing a bundle of, inter 
alia, inland and maritime transportation provided to shipping companies across the Community. 
The restrictions at issue related to inland transport services, which were held to constitute a 
separate market, whereas the benefits were claimed to occur in relation to maritime transport 
services.
The Commission refers to CGM v. Commission in Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
paragraph 43, at footnote B. The Commission defines the case as a limited exception to its 
general rule:
"...where two markets are related, efficiencies achieved on separate markets can be taken 
into account provided that the group of consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting 
from the efficiency gains are substantially the same [footnote B].n
The Commission argues that CGM v. Commission does not undermine its point because both 
product markets (inland transport services and maritime transport services) had the same 
consumers.
But why should the CFI's judgment be interpreted in this narrow way? The CFI does not 
expressly make such a link. In fact, paragraph 343's wording is much wider. The CFI even goes 
so far as to say that one should look at the effects without requiring a specific link with the 
relevant market. This seems contrary to the Commission's position, because it appears to argue 
that a specific link (that both product markets have the same consumers) is necessary.724
A possible reason why the Commission may feel that other product markets can only be 
considered if they have same consumers, is because it is collapsing article 81(3)’s first and 
second tests, see Chapter Four and Section 2.1. above. Whether or not this is acceptable at all is 
discussed below. However, on the assumption that it is, did the CFI collapse these two tests in 
CG M  v. Commission'? No.725 So collapsing these two tests to justify the narrow reading of the 
case does not seem appropriate.
723 Case T-86/95 Compagnie Générale Maritime v. Commission [2002], paragraph 343. The CFI's judgment in Joined 
Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires 'CB‘ and Europay International v. Commission 
[1994], paragraphs 101-105, could imply that one should only look at the effects on the relevant product market. 
However, this is probably an incorrect interpretation. The statements could also be read as a criticism of the 
Commission for not defining the relevant product market correctly, it had proposed two alternatives.
724 The Commission also relies on Case T-213/00 CMA CGM v. Commission [2003]. However, the same comments 
apply to that case as to CGM v. Commission. In fact, at paragraph 227 of CMA CGM v. Commission, the CFI 
repeats paragraph 343 from CGM v. Commission, referred to above. It also rephrases it emphasising that one can 
consider the effects on '...any market on which the agreement in question might have beneficial effects...'
725 The Commission, in its underlying decision, found that customers did not get a fair share of the resulting benefit 
and the applicants argued before the CFI that this was incorrect. If paragraph 343 were meant to incorporate both o f
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To recap. The Commission argues that only the effects on the specific relevant product and 
geographic markets can be considered. It extends this to allow the effects in other related 
markets to be considered as long as they involve substantially the same consumers.726 The 
Commission justifies this by saying that the Community competition rules must protect 
competition on the market; as well as by reference to the Community Courts' caselaw; and the 
effect on consumers. So far, the Commission provides no justification for the first reason, nor 
can we suggest one. Furthermore, there is no explicit Community Court judgments supporting 
the Commission's position, indeed those that there are tend in the opposite direction.
A key part o f the Commission's argument seems to be that consumers must get a fair share of 
the benefit. This is article 81(3)'s second test. As a result, the Commission seeks to limit the 
benefits that can be considered in article 81(3)'s first test. But, why should the wording o f  the 
second test delimit the first test? The Commission does not explain. Furthermore, even if such a 
link were made, would a delimitation, in the terms the Commission advocates, necessarily 
follow? No. Chapter Seven demonstrates that although the definition of consumer is not certain 
in the caselaw, there are many cases where the consumer considered is not a customer o f the 
parties. Sometimes the consumer is a user of a derived product of the parties', i.e. something on 
a different product market, such as the purchaser o f African textiles. The Commission admits as 
much at the end of paragraph 43:
"...in some cases only consumers in a downstream market are affected by the agreement in 
which case the impact of the agreement on such consumers must be assessed. This is for 
instance so in the case of purchasing agreements.”
Linking article 81(3)'s first two tests is wrong.727 The Community Courts have stated that there 
are four separate tests under article 81(3) of the Treaty, not three. The first test established that 
society benefits from the restriction o f competition, through the various relevant objectives such 
as increased employment and environmental policy. The second test ensures that consumers get 
a fair share o f the benefits.728 In any event, as we have seen, collapsing the two tests does not 
establish that only the relevant market is relevant because the definition of consumer in article 
81(3)'s second test is not restricted to the parties' customers and this can include other markets.
article 8I(3)'s first two tests, then there would have been no need for the CFI to discuss the merits o f the second test 
later in its judgment However, it did, paragraphs 368-374. The CFI did not even refer to paragraph 343 in this part 
of its assessment
726 Note that the Commission and the CFI only refer to the consideration o f benefits in other markets. My application 
of the total welfare standard is wider than both o f them because I also advocate the consideration o f costs in other 
markets. Thanks to Giorgio Monti for this comment
727 Monti (2002), pages 1076 and 1077. See also, Chapter Seven.
728 Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson (2000), page 116 argue that "It is hardly conceivable to affirm a valuable contribution 
to improving technological progress...if it is to the obvious disadvantage o f customers... " but the Commission has 
accepted that they are different tests, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 46.
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In law, there is no need to read the CFI's judgments in CGMv. Commission and CMA CGMv. 
Commission against their natural wording and in the restrictive manner proposed by the 
Commission. In fact, to do so may be positively harmful and could undermine welfare, for the 
reasons set out above. It may also effect the consideration of other relevant objectives, see 
Chapter Seven.
For example, in relation to developing countries, the Commission may even be obliged to adopt 
a total welfare approach. Article 177(1) o f the Treaty says that Community development policy 
shall foster, amongst other things, the smooth and gradual integration o f  developing countries 
into the world economy as well as the campaign against poverty in developing countries. Article 
178 of the Treaty instructs the Community to . .take account of the objectives referred to in 
Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries."729 
As far as possible, article 81 of the Treaty should be interpreted in line with articles 177(1) and 
178 of the Treaty in a way that is both effective and so that both provisions are consistent with 
each other.730
The relationship between Community competition policy and development is complex.731 
However, by way of example, there is evidence to show that shipping cartels, see above, 
increase transport costs, reduce trade volumes and slow growth. This could affect the integration 
o f developing countries into the world economy, as well as the campaign against poverty in 
these countries, see article 177(1) o f the Treaty.732 However, if the Commission and the 
Community Courts considered the competitive effects of agreements that fall within article 
81(1) on product and geographic markets other than just the 'relevant' ones, then an agreement's 
effects on development and other policies could be more easily considered. Decisions that were 
pro-competitive, not just for the EU but for these developing countries could to be (relatively) 
quickly imposed, speeding up the integration of developing countries into the world economy, 
in line with the Treaty.
The more widely the Commission can cast its net in the search for an agreement’s effects (both 
positive and negative) the more complete a picture it can draw up on how relevant Treaty 
objectives have been infringed. This applies to welfare as it applies to other objectives. It may
729 Furthermore, where distortions to competition arise in one of the ACP (a group o f 77 Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries) signatories to the Cotonou Agreement o f 23 June 2000 (which came into force 1 April 2003), the 
duty to take into account the affect of Community antitrust decisions is reinforced, see article 45(2) of that 
agreement
730 For a general exposition of this principle see Case C-67/96 Albany International v. Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Texielindustrie, [1999], paragraph 60.
751 For a more detailed discussion see Townley (2004), pages 128-134, and the documents referred to there.
732 Furthermore, where it affects them, such legislation does not lead to the elimination of distortions to sound 
competition in the ACP countries, article 45(2) Cotonou Agreement
well be that an agreement's direct effects are innocuous on some objectives. However, the 
knock-on effects on others could be tremendous. Ideally, the Commission would be able to take 
such effects into account, i.e. on all product and geographic markets. Chapters Four and Seven 
demonstrate that some of the Treaty objectives that must also be considered within article 81 
demand a more global approach. Adopting a total welfare model in relation to economic 
efficiency would make the treatment o f  all relevant objectives more consistent.
One could argue that article 3(1 Xg) o f the Treaty only refers to distortions of competition in the 
Common Market. However, in our view, and without forgetting the existence o f the 
jurisdictional test o f an 'effect on trade between Member States', we do not think that prevents 
analysis o f extra-Community effects. First, as explained above, markets are interlinked, so 
affects abroad can distort competition within the Community. Furthermore, article 81 is not 
merely there to implement article 3(lXg)> see Chapter Two. Other relevant (non-economic) 
objectives often require analysis o f  extra-Community effects, se Chapter Seven.
We have argued in favour of a total welfare approach. That said, we have already discussed 
some of the difficulties that such a wide-ranging review would create. There must be some 
limits on the effects that need to be considered. Otherwise the necessary investigation will be 
too costly, time-consuming and difficult for the relevant undertakings (and the decision-makers) 
to perform, especially as they will often have no experience o f the problems in other sectors.
There are mechanisms for reducing such problems without returning to the partial equilibrium 
framework, however. For a start, article 8 l's jurisdictional test (affect on trade between Member 
States) already restricts which agreements fall within article 81(1) in the first place.733 This 
reduces the cases that can be considered. Evidentiary problems may be limited through per se 
rules, such that costs or benefits in other markets could only be considered if they are above a 
certain magnitude, for example.734 This should be more efficient in the long-term.735 Secondly, 
regulators might limit their investigation to the effects on markets closely related to the relevant 
markets. This approach has already been adopted, to a certain extent, by the Commission in its 
competition reviews.736 Finally, while one should not artificially reduce the relevant geographic 
market to one's jurisdiction, when investigating the effect on total welfare, one might only 
assess the effects, or even only the direct effects, within that area.737
733 Sec, for example, Cases 89/85, etc. Àhlstròm v. Commission, (1988], paragraphs 16-18. Case T-102/96 Gencor v. 
Commission, [1999], paragraph 90 is wider, but this was a merger case.
734 See, for example, the position in Canada, Sanderson (1996-97), pages 631 and 632.
735 See, for example, Easterbrook(1992), pages 129-130.
736 See, for example, the form for notifying mergers, Form CO, Commission Regulation, On Merger Notifications 
and Time-limits, Annex A, sections 6-9.
737 See, for example, the comments o f Wood (1999), page 15.
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If the total welfare approach is used, we suggest adopting all these measures, with the exception 
o f the last one (which undermines many of the reasons for adopting a total welfare approach in 
the first place). However, these changes would not be sufficient. It is also important to clearly 
lay down how these rules will work, so that parties can better assess their transactions and thus 
save costs. Chapter Eight discusses these issues further.
2.4 Conclusion of Section 2
We have tentatively pointed to three ways in which welfare analysis can be 'distorted' in order to 
achieve objectives outside o f economic efficiency. These are: consumer welfare (or producer 
welfare); productive and dynamic efficiencies (at the expense o f allocative efficiencies); and 
total welfare over a partial equilibrium approach. This study is based upon the analysis in 
Chapter One. We say tentatively, because the Commission is rarely explicit about what it is 
trying to do; normally fails to quantify any costs or benefits that it considers; and, does not place 
its analysis within a wider framework, which would allow us to more readily understand what it 
is seeking to achieve, or to predict its assessment in future cases.
The Commission has explicitly adopted a consumer welfare approach in its policy statements. 
This does not reflect the wording under article 81(3) of the Treaty,738 as it only demands that an 
agreement be neutral from a consumer perspective, as opposed to demanding that consumers get 
a fair share of the agreement's benefit. The Commission’s decisions also refer to consumer 
benefits arising from the agreement, implying that the consumer welfare standard is being 
applied there too. That said, the Commission often pays a lot o f attention to the agreement's 
effects on Community industry and, particularly when Community undertakings benefit from 
the agreement, the Commission readily finds relevant consumer benefits. In this way, industrial 
policy creeps into its efficiency assessment, at least to some extent.
Furthermore, the Commission particularly encourages R&D activities by Community 
undertakings. This is probably because of the industrial policy and employment benefits that it 
believes they bring. By readily accepting short term, and often substantial, allocative efficiency 
losses to achieve these ends the Commission hopes to increase R&D spending in the European 
Union. It has often accepted quite speculative dynamic and productive efficiency gains in its 
decisions. Once again it fails to quantify the costs and benefits o f these agreements.
The Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, seem to be an attempt to put things on a more 
formal footing. They demand explicit listing and quantification o f all purported efficiency gains. 
This would certainly be an improvement, bringing greater transparency to the Commission's 
assessment. However, it is insufficient. The Commission must set up a more formal, structured, 
method of welfare analysis, properly explaining when short-term allocative efficiency can be
738 And even less that of article 81(1) o f the Treaty.
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compromised for long-term gain, for example. A more precise definition of competition is
* * 739imperative.
The Commission favours a partial equilibrium approach. However, there are many advantages 
to the total welfare analysis. It allows us to make a more global welfare assessment, encourages 
co-operation between antitrust agencies, should improve consistency between them and may 
make it easier to further other Community objectives, such as development policy, in a pro- 
market manner. The Commission bases itself on two cases, which do not seem to support the 
points it attributes to them. In addition, its position flies in the face o f two clear CFI judgments 
rejecting the partial equilibrium. If we follow the CFI, then there need to be limits placed upon 
what effects should be considered relevant in the antitrust analysis. Some suggestions are made 
in Section 2.3. The Commission must provide clear guidance on this issue.
3. MERE-BALANCING OVER MARKET-BALANCING
The Commission has three mechanisms with which to achieve a balance. We have looked at 
mere and market-balancing in some detail in Part B. Chapter One, also showed how welfare 
objective could achieve/ facilitate the pursuit o f other Treaty goals. Which should the 
Commission favour?
In general the Commission emphasises market solutions first, this explains the efforts to 
internalise environmental externalities, for example.739 40 The Commission, rightly, justifies this 
emphasis by saying:
"In most areas of Community endeavour, if a policy runs against market forces and 
competition, it not only has less chance of success, but is also unlikely to benefit 
consumers."741
The more that the relevant objectives are achieved through market forces, the harder is should 
be to justify balancing outside of this mechanism.
On a number of occasions the Commission has implied that only where it is clear that market 
forces have failed will it consider using mere or market-balancing and this is probably the best 
approach. An example of this can be seen in Commission decision, Synthetic Fibres,742 In that
739 Neven (1998), pages 114 and 117.
740 For example, in relation to environmental protection, Commission, RCP 1991, page 54 and SEC(92) 1986, 
"...whenever possible [integration of competitiveness and the environment requires a strategy that] should be built 
around solutions based on the competitive functioning o f markets."
741 Commission, RCP 1990, page 16. This is in line with a  general trend towards market-based solutions "The past 20 
years have seen a pronounced shift in the role o f government in business away from substituting for markets 
towards promoting them.", Colin Mayer, Financial Times, 28 August 2002, page 9.
742 Also see, SEC(92) 1986. In Commission decision, ENV Montedison, the Commission, in its article 81(3) analysis 
said "Through cooperation the two groups will rationalize, more quickly and radically than was possible without 
cooperation, by concentrating on a few core businesses and discarding others in which they were less competitive
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matter some of the parties in the industry had been seeking Commission permission to conclude 
a restructuring agreement between themselves for over 12 years, paragraph 9. The Commission 
said, paragraph 28, when granting an article 81(3) exemption, that the request had to be 
considered in the light of:
"...the overcapacity that existed in the synthetic fibres industry in 1982 and that is still 
running at a high level (around 30%) [mainly due to economies in scale which arise from 
bigger plants and new production methods] despite some reduction capacity in the past few 
years."
The Commission continued by saying that this should normally be for the individual companies 
to sort out alone, paragraph 30. However, paragraph 31, the Commission added:
"In the present case, however, market forces by themselves had failed to achieve the 
capacity reductions necessary to re-establish and maintain in the longer term an effective 
competitive structure within the common market"
However, market forces alone are not always sufficient.
"...die free play of market forces alone cannot in an imperfect market achieve certain 
priority objectives of the European Union, namely economic and social cohesion, an 
adequate level of research and development environmental protection, the growth of SMEs 
and structural adjustment..."743
To the extent that they do not (or cannot) produce the desired balance, and with the possible 
exception of industrial policy,744 then the Commission is bound, under Community law to use 
mere or market-balancing. Which of mere and market-balancing should the Commission prefer 
in these situations?
and which dragged down their general performance...", paragraph 29. That said, sometimes the Commission is 
more willing to intervene, sec Commission decision, BPCL/ICI, paragraph 35.
743 European Parliament, Resolution o f the European Parliament on the Twenty-fifth Competition Report o f the 
European Commission, in Commission, RCP 1996, page 357, paragraph B. Also see, ESC, Opinion on the 
Commission's industrial policy communication, paragraph 3.2.2; Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 2, 163 and 
164; European Parliament, Resolution on the Twenty-second Competition Report o f  the Commission, in 
Commission, RCP 1993, Annex I, paragraph 12; Commission decision, Olivetti/Canon, paragraph 56 and, Snowball 
and Antrobus (2001).
744 In Commission, RCP 1991, regarding the link between competition and industrial policy, the Commission said, 
page 11, "When in its 1990 communication on industrial policy the Commission opted clearly for a system of open 
and competitive markets, it reaffirmed the role to be played by competition policy in boosting the competitiveness 
o f  Community industry...The new article 130 [now article 1571 to be inserted into the EEC Treaty pursuant to the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union confirms this approach: it states that the objective of ensuring *that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness o f the Community’s industry exist1 must not lead to the introduction 'o f 
any measure which could lead to a distortion o f competition'.” See also, the Commission, RCP 1994, paragraph 14. 
Nevertheless, the Commission uses a mere-balancing test in relation to industrial policy too. Furthermore, as I 
pointed out in Chapter One, and as we have seen in this part, the idea that the Commission could merely implement 
value-neutral economic rules is farcical. As discussed, in contravention of the Treaty, industrial policy is not treated 
much differently from the other Treaty objectives.
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We prefer mere (over market) balancing. This is due to the difficulty of making market­
balancing transparent, and thus predictable. Not only are the underlying objectives difficult to 
measure, they are difficult to combine. Our analysis of the Commission's decisions illustrates 
this.745 A further benefit, discussed in Chapter Six, of calculating welfare before taking account 
of other objectives, is that the cost of the efficiency sacrifices being made in the name of 
industrial policy, and other relevant objectives, is more obvious. Furthermore, some economists 
suggest that many o f  the trade offs discussed in relation to market-balancing can be better dealt 
with in other areas o f  law, such as through the use of intellectual property rights.746
The Commission, and, in its shadow, the Member States' courts and competition authorities, 
have great scope for including many Treaty objectives within its article 81 analysis. 
Internalising externalities would normally be best. Where this does not work, then mere- 
balancing should (and must) be used. However, this power brings with it a responsibility. If the 
inclusions o f these Treaty aims within competition policy is not to completely undermine the 
market system then the Commission must be as clear and transparent as possible.
4. C O N C L U S IO N  O F  C H A PT E R  F IV E
A tentative assessment o f the Commission's decisions indicates that it uses market-balancing (as 
well as mere-balancing) to achieve Treaty objectives. There is reason to believe that, on 
occasion, the Commission tempers its consumer welfare goal for industrial policy reasons. The 
Commission's ready acceptance of speculative dynamic and productive efficiency gains adds 
credence to this argument. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines aim to put article 81 analysis 
onto a more formal footing. This is welcome, but insufficient. A more precise definition of 
competition is needed, as is a more formal, structured, method o f welfare analysis.
In our view, to the extent that it takes place, there is no room for market-balancing within article 
81, such that consumer welfare should be tempered for producer welfare purposes, see Section 
2.1. This is because such a process lacks transparency, and thus predictability; it helps disguise 
the cost o f political decisions; and, the relevant objectives can be adequately accommodated 
using other policy tools. Where non-economic Treaty objectives need to be considered, mere- 
balancing should be used.
Finally, the Commission's advocacy of the partial equilibrium approach is not founded in law. 
The CFI has held that considerations outside the relevant market can be considered. This allows 
the Commission to take account of other effects, such as developmental and environmental
745 This does not remove all difficult trade-offs from the efficiency calculation. Chapter One showed that long term 
consumer welfare may be enhanced by increasing R&D in the short term and reducing short term allocative 
efficiency. However, transparency is significantly increased where this trade-off is done purely to achieve consumer 
welfare; as opposed to achieving the perfect balance between consumer welfare and industrial policy, for example.
746 See, Neven (1998), page 116 and von WeizsScker (1980)
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ones, which might fall outside the relevant market This issue, and certain limits which might be 
imposed upon a total welfare approach, are considered in Chapter Seven.
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CONCLUSION OF PART B
Schaub claims that:
"Community competition law is now a mature and fully-fledged system of law, which 
pursues the same aims and covers the same phenomena as most other competition law 
regimes."747
Whilst some o f Community competition law’s aims are similar to those in other regimes, we 
saw in Chapter Two that the foundations on which our system is based demand the 
consideration o f non-economic objectives within article 81. These objectives sometimes clash 
with the economic goals that are also considered there. By way of contrast, in other 
jurisdictions, competition policy increasingly focuses on economic criteria. This leads us to the 
second claim, that Community competition law is now a mature and fully-fledged system of 
law. Part B raised many issues related to how to resolve the conflicts referred to above. It 
demonstrates that often, even basic, answers remain illusive. Would this be the case in a mature 
legal system?
"There are two kinds of legal uncertainty. There is good legal uncertainty i.e. unavoidable 
legal uncertainty which results from economic analysis, or from changes in 
circumstances... We can all live with that - no-one is complaining about that kind of legal 
uncertainty. However, the legal uncertainty that results from a gap in the way the system is 
being applied in practice and the way the legal framework is written is not tolerable, and 
must be addressed institutionally."748
Community competition policy must become more transparent.749 We need more clarity about 
which objectives can properly be considered within article 81. For example, we have seen that 
Member State objectives have been raised there, Chapter Four. Whether this is appropriate is 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Secondly, before we can be sure that a conflict is present, the 
relevant objectives must be clearly defined. There also needs to be an explanation about why 
each objective is being pursued, as this should affect its weight in the balance, see Chapters 
One, Three and Eight.
Part B has essentially asked three questions: how does the Commission balance Treaty 
objectives in article 81; where does it do this and what is the limit o f the balance? In relation to 
the first question, two balancing methods are discussed, mere and market-balancing, market- 
balancing is conducted inside, and mere-balancing is conducted outside of the welfare
747 Schaub (2002), page 38. See also, Faull (1991) and Verstiynge (1988), page 2.
748 Venit (1998), page 471.
749 See, for example, Korah, V., in Ehlermann (1998), pages 525-541. For a contrary view, see Faull (1998), page 15 
"On the few occasions that we (the Commission] pursue goals other than efficiency under article 85(3) [now article 




mechanism. This distinction is discussed in more detail above. Both methods have been used 
regularly and are still being used regularly by the Commission.
In Chapter Five's discussion of market-balancing, three avenues were highlighted. The first 
showed how the Commission seems to temper its consumer welfare goal for industrial policy 
purposes. We argued that this should not happen, because the process lacks transparency and 
helps disguise the cost of political decisions. This price is too high when the relative objectives 
can be adequately accommodated using other policy tools. However, if this method of balancing 
is to be used in future, guidance is needed about when it is to be favoured over mere-balancing.
The second avenue was to weigh short-term allocative efficiency losses against potential long­
term allocative efficiency gains through encouraging R&D. Increasing the predictability o f this 
trade-off troubles other competition authorities too. It can never be completely predictable, but 
clarity could be markedly improved through a more formal, structured, method of welfare 
analysis. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, start this process. Some further mechanisms are 
suggested in Chapter Eight.
Finally, we suggested that the Commission's advocacy of the partial equilibrium framework is 
not founded in law. This issue, and certain limits which might be imposed upon a total welfare 
approach is further discussed in Chapter Six.
Mere balancing was discussed in Chapters Three and Four, in relation to article 81(1) and (3) 
respectively. While it is less common within article 81(1), there is evidence that it takes place 
there. It is unclear why this is happening when article 81(3) seems more appropriate. Chapter 
Six argues that balancing within article 81(1) should end. If this advice is not heeded then 
Chapters Three and Four raise some issues that must be resolved before article 81(1) balancing 
can make any claim to be mature.
Even as regards mere-balancing within article 81(3), which is less controversial, fundamental 
questions remain unanswered, see Chapter Four. The Commission rarely even discusses 
whether it is taking a specific objective into account at all. It should be more specific in its 
decisions about how and why it has decided a case in a certain way, see the discussion about the 
G rtmdig’s EC distribution system decision. Also, the way that the Commission decides often 
means that political issues (highly relevant in the cases we are discussing) lead it away from DG 
Competition’s original opinion.750 This must be better reflected in the final draft.
The mechanism that the Commission adopts when balancing is unclear and thus not repeatable, 
by undertakings, their lawyers, or the Member States’ courts and competition authorities. The 
skeleton of a more transparent balancing mechanism is suggested in Chapter Eight.
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Furthermore, the limits of the article 81(3) balance are also unclear. On the few occasions that 
the Commission has explicitly defined this, it did not follow itself when specific matters came 
before it. It does not explain why. Nor are the limits clear from the caselaw. There is a lack of 
transparency. Chapter Four’s research showed that, where they are accepted as relevant in a 
given case, non-economic objectives have never 'lost' to the economic efficiency goal.750 51 This is 
contrary to the 'perceived wisdom* in this area. The Commission should better explain the 
determinants of an objective’s weight in the balance; the limits of the balance; and, how these 
limits change over time, see Part C. Instead of merely providing brief conclusions,752 decisions 
should make the trade-offs explicit and explain why they were resolved in the way they were.753
Before ending this section we should make one more point. Where the parties to an agreement 
act in accordance with a specific Community law, DG Competition is more willing to accept the 
non-economic objectives. For example, in Commission decisions, Eco-Emballages and DSD  
and others, the parties were acting in compliance with certain Community environmental 
legislation. While it is not necessary to have prior Community support in this way, it clearly 
helps. Support for this proposition is given by the Commission, Vertical Guidelines, in the 
section defining environmental agreements, paragraph 171, which says:
"Environmental agreements are those by which the parties undertake to achieve pollution 
abatement, as defined in environmental law, or environmental objectives, in particular, 
those set forth in Article 174 of the EC Treaty. Therefore, the target or the measures agreed 
need to be directly linked to the reduction of a pollutant or a type of waste identified as 
such in relevant regulations."
It is also beneficial to get another of the Commission’s Directorate-Generals to support the 
agreement in question. This occurred in relation to both the ACEA and the CEMEP matters. 
Also, VOTOB, got the agreement o f the Dutch Government. See Chapter Three.
The Commission is a political body, and political pressures can and do affect it. We might 
expect a reduction of this effect where article 81 decisions are taken by Member State courts 
and competition authorities, as they are theoretically more independent. This is far from clear. 
In any event, for some time after 1 May 2004, these bodies are likely to be extremely diffident 
to the opinions o f Community institutions in relation to Community competition law and the 
resolution of conflicts within it. Their independence may also be questionable, especially in the 
face of national interests, see Chapter Two.
750 Monti (2002), page 1070.
751 That is not to say that there are no 'external* checks on the balance. Chapter Seven discusses article 81(3)'s other 
three tests and how they interact with this balance.
752 Ehlermann (1998), page x and Korah, V., in Ehlermann (1998), page 526.
755 Lipsky (1998), page 332 and Forrester (1998), pages 360 and 382.
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In conclusion, in relation to conflict resolution between competing objectives within article 81, 
the citation of Schaub at the beginning of Part B's Conclusion seems wrong.754 The Treaty 
provides a different nest of values from other competition law systems. These values cannot be 
ignored. A mature system of law would explain how they should be taken into account; where 
this should happen and what the limits of this balancing process are. Community law is far from 
clear on any o f these points. In this regard, Community competition policy is more like a spotty 
teenager. It is aware o f many values. It knows that they must be taken into account and even 
does this sometimes. But it does so reluctantly and outside o f a mature overarching value 
framework.
Regulation 1/2003 formalises the Commission's leadership role in relation to articles 81 and 82. 
The reforms that this regulation has brought give the Commission more time to resolve 
fundamental competition problems, such as conflict resolution. The Commission's leadership 
role brings with it a responsibility. If the inclusion of these Treaty aims within competition 
policy is not to completely undermine the market system then the Commission must be as clear 
and transparent as possible and explain how and where to resolve conflicts in article 81, as well 
as what the limits of these conflicts are.
From what we have seen so far, the Commission (and DG Competition in particular) seems 
undecided on how to incorporate non-economic objectives into article 81. The Commission, its 
Legal Service and DG Competition must settle any internal debate on the issues under 
discussion and apply the outcome clearly and consistently.755 Part B shows there is much work 
to do.
Part C makes some suggestions in this regard. But, ultimately, the Community Courts must 
ensure that the Commission lives up to its responsibilities.756 To quote Lord Justice Woolf in 
relation to the English legal system:
"Appeals serve two purposes: the private purpose, which is to do justice in particular cases 
by correcting wrong decisions, and the public purpose, which is to ensure public confidence 
in the administration of justice by making such corrections and to clarify and develop the 
law and to set precedents."757
In relation to the consideration of non-economic objectives within article 81 this means that the 
Community Courts must openly declare that this is possible, as well as explaining where this 
should be done. They must force the Commission to clarify its balancing mechanism and to
754 See also, Whish and Sufrin (2000), pages 146-149 and Gerber (1994), page 143.
755 Whish (1998), page 502.
756 See Korah, V., in Ehlermann (1998), pages 529-541.
757 Lord Woolf, Final Report on Access to Civil Justice, Chapter 14. For similar points in relation to article 234 
references and appeals to the Community Courts, see Evans (1983), page 591.
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show how it applies this in its decisions, providing the reasons that article 253 of the Treaty 
demands. This does not mean that the Community Courts should weigh the relevant objectives 
themselves, to arrive at a final decision. Although they show increased propensity to do this in 
relation to merger cases758 this is not their role under article 81, either on appeal from the 
Commission or in an article 234 action. Having said that these cases are extremely positive in 
the sense that they have put tremendous pressure on the Commission to improve its merger 
decisions. The Community Courts should do the same under article 81, to ensure that the 
Commission provides reasons,759 within a  structured framework. Only then may Community 
competition policy truly claim to have come o f age.
758 See, Case T-342/99 Airtours pic v. Commission [2002]; Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission 
[2002] and Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BVv. Commission [2002].
759 Case T-95/94, Chambre Syndicale Nationale des Entreprises de Transport de Fonds et Valeurs and Brink’s 
France v. Commission [1995], paragraph 52, explains the need for reasoning in Commission competition decisions.
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PART C: HOW AND WHERE SHOULD PUBLIC POLICY
BALANCING BE  PERFORMED IN ARTICLE 81?
-211 -
INTRODUCTION TO PART C
Many argue that non-economic objectives have no place within competition policy. They see 
competition policy as economic policy and do not want it to be complicated and ’tarnished’ by 
non-economic considerations. More legitimately, they argue that competition policy cannot do 
eveiything. Non-economic objectives are important, but can often be achieved more efficiently 
using other mechanisms.
Chapter Two argued that, in the Community legal order, competition policy should not be 
isolated from the non-economic Treaty objectives. The Community Courts see the Treaty as a 
whole; they interpret it as a system for achieving article 2's underlying aims. This can require 
compromise. Sometimes competition must be restricted or distorted and non-economic 
objectives must be considered within, amongst others, article 81 of the Treaty.
Part B showed how this is currently done. It highlighted two mechanisms. The first, mere- 
balancing, takes place in both article 81(1) and 81(3) of the Treaty. There is little coherence in 
the consideration o f non-economic ends in either place. Chapter Five argued that the second 
balancing mechanism, market-balancing, should not be used, because it is too opaque.
Part C reflects upon the problems raised in the first two sections o f  this thesis. It suggests a 
framework for the consideration o f non-economic objectives. This is not an easy task. The 
current system is unacceptable. Prospective solutions will likely involve major re-organisation. 
This is not surprising. Today’s rules are based on foundations established in the 1950s and 
1960s. The world, the Treaty, our acceptance of antitrust, as well as our knowledge of economic 
theory, have all changed markedly since then.
Certain elements must be at the heart o f any proposed changes. First and foremost, the decision­
maker must be able to take account o f the various relevant objectives within article 81. 
Secondly, businesses, decision-makers and consumers need clarity and transparency.760 Thirdly, 
the proposed system must respect the Treaty, unless amendments are proposed.
Chapter Six discusses article 81(1) of the Treaty. It highlights two substantive problems in 
relation to this provision. First, the definition of a restriction of competition. The test proposed 
by the Commission and the CFI is unclear and unsatisfactory. An economic efficiency standard 
is suggested. Secondly, Chapter Six discusses the presence o f mere-balancing within article 
81(1) of the Treaty, arguing that it should not occur there. These two suggestions provide 
greater clarity, while, we argue, respecting the Treaty’s telos.
760 Part B asked a  series o f questions that, as a  minimum, must be answered before balancing o f non-economic 
objectives within article 81 can be considered coherent and transparent at a basic level.
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Chapter Seven analyses the four tests under article 81(3) of the Treaty. It considers some of the 
implications of incorporating non-economic objectives within that provision and suggests how 
th is might better be done. In light of the balancing test under article 81(3)‘s first condition, 
Chapter Seven also suggests that article 81 (3Xa) should be reinterpreted, and that the other two 
article 81(3) conditions be removed. Chapter Eight provides a framework for balancing the non* 
economic objectives under article 81(3)'s first test.
T hese changes sound dramatic. In reality, most are not. Many of the ideas discussed here have 
their roots in the existing caselaw or Commission decisions. As we said above, the world and 
the  Treaty have changed substantially since 1957, new interpretations and techniques art needed 
to  blend these together. The Treaty's words are less important than its structure and underl>ing 
telos.761 There are no constitutional obstacles to prevent Community competition policy 
evolving to meet new demands.762 Indeed, there is a constitutional imperative for this, where the 
current interpretation does not reflect this telos. This means that we can never consider the 
interpretation of any of the Treaty's provisions to have been permanently settled. They must be 
consistently reassessed in light of the system as a whole.
Non-economic objectives must be considered within article 81 of the Treaty. Part C offers some 
foundations for their consideration there and points the way to future demands that these 
objectives will place upon us. It does this in light of Chapter One's theoretical insights, although 
it takes care to restrict the analysis to that acceptable in the Community legal order.
761 Jones and Sufrin (2001), pages 88 and 89 and Chapter Two.
762 Frazer (1990), page 615.
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OBJECTIVES BE CONSIDERED IN ARTICLE 81(1) OF THE 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Competition is an important principle within the Community legal order. There are many 
references to it throughout the Treaty. In particular, agreements between undertakings which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the restriction 
of competition within the common market are prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market, article 81(1). Nevertheless, Chapter Two demonstrated that non-economic objectives 
are also important within the Community legal order and should be considered within article 81 
of the Treaty.
Despite the emphasis placed upon it, competition is not defined in the Treaty. Furthermore, Part 
B indicated a lack o f consistency in how and where conflicts are resolved between this and non­
economic objectives within article 81. Chapter Six deals with these two issues.
Section 2 asks what article 81(1) o f the Treaty means by "...prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition..." The expression is unclear. So, we discuss ways of defining the term, taking 
account of article 81's purpose. We conclude that article 81(1) would best be defined as an 
appreciable restriction of economic efficiency.
Then, Section 3, deals with the lack of clarity generated by mere-balancing non-economic 
objectives within article 81(1) of the Treaty. Chapter Three observed that mere-balancing 
probably takes place within this provision. It is unclear whether this is true and, if it is, how and 
where such balancing should be performed. We suggest that mere-balancing be restricted to
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article 81(3). Why? Conducting mere-balancing in article 81(1) decreases transparency, 
undermines the Commission’s corporate social responsibility initiatives and ignores article 81’s 
structure.763 On top of that, it is unnecessary. There is no need for mere-balancing within article 
81(1). Indeed, the best place for it is article 81(3) of the Treaty.
Are these issues still relevant today? Even if  many agreements fall within article 81(1) of the 
Treaty, due to a strict economic freedom approach, they can now be immediately exempted 
under article 81(3). Surely, under Regulation 1/2003, article 81 can now be enforced as a unitary 
norm by Community and Member State enforcers alike? Korah puts it like this:764
"The reform would effectively end the bifurcation of 81(1) and (3). Whether the market 
analysis is earned out under 81(1) or (3) will no longer matter once courts and national 
authorities can proceed to analysis under article 81(3). The wide scope historically given to 
81(1) will cease to be important.”
Korah is right in that now article 81, in its entirety, can be applied by the same decision-maker, 
in the same forum, the bifurcation o f this provision is less important.765 However, Regulation 
1/2003 does not:
• mean that the wide reach historically given to 81(1) ceases to be important;
• remove the need to clearly define article 81(l)'s scope; or,
• obviate the problems caused by mere-balancing in that provision.
Article 81(l)'s reach is still important. Where agreements fall within article 81(1), they are void 
unless they can be exempted under article 81(3) of the Treaty. There is also a risk o f fines. 
Where article 81(1) is interpreted widely, then a full balancing of public policy objectives under 
article 81(3) of the Treaty becomes necessary more often. This balancing exercise is expensive 
to conduct and the outcome hard to predict. A wide article 81(1) definition encourages litigation 
to upset the parties' bargain.766 This discourages investment, as contracts become less certain.767
763 It also obscures the cost o f the efficiency sacrifices made in the name of non-economic objectives. Theoretically, 
welfare could be considered separately even within article 8 i(l)  of the Treaty. However, welfare analysis itself 
requires a balancing exercise, see Chapter One. This may prove too tempting a shield for the consideration of these 
other aims, which may mean that they will not be treated truly separately. In our view, it is better to clearly remove 
non-economic considerations from this stage of the analysis altogether.
764 Korah (2000), page 189. See also page 361. Gyselen (2002a), page 197, talks of a "...seamless substantive legality 
test..." Gavalda and Parleani (2002), page 333, "La décentralisation, et la fin programmée du monopole de la 
Commission pour exempter individuellement sur la base du §3, va entraîner une globalisation de l'analyse conduite 
sur la base de l'article 81."
76î Korah and O'Sullivan (2002), page 120, say "The bifurcation of article 81 will remain but be less important", 
Venit (2003), page 575, agrees. Albors-LIorens (2002), pages 72 and 73, adds "...the procedural advantages 
promoted by the advocates o f the 'rule of reason' approach, would not longer be pertinent"
766 Forrester (2001), page 45. Gyselen (2002a), pages 190 and 191, argued in favour o f interpreting 81(1) widely for 
procedural reasons, but this was before the changes wrought by Regulation 1/2003, article 3.
I 767 Siragusa ( 1998), pages 543 and 544; Venit (1998), pages 567 and 568 and Hawk (1995), page 983.
I
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When there is ambiguity about what article 81(1) refers to, this problem is exacerbated.768 
Ambiguity may arise for many reasons. Key among them is that:
• a 'restriction of competition’ has not been clearly defined; and,
•  mere-balancing (sometimes) takes place there, and this is not a transparent process.
Therefore, one still needs to be able to clearly understand what a restriction of competition is.769
Article 81's burden o f proof is also an issue. Regulation 1/2003, assigns a different burden of 
proof to article 81(1) (the party alleging the infringement) and (3) of the Treaty (the party 
claiming the benefit o f this provision). At least some Member States’ courts, if  not other 
decision-makers, are likely to take the different burdens of proof quite seriously. Therefore, it is 
important to know what objectives can be considered within each paragraph. It also makes 
splitting the economic efficiency analysis between these paragraphs, as has often been done in 
the past, yet more artificial. An overly strict interpretation o f article 81(1), such that likely pro- 
competitive effects cannot be considered there, may also place an undue burden on the 
defendant. This is particularly so where vertical agreements are at issue, as they are normally 
considered to lead to at least some efficiency benefits.770
One might even say that these issues are o f particular import to undertakings since 1 May 2004. 
Once an agreement had been notified to the Commission under Regulation 17 there was 
immunity from fines.771 This is no longer the case under Regulation 1/2003. Furthermore, 
before the reforms the Commission had insufficient time to review all cases. There is likely to 
be much more competition enforcement today as Member States’ courts and competition 
authorities, as well as individuals, are encouraged to use article 81. As a result, undertakings are 
potentially open to more attack with less protection. Of course there is now no need to notify, 
which saves costs. It also means that one can take advantage of article 81(3) more easily, so 
undertakings are not necessarily worse off. I merely seek to show that they are exposed still and 
that this is made worse due to the ambiguity about what is relevant in article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Being able to understand the legal provisions that apply to them is vital.
768 Even more so where at least one o f the objectives in the balance ('competition') has not been clearly defined. 
Furthermore, article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty says that the agreement must not afford the undertakings the possibility 
of eliminating competition. This provision is discussed in Chapter Seven. However, 'competition' is likely to have a 
similar meaning throughout article 81. As a result, if  the term is unclear in article 81(1), it is unclear in article 81(3) 
too. This adds a further level o f difficulty in predicting the outcome of litigation.
769 Whish (2003), page 107, says "...it is still important to apply article 81(1) with intellectual rigour, and to appty it 
only to agreements that really do restrict competition..."
770 Verouden (2003), page 573.
771 Unless there has been a  clear infringement, although this is not certain, Korah (2000), page 209.
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2. "...PREVENTION, RESTRICTION OR DISTORTION OF COMPETITION..."
Section 2 asks what article 81(1) of the Treaty means by "...prevention, restriction or distortion 
o f competition..." The expression is unclear. Neither the Treaty, nor the Community Courts, nor 
the Commission have defined the term with sufficient clarity (or consistency) such that it can be 
applied by undertakings, Section 2.1. This is unacceptable. Companies can reasonably expect:772
"...an adequate level of predictability and consistent application of the rules that allows 
them properly to assess how the rules will be applied."
As a result, the remainder of Section 2 is dedicated to finding appropriate guiding principles that 
properly balance (in the Community context) the need for legal certainty with the flexibility 
required for governing an economy in a state of constant flux. Section 2.2. asks whether 
economic freedom can provide an appropriate foundation for such rules. It concludes that this is 
not the case. Section 2.3. advocates the adoption of an economic efficiency test.
Throughout this discussion we must remember that article 81 should be interpreted in light of 
the Treaty's objectives as a whole and that these objectives change over time. As a result, article 
81’s interpretation may change overtime too.
2.1 "...restriction o f competition..." is currently unclear
Much of the Treaty's wording is open-textured773 and, despite its emphasis upon the term, 
nowhere does it define 'competition',774 let alone a 'restriction o f competition'.775 This is hardly 
surprising given the dynamics of the object being regulated here, an economy that is in a 
constant state o f flux.776
Some will undoubtedly argue that wording such as 'restriction o f competition' is incapable of 
w hat might seem like manipulation. It has a meaning and that meaning simply needs to be made 
apparent.777 This is not the case.778 In the words o f Bright:
772 M ario Monti in Ehlermann (2001), page 9. See also, Marenco (1999), page 1231.
773 Baquero Cruz (2002), page 10.
774 Souty (2003), pages 16 and 55.
775 Article 81(lXaMe) of the Treaty provides examples o f restrictions of competition, such as directly or indirectly 
fixing purchase or selling prices or sharing markets or sources o f supply. However, "...this is insufficient in itself to 
explain the numerous intricacies involved in understanding how this article works.", Whish (2003), page 106. See 
also, Verouden (2003), pages 529 and 530. The notion of 'competition' is further discussed in Chapter Seven, in 
relation to article 81(3) of the Treaty. Similar problems emerge there to those under article 81(1).
776 See, Mdschel (1991), page 7.
777 Marenco (1999), page 1218.
778 Indeed, .Bork (1993), pages 58-61, distinguishes at least five definitions of'competition'. See also, Areeda and 
Hovenkamp (2000), paragraph 100a, "...ambiguity goes to the very meaning o f the terms in question."
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"As with any broad and simply stated legal rule, a number of approaches can be consistent 
with the wording of the provision. The issue is which approach is, taking into account the 
purpose of the provision, most appropriate."779
So is the appropriate approach dear? We turn to the statements and decisions of the 
Commission and the Community Courts. We also discuss how they have been interpreted by the 
doctrine.780
In our view, neither the Community Courts, nor the Commission have defined 'restriction of 
competition* with sufficient clarity (or consistency) such that it can be adequately applied by 
undertakings, or the Member States' courts and competition authorities.781 This failure operates 
on two levels. First, they have not properly explained the underlying principles which guide 
their definition of a  'restriction of competition'. This issue is rarely discussed in the doctrine.782 
Secondly, and possibly as a result of this first failure, it is extremely difficult to apply article 
81(1) in practice. We examine these two points in turn. This is not done in order to define a 
’restriction of competition*. We merely seek to highlight the ambiguity in its interpretation.
2.1.1 'restriction of competition' - exploring the underlying principles
Following the Ordoliberal tradition,783 Monti argues that a 'restriction of competition' under 
article 81(1) of the Treaty is "...an undue restriction of the economic freedom of the parties or a 
restriction on other market participants..."784 Monti believes that recent caselaw also supports 
this interpretation o f article 81(1) o f the Treaty. In his view, both Community Courts:
"...have interpreted the notion of a restriction of competition in article 81(1) as a restriction 
on freedom of action of market participants."785
779 Bright (1995), page 506. See also, Hildebrand (2002), page 183; Gerber (1998), pages 345 and 385-387; Joerges 
(1997), page 10 and Schröter (1987), page 691. Furthermore, Forrester (2001), pages 91-93, writes that when (in 
1958) the British Embassy in Paris asked the French Government about article 81 and 82’$ remit "...neither the 
Member States nor the Commission were able to respond to the UK's questions about how the competition rules 
would affect executed agreements,"
780 This is not an easy task, particularly in light of the balancing process taking place within article 81(1), see Chapter 
Three,
781 See also, Commentaire Megret (1997), page 171.
782 Uitermark (1996), page 6 and Gerber (1998), pages vii and 387.
783 The Ordoliberal tradition is briefly discussed in Section 2.2. below.
7,4 Monti (2002), page 1061. See also, Venit (2003), page 548; Lenaerts (2002), pages 32 and 33; Schröter (1987), 
pages 667-670 and Jacquemin and de Jong (1977), pages 198 and 199. O f the five, only Monti and Schröter justify 
their view with reference to the Community Courts' caselaw or Commission statements and decisions, see below.
785 Monti (2002), page 1061. See also, Vossestein (2002), page 857 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), pages 86 and 87.
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Monti relies on two recent cases to support this view.786 The first, Métropole télévision, was an 
appeal from Commission decision, TPS. It involved an agreement to create Télévision par 
satellite (TPS) whose object was to devise, develop and broadcast, in digital mode by satellite, a 
range o f television programmes and services, against payment, to French speaking television 
viewers in Europe. TPS was a partnership between six major companies. Some were active in 
the television sector, others in the telecommunication and cable distribution sectors. One of the 
grounds for appeal was that the Commission, paragraph 68:
"...should have applied article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty in the light of a rule 
of reason rather than an abstract rule."
In the applicants’ view, cases such as Nungesser and Coditel confirmed the existence of a rule of 
reason under article 81(1), paragraph 68.787 Furthermore, they argued that, under this rule:
"...an anti-competitive practice falls outside the scope of the prohibition in article 85(1)
[now article 81(1)] of the Treaty if it has more positive than negative effects on competition 
on a given market.”
The CFI thought otherwise. At paragraph 72 it argued that a rule o f reason had not been 
confirmed by the Community Courts. The CFI accepted that some o f the Community Courts' 
judgments have favoured a more flexible approach to interpretation under article 81(1), 
paragraph 75.788 However, the CFI added, paragraph 76:
"Those judgments cannot., .be interpreted as establishing the existence of a rule of reason in 
Community competition law. They are, rather, part of a broader trend in the case-law 
according to which it is not necessary to hold, wholly abstractly and without drawing any 
distinction, that any agreement restricting the freedom of action of one or more of the 
parties is necessarily caught by the prohibition laid down in article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] 
of the Treaty. In assessing the applicability of article 85(1) to an agreement, account should 
be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the economic context in 
which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreement and the 
actual structure of the market concerned..."
The CFI added, paragraph 77:
786 Case T-l 12/99 Métropole télévision (M6) and Others v. Commission [2001], paragraphs 76 and 77 and Case C- 
309/99 J.C.J. Wouters and Others v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002], paragraph 
97. Some earlier caselaw also supports him. See, for example, Case 86/82 Hasselblad v. Commission [1984], 
paragraph 46, where the ECJ held "As the Commission rightly points out, a prohibition of sales between authorised 
dealers constitutes a restriction of their economic freedom and, consequently, a restriction of competition." and 
other references ín Schröter (1987), pages 667-669.
787 The Nungesser Case and Case 262/81 Coditel SA, Compagnie Générale pour la Diffusion de la Télévision, and 
Others v. Ciné-Vog Films [1982], paragraph 20.
788 The CFI cited Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966]; the Nungesser Case; the 
Coditel Case; the Pronuptîa Case; the Gettrup-Klim Case, paragraphs 31-35; Case C-399/93 H.G. Oude Luttikhuis 
and Others v. Verenigde Coöperatieve [ 1995] and the European Night Services Case.
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"That interpretation...makes it possible to prevent the prohibition in article 85(1) from 
extending wholly abstractly and without distinction to all agreements whose effect is to 
restrict the freedom of action of one or more of the parties."
The CFI makes two points here. First, for the purposes of article 81(1), a restriction of 
competition cannot be defined in the abstract as every restriction of the parties' freedom of 
action. Secondly, account should be taken of the actual conditions in which the agreement 
functions. The second case that Monti relies upon, Wouters, confirms these points.789
Do these two cases justify Monti's conclusion that the Community Courts have interpreted the 
notion o f  a restriction o f competition in article 81(1) as a restriction on the freedom of action of 
market participants? The situation is far from clear. Neither court actually defines what a 
restriction of competition is. They merely hold that it is not every restriction o f economic 
freedom.
Three interpretations are possible. First, Monti assumes that the Community Courts are saying 
that a restriction o f competition is a restriction of economic freedom. The reference to 'context1 
is merely there to show that article 81(1) should not be applied in the abstract to all restrictions 
of economic freedom, but just to 'undue' restrictions. Whether or not a restriction is 'undue' can 
only be determined in the context in which the agreement actually operates. Many disagree that 
the jurisprudence unambiguously points this way. Summing up the conclusions of a group o f 
competition law experts, Whish says that several Community Court judgments eschew the 
confusion between restrictions o f competition and restrictions of conduct.790 This implies that 
economic freedom was/ is not (always) an issue under article 81(1) o f the Treaty.791
If the Community Courts (sometimes?) avoid basing their article 81(1) decisions on economic 
freedom, what other objectives might they be referring to in Métropole télévision and Wouters? 
The Community Courts may be saying that a restriction on competition should not be 
determined by asking whether or not there is a restriction o f  economic freedom (i.e. whether or 
not the agreement restricts economic freedom is irrelevant). Instead, we should ask whether 
there has been a restriction of competition (whatever that is) by examining the context in which 
the agreement actually operates. What, then, might a restriction o f competition be? Confusion 
arises, in part, because more than one objective is relevant under article 81(1). For example, the 
ECJ has said:
789 At paragraph 97 of W outers the ECJ holds "...not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an 
association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls 
within the prohibition laid down in article 85(1) [now article 81(1)1 of the Treaty. For the purposes of application of 
that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of 
the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects."
790 Whish (1998), page 499. admittedly, this statement was made before either W outers or M étropole television.
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"...an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national 
divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the most 
fundamental objections of the Community. The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at 
abolishing the barriers between states, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a 
stem attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct 
such barriers. Article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] is designed to pursue this aim..."791 92
It is certainly true that market integration was the first objective o f article 81 for some time.793 
This explains the Commission's emphasis on vertical restraints, for example. Having said that, 
market integration is not the only criterion used to assess restrictions o f competition. Another 
possibility is that article 81(1) of the Treaty incorporates an economic efficiency test. Although 
it is a hotly debated topic,794 795many authors,793 as well as the Commission,796 argue that the 
Commission and the Community Courts have already applied an economic efficiency test 
within article 81(1), at least some of the time.797 798Perhaps article 81(1), as interpreted by the CFI 
in Métropole télévision is an economic efficiency test? This is discussed further below.
A third alternative, suggested by Odudu, is that article 81(1) demands both a restriction of 
economic freedom and something else, which he suggests is an appreciable allocative efficiency 
loss. He says, for example, that:793
"A restriction on the commercial freedom of one of the parties is distinct from a restriction 
on the commercial freedom of one of the parties that restricts competition...
A restriction on conduct is not a restriction on competition unless it results in higher prices, 
and lower quality or quantity of goods produced."
Let's pause here for a moment This is a fundamental disagreement. The underlying motivation 
for the Community Courts' interpretation o f article 81(1) is still not clear. Even in the most 
recent jurisprudence. In the past, economic freedom was sometimes the basis for the analysis,
791 Although it is unclear, Whish’s observation seems to be based on the line of cases starting with Case 56/65 Société 
Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Uln [1966]. These are discussed in Section 2.1.2.
792 The Consten and Grundig Case, page 340.
793 Verstiynge (1988), page 3; Gerber (1998), pages 374,385 and 386 and Verouden (2003), pages 527,539 and 530.
794 See, Whish and Sufrin (1987), pages 20-36; Veistrynge (1988), page 8; Korah (1986), pages 98-103 (although she 
thinks that there should be a rule of reason, Korah (1981)); Manzini (2002), pages 395-397 and Manzini (2003), 
pages 287/II-296/II, as well as the references in all these papers.
795 Forrester and Norall (1984), pages 38-40; Venit (1986), pages 217 and 218; Korah (1990), page 1018; Hawk 
(1995), pages 982 and 983; Riley (1998), pages 483,484 and 491; Hildebrand (2002), Chapter IV and Souty (2003), 
pages 56 and 61.
796 See, Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 57.
797 Some argue that this tendency is increasing, see, Faull (1998), page 506; Heimler and Fattori (1998), page 596 and 
Ritter, Braun, and Rawlinson (2000), page 16. However, others treat this assertion more sceptically, see, Whish 
(1998), page 499 and Uitermark (1996), pages 9-11, or at least "...the Commission should look more rigorously 
into the economic aspects of the matter."
798 Odudu (2001), pages 263 and 264. This article appeared before the CFI's judgment in Métropole télévision.
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see above. Has this changed? Monti is certain that it has not. But he does not discuss this point. 
Nor does he explain why, if the Community Courts unequivocally support his position, they did 
not unambiguously say so. This is particularly important because, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three, the Community Courts have found restrictions o f competition even where agreements do 
not contain any contractual restrictions.799 Have the Community Courts abandoned economic 
freedom? This is unclear. Furthermore, if  they have, what is the new standard? Is it economic 
efficiency, merely allocative efficiency, or something else? This is not clear either. In fact, the 
Community Courts'judgments are so hard to reconcile that they are probably still undecided as 
to what article 81(l)'s underlying principles should be. They have not consistently chosen one of 
market integration, economic freedom or efficiency (or some other notion).800 Instead, they hide 
behind the notion o f factual and economic context, see Section 2.1.2. below, and have thus far 
avoided the issue.
Community competition law is a complex beast. It must be viewed in light o f the Treaty as a 
whole. The relevant balance of Treaty objectives changes over time, Chapter Two. Perhaps the 
Treaty's drafters used a general concept, such as 'restriction o f competition', to give the 
Community Courts more flexibility to change its content over time? Having said that, we are 
facing a somewhat different problem. As we have seen, it is not clear if certain objectives are 
relevant under article 81(1) of the Treaty (think o f economic efficiency), or whether this has 
changed over time (is economic freedom still relevant?). There is also little consistency or 
clarity as to how the relevant objectives should be combined there. This is unsatisfactory.
This ambiguity gives the Commission (and the Member States' courts and competition 
authorities) an enormous amount of freedom.801 Unsurprisingly, a clearer position has not 
emerged from them either.802 Sometimes almost every restriction in agreements between
799 Possibly as a result of this realisation, in a later article discussing M étropole télévision, Odudu drops the reference 
to economic freedom (see above, alternative three), implying that a mere (appreciable) restriction of allocative 
efficiency is enough, Odudu (2002), pages 103-105. He does not explain this change.
800 Gerber (2001), page 124, for example, points to "...at least four basic conceptions of what it means to protect 
competition [in Community competition law]."
801 The Commission's view is increasingly important, see Gerber (1998), pages 374 and 375 and Case 42/84 Remia 
B V and O thers v. Commission [1985], paragraph 34.
802 See, for example, Bright (1995), pages 506 and 507. One exception is the Office of Fair Trading in the United 
Kingdom. Their guidelines OFT, A rticle 81 and th e Chapter I  P rohibition, paragraph 2.22 state "Any agreement 
between undertakings might be said to restrict competition to some degree, in that it restricts the freedom of action 
of the parties. That does not, however, necessarily mean that the agreement has or will have an appreciable effect on 
competition, and the OFT does not adopt such a narrow approach. The OFT will assess the effect of an agreement 
on competition within the common market and/or within the United Kingdom or a part of it by examining an 
agreement in its economic context." This clearly cites economic freedom as the basis of the article 81(1) test (and 
the UK equivalent). That said, ambiguity is introduced through the application of this concept as a result of the 
Community Courts' insistence that the restriction be placed in context, see Section 2.1.2.
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significant players requires an exemption.803 On other occasions the Commission interprets 
'restrictions of competition' as 'undue restrictions of economic freedom'.804 The Commission 
insists that an economic efficiency analysis should not be conducted under article 81(1) of the 
Treaty.805 That said, it too is inconsistent.806 Of late, the Commission has emphasised a 'new 
economic approach’, see Chapter Two.807 Although the Commission distinguishes between the 
two, it is unclear how precisely the economic approach differs from an economic efficiency 
analysis, see Section 2.1.2. below. The Commission, Article 8J(3) Guidelines, do not define 
’competition’ either.
This part has not sought to define what a 'restriction of competition' is. Instead, it shows that 
even in relation to the most recent caselaw, there remains significant disagreement on what it 
means. Unsurprisingly, it is also unclear what a restriction of competition is not. What does this 
mean? Not only does Monti assert that economic freedom is the basis for article 81(1); he also 
argues that 'restriction of competition’ cannot be read as economic inefficiency, or even, 
allocative efficiency. As a result o f Métropole télévision, paragraph 78 (and presumably 
paragraph 77, see below), Monti has said that:
803 "...the validity of an un-notified agreement was jeopardised as soon as it could be shown that it contained a 
provision restricting freedom of action.", Venit (2003), page 574. See also Verouden (2003), page 532; Lenaerts 
(2002), page 32; Fox (2001), page 127; Hawk and Denaeijer (2001), page 129; Hawk (1995), page 975 and 
Waelbroeck (1987a), page 693.
804 See, for example, the Commission's arguments in Case 86/82 Hasselbiad v. Commission [1984], paragraph 42, 
T h e  prohibition on cross-supplies restricts competition because it seriously impedes the economic freedom of 
authorised dealers and makes them wholly dependent" This reflects Commission decision, Hasselbiad, paragraph 
59. See also, Commission decision, ACEC-Berliet, paragraph 11(1); Commission decision, Woodpulp, paragraph 
133; Commission, RCP 1991, paragraph 83 and page 334 and the Commission's position in matters such as the 
Coditel Case, page 3389 "...typical restrictions on freedom of economic action...” and the Nungesser Case, pages 
2035 and 2036.
805 See, for example, Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 57. This also the implication of 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 11.
806 See, for example, Commission decisions, LH/SAS, paragraphs 52-61; Fenex, paragraphs 59-64; Banque Nationale 
de Parisf Dresdner Bank, paragraphs 15 and 16;EATA; FETTCSA, here the Commission solely seems to focus on 
efficiency in article 81(1) of the Treaty, all the language is economics based, paragraphs 132-139 and Commission 
decision, SAS Maersk Air etc,, paragraph 72(a). See also, for example, Wesseling (2000), page 90. Also see, 
Commission, RCP 1992, page 19; Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 7 and Commission, Hortontal 
Guidelines, paragraphs 7, 19, 20, 24, 25 and 197. "Reading the Annual Reports on Competition Policy leads to the 
disappointing conclusion that the Commission actually has no definition at all or does not use its concept of 
competition in a consistent way. One finds: 'normal competition’, 'undistorted competition', 'workable competition', 
'effective competition', healthy competition', 'efficiency', 'real competition'; and these terms are all used in the 
general part of the Reports where the Commission reflects upon its own work.", Uitermark (1996), pages 6 and 7. 
See also, Bright (1995), page 506-513.
807 Perhaps this is intended to bring it in line with the Community Courts' jurisprudence? Many argued that their 
approaches differ. See, for example, van Gcrven (2004), page 418; Verouden (2003), page 539; Hildebrand (2002), 
pages 187 and 207; Bishop (2001), page 56; Jones and Sufrin (2001), page 120; Anderman (1998), pages 92 and 93; 
Ehlermarin (1998), pages 572 and 573; Hawk (1995), pages 982 and 983; Bright (1995),.pages 506-509, 521 and 
522; Waelbroeck (1987a), page 721 and Forrester in (1987) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, pages 726 and 727.
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"...tiie neo-classical conceptions of competition play a role - if at all - only when deciding 
to exempt an agreement under article 81 (3).”80g
Note that this argument by Monti does not undermine the second possible interpretation o f the 
CFI's judgment in Métropole télévision, see above.809 All it does is argue that a restriction of 
competition cannot be interpreted as economic efficiency.
Even here, one can legitimately question whether the CFI in Métropole télévision was 
unambiguous. The judgment says, paragraphs 77 (only the second part is relevant to this point, 
the first part of paragraph 77 is cited above) and 78:
"It must...be emphasised that such an approach [i.e. examining the agreement under the 
actual conditions in which it functions] does not mean that it is necessary to weigh the pro 
and anti-competitive effects of an agreement when determining whether the prohibition laid 
down in article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty applies.
In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, contrary to the applicants' submission, in 
the contested decision the Commission correctly applied article 85(1) of the Treaty to the 
exclusivity clause and the clause relating to the special-interest channels inasmuch as it was 
not obliged to weigh the pro and anti-competitive aspects of those agreements outside the 
specific framework of article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."
Weighing the pro and anti-competitive effects should take place, said the CFI, in article 81(3) of 
the Treaty. What does this mean? A similar statement in Van den Bergh Foods is equally 
opaque.810 Wouters does not expressly consider this point, although some balancing occurs 
within article 81(1) in that case.
As a preliminary issue, one might question the precedent value of these two CFI cases, 
Métropole télévision and Van den Bergh Foods. First, as we discuss below, the relevant 
passages are unclear. Secondly, both cases were decided by only three judges, rather than the 
full court. It is unusual that the CFI would appoint three judges to decide upon, what Odudu 
rightly calls,811 "...the most controversial issue in EC competition law."812 Finally, the ECJ in
808 Monti (2002), page 1062.
809 That a restriction of competition is not a restriction of economic freedom. We saw above that Monti merely 
assumes that the Community Courts in W outers and M étropole télévision  are saying that a restriction of competition 
is a restriction of economic freedom. He does provide other arguments in favour of an Ordoliberal approach 
(discussed in Section 2.2. below), but these are not based on the caselaw.
810 Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Com m ission [2003J, paragraph 107 "It is only within the specific 
framework of that provision [article 81(3)] that the pro and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction may be 
weighed..."
8,1 Odudu (2002), page 102 and Odudu (2001), page 261.
813 Tesauro, in Ehlermann (2001), page 300, a previous Advocate-General at the ECJ, argued, in relation to a different 
case, "I do not know if one judgment only can make caselaw. It is one judgment, only one. I have been reading the 
judgments of the European Court of Justice for many years now and 1 always tried to wait until there are three 
judgments on the same matter...otherwise there can be surprises." In the same book, page 305, David Edward, who 
has been -a judge at both the CFI and ECJ, agreed with these comments. He added "Remember that, in order to 
determine who is to decide a case, the Court uses the following broad principles: (a) if the case raises a major issue
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Wouters did not refer to Métropole té lé v is io n  and may overrule it.* 81314 While it is possible to 
distinguish the two cases, this can produce rather odd results.815 .Furthermore, given the 
controversy surrounding these issues, if Monti’s interpretation were right, silence here is 
unusual. If Métropole télévision and Van den Bergh Foods are not good law, then the issues 
discussed in Section 2.1.2. are still relevant. They show that, although it is far from clear, in 
fact, it is hard to argue that the Community Courts have not weighed the agreement's pro and 
anti-competitive effects in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Nevertheless, let’s examine paragraphs 77 and 78 in a little more detail. At least two 
interpretations are possible. First, they may mean that the pro and anti-competitive 
considerations are balanced in article 81(3) and are not considered in article 81(1) at all. This 
must mean that something else (i.e. not competitive issues) is relevant in article 81(1) of the 
Treaty. For example, economic freedom? This is Monti's argument. However, it is not certain 
that this is the correct interpretation. Paragraphs 77 and 78 could equally be understood as 
saying that the anti-competitive effects should be assessed under article 81(1) and the pro- 
competitive effects balanced against them under article 81(3) of the Treaty. Manzini and 
Verouden make this point,816 and it is essentially the argument that Odudu relies on.817
First let’s examine what Monti, Manzini and Odudu agree on. They assume that the CFI's 
references to ’pro and anti-competitive’ are shorthand for welfare. It is not certain that they are 
right. Nowhere in Métropole télévision does the CFI refer to either 'welfare' or 'efficiency', let 
alone assimilate them to 'competitive'. The same can be said in relation to Svelfare' in Van den 
Bergh Foods. The CFI refers to efficiency there, but not so as to definitively answer this
of principle, it will be brought before the plenary; (b) if it is a simple question of technical interpretation, like...a 
simple question of applying existing jurisprudence, it goes to a chamber of three: and (c) in-between there is the 
chamber of five, whose basic assignment is that it may develop existing jurisprudence, but not create new 
jurisprudence."
813 "The reader of the Court's judgments will be struck by the fact that previous decisions are often only cited by the 
Court where they support its argument Authorities which point the other way are sometimes not mentioned at 
all...", Amull, Dashwood, Ross and Wyatt (2000), pages 201 and 202. Judgment in the Van den Bergh Foods Case 
was handed down after the Wouters judgment and Advocate-General Légcr’s Opinion in Wouters was written before 
the Métropole télévision judgment
8,4 Korah (2002), page 25, asks this rhetorically. For a contraiy view see Manzini (2002), page 397.
815 One could say, for example, that all objectives can be balanced within article 81(1) of the Treaty (Wouters) except 
analysis of the pro-competitive effects, or, possibly all of the efficiency analysis (Métropole télévision). Monti
(2002), section 5.2. suggests another alternative, which Chapter Seven discusses.
8,6 Manzini (2002), page 396 and Verouden (2003), pages 538-540,565 and 566. See also, van Gerven (2004), pages 
426 and 427.
817 Odudu (2002), pages 103-105.
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issue.818 If Monti, Manzini and Odudu are wrong, then pro and anti-competitive effects may 
refer to non-welfare issues. If that were the case, then efficiency issues could be dealt with 
under article 81(1) after all.819 Unfortunately, without access to the Report from the Hearing 
from either case, we cannot be more definitive on this issue.820
In any event, from this point on Monti, Manzini, Verouden and Odudu disagree. This is 
unsurprising as it is unclear where the line between pro and anti-competitive effects should be 
drawn.821 Odudu believes that the CFI uses 'anti-competitive' to mean that the task demanded by 
article 81(1) is "...to determine whether the agreement has the object or effect of allocative 
inefficiency ”m  He argues that pro-competitive advantages (essentially productive efficiency823) 
should be considered in article 81(3) of the Treaty. Monti, remember, believes that any 
efficiency issues (be they gains or losses) should be dealt with under article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
Manzini does not expressly consider the point, but implies that anti-competitive is anything that 
undermines welfare and pro-competitive are things that enhance it. He implies that the former 
can be considered in article 81(1), the later should be assessed under article 81(3) o f the 
Treaty.824 Finally, Verouden argues that there is a European rule o f reason and that this focuses:
"...primarily on the functioning of the producer's distribution system (regulating intrabrand 
competition), rather than on competition in the market place as such (promoting interbrand 
competition)."825
It is not necessarily relevant whether the authors are individually right or wrong. What is 
relevant is that even the recent jurisprudence is unclear. Furthermore, this lack of clarity is
m The word 'efficiency* appears four times in the judgment It was always used to report arguments of the parties, as 
opposed to the CFI's thinking. Even then, it was used ambiguously, see paragraphs 120, 132, 140 and 148.
819 If we also agree that Monti's interpretation of paragraphs 76 and 77 is wrong, i.e. that article 81(1) does not relate 
to restrictions on economic freedom, but something different
820 The CFI’s references to the rule of reason does not clarify the debate. There are many versions of the rule of 
reason, each balancing different things, Manzini (2002), footnote 24; Ehlermann (2001), page 134-137; Black 
(1997), page 145 and Hawk (1987), page 738. The CFI may have been referring to one of these and not the others. 
For example, it has been argued that in W outers the ECJ conducted a rule of reason by putting the administration of 
justice into the balance, O'LoughHn (2003), pages 67 and 68.
821 Bishop (2001), page 60.
822 Odudu (2002), page 103.
823 Odudu describes pro-competitive effects as productive efficiency benefits, page 104. Presumably dynamic 
efficiency gains would also be included here. These terms are explained in Chapter One.
824 Manzini (2002), pages 395-397 and 399. See also, Lugard and Hancher (2004), page 411.1 say 'implies' because 
Manzini argues that anti-competitive issues fall within article 81(1) and pro-competitive are considered in article 
81(3). Therefore, it seems like he is discussing two sides of the same coin. However, in his conclusion, Manzini 
refers to "...restricting the freedom of action of one or more of the parties...", page 399.
825 Verouden (2003), page 540. Hildebrand (2002), pages 220 and 221, offers yet another test
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reflected by academics of some note writing in influential, peer-refereed, journals. Given this 
disagreement, it is hard to accept Odudu's view that:826
"In clear and explicit terms the Court of First Instance rejects the idea that all the economic 
assessment must take place under article 81(1)."
Indeed, it is difficult to agree that the CFI has been clear at all. One can argue that some of these 
alternatives are more likely than others, read in light of other Community Court cases, see 
below. But, in general, the lack of guiding principle from the Community Courts falls short o f 
Mario Monti's view that companies can reasonably expect an adequate level of predictability 
and consistent application of the rules that allows them properly to assess how the rules will be 
applied.
This part has argued that the Community Courts and the Commission have not clearly and 
consistently defined the underlying principles o f a 'restriction of competition*. Even in light o f 
Métropole télévision and Van den Bergh Foods the matter remains unresolved. Such a definition 
is important because even though the Treaty places a lot o f emphasis on ’competition' it is 
unclear what this means. Furthermore, the modernisation proposals:
"...appear to assume that the system's goals are well-defined and thus that those who will 
make decisions in the modified system can easily identify and follow them. The history of 
competition law in Europe suggests otherwise."827
Now, we turn to the way that article 81(1) is implemented in practice. We have seen that the 
restriction (whatever that is) should be placed in its economic context. What does this involve?
2.1.2 'restriction of competition' • the application
Even if Monti were right, that the recent caselaw supports his Ordoliberal approach,828 we are 
confronted with a second problem. That this approach, as applied by the Commission and the 
Community Courts, is unworkable in practice. A restriction on economic freedom is a 
restriction on individual economic freedom of action.829 But, as we saw above, the ECJ has held 
that not every agreement between undertakings or any decision of an association of 
undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily 
falls within the prohibition laid down in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
So, not all restrictions on economic freedom are relevant. This is logical. If all restrictions on 
individual economic freedom fell within article 81(1) of the Treaty then the net would be spread 
too wide. As Neale and Goyder point out:
826 Odudu (2002), page 103.
827 Gerber (2001 ), page 125.
828 And Section 2.1.2. assumes that he is, despite our scepticism.
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"There is a sense in which any one bargain excludes others; when a bargain is sealed, the 
competition for that particular portion of trade is at an end. It would be a reductio ad  
absurdum to call trade itself restraint of trade; yet some types of bargain may preclude a 
great deal of potential competition."^0
This is why Monti says there must be an undue restriction o f economic freedom. But, the 
problem lies in the detail. If not every restriction of economic freedom is a restriction of 
competition how can we decide when they are or when they are not? What mechanisms have 
been used to help define the economic freedom concept? As we saw in Métropole télévision, the 
CFI said:
"...account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it [the agreement] functions, 
in particular the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or 
services covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned..."
This is not a novel statement in Community competition law. But, what does the CFI mean 
when it says that account should be taken o f the economic context? Is this a reference to 
economic efficiency? Maybe not. As we have seen, at paragraph 77, the CFI emphasised that 
examining the agreement under the actual conditions in which it functions does not mean that it 
is necessary to weigh the pro and anti-competitive effects o f an agreement when determining 
whether the prohibition laid down in article 81(1) o f the Treaty applies. Monti argues that this 
confines economic efficiency to article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Taking this extreme assumption as 
our starting point, how easy are the rules in Métropole télévision to apply?
We know that some restrictions on economic freedom, but not all, are bad. How do we 
differentiate between good and bad? If the economic efficiency of the agreement is not relevant, 
what are the Community Courts referring to when they underline the importance of the overall 
context in which the agreement operates? Can the caselaw help us?
As mentioned above, the Métropole télévision case was an appeal from Commission decision, 
TPS. For the purposes of our discussion the Commission focused on two clauses within the TPS 
agreement. The first related to a clause concerning programmes and services requiring that the 
parties give TPS first refusal in respect o f all the special-interest channels and television 
services they operate or over which they have effective control. The parties also undertook to 
give TPS final refusal or acceptance on the best market conditions in respect of any programmes 
or services which they offer to third parties, with TPS having the option of canying these 
channels and services on an exclusive or a non-exclusive basis. The Commission found, 
paragraph 101, that while the obligation on the members to give TPS first refusal over their 
special interest channels might have been ancillary to the launch of the platform:
®29 M ôscheî (1989), page 146.
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"...this obligation, which is imposed for a period of ten years, nevertheless results in a 
limitation of the supply of special-interest channels and television services. In this respect, 
the clause in question falls within the scope of article 85(1) [now article 81(1)]."
The second clause of interest to us was a provision concerning the exclusive transmission of the 
general-interest channels (TF1, France 2, France 3 and M6) by TPS. This granted TPS the 
exclusive right to broadcast the general-interest channels by satellite (although they would also 
be transmitted by cable), paragraph 102. These television channels typically attract the largest 
audiences in France, some 90% of all viewers, paragraph 103. There is a potential demand for 
the transmission of these programmes in digital form as nearly half o f  all French homes with a 
television set were located in areas o f poor reception, paragraph 104. The Commission said that 
access to these channels was "...undeniably important and attractive to viewers, to the sole 
benefit of TPS.", paragraph 106. The Commission found that article 81(1) of the Treaty would 
apply to this clause, paragraph 108, because, paragraph 107:
"The exclusive right to broadcast the four channels concerned for the duration of the 
agreements, namely 10 years, albeit limited to encrypted satellite transmission in digital 
mode, does constitute a restriction of competition since it denies TPS's competitors access 
to attractive programmes."
Before the CFI the applicants argued that article 81(1) o f the Treaty had been misapplied 
because the Commission had not used the rale of reason. They lost this point. The CFI 
concluded, paragraphs 78 and 79:
"...in the contested decision the Commission correctly applied article 85(1) [now article 
81(1)] of the Treaty to the exclusivity clause and the clause relating to the special-interest 
channels...
It did...assess the restrictive nature of those clauses in their economic and legal context in 
accordance with the caselaw. Thus, it rightly found that the general-interest channels 
presented programmes that were attractive for subscribers to a pay TV company and that 
the effect of the exclusivity clause was to deny TPS's competitors access to such 
programmes (points 102 to 107 of the contested decision). As regards the clause relating to 
the special interest channels, the Commission found that it resulted in a limitation of the 
supply of such channels on that market for a period of 10 years (point 101 of the contested 
decision)."
Here then are two examples, according to the CFI, of the Commission putting restrictive clauses 
in their economic and legal context In relation to the general-interest channels the Commission 
had said that the channels in question were both attractive for subscribers and that the 
exclusivity clause would deny TPS's competitors access to such programmes.
830 Neale and Goyder (1981), page 25. See also, Case 42/84 Remia  v. Comm ission  [1985], paragraphs 18 and 19.
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But what does this analysis amount to? Not much. First, the Commission did not discuss why 
this clause had been adopted, presumably to make the chances of entjy more successful (this too 
is economic freedom). This meant that it could not, and did not, examine this clause's effect in 
light o f the legal and economic context. It just focused on the immediate result and ignored the 
underlying point o f  the exercise.
Secondly, the Commission said that these programmes were popular; this is not surprising as 
they include the most established French channels. It added that there was a lot of potential 
demand. The relevance of the demand point is not clear as it is used in a static way - i.e. there is 
a problem, poor reception in many homes, which may mean that more people might want access 
to such programmes. The Commission provides evidence that some people have subscribed to 
TPS because o f these channels, it did not provide evidence to say that more were likely to 
switch now. It also said that such channels were not essential, as the two other digital bouquets 
had been launched without them. The Commission did not look at the potential for others to 
provide equally attractive general-interest channels.
In relation to the second clause the argumentation is even less thorough. The Commission fails 
to consider the reason for the clause. The Commission merely noted that TPS got first refusal 
for a period of ten years. It goes on to say that this "...results in limitation o f the supply of 
special-interest channels...", paragraph 101, and thus falls within article 81(1) of the Treaty. No 
attempt is made to place this in any economic context. The Commission has done no more than 
point out that there is a restriction o f  economic freedom.
The reasoning and conclusions o f the Métropole télévision case are unsatisfactory. The CFI says 
that merely pointing out that there is a restriction of economic freedom is not enough. It says 
that the Commission must also examine the legal and economic context of the clauses in 
question. But how, and in relation to what? Furthermore, in relation to the special-interest 
channel clause the CFI supported the Commission for essentially doing no more than remark 
that there was a restriction of economic freedom. In relation to the general-interest channel 
clause the Commission does slightly more work but does not provide a thorough or convincing 
economic context to support its conclusions that the restriction on economic freedom is 
important.
As we saw above, in Métropole télévision the CFI cited seven other cases which it argued were 
part of the broader trend in the caselaw that account should be taken o f the actual conditions in 
which the agreement functions. We examine three of them below.831 They are the Gettrup-Klim
1311 have already discussed the effect of market integration on article 81(1) in Chapter Three. The presence of market 
integration issues complicates the analysis and Case 56/65 Société Technique M inière v. Maschinenbau Vim  [1966]; 
the N ungesser Case and the Pronuptia Case fall into this category. The C oditel Case was also discussed in Chapter 
Three. Having said that, analysis of these cases would not reveal any clearer guidelines. For example, the
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Case; Case C-399/93 H.G. Oude Luitikhuis and Others v. Verenigde Coöperatieve [1995] and 
the European Night Services Case. However, the examination of these cases further obscures 
the CFI's judgment in Métropole télévision. The CFI cites them to show that there is no 
balancing of pro and anti-competitive elements under article 81(1) of the Treaty. On the 
assumption that pro and anti-competitive relates to welfare (which is unclear, see above), these 
cases seem to show quite the opposite.
Gottrup-KIim concerned an action between 37 Danish co-operative associations specialising in 
the distribution of farm supplies and DLG (the Danish co-operative association distributing farm 
supplies). The case concerned the lawfulness of a change that DLG made to its statutes, 
excluding the plaintiffs from DLG because they were members o f another organised co­
operation, which was in direct competition with i t  The national court, in an article 234 
reference, sought to ascertain whether a provision in the statutes o f a co-operative purchasing 
association, the effect o f which is to forbid its members to participate in other forms of 
organised co-operation, which are in direct competition with it, is caught by the prohibition in 
article 81(1) of the Treaty.
The ECJ noted that co-operative purchasing associations are voluntary associations established 
in order to pursue common commercial objectives, paragraph 30. The compatibility o f DLG's 
statutes with the Community rules, said the ECJ, cannot be assessed in the abstract. One must 
look at, paragraph 31, "...the particular clauses in the statutes and the economic conditions 
prevailing on the markets concerned." The ECJ continued, paragraph 32:
"In a market where product prices vary according to the volume of orders, the activities of 
co-operative purchasing associations may, depending on the size of their membership, 
constitute a significant counterweight to the contractual power of large producers and make 
way for more effective competition."
I f  some members could belong to two co-operatives at the same time then the proper 
functioning o f the co-operative could be jeopardised, as could its contractual power vis-à-vis 
producers. As a result, the prohibition of competition did not necessarily constitute a restriction 
on competition, paragraph 34. Finally, the ECJ concluded the issue, paragraph 35:
"Nevertheless, a provision in the statutes of a co-operative purchasing association, 
restricting the opportunity for members to join other types of competing co-operatives and 
thus discouraging them from obtaining supplies elsewhere, may have adverse effects on 
competition. So, in order to escape the prohibition laid down in article 85(1) [now article 
81(1)] of the Treaty, the restrictions imposed on members by the statutes of co-operative
Commission cited two of these cases, the Nungesser Case and the Pronuptia Case as examples of the ECJ applying 
the rule of reason under article 81(1) of the Treaty, Commission, White Paper on Modernisation^ paragraph 57, 
footnote 47. The CFI cites them in M étropole télévision to show the opposite.
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purchasing associations must be limited to what is necessary to ensure that the co-operative 
functions properly and maintains its contractual power in relation to producers."
The ECJ accepts that a provision restricting the opportunity of members from joining other co­
operatives restricts competition (i.e. may be anti-competitive). However, this is not enough. The 
ECJ goes on to say that co-operatives of this kind provide a significant counter-weight to 
producers and thus "...make way for more effective competition.", paragraph 32 (i.e. are pro- 
competitive). It ’suggests' that the Danish court accept the "prohibition on competition", 
paragraph 34, or at least accept it to the extent that it is necessary to ensure that this contractual 
power, (which leads to more effective competition) is maintained, paragraph 35. It is difficult to 
see this exercise as anything other than an assessment of the pro and anti-competitive effects of 
the statutes’ new rule.832 In the event that the ECJ is not undertaking such a balancing exercise, 
which is certainly possible as the judgment is somewhat obscure, it provides little guidance of 
what the test is and how it relates to economic freedom.
The same issue arises in Case C-399/93 H.G. Oude Luttikhuis and Others v. Verenigde 
Coöperatieve [1995], another of the cases cited by the CFI in Métropoie tél¿vision. Mr 
Luttikhuis and eight other dairy farmers (the applicants) were members of the Verenigde 
Coöperatieve (the respondent), a Dutch co-operative association for processing milk and other 
dairy products and for selling those products. The respondent undertook to buy all the milk its 
members produced, and in return, its members gave it an exclusive right to buy their milk. The 
dispute arose because of a fee which the respondent’s statutes held was payable when the 
applicants decided to withdraw from the co-operative. The applicants argued that both this fee 
and the exclusive sales obligation breached article 81(1) o f the Treaty. The ECJ held that 
organising an undertaking in the form of a co-operative does not necessarily fall within article 
81(1) o f the Treaty. Indeed, held the ECJ, co-operatives are, paragraph 12:
"...favoured both by national legislators and by the Community authorities because it 
encourages modernisation and rationalisation in the agricultural sector and improves 
efficiency.”
That said, certain provisions in their statutes may fail within article 81(1), paragraph 13. The 
ECJ continued, paragraph 14:
"In order to escape that prohibition, the restrictions imposed on members by the statutes of 
cooperative associations intended to secure their loyalty must be limited to what is 
necessary to ensure that the cooperative functions properly and in particular to ensure that it 
has a sufficiently wide commercial base and a certain stability in its membership (see Case 
C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs Growareselskab [1994] ECR 1-5641, 
paragraph 35).”
832 See alsOj Bolze(1995), pages 555 and 556 "La cour utilise une méthode qui s'apparente à la rule ofreasort du droit 
antitrust américain pour évaluer concrètement l'impact du comportement dénoncé..."
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The ECJ's judgment reflects Advocate-General Tesauro's Opinion, paragraph 30.833 What is the 
underlying logic? One interpretation is that co-operatives are favoured because they can be pro- 
competitive. The ECJ explicitly refers to the fact that they encourage modernisation and 
rationalisation in the agricultural sector and improve efficiency. Note that these are a mixture of 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency gains.834 Restrictions imposed on the members 
(i.e. anti-competitive clauses) are acceptable insofar as, in fact, they are necessary to ensure the 
co-operative functions properly.835 In other words, we balance the agreement's pro and anti­
competitive effects on the market, in order to assess whether the 'restriction* can 'escape' article 
81(1) of the Treaty. Or, as stated in Advocate-General Tesauro’s Opinion, paragraph 31 :
"It is therefore in the light of the circumstances and actual operating conditions of the 
market concerned that the overall effect o f competition on those clauses must be examined.
[my emphasis]"
The test proposed by the ECJ here, as well as Advocate-General Tesauro, resembles a rule of 
reason analysis, where the agreement's pro and anti-competitive (welfare) effects are balanced 
against each other.836 This happened within article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Finally, in the European Night Services Case the CFI examined a Commission decision in 
relation to an application by ENS that Regulation 1017/68 did not apply to some agreements 
concerning the carriage of passengers by rail through the Channel Tunnel or, failing that, 
exemption of the agreement. The case is extremely long and complex. However, for our, 
purposes it is only relevant that the Commission had found that the agreements restricted 
competition between the parent undertakings in the relevant joint venture, between the parent 
undertakings and ENS and also vis-à-vis third parties. The CFI said, paragraph 136 that:
"...it must be borne in mind that in assessing an agreement under article 85(1) [now article 
81(1)] of the Treaty, account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, 
in particular the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or 
services covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned 
(judgments in Delimitis, cited above, Gottrup-Klim, cited above, paragraph 31, Case C-
833 Ackermann (1997), pages 701 and 702.
834 We saw Odudu arguing that some economic analysis is still necessary, post M étropole, but that this should be 
restricted to allocative efficiency arguments, with productive and dynamic efficiency issues being raised within 
article 81(3) of the Treaty, Odudu (2002X pages 103-105 and Odudu (2002a). This judgment may undermine 
Odudu's argument, see also, in particular, the arguments of the German Government, in the Nungesser Case, 
paragraph 55.
835 The ECJ explained, paragraphs 15 and 16, why these clauses might, in fact, be anti-competitive. This was for the 
Member State court to establish as it was an article 234 reference.
836 This is the position adopted by a lot of the doctrine in its commentary of the case, see Ackermann (1997), pages 
704-707, "The European rulings on restrictive clauses in statutes of co-operatives fit this [a rule of reason] 
analysis."; Vogel (1997), pages 130 and 131, "La CJCE invite en réalité à faire application d'une règle de raison..." 
and Bolzè (1996), pages 586 and 587, "La doctrine a estimé qu'il s'aggissait là de l’utilisation par le juge de la règle 
de raison...".
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399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others v Verenigde Coöperatieve Melkindustrie [1995] ECRI- 
4515, paragraph 10, and Case T-77/94 VGB and Others v Commission [1997] ECR 11-759, 
paragraph 140), unless it is an agreement containing obvious restrictions of competition 
such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets (Case T-148/89 Tréfïlunion v 
Commission [1995] ECR 11-1063, paragraph 109). In the latter case, such restrictions may 
be weighed against their claimed pro-competitive effects only in the context of article 85(3) 
of the Treaty, with a view to granting an exemption from the prohibition in article 85(1)."
The CFI distinguishes between restrictions by their object and effect. In relation to an analysis 
of the effect o f allegedly restrictive clauses the CFI held that they should be examined in the 
context in which they function. This is what the CFI says in Métropole télévision, see above. 
Then, in ENS, the CFI explains that where a restriction is, by its object restrictive, pro- 
competitive elements can be taken into account only in article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Although it is 
not explicit, the implication is that where this is not the case, pro-competitive elements may be 
considered under article 81(1).837 This interpretation is certainly debateable. What is certain is 
that the test under article 81(1) of the Treaty is far from clear. Or, in Venn's words:838
"...most practitioners would agree that, under the test adopted by the CFI in Night 
Services,839 the analysis under article 81(1) is fraught with at least as many, if not more, 
uncertainties as the analysis under article 81(3)..."
In conclusion, in Métropole télévision, the CFI holds that a mere restriction of competition is 
not enough. While the agreement's pro-competitive effects cannot be balanced against its anti­
competitive effects within article 81(1) o f  the Treaty, it should be examined within its actual 
context in order to see whether it restricts competition. The CFI cites seven cases to support its 
argument. Some appear to distinguish between an economic approach and economic efficiency 
analysis.840 However, Verouden believes that the exercise of assessing the agreement in its 
economic context entails "...some balancing o f pro and anti-competitive effects."841
Indeed, one might argue that by differentiating between a 'rule o f reason’ and an 'economic 
approach' we are getting dangerously close to pure semantics.842 This is nicely illustrated by the 
concluding discussion at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute in 1987. At one point Professor
837 Bishop and Walker (2002), page 139 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 2.97 and 2.98. This is also the 
implication of the discussion in Hawk and Denaeijer (2001), page 131, for example. For a contrary view see Goyder 
(2003), page 93 and (possibly) Jones and Sufrin (2001), page 154, although note their page 189.
838 Venit (2003), page 561.
839 Here Venit cites paragraph 136 of the European N ight Services Case.
840 Schaub, A., in Ehlermann (200IX pages 243 and 257, for example, seems to do this, although he does not explain 
how the two are different
841 Verouden (2003), page 539.
842 "Obviously, there is still much opposition to the notion of a 'rule of reason1. It is therefore frequently argued that 
those cases which could be interpreted as instances of such a 'rule of reason' are either exceptions to the rule or can 
be explained in terms of [a] mere ’economic' reading of article 85 [now article 81]. However, it would seem that we 
are thus getting dangerously close to pure semantics." van Empel (1988), page 23.
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Hawk (a US academic) and Mr Schröter (then a Commission official) are discussing 
Commission decision, SAFCO. Mr Schröter claims to apply the Community Courts’ caselaw 
(the economic context approach) when finding that the restriction of economic freedom in that 
case should not have fallen within article 81(1) of the Treaty.843 Professor Hawk replied:
"...let me suggest that your reading of SAFCO is the US rule of reason; you just applied 
it...The chief characteristic of the rule of reason...is its requirement of an enquiry into the 
actual pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of the arrangement at issue."844
Section 2.1.1. argued that the underlying principles of article 81(l)’s test are far from clear. 
Section 2.1.2. has argued that the application of the caselaw in article 81(1) also lacks clarity on 
many levels:
• First, the CFI in Métropole télévision seems to undermine its own insistence that the 
context is relevant by refusing to annul the underlying Commission decision, even 
though it found a restriction of competition as a result of a mere restriction of economic 
freedom;
• Secondly, the CFI in Métropole télévision argues that examining an agreement in its 
economic context is not the same as weighing the agreement's pro and anti-competitive 
in article 81(1), and yet:
o if  placing the agreement in its economic context is different from conducting a 
rule o f reason, then it is unclear exactly what placing the agreement in its 
context means. See the discussion of the European Night Services Case 
above;845 and,
o much of the doctrine makes exactly the opposite point. See the Gettrup-KJim 
Case and Case C-399/93 H.G. Oude Luttikhuis and Others v. Verenigde 
Coöperatieve [1995], discussed above.846
843 Schröter, R , in (1987) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, pages 736 and 737.
844 Hawk, B., in (1987) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, page 738.
845 When discussing the remit of article 81(1) of the Treaty in Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, the Commission 
uses similar language to the CFI in Métropole télévision. It is equally unclear. The Commission said, "For an 
agreement to be restrictive by effect it must affect actual or potential competition to such an extent that on the 
relevant market negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods and services can be 
expected with a reasonable degree of probability...Such negative effects must be appreciable.", Commission, 
Article 8Iß)  Guidelines, paragraph 24. These seem to be economic efficiency criteria.
846 Similar points have also been made in relation to the other four cases that the CFI refers to in Métropole télévision, 
paragraph 73. See the articles cited in relation to the possible existence of an economic efficiency element to article 
81(1) of the Treaty, in Section 2.1.1. above. See also the Opinion of Advocate-General Léger in Wouters. At 
paragraph 102 he says "...the Court has made limited application of the 'rule of reason' in some judgments. 
Confronted with certain classes of agreement...it has drawn up a competition balance sheet and, where the balance
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2.1.3 Conclusion of Section 2.1.
Section 2.1. was not designed to argue what is meant by a 'restriction of competition' under 
article 81(1) of the Treaty. It merely sought to show that considerable disagreement (although 
not total uncertainty847) remains as to what this phrase means. This can be found in the 
Community Courts' caselaw, in Commission decisions as well as between eminent Community 
competition law scholars.848 This remains the case today, despite the Commission's recent 
attempt to clarify the law.849
In many ways the lack of clarity is unsurprising. 'Restriction o f competition' is not defined in the 
Treaty. It's content is not self-evident and needs to be fleshed out in the caselaw. This is not 
easy either. Remember that the provision must be viewed in light o f the Treaty as a whole and 
that the relevant objectives themselves have often not been clearly developed. They also conflict 
and change over time. In addition, the creation of the CFI necessarily reduces the ECJ’s control 
over developments in the system. "No longer is there one judicial voice; there are two." 
Furthermore, the Commission's growing power, authority and confidence contributes to the 
erosion o f the leadership that the ECJ has shown in the past.850 This is not even to mention the 
Member States' courts and competition authorities.
That said, it is simply unacceptable that article 81(l)'s underlying principles, as well as the 
methodology for applying the provision in practice, remain so opaque. While these might 
change over time, clear rules could still be produced as and when these changes occur. These 
could then be applied more consistently, openly and transparently by all relevant decision- 
makers. In the words of Black:
"It remains a scandal of competition law on both sides of the Atlantic that there is no 
consensus as to the kind of competition the law is intended to promote: different decisions 
give precedence to different kinds."851
As a result, Sections 2.2. and 2.3. discuss how a 'restriction o f competition', for the purposes of 
article 81(1) of the Treaty, should now be defined. As stated above, the 'right' definition must
is positive, has held that the clauses necessary to perform the agreement fell outside the prohibition laid down by 
article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] of the Treaty."
847 van Gerven (2004), page 419.
848 Further to the references given above, see, for example, van Gerven (2004), pages 418 and 419; Whish and Sufrin 
(2000), page 146; Ehlermann (1998), pages 474 (Schaub); 490 (Whish) and 499 (Whish summarising the views of 
the conference's participants).
849 In Commission, A rtic le  81(3) G uidelines. See van Gerven (2004), page 422. He is commenting on the draft 
guidelines, but they remain largely unchanged in this regard.
850 Gerber (1998), page 375. See also pages 388 and 389.
851 Black (1997), page 146.
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combine the need for legal certainty with the flexibility required for governing an economy in a 
state of constant flux. The definition must also take proper account o f the Treaty's overall aims. 
Section 2.2. considers basing article 81(1) upon an economic freedom approach. But, ultimately, 
Section 2.3. concludes that an economic efficiency approach would be more appropriate.
2.2 Economic Freedom?
The Ordoliberal School has had a profound influence on Community competition law.852 We 
have seen that a ’restriction of competition’ has sometimes been interpreted as a restriction o f 
economic freedom. Many argue that the Ordoliberal School’s cornerstone, the protection of 
economic freedom, should continue to form the basis of the article 81(1) test. We investigate the 
pros and the cons of this assertion in Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. respectively. Before doing so we 
briefly discuss the origins of the Ordoliberal school and what it stands for.853
Just as the National Socialists were taking power in Germany in 1933, three academics met at 
the University of Freiburg in Germany and discovered that they had similar readings of the 
failings of Weimar and similar views of what to do about it.854 They believed that the lack of a 
dependable legal framework had led to the economic and political disintegration of Germany. In 
their view, the core of the problem lay in the inability of the legal system to prevent the creation 
and misuse of private economic power.855
The Freiburg school followed earlier conceptions of liberalism in considering a competitive 
economic system necessary for a prosperous, free and equitable society. They were convinced 
that such a society could only develop once the market was embedded in a constitutional 
framework.856 This framework857 was designed to structure the relationship between the 
government and the individual along clear lines. It determines the kind o f economic order the 
state is committed to pursue, and establishes a system of principles which binds economic 
policy. For the Ordoliberals it was not enough to protect the individual from the power of
852 See, for example, the references to freedom in Commission, RCP 1971, page 11; Commission, RCP 1985, page 
11; Verouden (2003), page 534 and 538; Monti (2002), page 1060; Hildebrand (2002), pages 159 and 165; Gerber 
(2001), page 123 and Mdschel (1989), page 142. For example, Gerber (1998), page 343, argues that the German 
negotiators of the Treaty were imbued with the Ordoliberal orthodoxies. Furthermore, Walter Hallstein, the first 
President of the Commission and Hans von der Groeben, one of the drafters of the Spaak Report and the first 
Commissioner for DG Competition are both associated with the Freiburg school, Verouden (2003), page 535 and 
Hildebrand (2002), page 161.
853 For a more detailed analysis of the origins and views of this school sec, Gerber (1998); MOschel (1989); Peacock 
and Willgerodt (1989) and Peacock and Willgerodt (1989a) and the references made there. The brief account 
provided here relies heavily on these sources.
854 Gerber (1998), page 233.
855 Hildebrand (2002), page 158 and Gerber (1998), page 235.
856 Verouden (2003), page 535; Gerber (1998), page 232 and MOschel (1989), page 154.
837 Which would include a property rights system, a monetary system, the organisation of markets, freedom of 
contract, etc., Moschel (1989), page 154.
- 2 3 7 -
government. Remember, governments were not the only threat to individual freedom. They 
thought that private economic power had helped to destroy the social and political institutions 
during the Weimar period. They emphasised the need to protect society from the misuse o f such 
power.858 In other words, Ordoliberals considered a coherent legal framework as essential to 
guarantee individual freedoms and economic progress.859
As a result, the Ordoliberals focused on the role of the economy in society. To them, the essence 
of the transaction economy was economic competition, as this allowed the system to function 
effectively. Economic competition meant a system in which no firm in a market was able to 
coerce conduct by other firms in that market.860 The Ordoliberals embedded competition policy 
in the economic order of the free and open society. A strong state was needed to ensure 
economic actors played by the rules. Legal principles dealt with the acquisition and exercise of 
economic power.861 This was in order to prevent those with private economic power from 
destroying the basis of private autonomy and ultimately jeopardising political liberties 
(economic power, they felt, had a tendency to turn into political power).862 The state had to 
provide a  basic level o f legal security by assuring that the law was knowable, dependable and 
not subject to manipulation.863
In brief, competition policy was the cornerstone of the economic constitution. The goal of this 
Ordo-liberal competition policy lies in the protection of individual economic freedom of action 
as a value in itself, or vice versa, the restraint of undue economic power. Economic efficiency, 
as a generic term for growth, was but an indirect and derived goal.864
2.2.1 In favour of economic freedom
So, in theory, an economic freedom standard within article 81 of the Treaty could have 
important benefits. Four reasons are normally given for favouring the Ordoliberal definition of a 
restriction of competition within article 81(1) of the Treaty. First, there is the historical 
argument, that the economic freedom concept is what influenced the drafting of article 81. 
Secondly, some argue that the Ordoliberal definition conforms most closely with the structure of
858 Gerber (1998), page 240.
859 Sauter (1998), page 46.
860 Hildebrand (2000), pages 158 and 159; Gerber (1998), pages 244 and 245 and Mflschel (1989), footnote 16.
161 Hildebrand (2000), page 158.
862 Gerber (1998), pages 250 and 251; Amato (1997), pages 2 and 3 and MOschel (1989), pages 151 and 152.
863 Gerber (1998), page 248.
864 Gerber (1998), page 251 and MOschel (1989), page 146.
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article 81. Thirdly, there is a procedural argument. Finally, there is the 'constitutional' 
argument.865 We examine each of these in turn.
(a) The historical argument
Monti refers to the historical argument "...Ordoliberal ideas influenced the drafting of the 
competition provisions in the EC Treaty."866 For example, Gerber argues that the German 
negotiators o f the Treaty were imbued with the Ordoliberal orthodoxies867 and Moschel points 
to the structural similarity between article 81 and the German Ordoliberal competition rules.868
Even on the assumption that Ordoliberal ideas were influential in this way,869 it does not mean 
that the concept of a 'restriction o f competition', for the purposes of article 81(1) o f the Treaty, 
should be interpreted in line with Ordoliberal thinking. The Community Courts are the 
interpreters of the Treaty and its limits.870 They prefer a teleological approach, based on an 
interpretation o f the Treaty's current objectives, Chapter Two; and rarely adopt a historical- 
purposive approach to the interpretation o f the Treaty, even when the drafters' intention is clear 
(which it is not here). For example, in one case, Belgium invoked an argument based upon the 
Member States' intention at the time the Treaty was drafted. The ECJ ignored the argument but 
the Commission summed up the position by saying:
"As historical interpretation plays hardly any part in Community law it would be futile to
refer to the intentions of the authors of the Treaty... "871
KS In order to justify the use of economic freedom within article 81(1), it is sometimes also argued that somehow the 
'European way' is different and we demand fairness on top of efficiency. See, for example, Commission, RCP 1979, 
pages 9 and 10 and Commission, RCP 1985, page 11. Specifically what is meant by fairness is rarely articulated, 
Korah (2000), page II. Furthermore, one might ask, even if this point is right on its face, whether distorting 
competition policy is the best way of achieving such an end. There are many other, more efficient, ways of 
implementing notions of fairness. See, Motta (2004), pages 24-26 and Townley (2002). In any event, fairness and 
economic efficiency do not always conflict, Motta (2004), page 26.
866 Monti (2002), page 1060. Although he acknowledges, on the same page, that article 81 "...is not a replica of 
Ordoliberal thought, but its structure bears the imprint of this political philosophy."
867 Gerber (1998), page 343 and Gerber (1994a), page 73.
868 MOschel (1989), page 150.
869 Though important in Germany, the prevalence of economic freedom was not universally accepted even there. For 
example, in the Consten and Grundig Case, page 342, the German Government argued that the Commission, 
"...before declaring article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] to be applicable, should, by basing itself upon the 'rule of 
reason', have considered the economic effects of the disputed contract upon competition between the different 
makes."
870 Article 220 of the Treaty. See also, Craig and de Burca (1998), page 88.
871 Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium [1980], page 3890. See also the Opinion of Advocate-General Mayras in 
Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgium [1974], pages 665 and 666 and Craig and de Burca (1998), page 89. Similar 
arguments were raised by the parties in relation to the notion of'agreement' in article 81(1) of the Treaty, see Case 
T-l/89 Rhdne~Poulenc SA v. Commission [1991], page 928. Advocate-General Vesterdorf did not support their plea, 
pages 928 and 929 and, once again, the CFI ignored the historical argument, paragraph 121. See also, Forrester, I., 
in Ehlermann (2001), page 78.
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Marenco argues that it would be dangerous to ignore the history o f  the competition 
provisions.872 In this case, it would be dangerous not to. There are three reasons why we should 
not adopt a historical approach in the interpretation o f article 81(1) of the Treaty. First, the 
Treaty's travaux préparatoires were deliberately never published.873 This means that they are 
not a source that can be used and we cannot be sure what these wishes were (or even if  they 
conflicted). It also implies that a historical interpretation is contrary to the founders' wishes. 
Secondly, as noted above, 'restriction o f competition' is an open concept. It does not necessarily 
relate to economic freedom.' American antitrust scholars also influenced the drafting o f the 
ECSC Treaty's and the German competition provisions, upon which article 81 is based.874 
'Restriction of competition' could equally refer to efficiency criteria. If the 'founding fathers' 
intended to incorporate the economic freedom concept into article 81(1) why didn't they do so 
explicitly? Presumably, this was either because they were not so singularly motivated by this 
aim; or, they thought that such an objective was too controversial to be mentioned explicitly. 
Perhaps, as noted above, although it was influential, there was not a clear consensus that 
economic freedom should form the basis of the Community competition provisions. Remember 
that in 1958 the Member States told the United Kingdom that it was for the ECJ to interpret 
articles 81 and 82, see above. Finally, the continuous process o f integration, and the transition 
from the 'European Economic Community' to the 'European Community', reduces the relevance 
of the Member States' original intentions in 1957.875 The Treaty and its objectives have 
fundamentally changed.876 The competition provisions must follow, Chapter Two.
In light o f these arguments, the historical argument is unpersuasive.
(b) The structural argument
What about the structural argument? This is really a negative kind of argument. The point being 
that economic efficiency cannot be the relevant criterion under article 81(1), so economic 
freedom must be. This ignores the fact that other criteria might be relevant under article 81(1), 
see Section 2.1. But, even if we take the argument at face value, does it work? The CFI, in cases 
such as Métropole télévision, paragraph 74, suggests it might:
"Article 85 [now article 81] of the Treaty expressly provides, in its third paragraph, for the 
possibility of exempting agreements that restrict competition where they satisfy a number 
of conditions...It is only in the precise framework of that provision that the pro and anti­
competitive aspects of a restriction may be weighed...Article 85(3) of the Treaty would
172 Marenco (1999), page 1244. 
m  Craig and de Burca (1998), page 89.
*74 Jones (2004), page 12; Goyder (2003), page 21; Marenco (1999), pages 1220-1229 and 1238; Gerber (1998), 
pages 337-342; Gerber (1987), page 86 and Graupner (1965), pages 8 and 9.
*75 Lenz (2000), page 37, citing Ackermann ( 1997a), page 59.
176 Weiler( 1991).
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lose much of its effectiveness if such an examination had to be carried out already under 
article 85(1) of the Treaty."877
Why do they think that? Monti explains why:
"From a neo-classical perspective, the inclusion of article 81(3) makes no economic sense: 
if an agreement’s anticompetitive harms are outweighed by its pro-competitive benefits, 
then the agreement does not restrict competition at all. Conversely if an agreement’s pro- 
competitive effects (for example in terms of productive efficiency) are outweighed by the 
risks generated by too much market power (which would reduce consumer welfare) then 
the agreement as a whole is anticompetitive. Therefore, article 81(3) is futile -  an 
agreement either promotes competition (and is thereby lawful) or suppresses competition 
(and is thereby unlawful) -  the weighing of the pro and anti competitive aspects of an 
agreement can be carried out under the first paragraph of article 8 {...Accordingly, the neo­
classical definition of competition does not fit within the structure of article 81..."878
The Commission has argued that casting aside article 81(3) of the Treaty in this way is 
impossible without a change in the Treaty. It added that it would be paradoxical to introduce a 
rule of reason into article 81(1) of the Treaty because article 81(3) contains all the elements of a 
rule of reason. It would be dangerous to do this without the backing o f  the Community Courts. 
It would also divert article 81(3) of the Treaty from its true purpose, which is:
"...to provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and 
not to allow application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations."879
If  a full economic efficiency test were carried out under article 81(1) o f the'Treaty, would article 
81(3) lose much of its effectiveness? Advocate-General Lenz did not think so:
"If a rule, which at first sight appears to contain a restriction of competition, is necessary in 
order to make that competition possible in the first place, it must indeed be assumed that 
such a rule does not infringe article 85(1) [now article 81(1)]. It would be unconvincing to 
reject that argument on the ground that paragraph 3 of article 85 [now article 81] in any 
event provides the possibility of exemption from the prohibition in paragraph l."880
877 This argument was also used (although not developed) by the CFI in Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. 
Commission [2003], paragraph 107. That case also cited Case C-235/92P Montecatini v. Commission [1999], 
paragraph 133; Case T-14/89 Montedipe v. Commission [1992], paragraph 265 and Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v. 
Commission [1995], paragraph 109. It argued that they made the same point None of them do. They each cast 
doubt on the applicability of the rule of reason in the specific circumstances of the case, but they do not state, as a 
general rule, that the rule of reason does not exist in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
878 Monti (2002), pages 1060 and 1061. See also, Cseres (2004), page 229; Manzini (2002), page 395 and 
Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 57.
879 Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 57. See also, Marenco (1999), page 1240 and Waelbroeck 
(1987a), page 723.
880 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Beige des Sociétés de Football Association v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995], Opinion 
of Advocate-General Lenz, paragraph 265.
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Conducting the economic analysis under article 81(1) does not make article 81(3) o f the Treaty 
redundant.881 Indeed, this would only be the case if only economic considerations were relevant 
there. However, as we saw in Chapters Two and Four, and as Monti argues in the same paper, 
other objectives can be (and are) considered under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. This provides that 
provision with plenty of'effect'.882
Is a more subtle point being made? Does the existence of terms such as "...improving the 
production or distribution of goods or... promoting technical or economic progress..." in article 
81(3) mean that some economic efficiency assessment is demanded in that paragraph? In other 
words, do the article 81(3) criteria necessarily (at least in part) relate to competition?883 Monti 
seems to make this point, see Chapter Four. If this were the case, then we might then say that if 
the economic analysis had already been performed in article 81(1), article 81(3) would become 
superfluous. However, Chapter Four argued that such a reading was not in line with the Treaty's 
structure, article Si's wording, the Community Courts' caselaw, or the decision-making practice 
of the Commission.
One benefit of Monti's argument is that it puts a lot o f emphasis on economic efficiency gains. 
He is right to do this. As Section 2.3. explains, there are many arguments in favour of basing the 
analysis on economic efficiency today. The Treaty is a living document. Even if economic 
freedom was a key element o f a restriction o f competition in the past, it may be time to replace 
it with an economic efficiency test. Indeed, despite its protests, this may be what the 
Commission's new economic approach is really aiming to do.
In conclusion, it is difficult to place much credence on the structural argument either. 
Conducting the efficiency analysis under article 81(1) does not mean that article 81(3) would be 
cast aside, non-economic considerations could still be considered there. No Treaty change 
would be needed. The Commission also argued that it would be paradoxical to introduce a 'rule 
of reason' under article 81(1) because article 81(3) contains all the elements o f such a rule. As 
discussed above, the 'rule of reason' can mean many things. There are many advantages to
881 Wesseling (2000), pages 102-105 and 112; Wesseling (1999), pages 421-424; Ehlermann (1998); Korah, V., in 
(1987) Fordham Corporate Law Institute, page 731 and Forrester and Norall (1984), page 41. See also, the opinion 
of Advocate-General Léger, Case C-309/99 J.C .J. Wouters v. A lgem ene R aad van de Nederlandse Orde van 
A dvocaten  [2002], paragraphs 104-108. In fact, in response to the Commission's argument, that justifications linked 
to public policy issues should be considered under article 81(1) of the Treaty, Advocate-General Léger said, 
paragraph 107 "Such an interpretation is liable to negate a great part of the effectiveness of articles 85(3) [now 
article 81(3)] and 90(2) [now article 86(2)] of the Treaty."
882 It is certainly possible that if only non-economic considerations are relevant under article 81(3) then it will be used 
less often. This is because in most cases only efficiency issues are raised. In this sense the CFI might be right to say 
that article 81(3) would lose much of its effectiveness. But this is not really the point. Surely it is only an issue if 
only economic arguments could be used there?
883 This is probably the argument of Waelbroeck in Ehlermann (1998), page 485, although he does not develop it See 
also, Waelbroeck (1987a), page 723.
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economic efficiency analysis under article 81(1) of the Treaty and interpreting article 81(3) as a 
non-economic rule o f reason, see below.884
(c) The procedural argument
In 1957, when the Treaty was first adopted, Germany and France were the only Community 
countries that had a competition law.885 The acceptance of the competitive economy was not 
free from dispute.886 By imposing a very wide interpretation on article 81(1) (by adopting an 
economic freedom test rather than economic efficiency),887 the Commission deliberately took 
control of the application of article 81 and its development.888 Under Regulation 17, only the 
Commission could implement article 81(3), see Chapter Two.
The Commission's approach had some logic.889 At least initially, control was considered 
important. Antitrust rules called for fundamental, indeed revolutionary, changes in centuries old 
habits of thoughts and patterns of conduct.890 The Commission needed to gain experience of 
how the market functioned. Furthermore, antitrust rules were not well understood by European 
firms at the time,891 It was thought that exemption discussions with the Commission would give 
businesses a lot more certainty 892 893Placing a sole decision-maker in charge of article 81 should 
also have ensured a more uniform interpretation and coherent application.895
Such arguments imply that the Treaty should be interpreted in light of secondary Community 
legislation. This is incorrect. Relative competences within article 81 should not have governed 
the article's substantive interpretation.894 In any event, Regulation 1/2003 has fundamentally
884 The Commission also argued that it would be dangerous for it to assume there were an economic rule of reason 
within article 81(1) of the Treaty without the backing of the Community Courts. As the Community Courts have the 
final say on Treaty interpretation this is, in a certain sense, correct However, in reality, what is 'dangerous', in the 
sense it is used by the Commission, is to interpret the Treaty incorrectly. In a similar vein, it would also be 
'dangerous* to rely on the fact that there is not an economic rule of reason in article 81 (1 ), if this proved to be wrong. 
The Commission does not hesitate to do this, even though it acknowledges that the Community Courts have used an 
economic rule of reason before, see above.
885 Graupner (1965), page 9.
886 Amato (1997), page 43.
887 Hawk (1995) and Forrester and Norall (1984).
888 Korah (1990), page 1015; Bright (1995), pages 514-516; Amato (1997), page 118; Siragusa (1997). page 276; 
Bergès-Sennou (2002), page 438 and Koinninos (2005) DRAFT, footnote 5.
889 Schaub (2001), page 50.
890 Forrester and Norall (1984), pages 12,13 and 19; Marenco (1999), page 1220 and van Mien (1999k page 1.
891 Press Release 1P/04/411 and Siragusa (1997), page 276.
892 See, Forrester and Norall (1984), pages 18-22 and Korah (1986), page 94.
893 van Miert (1997), page 36.
894 See, Case 48/72 S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. the spouses WilkinJanssen (1973]. paragraph 6; Baquero Cruz
(2002), pages 56 and 57, and the references made there; and Mestmacker (2000), pages 414-M6 “Article S3
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altered Regulation 17. Today, the Commission, as well as Member States' courts and 
competition authorities have jurisdiction to interpret article 81 in its entirety. The whole 
provision is now directly applicable.
As a result, the procedural argument no longer has, if  it ever had, m erit
(d) The constitutional argum ent
The constitutional argument, in brief, is that economic freedom has the status of a fundamental 
right in the Community legal order. This right must be protected. Amongst others, this should 
be done through the competition provisions, particularly articles 81 and 82. If article 81 is to 
protect the right, then economic freedom must be considered within article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
If economic freedom could only be considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty, then it would 
be irrelevant whenever article 81(1) were not breached. If, for example, article 81(1) were held 
to promote economic efficiency, then this fundamental individual right (economic freedom) 
would then be permanently undermined by a utilitarian majoritarian value (economic 
efficiency). This would fundamentally dimmish the right’s value.
In Community law circles it is generally accepted that the Treaty, as interpreted by the 
Community Courts,* 895 forms the constitution of the EU.896 The ECJ agrees.897 Constitutionalism 
denotes the basic idea of limited government under the rule of law.898 The doctrines of direct 
effect and supremacy allow individuals to rely on Community law (which national law cannot 
overrule) before national courts even against the Member States and the Community itself.
"Consequently, the Treaty offers individuals enforceable constitutional guarantees even 
against democratic decisions, whether taken at Community or national level.,."899
That said, not everyone shares the view that the Treaty is a constitutional document. The 
German Constitutional court, for example, refutes the idea that the Treaty is anything other than 
an international agreement between sovereign states.900 Nevertheless, we can ignore this issue in
regulations are to give effect to the principles enshrined in the competition rules. They cannot change these 
principles nor can they modify the Treaty."
895 Craig and de Burca (1998), pages 163-165 and Petersmann (1991), page 256.
896 See, for example, Joerges (2002), page 9 and Weiler (1997).
897 "...the EEC Treaty...constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.", Opinion 
1/91 Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph o f Article 228(1) o f the Treaty [1991], paragraph 21.
898 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament [1986], paragraph 23 and Petersmann (1991), 
page 252.
899 Sauter (1998), page 31.
900 The issue is discussed in Joerges (2002), section 2.2.2.; Sauter (1998), pages 36 and 37 and Zuleeg (1997).
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the present discussion, because, even on the assumption that the German Constitutional court is 
wrong, the resulting arguments do not undermine the change we advocate.
So, what sort of constitution is it? Were the actors that developed the aforementioned doctrines 
(direct effect and supremacy) following a particular vision of the European project to justify its 
primacy?901 902Some believe so. The Ordoliberals have long understood both the German Federal 
Republic and Community as political systems based upon an Ordoliberal economic
* • Q05constitution.
As we saw above, the Ordoliberals considered a coherent legal framework as essential to 
guarantee individual freedoms and economic progress. Remember that the economic 
constitution indicates the legal structure that determines the type of economic system a state will 
pursue. It sets out a related system of principles that bind economic policy. The state then 
guarantees this economic order by enforcing the economic constitution. Sauter writes that:
"The state is constrained to observe the economic constitution, as it incorporates justiciable 
criteria. These constraints can take various forms, such as clear objectives for state policy, 
limits on its competence, limits on the instruments of state action, and, especially, 
individual rights that are directly enforceable."903
Is the Community legal order based upon an Ordoliberal economic constitution? If so, this 
would be important for our argument.904 Remember that, for Ordoliberals, competition law is a 
key part of this economic constitution. Competition has a value in its own right, which goes far 
beyond mere efficiency criteria.
"In this view, the economic constitution serves, first, to guarantee the basic equality of 
individuals as economic subjects; second, to back up the private law society by public 
authority; and third, to protect civil liberties...Thus, under the Ordoliberal economic 
constitution, economic rights and freedoms enjoy equal status to traditional political rights 
and freedoms, and may be enforced against majoritarian decisions."905
Here lies the difficulty. If the Community is based upon an Ordoliberal economic constitution, 
then competition law (including article 81) should be a key part of that order. In line with 
Ordoliberal values, the concept of a ’restriction of competition' under article 81(1) of the Treaty 
must refer to economic freedom. This would be a right of higher rank, protected under this 
constitutional order.906 As a result, if we changed the interpretation of a 'restriction of
901 Joerges (2002), page 10.
902 Sauter (1998), page 47 and Chalmers (1995), page 56.
903 Sauter (1998), page 47.
904 Sauter (1998), page 47.
905 Sauter (1998), pages 47 and 48. Sec also Chalmers (1995), page 57.
906 "We suggest that fundamental rights are commonly regarded as being at the peak of the normative hierarch) of 
laws against which other rules are to be measured.", Coppel and O'Neill (1992), p3ge 682.
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competition' to mean economic efficiency it might be argued that we are undermining a 
fundamental right (economic freedom) with a utilitarian rule (economic efficiency).907 Such a 
modification would involve a fundamental change in the constitutional order. This would need 
to be justified at the constitutional level.
Why might the Community be based upon an Ordoliberal economic constitution? Perhaps, the 
answer lies in its past? If Germany is founded on the Ordoliberal tradition then economic 
freedom must be a fundamental right there. As a result, so the argument goes, this fundamental 
right must have entered the Community legal order, see below.
However, it is questionable whether Germany,908 let alone the Community, is founded on the 
Ordoliberal tradition. Sauter reports that the German Constitutional court has held quite the 
opposite, denying the constitutional status of economic liberalism in Germany.909 In addition, 
there are many ways in which the Community legal order does not reflect (or no longer reflects) 
the Ordoliberal position.910 This is unsurprising. The Community is a new legal order.911 
Community law is strongly influenced by the constitutional traditions of the Member States, but 
it does not rest on any preconceived constitutional blueprint. Joerges writes:
"Academic legal theories do not represent the actual law. Nor are they, however, just 
arbitrary normative constructs. AH academic legal theories of integration are similar in that, 
in their interpretation of the EEC Treaty, they refer to assumptions that are partly 
extralegal, partly empirical, and partly theoretical. They reflect what is possible and 
desirable under specific historical conditions."912
907 "As the law now stands...the competition rules contained in the Treaty have a constitutional status and may be 
interpreted as shaping a law o f econom ic liberty from restraints of competition and abuses of economic power, not 
only a law  o f  econom ic efficiency. Thus, an efficiency-orientated approach may not be in tune with the current 
nonnative structure.”, Baquero Cruz (2002), page 1.
908 The same would apply if it were protected in another Member State too. However, I restrict my enquiry to 
Germany because the Ordoliberal tradition is rarely followed outside Germany, Joerges (2002), page 6 and Sauter 
(1998), page 49. Attempts by authors such as Gerber to show that "Competition law in Europe is based primarily on 
ideas developed by European thinkers..." show little more than that the Member States (outside Germany) have 
often implemented competition laws with similar wording to articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, see Gerber (1998), 
pages 401-416. In support of his case, Gerber only examines Sweden, Italy and France. He looks at the wording, but 
fails to examine the substance (and background), of their competition provisions. This was a mistake. "However 
similarly competition rules may have been worded by the Community and by national legislators, their application 
may result in divergent decisions as it has to follow the different objectives underlying apparently similar rules.”, 
Ullrich (1996), page 182. For example, the Italian equivalent of article 81(1) is an economic efficiency test, see 
Siragusa (1998), pages 470, 565 and 566 and Laudati (1998), pages 396-401. Wesseling (2000), page 105, agrees, 
and suggests that the French law does the same. Drahos (2001), chapters 4 and 5, describes considerable 
convergence between the European competition regime and that of Germany and Austria; and has similar, though 
weaker, conclusions vis-à-vis Dutch competition law.
909 Sauter (1998), pages 48 and 49.
910 See, for example, Baquero Cruz (2002), pages 26-29; Sauter (1998), pages 46-68; Poiares Maduro (1997), pages 
65-67 and Chalmers (1995), pages 66-72.
911 See, for example, the van Genden Loos Case, page 12, "...the Community constitutes a new legal order..."
9,2 Joerges (1997), page 4. See also, Joerges (2002), pages 5 and 11.
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But this does not yet mean that we can ignore the rights-based critique. Even if the Ordoliberal 
model has not been accepted lock, stock and barrel into the Community legal order, it has had a 
considerable influence, see above. The critique would still have force if it could be shown that:
• economic freedom is a right of higher rank, protected under the Community 
constitutional order, even though this is not based on an Ordoliberal economic 
constitution;913 and that,
•  the concept o f a 'restriction o f competition' under article 81(1) of the Treaty, refers to 
economic freedom.
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community law.914 Do 
these rights include economic freedom? Some believe that the enquiry should start by reference 
to national law. They argue that if economic freedom were a fundamental right in Germany, it 
would be a fundamental right in the Community legal order too. For example, Advocate- 
General Warner has said:
"...a fundamental right recognised and protected by the Constitution of any Member State 
must be recognised and protected also in Community law. The reason lies in the fact that, 
as has often been held by the Court...Community law owes its very existence to a partial 
transfer of sovereignty by each of the Member States to the Community. No Member State 
can...be held to have included in that transfer power for the Community to legislate in 
infringement of rights protected by its own Constitution. To hold otherwise would involve 
attributing to a Member State the capacity, when ratifying the Treaty, the power to flout its 
own Constitution, which seems to me impossible.'’915
However, this starting point lacks merit for two reasons. First, while Ordoliberals argue that 
economic freedom should be entrenched as a constitutional principle; we have not found 
evidence of economic freedom being a fundamental right in German Constitutional law.916 
However, even if we are wrong on that point, the Community Courts have never gone so far as 
to accept Advocate-General Warner's thesis here.917 Indeed, they approach the issue in a 
fundamentally different way:
"Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of 
measures adopted by the institutions of the community would have an adverse effect on the
9,3 The economic freedom rule must be of a higher rank, in order to justify its status as a right, as opposed to merely a 
conflicting policy interest
914 Craig and de Burca (1998), Chapter 7; Coppel and O'Neill (1992), pages 670-672 and Petersmann (1991), page 
257.
915 The Opinion of Advocate-General Warner in Case 7/761RCA v. Amminstrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1976], 
page 1237.
9.6 See, for example, Michalowski and Woods (1999). Although, German Constitutional law guarantees a general 
right to liberty, which may be applicable in this respect, see Alexy (2002), Chapter 7. Thanks to Emst-Ulrich 
Petersmann for th is comment
9.7 Hanley (2004), page 299.
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uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such measures can only be 
judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of 
national law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law 
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in question. Therefore the 
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by 
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the 
Constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure.
However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any analogous guarantee 
inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact, respect for fundamental rights 
forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The 
protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community."918
So we should examine the Community legal order directly.919 Has economic freedom been 
given a higher constitutional status by the ECJ such that article 81(1) must refer to this concept? 
The answer is probably not. The explanation of why not comes in two parts.
First, although the ECJ calls 'freedom o f  competition' a general principle of Community law, it 
has not defined the concept and it has actually said that references to 'freedom of competition' in 
articles 4, 98 and 105 of the Treaty cannot be invoked by individuals against the Member 
States.920 Therefore, and this is the second point, one would have to find this Tiigher 
constitutional principle’ embedded within one of the operational treaty provisions, such as 
article 81(1). However, the case law is unclear on whether a restriction of competition is a 
restriction of economic freedom. Furthermore, even if a restriction of competition had been 
interpreted in this way, the Community Courts (and the Commission) have not injected this 
concept with a higher constitutional status. Instead, when it is mentioned, it is treated as a policy 
objective to be balanced against all others.
Let's consider these points in more detail. First, in Case 240/83 P rocurer de la République v. 
Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées [1985], for example, the ECJ held, 
paragraph 9:
918 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fü r  Getreide und Futtermittel [19701, 
paragraphs 3 and 4. A similar point is made in relation to article 81, Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. 
Bundeskartellamt [1969], paragraphs 3-7.
9,9 Schröter (1987), page 646.
920 This also undermines the possibility of a 'general right to liberty' in the Community legal order, as there is in, for 
example, Germany, see above. Nor would I argue in favour of such a general right to liberty. This turns legislating 
on its head, generally favouring rights over majoritarian goals, instead of in a minority of important cases. 
Unfortunately, there is not space to discuss this issue in full; many theses could be written on the topic, see, for 
example, Zucca (2005).
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"...the principles of freedom of movement of goods and freedom of competition, together 
with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of Community law of 
which the Court ensures observance."
As a result, Coppel and O'Neill,921 argue that the ECJ has elevated the free market freedoms 
guaranteed in the Community to fundamental rights status. Presumably, in their view, the same 
would apply to freedom of competition.922 They saw this as controversial.923
These freedoms are certainly important in the Community legal order. That said, when one 
penetrates the rhetoric, it is hard to believe that they have been given fundamental rights status. 
First, we saw in Chapter Two's discussion of the Echirolles Case, that the ECJ has held that 
when the Treaty, in articles 4, 98 and 105, states that Community economic policy must comply 
with the principle o f "...an open market economy with free competition...",924 this does not 
impose clear and unconditional obligations on the Member States which can be relied upon by 
individuals.925 Rather these are general principles, calling for complex economic assessments. 
They are objectives to be weighed in the balance, not privileged 'trumps' that can be invoked by 
individuals 926 It is widely accepted that freedom of competition can be restricted by the pursuit
921 Coppel and O'Neill (I992X pages 689-691.
922 Petersmann (2003), page 62.
923 Coppel and O'Neill saw such an elevation of these freedoms as controversial, for once this happens, other 
'conventional1 fundamental rights will have the same status as these freedoms and can no longer act as a bulwark 
against them. As a result, "The invocation of the idea of fundamental rights by the European Court does not set 
essential limits to lawful executive action, because executive action which has as its object the promotion of the 
four market freedoms [as well as freedom of competition] is itself in the vocabulary of the European Court, 
instantiating a fundamental right", Coppel and O'Neill (1992), page 690. However, this could be beneficial. 
Petersmann argues, for example, that "...the everyday experience of most citizens is that their standard of living and 
their possibilities in life depend largely on their individual opportunities to produce and consume goods and services 
of their own choice; for that reason, the EC tradition of regulating economic freedoms and policies at the 
constitutional level should be maintained.", Petersmann (1995), page 1155. In this view these very rights become 
the bulwark against state and individual power.
924 1 assume here that ’free competition’ refers to economic freedom. This is far from certain, see above. However, if it 
does not refer to economic freedom, then the argument that this has fundamental rights status is even harder to 
make.
925 Sauter (1998), pages 40 and 41, calls 'free competition’ a political, as opposed to a legal, principle. See also, 
Amull, Dashwood, Ross and Wyatt (2000X page 153.
926 Petersmann (1995), page 1154, refers to an earlier article he wrote (unfortunately this is in German and so I cannot 
read it) about the "...EC’s ’economic constitution’ and the still inadequate constitutionalisation of the EC’s 
agricultural, competition, industrial and anti-dumping policies see Petersmann, "Grundprobleme des 
Wirtschaftsverfassung der EG", (1993) Aussenwirtschaft, 389-424."
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of other legitimate Community objectives.927 As Chapter Two claimed, the same principles are 
likely to apply to Community measures too.928
Furthermore, even if it could be argued that competition has been given such a status, the 
content of this 'right' remains undefined. Unless it can be shown that freedom o f competition 
equates to economic freedom  then economic freedom's privileged hierarchical status remains in 
doubt. Some seem to make this argument.929 However, it is far from clear that the Treaty has 
promoted economic freedom to the level o f a Constitutional principle in its own right.930
That does not get us all the way. It may be that freedom of competition cannot be invoked 
through article 4, etc. This does not necessarily mean that a fundamental right to economic 
freedom could not be found in the operative provisions of the Treaty, perhaps article 81, for 
example. This is the second part o f our argument.
However, as we have already seen, Section 2.1., a restriction o f competition, for the purposes of 
article 81(1), has not been consistently interpreted as a restriction of economic freedom. As a 
result, it is hard to argue that that provision promotes this 'fundamental right'. Furthermore, even 
if a restriction o f competition, for the purposes of article 81(1), had been interpreted as 
economic freedom, the Community Courts (and the Commission) have not provided it with 
fundamental rights status. Dworkin explains that rights must have:
"...a certain threshold weight against collective goals in general...for example...[they] 
cannot be defeated by appeal to any of the ordinary routine goals of political administration, 
but only by a goal of special urgency...[if this is not the case] the putative right adds 
nothing and there is no point to recognising it as a right at all."931
Weiler and Lockhart argue that one should not confuse this lexographical similarity (the use of 
the word 'right') in Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v. Association de défense des 
brûleurs d'huiles usagées [1985], paragraph 9. They argue that it is going too far to claim that
927 Sauter (1998), page 63 and Poiares Maduro (1999), page 454, the ECJ has ". ..to my knowledge never struck down 
Council legislation for violation of such economic rights and freedoms.” This does not necessarily decide the issue. 
Rights can sometimes be undermined. However, 'competition* has not been given a fundamental rights status 
through article 81, see below.
928 This is implicitly accepted by Petersmann (1991). At page 258, he calls the market freedoms and competition 
policy "...the primary objective of the EEC Treaty..." He does not expressly say they have constitutional status in 
the Treaty, although Sauter (1998), page 45, interprets him in this way. That said, Petersmann argues that the 
Community Courts should treat the market freedoms and competition policy as fundamental rights of EC Citizens 
against the Community institutions, pages 266-270. The implication being that they do not as yet do that
929 See the references in Sauter (1998), footnote 59. Unfortunately all references are to articles in the German 
language. As I do not read German, my ability to reply to these arguments specifically is restricted.
950 Demetriou and Higgins (2003) make a similar point in relation to the free movement provisions.
931 Dworkin (1977), page 92.
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the ECJ has elevated these freedoms to the status of fundamental rights, which is not to say that 
they are not extremely important Community principles. They write:
"In general the jurisprudence on market freedoms is rather flexible in yielding to non­
protectionist competing values far less grave than human rights."932
This can be seen in Case 240/83 Procureur de la République v. Association de défense des 
brûleurs d'huiles usagées [1985] itself. There the ECJ continued, paragraph 12:
"...it should be observed that the principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in 
absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of general interest 
pursued by the Community provided that the rights in question are not substantially 
impaired."
This argument is not watertight, because even fundamental rights give way to utilitarian 
necessities on occasion.933 However, the flexibility that Weiler and Lockhart point to 
undermines the claim to a 'fundamental rights' status for these concepts. The same can be seen 
with respect to 'restrictions of competition' under article 81(1) o f the Treaty. A number of 
peculiarities in the way this provision is applied belie the notion that it protects a fundamental 
human right in the Community legal order.
• Chapter Three argued that they have been balanced against other values within article 
81(1) o f the Treaty;
• restrictions o f competition are often allowed because they are not appreciable; and,
• we have seen that the Community Courts have told the Commission to balance 
restrictions o f competition against the article 81(3) values, Chapter Two.934 Chapter 
Four showed that there were no Commission decisions where non-economic objectives 
had been raised, under article 81(3), and where the Commission accepted that these 
arguments were in fact relevant, where these non-economic objectives did not win, i.e. 
tilt the balance in their favour (and against a restriction of competition).935 One might 
say that competition can never be eliminated, article 81(3)(b), but this protection falls 
far short of that given to fundamental rights.
Finally, when discussing article 81(1) we normally resort to shorthand and only mention 
’restrictions of competition'. However, the provision also refers to ’distortions of competition'.
932 Weiler and Lockhart (1995), page 596. More generally see their pages 593-596; Chalmers (1995), pages 70 and 71 
and Frazer (1990), pages 612-615.
933 Dworkin (1977), page 92. See, for example, the European Convention, Part L Title II.
934 Even advocates of the individual freedom standard agree that this must be balanced against consumer welfare 
considerations, for example, Schröter (1987), page 659.
935 Some may reject this reading of the balance. However, even Monti's reading o f article 81(3)'s first test, see 
Chapter Four, undeimines the idea that economic freedom has 'fundamental rights status' in article 81(1) o f the 
Treaty.
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Normally these two concepts are dealt with in the same way. However, on occasion, the 
Commission has said that distortions do not only occur when existing competition is diminished 
by an agreement. Article 81(1) o f the Treaty can also be breached when competition is 
increased or intensified?16 The Ordoliberals believe that market power should be diffused as far 
as possible. I f ’competition' for the purposes o f article 81(1) were considered a fundamental 
right, there would be no place for a  concept such as distortion and increasing competition would 
not be seen as wrong.
If 'restriction o f competition' meant restriction o f economic freedom and this had been given 
fundamental right status within the Community legal order, one would not expect to find 
derogation so easy to achieve. What would we say if the Community Courts allowed de minimis 
torture? Is it wrong to increase freedom o f  speech? Would we allow even appreciable torture on 
the understanding that this would enhance industrial policy? Probably not.
Would the position change under the European Convention, if adopted? There is an increased 
emphasis on freedom, this being mentioned as one o f the founding values o f the European 
Union, article I-2.935 *37 However, the provision goes on to explain that these values are common to 
the Member States. Outside of Germany the economic freedom notion receives little support, so 
it is unlikely that the Constitution refers specifically to economic freedom here. There may also 
be support in article 1-3, which states that the Union will offer its citizens an internal market 
where competition is free and undistorted. Does this reinforce the notion of economic freedom? 
Once again, it is far from certain. The language is similar to 'free competition' and we have seen 
that the ECJ said article 4 of the Treaty could not be relied upon to give individual rights.938 
Furthermore, article 1-3 also refers to undistorted competition. This may oppose the economic 
freedom idea, which would demand that market power should be diffused even if the market 
tends towards oligopoly.939 On top o f this, freedom of competition is not mentioned in article I- 
4, a provision entitled 'fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination*.
In conclusion, economic freedom has, at times, been promoted as a relevant value under article 
81 of the Treaty. Having said that, it is far from clear that it has the status of a fundamental right 
in the Community legal order. Even if it has, there is currently little evidence to show that it 
must be protected as such within article 81(1). Furthermore, we are not persuaded that this 
position will change even if the European Convention is adopted. It is not directly protected in
935 Barack (1981), page 136 and Smit and Herzog (1976), Volume 2, section 85.26, paragraph 3-122. The ECJ in 
Case 262/81 Coditel SA, Compagnie Générale p o u r  la Diffusion de la Télévision, and Others v. Cinê-Vog Films SA
and Others [1982], paragraph 20, may also distinguish between restriction and distortion.
937 See also the references to liberty* in article 11-66 and economic rights in articles 11-75 and 76.
938 The same would likely apply to an argument in favour of a 'general right of freedom’, see above.
939 Hildebrand (2002), page 158.
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Section I, Title II of the European Convention, nor is its protection inspired by the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States.
(e) Conclusion of Section 2.2.1.
The arguments for including economic freedom within article 81(1) are not convincing. The 
historical approach to Treaty construction is fraught with danger and is rarely employed by the 
Community Courts. True, there were practical reasons why, in the past, interpreting a restriction 
of competition as a restriction o f economic freedom may have been beneficial. These principally 
arose as a result o f Regulation 17. It is questionable whether the presence of secondary 
legislation should have been allowed to distort the interpretation o f the Treaty. In any event, 
Regulation 17 no longer exists and the whole o f article 81 is directly applicable. On top of this, 
there is little evidence that economic freedom has, in fact, achieved constitutional status in the 
Community legal order, let alone that this is manifest in the current article 81 caselaw.940
That is not to say that the economic freedom concept is worthless. It is not.941 But it does mean 
that its claim to article 81(1) holds much less weight If it does not have true constitutional 
status then changes to article 81(1 interpretation (if indeed this is a change) need less 
justification. It is merely a value to be balanced against others. Section 2.2.2. goes on to provide 
some positive reasons against employing economic freedom in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
2.22 Against economic freedom
Article 81(1) has been given a broad interpretation.942 Many o f these commentators point to a 
formalistic approach focusing on restrictions o f economic freedom.
This has often been criticised. For example, Hawk complains that this concept: (a) fails to 
generate precise, operable, legal rules; (b) can undermine economic efficiency analysis, which 
he claims provides a suitable analytical framework; (c) favours traders/ competitors over 
consumers and consumer welfare; and, (d) captures totally innocuous contract provisions under 
article 81(1) of the Treaty which have no anti-competitive effects in an economic sense.943
940 There are certain textual, contextual and functional arguments in favour o f economic freedom. We should be 
extremely careful about relying on such arguments however. The Vienna Convention's guide to Treaty 
interpretation is inappropriate in the Community legal order, which has its own rules o f interpretation, see Chapter 
Two. Nevertheless, Section 2.3. discusses the textual and functional arguments. The contextual ones have been dealt 
with in Section 2.2.1. Briefly put, the ECJ held that 'free competition' did not create individual rights that could be 
relied on. As a  result, it is improbable that the Community legal order incorporates a general right to liberty which 
can be relied on either.
941 Sen (2002), particularly chapters 9, 17 and 20-22, emphasises a similar concept; Amato (1997), pages 1-4; 
Schröter (1987), pages 667-670 and Petersmann (1991).
942 See, for example, Venit (2003X pages 548 and 549; Fox (2001), page 23; Bishop (2001), pages 56 and 58; 
Forrester (2001), page 76; Venit (2001), page 291; Ehlermann (1998), page xiv and Hawk (1995), section 2.
945 Hawk (1995), page 978.
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These problems are exacerbated because, as the internal market is increasingly realised, more 
and more agreements affect trade between Member States, and thus fall within article 81's 
jurisdictional threshold.
Assume that a restriction of competition under article 81(1) can be equated with a restriction of 
economic freedom, which is far from clear, see Section 2.1. Before one can criticise this 
practice, one must understand why economic freedom is being pursued. There are, essentially, 
two schools o f thought:944
• some believe that economic freedom is used to assess whether there is a reduction in 
allocative efficiency. Such people may not agree with Hawk’s four-point critique, in 
fact, but at least they would accept that his points are relevant;
• others argue that facilitating market access is essential in its own right, even if  this 
undermines economic efficiency. Think of the Ordoliberal School, for example. For 
these people much of Hawk's critique is simply misplaced.
By distinguishing between these two camps, we hope to inject a little more clarity into the 
critique of the 'economic freedom' standard.
Marenco falls into the first camp. He argues that one must assess restrictions of economic 
freedom under article 81(1) o f  the Treaty. For Marenco, economic freedom is not a value in 
itself.945 Economic freedom is merely a  legal concept that enables us to assess whether an 
agreement tends to reduce allocative efficiency.946 9478Having said that, he accepts that the legal 
concept (economic freedom) and the economic concept (economic efficiency) are not one and
A AJA
the same. Some restrictions o f economic freedom are actually efficiency enhancing. In
944 Marsden (2000) makes a slightly different argument which, although it is far from clear, seems to relate to market 
integration. As such, it is discussed in Section 3.
945 Marenco (1999), page 1243.
946 "La finalité des règles de concurrence est de promouvoir une meilleure allocation des resources et, par là, la baisse 
des prix pour les consommateurs.", Marenco (1999), page 1229. At page 1230 he continues "Lorsque des 
enterprises coopèrent entre elles, il faut se demander si leur accord tend à améliorer quantitativement ou 
qualitativement l'offre des produits ou services ou si, par contre, il tend à  restrendre cette offre...Cest donc la 
tendance de l'accord à  augmenter ou restreindre l'offre sur le marché qui doit être jugée... Le critère de la restriction 
de la liberté entrepeneuriale des parties se prête parfaitement à determiner cette tendance." See also, page 1243 and 
Commission, RCP 197!, page 11, the last paragraph can be read as encouraging economic freedom for efficiency 
ends.
947 Marenco (1999), pages 1239 and 1240.
948 Marenco (1999), page 1238.
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order to determine whether this is the case, he turns to article 81(3), where an economic 
efficiency analysis can be performed.949
For Marenco, economic freedom is a legal rule through which we can assess economic 
efficiency benefits. It is not a perfect rule, but it is more than adequate. Hawk disagrees. First, 
he criticises economic freedom because it does not provide precise, operable rules.950 This is 
important. Why? Because those in the first camp principally advocate economic freedom as a 
good, easily applicable, approximation of the economic efficiency standard.
All contracts restrict economic freedom. If all contracts restricted competition, the rule would be 
clear, but it would be inoperable, and the social costs of consistently implementing it would be 
unimaginably high.951 As a result, it is normally agreed that there must be some limit to the 
notion.952 Monti argued that only 'undue' restrictions of economic freedom were relevant, for 
example, see Section 2.1.1.
But how can we clearly decide what is undue? The answer is far from obvious.953 It is difficult 
to construct logically consistent limits to the notion:
"...the term 'freedom* provides little guidance, as the once heated debates in Germany and 
the US some decades ago showed."954
The Commission has made many attempts to define the limits of economic freedom, for the 
purposes of article 81(1). Most have come to naught or been abandoned due to lack of 
agreement955 The Commission's latest attempt is more helpful but does not go far enough.956
949 Marenco (1999), page 1238. Although he accepts that sometimes the Community Courts do some o f this analysis 
under article 81(1), Marenco (1999), page 1240.
950 See also, Riley (1998), page 483; Korah (1998), footnote 1 and Schaub (1998), page 474.
951 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), page 101 and Bork (1993), page 59.
952 See above; Hawk (1995), page 978 and Bork (1993), page 59.
953 Marenco argues that one must distinguish between restrictions which necessarily result from every contract and 
those which are imposed on future contracts. For example: "...si une entreprise achète tous ses besoins en 
aluminium pour dix ans à venir par un contrat qui précise la quantité et le prix, soit de façon précise, soit par 
référence aux cours qui seront cotés par le London Metal Exchange au moment de la livraison annuelle, on est en 
présence d'un exercise de la liberté des entreprises. Si en revanche l'acheteur s'engage à acheter ses besoins chaque 
année pour dix ans auprès du même vendeur, les termes du contrat devant être négociés les 1er octobre, il s’agira 
d’une restriction de la liberté entrepreneuriale de l'acheteur en violation de l’interdiction des ententes.", Marenco 
(1999), pages 1237 and 1238. However, this distinction is unconvincing if economic freedom is there to assess 
economic efficiency, as neither of these methods is, in and of itself, less efficient than the other. Nor does it reflect 
the article 81(1) caselaw, think of the Nungesser Case, for example.
954 Schaub (1998), page 124. Hildebrand (2002), pages 159 and 160, agrees that the issue of economic freedom's 
limits has caused heated debate in Germany. See also, Hawk (1995), page 979, on the failure to establish clear rules 
here.
955 Luc Gÿselen, then o f  DG Competition, while participating in the Competition Law Workshop, European 
University Institute, 6/7 June 2003. See also Schaub (1998), page 474.
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More generally, Section 2.2.2. showed how unclear the efforts have been to clarify this aspect 
over forty years of Community decision-making practice.956 57 Nor is it a concept with which 
businesses are familiar.958 Hawk suggests that it is impossible to limit economic freedom in a 
logically consistent way. Such is the difficulty that, at times, almost every restriction in 
agreements between significant players seems to require an exemption, see above. In practice, 
the decision-maker has a lot o f discretion 959 Therefore, one might question whether the 
economic freedom concept is a useful proxy for economic efficiency, in that it does not seem 
easy to apply. Indeed, Hawk goes further. He believes that economic efficiency, unlike 
economic freedom, provides a framework of precise operable rules which companies and 
decision-makers can apply, this is discussed in Section 2.3. below.
Furthermore, Hawk points to a tension between economic freedom and economic efficiency, 
points (b) to (d) above. Hawk would disagree with Marenco, in that he does not think that the 
economic freedom concept essentially reflects economic efficiency. This goes to the heart o f the 
issue too. If the economic freedom concept produces fundamentally different results from those 
which would be achieved through application of an economic efficiency standard, then it is not 
a good proxy.
Hawk's argument comes in two parts. First, he argues that economic freedom is a much wider 
concept. According to Hawk, it captures many totally innocuous agreements, from an economic 
efficiency perspective. This point depends somewhat on how one delimits economic freedom 
and what efficiency standard is used.960 But there is overwhelming support for Hawk's view 
from both jurists and economists, when a consumer welfare standard is adopted.961 Secondly,
956 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 13-31. First, these guidelines do not provide an underlying 
objective to guide article 81(1) analysis in case o f ambiguity. Lugard and Hancher (2004), page 411, write that 
"...the concept o f a  ’restriction of competition’ remains in some cases difficult to grasp as a result o f a  lack of a 
clear, quantifiable standard by which agreements are judged.” Secondly, although the account o f how to apply the 
provision is quite detailed, it does not capture the entire article 81(1) analysis, see Kjolbye (2004), page 56$.
957 Admittedly, some of the confusion in the Community is due to the collision of different objectives within article 
81(1), see Chapter Three and because the underlying objectives o f the provision are unclear, see Section 2.1.1. 
above.
9SS Whish and Sufrin (1987), page 4, note this argument
959 Waelbroeck (1987a), page 693, points to controversy as a result o f  this discretion.
960 MOschel (1991), page 14, for example, argues that "...there is no difference between an antitrust law orientated 
toward protection o f  competition [by which he means economic freedom) or one orientated toward promotion of 
economic efficiency [by which he means static and dynamic consumer welfare]." See also page 20 and Cooter 
(1987). To the extent that MOschel is right, an economic efficiency standard could still be preferable if  it offers 
more predictable rules, see Section 23 . below.
961 See, for example, Bishop and Walker (2002), paragraph 5.02; Bishop (2001), page 58; Neven, Papandropoulos 
and Seabright (1998), page 37; Siragusa (1998), page 544; Heimler and Fattori (1998), page 595 and Hawk (1995), 
page 98 T. Venit (1998), page 575, points out that, due to the uncertainty caused by the economic freedom concept, 
it is often interpreted even more widely than it should be, as undertakings err on the side of caution.
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IV *
Hawk says that the economic freedom notion tends to favour traders/ competitors over 
consumers and consumer welfare, and thus often undermines economic efficiency.962 There is a 
lot of evidence for this too.963
Marenco accepts that economic freedom does not capture all efficiencies. However, he sees it as 
an important legal rule that captures most o f them. Divergences can later be corrected in article 
81(3). Marenco argues that one cannot apply the economic concept, as it is too unclear. Instead, 
we must translate it into a legal rule, such as economic freedom. Marenco believes that use of 
economic freedom enhances legal security.964 965But it is hard to accept his logic. First, the 
economic freedom notion is unclear, see above. This means that its application is difficult and 
controversial. Secondly, Marenco accepts economic efficiency analysis under article 81(3) of 
the Treaty in any event.
The use of the economic freedom 'shorthand' is hard to apply clearly and consistently. Clear 
rules can be made, but these seem disproportionate to the efficiency aim,966 even undermining it 
at times. It captures many benign agreements within article 81(1) only to exempt them under 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. Why not have the efficiency analysis in article 81(1) directly?967 This 
should result in a more accurate efficiency assessment. But there is another important result of 
defining a restriction o f competition within article 81(1) of the Treaty as economic freedom. As 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, use of a wide concept there substantially increases 
undertakings' costs. This was evident under Regulation 17, as only the Commission could apply 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. However, even under the new regime a wide, uncertain, article 81(1) 
can significantly increase costs, undermining economic progress for everyone in the 
Community.
We said above that there were two camps. Marenco fell into the first o f these, believing that 
economic freedom was an indirect measure o f economic efficiency. The second camp sees 
economic freedom as a value in itself. We saw that the Ordoliberal School, for example, believe
962 Hawk (1995X page 978.
963 See, for example, Motta (2004), section 13.1.3. and Kühn (1997), pages 137-143. Hawk is probably reading the 
economic freedom context too narrowly. He says that it favours traders/ competitors over consumers and consumer 
welfare. In fact, economic freedom also favours consumers and their access to market as well. For example, the idea 
that consumers have a 'right* to purchase goods anywhere in the Community would probably be supported by those 
in favour o f economic freedom. However, Hawk is correct when he says that this is not a majoritarian rale. He is 
also correct that this rights-based approach can undermine consumer welfare, as Motta (2004) and Kühn (1997) 
explain.
964 "...ce critère (economic efficiency! est également dangereux pour la sécurité juridique, car les entreprises 
n'auraient pas de point de référence.", Marenco (1999), page 1239.
965 Marenco (1999), page 1240.
966 See, for example, Bright (1995), pages 509-513 and 518.
967 This is not to argue that there should be no per se rules, see Section 2.3. below.
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that facilitating market access is essential, even if  this tends to undermine economic 
efficiency.968
Most of Hawk's critique focuses on explaining how economic freedom is incompatible with 
economic efficiency, favouring competitors over consumers, see points (b) to (d) above. To 
those that see the protection o f economic freedom as a fundamental right, this is o f little 
relevance. However, we have argued that, in the Community legal order, economic freedom is 
not treated as a fundamental right, see Section 2.2.1.(d) above.
Where economic freedom is merely an objective like any other the position changes. Section 
2.2.1. claimed that the main arguments in favour of using economic freedom within article 81(1) 
of the Treaty were unpersuasive. Nevertheless, we saw that there are strong arguments in favour 
of economic freedom. If it is a value promoted in the Community legal order, then this fact 
alone may justify its presence within article 81(1).
The point of departure is to ask what weight economic freedom is given in the Community legal 
order. In our view, economic freedom is not a particularly important Treaty value today. It is not 
mentioned in articles 2 ,3 and 4 o f the Treaty, or anywhere else. True, article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union speaks of 'liberty', as does the European Convention. Furthermore, articles 4, 
98 and 105 all promote "...an open market economy with free competition..." But it is far from 
clear that these concepts refer to ’economic freedom'.969 The Community Courts have never 
equated them, for example. Furthermore, as we saw above, they have said that these references 
cannot be relied upon by any individual against the Member States. The recent Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines do not mention economic freedom when they discuss article 81(1) of 
the Treaty. Quite the contrary, they emphasise that:
The objective of article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.”970
The lack of emphasis on economic freedom is not particularly surprising. As noted above, the 
Ordoliberal School, which strongly supports this notion, has had little influence outside of 
Germany. Nevertheless, the Community Courts and the Commission have both referred to 
economic freedom in the past, see above. As a result, it would be foolhardy to assume that the
968 Wolf is in the second camp, although he believes that the pursuit o f economic freedom, while justified in its own 
right, largely reflects economic efficiency concerns. When it docs not, he argues that article 81(3) can be used, Wolf 
(1998), page 131. Schaub (1998), page 124, also discusses this.
969 For example, Petersmann (2003), page 62, suggests that 'free competition' refers to economic freedom, while Niels 
and ten Kate (2004), page 11, assume it refers to economic efficiency.
970 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 13. In my view one cannot place too much weight on this 
statement however, because it does not accurately reflect article 81’s objectives given its position within the Treaty, 
see Chapter Two. Having said that, it implies that the Commission no longer interprets 'restrictions of competition' 
as 'restrictions o f economic freedom* either.
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concept had no value in the Community legal order, even though the Commission increasingly 
emphasises an economic approach, see Chapter Two, and many believe that this would bring it 
more in line with the Community Courts, see Section 2.1.
Having said that, even if  economic freedom were given a lot of weight under the Treaty, then 
the fact that it can significantly undermine consumer welfare (a majoritarian goal) is still 
relevant, given that economic freedom does not have fundamental rights status. Not everyone is 
an entrepreneur, seeking to enter the market.971 By way of contrast, a consumer welfare test 
benefits us all.972 In the absence of clear guidance in the Treaty to the contrary,973 it seems more 
in line with the article 2 task of "...raising the standard of living and quality of life..."974 to 
define 'competition' as something that benefits the many, rather than the few.975
One might argue that using economic freedom within article 81(1) o f the Treaty does not really 
undermine economic efficiency. Those in favour of economic freedom in its own right are not 
saying that efficiency considerations are irrelevant. They merely consign them to article 81(3). 
But this approach can still cause significant problems. Remember that economic freedom fails 
to generate precise, operable, rules. Basing the article 81(1) analysis on a wide, uncertain, 
concept (such as economic freedom), means that many agreements fall within the Community 
competition provisions. Even post Regulation 17 a wide, uncertain, article 81(1) creates 
significant costs for undertakings, and ultimately consumers, see above.
But the arguments against formally adopting an economic freedom standard in article 81(1) of 
the Treaty do not stop there. Three other issues should be mentioned. First, as we saw in
971 Which is not to argue that we only benefit from values which we actually use, see Sen (2002), pages 624-626.
972 Areedaand Hovenkamp (2000), pages 101 and 102.
973 Does the requirement that agreements seeking exemption must allow consumers a fair share o f the resulting 
benefit show that majoritarian issues need not be considered until article 81(3) o f the Treaty? If so, this implies that 
article 81(1) may not be a  utilitarian test However, imagine that article 81(1) involved a consumer welfare test and 
that this could be balanced against, for example, cultural and environmental considerations in article 81(3)'s first 
condition. It would also be logical to ensure that this balance did not ignore the consumers of the underlying 
product. In this way, ’fair share* might not solely be measured vis-à-vis the parties to the agreement, but also against 
society in general. As a  result, the reference to 'consumers' in article 81(3) does not necessarily imply that 
majoritarian issues should be reserved to that provision.
974 The Preamble also says that the essential objective of the Member States' efforts through the Treaty is "...the 
constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples..." See also, article 153 of the Treaty, 
consumer protection.
975 Petersmann (2003), pages 52 and 53 and Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 101 and 102, also argue that it is 
fairer. However, their solutions are quite different Petersmann suggests placing personal liberties beyond 
majoritarian interests through a rights-based approach. Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest the adoption of the 
majoritarian interests, a consumer welfare standard. Petersmann rejects this approach, because of the problem o f 
'capture' and its implications for political markets, Petersmann (2003), pages 52 and 53. The link between political 
and economic markets is questionable however, Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 103 and 104. Capture can 
perhaps be dealt with more efficiently through other means, see, for example, Motta (2004), pages 20 and 2 1. In any 
event, a consumer welfare standard already tilts the scales in favour of small interest groups, reducing the chance o f 
capture, see Lyons (2002) and Neven and Roller (2000).
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Chapter One, most competition rules are now based on an economic efficiency te s t Basing 
Community competition law on the economic freedom standard runs counter to all of these:
•  these different standards make co-operation between those enforcing article 81 and 
extra-Community competition authorities more difficult.976 This is particularly 
important in this new era of antitrust law, where it is called upon to keep open world, 
and not just national, markets.977 Why is co-operation with extra-Community 
competition authorities more difficult?
o It is more difficult for these authorities to understand what the Community 
standard is. Therefore, it is harder for them to provide assistance in a multi- 
jurisdictional investigation; and,
o it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the Community standard somehow 
discriminates in favour of Community undertakings,978 regardless o f whether 
this is true. This may make these extra-Community agencies less co-operative 
than they would otherwise be.
• The different standards mean that undertakings whose agreements fall within article 81 
and an extra-Community competition regime must comply with both sets o f rules.979 
This burden principally falls on Community undertakings, generating economic costs 
for them and the Community, particularly in relation to technology transfer, industrial 
co-operation, effective distribution systems and economic progress.980
Secondly, an economic freedom standard can undermine other Treaty objectives. In Chapter 
One we saw how it could undermine market integration, for example. Furthermore, insofar as it 
undermines economic efficiency it could undermine all the other objectives that the efficiency 
standard tends to promote indirectly, see Chapter One.
Finally, the fact that economic freedom is hard to define complicates the application o f article 
81(3) as well. Competition must not be eliminated, article 81(3)(b), surely 'competition' used 
here must refer to economic freedom if it has that meaning under article 81(1) of the Treaty? 
Furthermore, it is hard to weigh the objectives which fall within article 81(3)'s first test, against
976 Mario Monti (2001); Marsden (2000); Schaub (1998), pages 127 and 128 and Laudati (1998), page 384.
977 Amato (1997), page 126.
978 This is the implication o f Ostiy (1993), page 267.
979 Mario Monti (2001).
980 See, Chapter One; Kaczorowska (2000); Laudati (1998), pages 384 and 385; Bright (1995), page 520 and Addy 
(1993), page 301. This is also the implication o f Venit (2003), page 569.
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the restriction of economic freedom under article 81(1), when the latter notion is unclear.981 The 
decision-maker must balance an amorphous concept (economic freedom) against other Treaty 
objectives. When an undefined entity must be weighed in the balance the outcome can be very 
hard to predict.982 This may, in part, explain the lack of clarity so far in the Commission 
decisions. The introduction to this chapter discussed the costs o f this lack of transparency.
In conclusion, if economic freedom is used as a proxy for economic efficiency then it should be 
replaced. It often undermines the very goal it seeks to promote and does not provide clear, 
operable rules, which are easy to implement. If economic freedom is promoted as a value in 
itself, its relevance for article 81(1) is harder to judge and depends on the importance that the 
concept is given in the Treaty. Despite the difficulties with the definition of a relevant restriction 
on economic freedom, if defining 'restriction on competition' in this way helps achieve an 
important Treaty objective then the uncertainty (and costs) that this causes may still be 
worthwhile. However, economic freedom is not given much weight in the Community legal 
order today. Furthermore, it undermines majoritarian goals, such as consumer welfare, which 
better reflect the Treaty aims; it threatens co-operation with extra-Community competition 
authorities; it undermines other Treaty objectives; and, it imposes significant costs on 
Community undertakings and consumers alike. As a result, if  economic freedom is to be 
considered at all, and we may decide that it is simply too uncertain a criterion to apply, however 
beneficial its aim, it may be better to relegate it to article 81(3) of the Treaty.
2.2.3 Conclusion of Section 2.2.
Section 2.1. argued that the definition o f a restriction of competition for the purposes of article 
81(1) of the Treaty had not been interpreted clearly or consistently. Nor is the position any 
clearer today. This is unacceptable and so Section 2.2. asked whether economic freedom should 
form the bedrock of analysis under article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Why was economic freedom considered? First, a long and noble tradition, originating in Austria 
and Germany has emphasised the importance of competition as a process, as opposed to ju s t as 
an outcome. This tradition has had an important influence on Community competition law in 
general and article 81 in particular. As a result, economic freedom has been referred to within 
that provision in the past.
Section 2.2.1. examined the four main arguments used to justify economic freedom's 
consideration within article 81(1) of the Treaty. It argued that none o f them were convincing.
981 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 12 say "The assessment o f any countervailing benefits under 
article 81(3) necessarily requires prior determination of the restrictive nature and impact of the agreement"
982 It would be exceedingly difficult if  not impossible, to construct rational criteria to govern conflicts between 
economic freedom and efficiency, Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 108 and 109.
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This does not mean that economic freedom should be rejected, but it does undermine our use of 
this value.
Section 2.2.2. went on to discuss arguments against considering economic freedom within 
article 81(1) o f  the Treaty. It distinguished between two uses o f the economic freedom concept. 
Sometimes economic freedom is used as a proxy for economic efficiency. In this case we 
concluded that it should be replaced. However, most people that argue in favour of using 
economic freedom promote it as a value in itself. In this case, its relevance for article 81(1) is 
harder to judge and depends on the importance that the concept is given in the Treaty. In our 
view, economic freedom is not given much weight in the Community legal order anymore. 
Furthermore, its presence in article 81(1) produces many costs. As a result, we concluded that if 
economic freedom is to be considered at all, it may be better to relegate economic freedom to 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. However, this should only be done if a concept can be found which 
is more in line with the Treaty's objectives.
2.3 Another Suggestion
Section 2.2. argued that economic freedom is no longer a strong candidate for consideration 
within article 81(1) of the Treaty. Considering the values that the Treaty (as interpreted by the 
Community Courts) promotes today, is there another concept that would serve as a better basis 
for article 81(1)?
In Section 2.2.1. we saw Odudu argue that a 'restriction of competition’ under article 81(1) of 
the Treaty might refer to allocative efficiency. This seems coherent with article 81’s wording.983 
However, in our view, Odudu does not make a sufficiently persuasive case. A provision's actual 
wording is not the key issue when it comes to Treaty interpretation. Nor do we think that the 
Community Courts' caselaw supports him as much as he claims.984
w îNcven (1998), page 112.
984 Although, in general, allocative efficiencies are emphasised in article 81(1) analysis, Neven (1998), page 117, 
Section 2.1.2. and Chapter Three argue that cases such as Nungesser seem to consider productive and dynamic 
efficiencies within article 81(1) o f the Treaty. See also, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2) and 
Kjalbye (2004), pages 567-569. Furthermore, in some Commission decisions, such as Commission decision, 
CECED, the Commission emphasises allocative efficiency gains in its article 81(3) analysis.
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Furthermore, splitting out the allocative efficiency analysis does not make much sense from an 
economic perspective.985 Verifying whether an agreement reduces efficiency is not very 
meaningful without examining possible pro-competitive effects as well (be they allocative or 
dynamic).986 It also leads to confusion between economists and lawyers as to what 
considerations are relevant at each stage of analysis.987 The Commission accepts this:
"...the current division between paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 in implementing article 85 
[now article 81] is artificial and runs counter to the integral nature of article 85, which 
requires economic analysis of the overall impact of restrictive practices..."988
Examining all efficiency issues together would bring the concept of a 'restriction o f competition* 
under article 81(1) closer to the mainstream economic notion of consumer welfare. It would also 
mean that the same burden of proof would apply to all economic issues.989 This would improve 
the focus and clarity o f economic analysis under article 81. As article 81(3) has been deemed 
appropriate for the consideration of other issues, see Chapters Two and Four, it might be better 
to combine all the economic efficiency analysis within one paragraph. Section 2.3. asks whether 
it makes sense to focus on an integrated welfare analysis in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
"Economists claim that if the antitrust laws were more firmly grounded in microeconomic 
theory, these laws would be politically more stable, their enforcement would be simpler, 
more consistent, and predictable, and their social benefits larger."990
These are important benefits and we discuss them below. However, before doing this we must 
deal with a couple o f preliminary issues. First, is an economic welfare test compatible with the 
Community legal order? Secondly, there are many types of economic efficiency test, see 
Chapter One. What type of test are we referring to here?
Schröter wams us not to adopt general terms from other legal systems unless they 'fit' in our 
legal order too.991 He was worried that the adoption of an American rule of reason within article
985 For example, it raises some complex conceptual problems. Although it is hard to imagine, an agreement might 
promote allocative efficiency and yet, in the long term, be efficiency-reducing where it eliminates/ reduces the 
chance o f productive or dynamic efficiencies. Under Odudu's system, these issues could not be dealt with as the 
agreement would not fall within article 81(1) o f the Treaty. As productive and dynamic efficiencies are often the 
most important, from an efficiency perspective, see Chapter One, then this could ultimately be bad for consumers. 
In addition, productive and dynamic efficiencies reduce allocative efficiency losses in the long term. Is Odudu 
suggesting that we should really distinguish between long and short term gains? This would be extremely complex, 
and would ultimately lead to some quite artificial distinctions.
986 Verouden (2003), pages 528, 572, 574 and 575; Venit (2003), page 575; Gyselen (2002a), page 197; Bishop and 
Walker (2002), paragraph 5.05 and Hawk (1995), page 987.
987 The economic analysis has nearly always been split between article 81(1) and 81(3) in the pas t As such it is 
unsurprising that the precise dividing line between these provisions has been a recurring question, both in the 
literature and the Community Courts' caselaw, Verouden (2003), pages 528 and 575.
988 Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 49.
989 Regulation 1/2003, article 2, discussed above.
990 Jenny (1993), page 197.
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81(1) of the Treaty would be inappropriate.91 92 This is an important point. Given that (like 
economic freedom) economic efficiency is not mentioned in the Treaty, the answer is not 
obvious. Therefore, we should check that an economic efficiency approach is compatible with 
the Community legal order.993
In our view, an economic efficiency approach in article 81(1) o f the Treaty would comply w ith 
the Community legal order. As regards the general Treaty framework, Section 2.2.2. argued that 
a majoritarian goal (such as consumer welfare) seemed to be more in line with the Treaty's 
Preamble and articles 2 and 153. Furthermore, Section 2.1. cited Bright’s view that article 
81(l)'s 'restriction o f competition’ reference was wide enough to cover a number of approaches. 
In fact, there is little doubt, that the words 'restriction o f competition* could accommodate a 
consumer welfare test,994 especially given the Community Courts' teleological approach to 
Treaty interpretation. Even if economic efficiency has not been a consistent objective of those 
applying that provision, we saw that both the Commission and the Community Courts have 
interpreted it in that way in the past, Sections 2.1.1. and 2.1.2.
The second preliminary issue, which should be discussed, is related to the first. If economic 
efficiency is to be the underlying article 81(1) test, what type of efficiencies should the 
Commission pursue? There are many choices, see Chapter One. Should it follow a partial 
equilibrium or a total welfare model; focus on consumer or producer welfare; and/ or, what 
balance should it pursue between static allocative efficiency and dynamic, productive and 
dynamic allocative efficiencies?995 Within these, which ’school’ o f economic thought should it 
follow?996
991 Schröter (1987), page 645. This is certainly right and is one of this thesis' main underlying arguments, see Chapter 
Two.
992 There are many types o f rule of reason, see Section 2. For the purpose o f this discussion we take a wide definition, 
assuming it to be a full economic analysis.
991 Schröter (1987), pages 691 and 692, concluded that it would not be appropriate. His arguments were based on (1) 
the divergences in the Member States' legal traditions; (2) the lack of legal security that such a change would entail; 
and, (3) the fact that the Commission alone could, at that time, decide article 81(3) issues. However, since 
Regulation 1/2003, the whole of article 81 is directly applicable and effective in the Member States' courts and 
competition authorities. As a result, the risks to homogenous enforcement that he points to in (1) and (3) would 
arise in any event, as he accepts an efficiency analysis under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. The lack of legal certainty, 
point (2), is discussed below.
994 See, for example, Siragusa (1998), pages 470, 547, 565 and 566; Siragusa (1997), pages 284 and 285; Hawk 
(1995), page 987 and Schröter (1987), pages 691 and 736.
995 Duhamel and Townley (2003) discuss other variants of these tests.
996 See, Hildebrand (2002X Chapter III; Hildebrand (2002a); Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2001), Chapter 1 and 
Furse (1996), pages 250-254.
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Chapter Five found little underlying consistency uniting the Commission's economic analysis. 
This lessens the Commission’s chance o f  achieving the aims it seeks; makes it harder for the 
disparate decision-makers to know what they should be tiying to achieve; and, makes the 
outcome o f disputes less predictable for undertakings, see Chapter Eight
The top priority must be to define the economic efficiency test’s underlying objective.997 The 
Community Courts have yet to rule on whether a consumer or a producer welfare standard 
should be adopted. It is a highly political question, and, as such, outside the scope o f this law 
thesis. Having said that, Chapter One showed that the Commission promotes a consumer 
welfare standard in its policy statements.998
In our view, this is permissible under Community law. The main justification for this approach 
given today is the wording of article 81(3), which says that "...consumers [must get] a fair share 
o f [the agreement’s] resulting benefit..."999 This would not be relevant if the efficiency analysis 
were conducted in article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Nevertheless, the Commission may be wise to 
retain this standard, given what is said below.1000
Chapter Five discussed the relative advantages of a total welfare model over the partial 
equilibrium approach. Contrary to the Commission's position, we argued in favour o f a total 
welfare model. We thought that this would lead to more accurate welfare assessments,1001 as 
well as being more in line with the approach demanded in relation to the assessment of other 
Treaty objectives within article 81, see Chapters Four and Seven.
The Commission must also provide rules for how the trade-offs between, for example, static 
allocative efficiency and dynamic, productive and dynamic allocative efficiencies will be 
made.1002 Chapters One and Five noted that a consumer welfare standard need not necessarily
997 Although these comments must be read in light o f Chapter Eight's framework.
998 Although, Chapter Five notes that this is sometimes less clear in Commission decisions.
999 See, for example, Kjolbye (2004), pages 566 and 567 and Cseres (2004), page 232. This point was discussed in 
Chapter Five.
1000 The Commission should not substantially distort its consumer welfare analysis for industrial policy or other aims 
through market-balancing. In other words, it should not operate a mixed consumer welfare/ producer welfare 
standard. This ts because it is difficult to make the balance predictable and transparent, and the relevant objectives 
can be achieved through other means. It would be better to use mere-balancing, see Chapter Five.
1001 Although we acknowledged that this would lead to a number of evidentiary and other problems. Chapter Five 
suggested some ways of reducing these.
1002 Chapter Five points to the lack o f clarity in Commission decisions in this area. True, it is hard to be clear on 
where the balance lies between long term (prospective) and short term (often relatively clear) allocative benefits. 
Two things will considerably improve the currem position. First, the selection and implementation of a clear 
underlying objective, see above. Secondly, greater insistence on die quantification of benefits. There is a risk that 
this will focus the assessment on allocative benefits because (a) these are easier to establish; and (b) they occur 
sooner. As allocative efficiency benefits may be outweighed by productive and dynamic efficiencies, care should be 
taken not to swing the pendulum too far back the other way.
- 2 6 5 -
undermine industrial policy goals, where a long-term perspective is taken.1003 However, to better 
achieve a consumer welfare goal the Commission should pay more attention to when asserted 
consumer benefits arise, as well as to their quantum. Chapter Five indicated that Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines go some way towards demanding more precision in this regard. This is 
to be welcomed. Chapter Eight provides further guidance for this framework.
The Commission must correctly define article 81's objectives, by situating it within a Treaty 
context, see Chapter Two. Once this has been done, these must be placed within a wider 
framework o f article 81 analysis, see Chapter Eight. Then the Commission must, in agreement 
with economists, establish the best economic efficiency test to achieve these ends.1004 
Whichever welfare standard the Commission adopts, it is imperative that it explains this to 
undertakings, as well as demonstrating clearly how the standard will be implemented.
Having found that it is possible to interpret a ’restriction of competition' under article 81(1) of 
the Treaty as a restriction of consumer welfare, let us examine the advantages of doing so. The 
quotation at the beginning o f Section 2.3. highlights four key benefits of a welfare approach. 
First, larger social benefits; secondly, more consistent and predictable enforcement; and, thirdly, 
simplicity of enforcement. Finally, political stability was mentioned. We assume that this means 
that there is less room for politically motivated interventions in antitrust decisions. However, 
this assumes that there is a lot o f transparency in the system (so that such interventions would be 
obvious) and, probably, that welfare is the only goal o f  competition policy (so that it would be 
clear that such intervention would be wrong). We have already seen that, in the Community 
legal order many objectives, outside of welfare are relevant. Nevertheless, the issue of 
transparency is important and is discussed in relation to the predictability point and also in 
Section 3 below. We examine the remaining three points in turn below, and then conclude by 
discussing some other advantages and disadvantages o f  defining a restriction o f competition in 
this way.
The benefits o f having an economic efficiency test are legion. In Massey’s words:
"The quest for efficiency is about avoiding or reducing waste. In simple terms, in a world in 
which not all human wants are currently satisfied and the resources available to us are both 
scarce and finite, a failure to make the best possible use of resources and avoid waste is
1003 Having the economic efficiency test under article 81(1) and not (3) may mean that market-balancing can be used 
to achieve industrial policy aims in a  way that article 157(3) of the Treaty would not otherwise permit (which is not 
to say that we support this, see Chapter Five). Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 68, suggest that article 157(3) is 
justiciable. Article 157(3) states that article 157 "...shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the Community 
of any measure which could lead to a  distortion o f competition.” I f  competition is defined as an efficiency test that 
takes account o f industrial policy issues then it might be said that competition is not distorted. Even if  this argument 
works it may be o f  little concern as article 157(3) has not affected the Commission's approach much, see Part B.
1004 This is a technical question for economists and is not discussed further here.
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unacceptable. Inefficiencies involve costs in the form of lower output, and hence less 
employment opportunities and reduced standards of living for society."1005
A consumer welfare standard would help protect consumers' interests. It should help other 
policy objectives as well.1006 Chapter One noted that the Commission hopes to promote greater 
R&D, industrial policy, consumer protection, employment and market integration through its 
economic efficiency focus.1007 Therefore, adopting an economic efficiency approach within 
article 81(1), while important in and o f itself, should also help achieve these other ends.1008 
Indeed, the Commission has said that it will often appear that Community policies in general 
rely on competition for their effective implementation and that enforcement of the competition 
rales supports the objectives pursued by these policies.1009
It is particularly efficacious to use, where possible, market forces to achieve these aims. As the 
Commission itself has pointed out:
"In most areas of Community endeavour, if a policy runs against market forces and 
competition, it not only has less chance of success, but is also unlikely to benefit 
consumers. For example, in technology policy, whilst some co-operation in research may 
be desirable, elimination of effective competition would take away the main spur to 
innovate and apply new technologies."1010
Promoting the welfare assessment to centre stage constantly reinforces the message. Not only 
because of the beneficial effect o f harnessing this mechanism, but because it forces us to reflect 
on the costs of attempting to undermine it, see Section 3.
The second benefit o f  the welfare approach, which we need to consider, is the claim that it 
provides a more consistent and predictable enforcement mechanism.1011 This is an important 
claim, and was one o f the key weaknesses of the economic freedom test, see Section 2.2.2. But
1005 Massey (1996), page 95. Also see, for example, Korah (2000), pages 9 and 10; Whish (2003), pages 2-6 and 
B&C (2001), paragraph 1-076.
1006 Consumer welfare's compatibility with the wider Treaty aims is discussed above and in Section 2.2.2.
1007 For example, in relation to: industrial policy, Commission, Framework fo r State Aids for R&D, paragraph 1.4; 
cultural policy, Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 175 and 176; consumer protection, Commission, RCP 1994, 
Introduction; environmental policy, Commission, RCP 1993, paragraphs 163-165; economic and social cohesion, 
Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 154 and Brittan (1992), pages 65-66; commercial policy, Commission, RCP 
1993, paragraphs 180 and 181 and, to a certain extent, economic freedom, Neumann (2001), page 183; Fels and 
Edwards (1998), pages 55-58 and MOschel (1991), pages 15 and 16. See also, Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), page 
4 and Areeda and Turner (1978), page 13.
,00t Chapter One noted that, while this is true in the long-term, there arc often short term conflicts. Furthermore, some 
policies often/ always conflict with a consumer welfare approach. This is discussed in Section 3.
1009 Commission, RCP 1991, page 39.
10,0 Commission, RCP 1990, page 16.
1011 We saw Hawk (1995), page 978, making a similar claim in Section 2.2.2. above.
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is it true? Whish and Suffin thought not, arguing that the current article 81(1) test was more 
certain.1012 Others agree:
"Generally business groups in Europe, just as in America, complain about the lack of 
certainty in antitrust law. At the same time, they are inclined to demand more flexibility.
Such demands are irreconcilable. A rule of reason under article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] 
would bring about more uncertainty for business men."101j
Commercial agreements take many different forms and operate in a great variety o f contexts. 
The economy is in a constant state o f flux. A welfare test (unlike the formulistic economic 
freedom concept) can provide the requisite flexibility. Flexibility is important, but the real aim 
must be to achieve flexibility, combined with an appropriate level of certainty.
What about certainty and predictability? Before we can deepen the discussion we must make an 
important distinction. Uncertainty can be related to what the test is as well as how it is applied, 
see Section 2.1. Certainty would be markedly increased if the Community Courts clearly said 
that a 'restriction of competition', in article 81(1), related to consumer welfare, this is discussed 
above. We argued that less clarity could be engendered in relation to economic freedom, 
because of the difficulty of explaining the notion of'undue', see Section 2.2.2.
Having said that, an economic efficiency test does not provide complete certainty vis-à-vis its 
application. This is because it is dependent upon the value judgments adopted by the decision­
maker, see Chapters One, Four and Five, as well as the application of these to the facts. For this 
reason, those that worry about a lack o f certainty are right to highlight this weakness of the 
welfare notion. Three issues must be confronted:
• Does microeconomic theory work?
•  Do the relevant actors understand microeconomic theory?
•  Is it feasible for the relevant actors to apply microeconomic theory in every case?
The first problem to confront is whether microeconomic theory works, i.e. can it explain real- 
world interactions? In general, although not everyone would agree,1014 in our view, the answer is 
yes. Microeconomics provides a coherent set o f answers to most of the central questions that 
antitrust considers,1015 which has wide, though admittedly not universal,1016 acceptance.1017 True,
10,2 Whish and Sufrin (1987), pages 20 and 37.
10.5 Joliet (1967), pages 189-190. See also, Jenny (2000), pages 26-31.
1014 See, for example, Ginsburg (1991), pages 26-29; Armentano (1990); Lutz (1989), pages 159 and 160 and 
Hildebrand (2002), pages 106 and 121, although at page 161 she contradicts herself; saying "...economic theory has 
developed over the years and provides today an analytical model, which is maybe suited for the specific situation of 
European competition law."
,0,s Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), page 116.
10.6 See, references in Jenny (2000), page 27, for example.
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there is a lack o f agreement in relation to some of the precise relationships between competition 
and innovation, the policy implications of entry barriers and whether vertical integration is 
harmful. But the great majority of these differences only impact at the margins of antitrust 
enforcement, as opposed to at the centre. Nearly all of the economic issues relevant to antitrust 
policy lie at the core.101*
The next issue is, even if microeconomic theory generally works, do the relevant actors 
understand it? Here too, the answer is a qualified yes. When undertakings enter into agreements 
they, assess the agreements' effect on prices and quality. Therefore, the sort of questions that the 
consumer welfare test provokes are already well understood by business.107 8019 The same can be 
said of consumers. Furthermore, as Venit has repeatedly argued, the Commission has a wealth 
o f experience in economic analysis, now that this has become the norm in major merger 
decisions.1020 The Member States' courts and competition authorities also have relevant 
experience now. All the Member States have competition laws and most courts have significant 
experience of applying economic notions in relation to directly applicable Community law.1021 
As a result, the adoption of an economic efficiency approach, if  properly explained, should 
enhance the coherence and predictability o f decisions, as it is already well understood by most 
of the relevant actors.1022
But, even those that accept what has been said thus far might say that reliance on a consumer 
welfare standard places a heavy burden on the decision-maker. Courts and competition 
authorities have neither the knowledge nor the time to conduct a cost benefit analysis both 
within and without the relevant markets in every case.1023 Such analysis may be reasonably 
predictable in theory, but in practice it is far from simple. Uitermark agrees. Competition is 
complex and he warns against ready-made answers. In his view:
1017 Verouden (2003), page 538; Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 116 and 117 and Scherer (1992a), pages 501- 
509.
1018 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), pages 116-118.
1019 That is not to argue that every comer store actually carries out a welfare analysis before pricing the carrots it will 
sell, but, implicitly, this is essentially what they do and so the concepts are relatively easily understood.
1020 Venit (2003), pages 551 and 552 and Venit (1998), page 569.
1021 As Gyselen points out, the Member States' courts are often called upon to conduct economic analysis already 
"...there is no fundamental conceptual difference between the economic assessments (we suggest under article 
81(1), although he was discussing them under article 81(3)]...and those to be undertaken under the directly 
applicable provisions o f article 81(1), article 82 or article 86(2) EC. Nor does the degree of complexity involved in 
these assessments differ.", Gyselen (2002a), page 183.
1022 See, Mario Monti (2003), part 111 and Ehlermann (1998), pages ix, 324,327,355,463 and 464.
1023 See, for example, Petersmann (2003), page 52; Jenny (2000) and Easterbrook (1992), pages 119-129.
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"...each individual case should be judged on its own merits, using all economic insights 
that are presently available."1024
Even if such analysis were possible, is it practicable?1025 The point is a good one; indeed it is 
one of competition policy's main challenges.1026 But it should not be exaggerated.1027 Lawyers' 
concern for legal certainty can be mitigated by the development of an integrated, step-by-step 
approach to decision-making.1028 This should involve the use of presumptions,1029 negative 
block clearances,1030 per se rules1031 and market share filters.1032 The De Minimis Notice and the 
Vertical Restraints Block Exemption already employ market share filters, for example, and the 
Community Courts support their use. Economists would have to advise on the use of per se 
rules. The examples of conduct listed in article 81(lXaHe) o f the Treaty are already effectively 
treated as such (at least within article 81(1)), and might be extended, if appropriate.1033 Finally, 
more efforts might be made to increase the expertise in economics available to the decision­
makers.1034
1024 Uitermark (1996), page 13.
1025 Korah (2002), page 24; Jenny (2000), page 28 and Korah (1981), pages 348 and 349.
1026 Faull (1998), pages 503 and 505.
1027 Gyselen (2002a) and Korah (1998), page 487.
1028 Van den Bergh (2002), page 51 and Korah (1998), page 487.
1029 Faull (1998), page 489.
1030 Siragusa (1998), pages 555-557. In the UK, for example, virtually all vertical agreements fall outside of our 
equivalent to article 81(1) of the Treaty, see OFT, Vertical Agreements and Restraints and references made there. 
Note, there is currently a debate about removing the UK exception for vertical agreements, see Waelbroeck (2004), 
page 3.
1031 Hawk and Denaeijer (2001), pages 132-134; Heimler and Fattori (1998), page 597; Hawk (1995), page 988; 
Easterbrook (1992), pages 129-132 and Williams (1989), page 23.
Manzini (2002), pages 398 and 399, points out that the ECJ in the Matra Case, paragraph 85, held that, in principle, 
no anti-competitive practice could exist which could not be exempted, as long as it complied with the article 81(3) 
criteria. He took this as an argument against per se economic rules, saying that agreements can always be exempted 
under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. But this is wholly dependent on what the ECJ analyses under article 81(1) of the 
Treaty and what article 81(3)*s criteria refer to. If  we decide to do all economic analysis under article 81(1), then the 
agreement can be exempted under article 81(3), even it fell foul o f a per se rule. However, it would be in line with 
the caselaw to say that an exemption could not be considered on economic grounds, but, for example, 
environmental protection, or whatever factors were considered relevant under article 81(3) o f the Treaty.
1(02 Jenny (2000), pages 28 and 29; Hawk (1995), pages 978, 979 and 987-988 and Easterbrook (1992), page 130. 
Recently, Monti (2004), page 407, has said that today "...market power is a  crucial element to take into account in 
applying article 81..."
1033 As, under this suggestion, welfare analysis would no longer be considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty, these 
rules might be better seen as presumptions that the party relying on article 81(1) can use, but which could be 
rebutted under certain conditions. Although Easterbrook (1992), pages 129 and 130 questions even this "Even proof 
that a  practice saves customers ’millions o f dollars’ eveiy year does not justify case-by-case inquiry, once the 
practice is located in a group likely to be harmful."
1034 Williams (1989), page 23.
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These measures are not ideal,1035 but they enhance certainty while providing flexibility, and can 
be more efficient in the long term.1036 This should reduce compliance costs. This is 
important.1037
Adoption of an economic efficiency standard does create some difficulties.1038 Much work has 
to be done before it works smoothly. Having said that, we must not lose sight of the potential 
benefits. We must also seek the right blend of flexibility and certainty. In our view, economic 
freedom cannot provide this. Consumer welfare may not be perfect, but it is better than most 
other concepts.1039 It also has relative success in other jurisdictions, such as the US, where it is 
already used.1040
As pointed out above, one can also tolerate a certain amount o f uncertainty, as long as the 
underlying objective being pursued is important enough. There is no doubt that economic 
efficiency has been interpreted as an important Treaty objective, especially in relation to article 
81.
"As regards legal certainty, such an approach [one that is functionally somewhat like the 
US rule of reason] entails the realistic acceptance of a substantial but tolerable level of 
uncertainty - a level with which many businessmen are perfectly willing to live."1041
In conclusion, adopting consumer welfare as the article 81(1) objective, as opposed to economic 
freedom, could, depending upon the statements of the Community Courts and the Commission, 
help clarify the application of this paragraph. To the extent that ambiguity persisted, at least it 
would be in the name of an important objective that, in the long term, would help us achieve 
other Treaty objectives too.
1035 For example, in relation to the difficulty o f defining market power, see Jenny (2000), page 29 and Schroeder 
(1997).
1036 See, for example, Easterbrook (1992), pages 129-130.
1037 Moussis (2000), page 287.
1038 Another problem that those in favour of economic freedom highlight is that, from a liberal perspective, 
competition rules also protect competition as a discovery procedure and as a  mechanism for limiting abuses o f 
power, i.e. protection of competition as a process. However, the same can be said o f welfare analysis, unless one 
takes an extremely short-term perspective. Chapter One emphasises that competition must be seen as a dynamic 
(and not a static) mechanism. If short-term gains are delivered and these will eliminate competitors in the long-term, 
then welfare will likely be undermined in the long-term too.
1039 "...notwithstanding their vagueness, economic standards provide more legal certainty than populist and other 
elements, as well as the possibility o f ex post empirical assessment”, Castañeda (1998), page 51 and "Modem 
competition theory and case law have provided better tools [than the economic freedom test] based on the 
assumption that the protection of a system of workable competition is at issue.", Schaub (1998), page 124.
1040 Furthermore, those that criticise the presence of welfare within article 81(1) must be wary ifi like Whish, Sufrin 
and Marenco, see above, they are prepared to consider it under article 8 1 (3) o f the Treaty. It is questionable whether 
consigning it to article 81(3) increases certainty as it will have to be considered in any event In fact if  the article 
81(1) test is wide (so that potentially more agreements must be considered under an economic efficiency test) then 
this may increase uncertainty.
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In our view, there are three other advantages of defining a 'restriction of competition' under 
article 81(1) of the Treaty, as (an appreciable) restriction o f consumer welfare. The first point is 
that competition systems are increasingly placing greater emphasis on the economic efficiency 
test, and the consumer welfare test in particular, Chapter One. Following this lead in the 
Community would have many benefits, such as improving and facilitating co-operation between 
competition authorities and reducing the regulatoiy burden for Community undertakings, see 
Section 22.2. above.104 042
Secondly, this should reduce the amount of competition authorities' work,1043 freeing up time for 
them to focus on serious article 81 infringements, as well as more sensitive, political, cases.1044 
Since 1 May 2004 the Commission has theoretically been able to do just that. However, the 
Regulation 1/2003 has, to a large degree, transferred the Commission's burden to the Member 
States' courts and competition authorities. Many have received only small budget increases. As 
a result, they now have less time to focus on serious infringements. Embracing the consumer 
welfare standard within article 81(1) would benefit them and, as a result, probably improve the 
quality of their decision-making, as they will have more time.
Finally, adopting a consumer welfare test within article 81(1) o f the Treaty will narrow its 
scope. This means fewer agreements will fall within the provision. This reduces Community 
undertakings' compliance costs. Not through a relaxation in the desire for competition, however. 
But, rather it means a redefinition o f  the test, so that it better focuses on the agreements that 
matter.1045
One weakness of this position should be discussed. Manzini argues that the adoption of a 
consumer welfare test within article 81(1) of the Treaty would undermine the explicit wording 
of article 81(l)(a)-(e). He believes that these provisions rule out an economic balancing act. In 
his view, they demand an examination o f the specific effects o f an agreement, regardless of 
whether this has positive welfare effects.1046
This is a powerful criticism. One response could be that, the reason why the Treaty lists these 
five examples is not because such acts are wrong in themselves. These acts are seen as wrong
1041 Forrester and Norall (1984), page 17.
1042 This would especially be the case if  all jurisdictions adopted a total welfare model, see, for example, Fox (1998a), 
pages 8,11 and 12 and the discussion in Chapter Five.
1043 Korah (2000), page 10.
1044 Siragusa (1997), pages 285 and 286.
1045 Ehlermann (2001), page 285.
1046 Manzini (2002), pages 394-395. See also, Case T-14/89, Montedipe v. Commission, [1992], paragraph 265. 
Others also argue that article 81 as a whole focuses on anti-competitive conduct, whereas in articles 82 and 87 of 
the Treaty, for example, the results o f  the actions are expressed as a  separate criterion.
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because o f the effects that they are likely to have, for example on welfare. In other words, they 
are examples of types of restriction that are normally welfare reducing and thus can normally 
(but are not always) be presumed "wrong" in a per se fashion. This response is justified because, 
in the Community legal order, the ECJ has held that the first principal of interpretation is to look 
at the ordinary meaning of the word in its context and in light of the objectives of the Treaty, see 
also Chapter Two.1047 In other words, Treaty provisions are interpreted in light of the effect that 
certain conduct has on the achievement o f the Treaty’s objectives. This implies that one should 
not focus merely on the conduct itself.
The approach to the notion o f lack o f appreciability provides one example of this kind of 
thinking.1048 The Community Courts and the Commission read into article 81 the idea that the 
five examples in article 81(1) are only relevant in the event that agreements that breach them 
have a certain effect.1049 In other words, an agreement between two SMEs that, for example, led 
to price discrimination, article 81(lXd) o f the Treaty, may well fall within this 'exception* 
because it is not perceived as having an important welfare effect. Thus, it would fall outside 
article 81(1).1050 Agreements between SMEs are just as capable o f price discriminating as those 
o f any other economic actors. But this is a problem only insofar as it leads to welfare effects.1051
2.4 Conclusion of Section 2
Companies can reasonably expect an adequate level of predictability and consistent application 
of the competition rules that allows them properly to assess how they will be applied.
There is considerable disagreement as to what article 81(1) of the Treaty means by 
"...prevention, restriction or distortion of competition..." The expression is unclear. Neither the 
Treaty, nor the Community Courts, nor the Commission define the term with sufficient clarity 
(or consistency) such that it can be applied by undertakings. This is unacceptable.
1047 Case 53/81 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982], paragraph 9.
1048 One might also think o f the ancillary restraints doctrine as extended to article 81 agreements, see, for example, 
Case 42/84 Remia v. Commission [1985].
1049 See, for example, the De Minimis Notice and Case 5/69 Franz Volk v. Établissements J. Vervaecke [1969], 
paragraphs 5/7. See also, Bright (1995), pages 508 and 509, who, commenting on the previous case, said "Very 
probably what is being sought is a reduction in competition that has a consequence for the satisfactory operation of 
the market"
1050 Admittedly, the Commission’s De Minimis Notice does not apply where certain hardcore restraints are included 
within an agreement, paragraph 11. However, this list does not contain all the items in article 81(l)'s list. 
Furthermore, the de minimis doctrine can still apply even where there is a hardcore restraint See, Case 5/69 Franz 
Volk v. Établissements J. Vervaecke [1969], paragraphs 5/7, "Thus an exclusive dealing agreement, even with 
absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in 
the products in question in the area covered by the absolute protection, escape the prohibition laid down in article 
85(1) [now article 81(1)]." See also, Case 1/71 Société Anonyme Cadillon v. Firma Höss [1971], paragraph 9 and 
Case 306/96 Javico International and Javico v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums [1998], paragraph 17.
1051 A similar comment could be made in relation to the Nungesser Case and article 81(1X0 of the Treaty.
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We sought appropriate guiding principles that properly balance the need for legal certainty with 
the flexibility required for governing an economy in a state o f constant flux. Our analysis was 
conducted in light of article 81(l)’s place within the Treaty, as interpreted by the Community 
Courts today.
We considered the notion of economic freedom first. There is dispute about whether economic 
freedom is used as a way of achieving economic efficiency objectives, or as an end in itself. If it 
is an indirect way of achieving consumer welfare, it would be better to apply an economic 
efficiency test directly. Where economic freedom is used as a value in itself the argument is 
more complex. There are practical reasons why, in the past, interpreting a 'restriction of 
competition' as a restriction o f economic freedom has been beneficial. However, we found that 
the main arguments in favour of maintaining this concept today were misplaced. In part, this 
was due to problems in applying the economic freedom test, not least o f which was the 
difficulty o f placing coherent limits on the notion. We decided to search for a concept that was 
more in line with the Treaty's objectives, one that could be applied more clearly and 
consistently.
Economic efficiency is an appropriate concept. It 'fits' within the Community legal order, and 
particularly within article 81(1) o f the Treaty. It has already been used there by the Commission, 
the Community Courts and certain Member States' competition authorities. We noted the 
benefits that would result from such a change, both direct and indirect, see Chapter One. It 
would provide the flexibility that business needs, with a tolerable level of legal certainty. It 
would bring us into line with other competition authorities, reducing Community firms' 
compliance costs. Finally, a consumer welfare standard would also have a positive effect on 
consumers.
We agree with the Commission that a consumer welfare standard would be acceptable under the 
Treaty. Having said that, it is a wide concept and we call on the Commission to define the 
notion in more precise terms, we made some suggestions in this regard. A full economic 
analysis would be too costly to apply in every case, so market share thresholds, per se rules and 
other filters should be used to ensure that article 81(1) only bites where competition concerns 
arise.
The Commission has expressed concern that defining a 'restriction of competition* as a 
restriction of consumer welfare could not be done without the support of the Community Courts 
or a Treaty amendment, see above. The ECJ should overrule the CFI’s Métropole télévision 
judgement on this point at the first opportunity. As long as they do so clearly and unequivocally
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then, there is no need to amend article 81(1) of the Treaty, indeed the flexibility of this notion 
may prove useful in the future.1052
Other countries look to the US and Europe for antitrust leadership.1053 The adoption of clear and 
similar tests by the relevant authorities would send a strong signal to other jurisdictions about 
the benefits of this approach. This is not to deny that the US and Community antitrust 
provisions must be read in different contexts. For this reason, Section 3 affirms the importance 
of public policy considerations. The greater clarity that this change to article 81's underlying test 
would promote would also give us more credence when seeking to persuade developing 
countries to enact clear and transparent competition legislation of their own.1054
3. MERE-BALANCING IN ARTICLE 81(1) OF THE TREATY?
Part B showed that conflicting Treaty objectives have been balanced in both article 81(1) and 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. There was no consistency in when and where the objectives could be 
and were invoked.1055 Section 3 seeks to impose some order.
Komninos suggests that:
"...article 81 EC as a whole should be balanced against public interest concerns. In this 
sense, the non-economic norm (in Wouters the protection of the legal profession’s 
independence) is not brought into the substance of article 81 EC (in its first or in its third 
paragraph), thus blurring its purity, but it is taken into account at a preceding stage, leading 
to an exception from the ambit of article 81 EC as a whole, subject to a control of 
proportionality."1056
The problem with this suggestion is that it is impossible at law. When one applies article 81, 
there is not a step where one can weigh the provision as a whole against public policy 
objectives. One must apply first article 81(1) o f the Treaty and then, if necessaiy, article 81(3). 
It is a two step process.1057 While Komninos’ suggestion seems attractive, it is unworkable from 
a legal perspective.
1052 However, given the general nature o f the specific list of prohibitions, article 81(lXa)-(e), and the fact that 
whether or not a particular behaviour is anti-competitive depends on the context in which restrictions operate, it is 
now time to remove this list, see also, Massey (1996), pages 101-103.
I0SÏKo!asky (2004), page 53.
,0S4 Kolasky (2004), page 53 and Townley (2004), pages 130 and 131.
10sî Deckert (2000), page 176.
1056 Komninos (2005) DRAFT, page 11. Schmid (2000), pages 166 and 167, also considers this option, although he 
rejects i t
1057 Idot (2001), page 336, "...it is confusing to say that the Commission would have to. take a global approach, 
whereas the structure o f article 81 requires reasoning in two stages."
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In our view, non-economic objectives are best considered within article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
Mere-balancing should be restricted to that paragraph.1058 Why? Chapter One discusses 
'exclusion's' benefits at length.1059 Conducting mere-balancing in article 81(1), reduces 
consumer welfare, decreases transparency, undermines the Commission’s corporate social 
responsibility initiatives and ignores article 81's structure. This is unnecessary; there is no need 
for mere-balancing within article 81(1). Indeed, the best place for mere-balancing is article 
81(3) o f the Treaty.
Delegation theory tells us that the objectives assigned to a competition law might be more 
completely achieved if drawn narrowly. Increases in consumer welfare are most likely where 
this is the only objective considered within article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Consumer welfare’s 
benefits were discussed in Chapter One and Section 2. It also helps reinforce the market 
mechanism. Furthermore:
"Separating the objective of the four freedoms, including competition law, from other 
objectives of the Treaty could lead to a more expeditious creation of a real internal 
European market, with its advantages of economies of scale and scope."1060
Secondly, if only one objective needed to be considered in the article 81(1) analysis, then the 
application of the provision would be more transparent. Increasing transparency is important. It 
helps:
•  reveal the non-economic objectives’ costs; and,
•  improve legal predictability for relevant bodies.
Whenever non-economic objectives are achieved at the expense o f consumer welfare there is a 
cost. This does not mean that resolving the balance in that way was necessarily wrong. Indeed, 
the reservation of article 81(3) for balancing non-economic objectives sends a clear message 
that, in certain circumstances, this is permissible. However, in order to assess whether or not to 
promote a conflicting non-economic objective, one must know the cost o f the decision. Using 
article 81's structure to clearly separate the economic and non-economic considerations should 
force the decision-maker to demonstrate and justify the sacrifices, judgments and trade-offs it 
favours.1061 Knowing the cost o f political intervention is important.1062 It increases
1058 This does not mean that an Albany style analysis should not take place within article 81(1) of the Treaty, where 
necessary (although this should be kept to a minimum). Remember that, in the Albany Case, discussed in Chapter 
Two, the ECJ did not balance competing objectives, but said that article 81(1) simply did not apply to certain types 
o f agreements.
1059 Although the rejection of mere-balancing in article 81(1) is not a rejection of compromise, because this can, and 
should, take place within article 81(3) of the Treaty, see Chapter Seven.
1060 Kirchner (1998), page 522.
,06t Lipsky (1998), page 458 and Ginsburg (1991), page 25.
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accountability,1062 063 which should force a better articulation of the competing policies. This, in 
turn, strengthens the position of the voter.1064
Transparency also means increased legal predictability for undertakings.1065 Chapter Three 
showed that mere-balancing within article 81(1) of the Treaty reduces the clarity o f the 
provision, it makes it less clear whether, or not, article 81(1) of the Treaty applies.1066 Even if  
the Commission and the Community Courts made eveiy effort to explain their reasoning (which 
they do not, see Chapters Two and Three) the outcome o f the balance would always be in 
doubt.1067 Chapter Two emphasises the importance of clarity to business and to the economy as 
a whole. It helps undertakings plan for the future. But, there is another benefit, which would 
also apply to consumers or others who might make use o f the antitrust laws. Increased clarity 
reduces frivolous litigation. Ambiguity makes aggressive litigation on competition grounds 
easier.1068 Those that want to claim that an agreement (or clause) is void under article 81(2) o f 
the Treaty have more (potential) grounds o f attack. Those that wish to defend the agreement 
have more (potential) grounds for defence. Regardless o f the merits o f the case. This increases 
litigation risks (also making what litigation there is more lengthy and complex),1069 augmenting 
business (and consumer) uncertainty. Welfare is further reduced.1070 This could, amongst other 
things, undermine the Treaty's aim of raising the standard of living, article 2.
Restricting article 81(1) to a pure consumer welfare analysis also supports the Community's 
stance on corporate social responsibility for undertakings, Chapter One. A key part o f the 
Commission and Council's strategy in this area is to encourage firms, on a voluntary basis, to 
co-operate (within the limits of the law). If other objectives are relevant within article 81(1) o f
1062 Wolf (1998), page 132; Móschel (1991), page 12 and Ginsburg (1991), page 25. The desire for transparency and 
accountability in the decision-making process has been cited as the reason for the Community Courts' application of 
articles 81 and 82 (in conjunction with articles 3(l)(g) and 10 of the Treaty) to Member States, see MOschcI (1991), 
page 12.
1063 Neven (1998), page 22.
1064 Kirchner (1998), page 522.
1065 Schmid (2000), page 166.
1066 How many of us would have predicted the ECJ's decision in the Wouters Case, for example? See, Forrester 
(2005) DRAFT, page 17.
1067 Jebsen and Stevens (1995-6), page 460. On the lack of clarity in a mere-balancing approach in general see also, 
Baxter (1983), page 621, and the references cited there, as well as Chapter One. Chapter Eight advises on how to 
improve predictability within mere-balancing.
,06* Riley (1998), page 485.
1069 Korah (2002), page 25.
1070 These reductions can be important, although they are small in relation to the benefits to the economy of 
competition policy, Gardner (2000). The smaller they are the better, provided that this is not achieved at the expense 
of an even larger loss to society as a  whole, COM(96) 721, paragraph 86. For a brief indication o f some business 
costs related to possible changes in the UK competition regime see, DTI (2002), pages 13-15.
- 2 7 7 -
the Treaty, then where undertakings sought to co-operate so as to increase welfare, they could 
be forced to implement other Treaty goals, such as development policy. The same would apply, 
for example, if they had an environmental agreement that did not appreciably restrict 
competition. This runs contrary to the CSR initiative as a voluntary scheme. Co-operation 
becomes less attractive, which could reduce the other benefits to be gained through encouraging 
these kinds of agreements, see Chapter One.1071
These benefits are important, but they would not be decisive if  by removing the consideration of 
non-economic objectives to article 81(3) would undermine the aims of the Treaty. It does not. 
There is no need for mere-balancing in article. 81(1) o f  the Treaty; indeed article 81(3) is the 
best place for it. We now consider these points in turn.
Since Regulation 1/2003,1072 there is no need for mere-balancing in article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Chapters Two and Four showed a vast array of objectives being considered in article 81 (3).1073 
Where an agreement restricts competition (reduces consumer welfare), then it could still be 
exempted if  it fulfilled article 81(3). In addition, exempting agreements due to policy 
considerations under article 81(3), better reflects article 81's structure, see Chapter Three.1074 
Although in practice they have sometimes wavered, the Community Courts1075 and the 
Commission1076 now seem to agree that, in theory, mere-balancing is better conducted under 
article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Legal scholars tend to support this view, see Chapter Three.1077
Wesseling points out that such a change would make exemption harder because the agreement 
would have to fulfil all four article 81(3) conditions, as opposed to just outweighing the
1071 One could make the same point in relation to any legislation that 'forced* firms to comply with, for example, 
environmental standards. However, the issue is somewhat different here as article 81(1) only applies where there is
some form o f co-operation, which is the basis o f CSR too.
1073 Chapter Two suggested that one reason lying behind the ECJ's Wouters and Albany judgments may have been the 
procedural repercussions of finding restrictions of competition in the underlying agreements which had not been 
exempted (they would have been void under article 81(2) of the Treaty). As mentioned there, agreements no longer 
need to be notified to the Commission so these procedural problems no longer arise.
1073 Monti (2002), section S.2., argues that Member States' objectives cannot be considered in article 81(3) of the 
Treaty. However, Chapter Seven disagrees.
1074 Schmid (2000), page 166. Furthermore, article 157(3) of the Treaty also implies that balancing should take place 
in article 81(3).
1073 Case T-112/99 Métropole Télévision (M6) and  Others v. Commission [2001], paragraph 74 and the Wouters 
Case, see the opinion of Advocate-General Léger, paragraphs 100-108. Although Jans (2000), page 275, says that it 
is unclear what the Community Courts will say after the Albany Case. The same might be said of the Wouters Case 
too, see Vossestein (2002), pages 858 and 859.
1076 See, Commission decision, Joint selling o f  the commercial rights o f  the UEFA Champions League, paragraphs 
129-131; the Albany Case, see the reference to the submissions o f  the Commission, paragraph 175 of the opinion of 
Advocate-General Jacobs and Commission, R C P 1992, paragraph 77.
1077 Some Community competition authorities interpret their equivalent o f article 81 in this way too, see Section 2.
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restriction of competition.1078 This is because article 81(1) does not demand that consumers get 
a fair share o f the resulting benefit, etc. Wesseling makes an important observation, but it should 
not be exaggerated. Chapter Three showed that some o f these tests have been introduced into 
article 81(1) too.*079 Nevertheless, Wesseling is right insofar as article 81(3)’s clear articulation 
of four conditions may make exemption more difficult.1080 At the very least, it forces those 
conducting the balance to consider the effect on consumers, as well as the effect on competition. 
Given the importance of the consumer welfare test, this should be positive. In other words, if 
exemption under article 81(3) of the Treaty is more difficult, then this weighs in favour of 
restricting exemption to that paragraph. This argument gives some weight to Chapter One’s 
point about competition law not being the most efficient instrument to promote many non­
economic objectives. However, it does not abandon compromise altogether, as article 81(3) of 
the Treaty can normally be used for this.
There is one situation in which it potentially makes a great deal o f difference whether balancing 
takes place under article 81(1) or 81(3) of the Treaty. Consider an agreement that would not 
have been considered restrictive of competition, for the purposes of article 81(1) of the Treaty 
(for us this means that consumer welfare is not appreciably restricted), except for the fact that it 
infringed some other Treaty objective. This sort of (negative) mere-balancing is not normally 
performed within article 81(1), although protection of SMEs1081 and the market integration 
objectives sometimes operate in this fashion.1082
1078 Wesseling (2000), pages 106 and 107.
1079 Chapter Three showed that when balancing takes place in article 81(1) an indispensability test is often implied. 
Indeed, in the Wouters Case the ECJ probably used a full-blown proportionality test. Furthermore, we have seen 
that article 81(3)'$ fa ir  share to consumers test is used to justify a consumer welfare test there. If consumer welfare 
were already relevant within article 81(1), then all article 81(3)’s four tests would be present within the first 
paragraph, except that competition could be eliminated. It is unlikely that the Community Courts or the Commission 
would allow competition to be eliminated even when balancing under article 81(1) o f the Treaty.
1080 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, reinforce this approach. They seem to place a heavy burden of proof on 
the parties wishing to benefit from article 81(3), while narrowing article 8 I(l) 's  interpretation, see Geradin (2004), 
page 14.
1081 Although more recent versions of the dc minimis notices have introduced a market share test too. Agreements 
between firms are not merely exempted where the undertakings that enter into them are small. The market share 
test, see the De Minimis Notice, paragraph 7, is analysing something else as well, i.e. the agreement's impact on the 
market, see the De Minimis Notice, paragraph 1. If  a  consumer welfare became the declared objective o f article 
81(1) an appreciability test would still be relevant
jo« wijjsh and Sufrin (1987), page 37, argue that those in favour of "...the rule o f reason fail to give due 
consideration to the significance of single market integration." Marsden (2000) implies the same thing. However, 
Chapters One and Three: (1) suggested that the market integration objective may be there to enhance economic 
efficiency; and, (2) noted that the market integration objective, as currently pursued, may actually undermine 
market integration in ways that a welfare standard would not In any event, although the market integration 
imperative is unlikely to disappear in the near future, since achievement o f the single market it has been less 
important as a policy goal. Nevertheless, Whish and Sufrin's point is worth pursuing because it may be that market 
integration is not solely there to achieve efficiency aims. Furthermore, other objectives may also be considered
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If mere-balancing were prevented in respect of this kind o f 'negative* objective would the 
Treaty's aims be fully achieved?1083 What if there were an agreement that did not restrict 
competition but was particularly destructive to the environment? If the agreement were cleared 
under article 81(1), would this comply with the Commission's obligation to ensure a high level 
of environmental protection in its definition and implementation of Community policies? In 
other words, in the Treaty context, does restricting balancing to article 81(3) sufficiently 
accommodate the need for compromise, or does it give competition too much weight?1084
The answer is probably not, for four reasons.1085 First, we suggest defining a restriction of 
competition as an appreciable restriction of consumer welfare. Consumer welfare and the public 
interest overlap to a large degree.1086 Externalities can be internalised. Even where this has not 
been done, many other objectives are directly and indirectly promoted through the consumer 
welfare concept. As a result, the standard we suggest actually incorporates many relevant 
objectives within it and so reduces the problem of conflict, at least in the long term.
Secondly, agreements that cause no competition problems, but cause environmental damage, for 
example, should be dealt with through environmental legislation. Article 81 is not a blank 
cheque to legislate in all areas. The absence of environmental legislation cannot be used as an 
excuse for pursuing environmental policy through competition law. It is up to the Council and 
the European Parliament to adopt environmental legislation. Allowing the Commission (or a 
Member State court, for example) to bypass them in this way would undermine the separation of 
powers under the Treaty1087 and distort the competition rules from their true purpose.
Furthermore, administrative action would become impossible if every decision had to take 
account of its effect on every relevant objective. This cannot be the intention of the Treaty. In
within article 81(1) which may conflict with competition, think of the Wouters Case, discussed in Chapter Two 
(although that was not an example of'negative mere-balancing').
1083 Ehlermann (1998), page 4, notes this problem in relation to the international harmonisation of competition laws.
l0M One might also comment that interpreting a restriction o f competition as a restriction of consumer welfare 
(instead o f economic freedom) means that article 81(1) is interpreted more narrowly, see Section 2. As a result, it 
applies to less agreements. Therefore, there is less opportunity to invoke other policy objectives (for example within 
article 81(3)) in relation to agreements. However, if  arguments like this held sway, we could be forced to apply 
article 81(1) to all agreements. The fact that the Community Courts accept an appreciability test implies that this 
need not be so.
I0Si Vogelaar (1994), pages 542 and 543, argues that environmental considerations can only be raised under article 
81(3) of the Treaty "...since the test of article 85(1) [now article 81(1)] is a strictly legal and economic one..." He 
cites two cases to support this, including Case 5/69 Franz Volk v. Etablissements J. Vervaecke [1969]. But this is a 
circular argument and depends on the definition of'restriction o f competition'. Furthermore, he is not supported by 
the later caselaw, think of the Wouters Case, for example.
1086 See Chapter One and Howe (1998), page 450.
1087 Vedder (2003), page 158.
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any event, most agreements between undertakings that restrict competition are found to fall 
outside article 81(1) of the Treaty. Normally this is either because they do not fulfil article 81's 
jurisdictional tests or because they are not appreciable. These minor agreements would likely 
cause little environmental damage or consumer harm.1088 The benefits o f balancing under article 
81(1) of the Treaty would not be great in most of these cases.
Finally, in the rare cases where non-economic objectives are significantly undermined by such 
an agreement, these objectives are normally more effectively protected through direct legislation 
that does not distort competition.1089 Allowing mere-balancing within article 81(1) o f the Treaty 
may even undermine the very objectives that we seek to promote. This is because this reduces 
the Member States' incentives to deal with problems using optimal instruments, see Chapter 
One.1090
One might add that if mere-balancing takes place in article 81(1), what is left to be considered in 
article 81(3)?1091 Some may suggest, in light o f Métropole télévision, that economic efficiency 
should be considered under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. It would be a topsy-turvy world where a 
competition law only considered economic efficiency as being a justification for otherwise 
unacceptable agreements.
This sort of (negative) mere-balancing is not normally performed within article 81(1) o f the 
Treaty. The market integration objective sometimes operates in this fashion, but is increasingly 
less important and may even be promoted by efficiency enhancing agreements. Furthermore, the 
problem we have discussed rarely arises today and so the change we advocate, in fact, makes 
little difference. On the other hand, a clear article 81(1) test produces many benefits everyday, 
these have been highlighted above. It would also be difficult to set a limit on the invocation of 
non-economic objectives if they could be considered even if article 81(1) were not otherwise 
breached. Therefore, we are prepared to allow the tiny minority o f  agreements that would 
prejudice other Treaty objectives to pass through article 81(1) of the Treaty unscathed. It seems 
a worthwhile price to pay.
1088 Chapter Eight discusses application o f the appreciability doctrine to non-economic Treaty objectives.
1089 Monti (2002), page 1092, points out that "...increased activism by the EC in other policy areas reduces the need 
for competition law to intervene to achieve other goals..."
1090 One cannot rely too heavily on this argument, otherwise the policy-linking clauses would be of no value. It would 
also allow us to forbid balancing under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. However, the argument is relevant insofar as it 
shows that the non-economic objective can invariably be (better) protected by other means. Therefore, critical 
damage can still be prevented.
1091 One option could be that article 81(1) is a 'quick check' and article 81(3) is a more thorough look, like Phase I and 
II under the ECMR. However, there is no support for this in article 81. Paragraphs 1 and 3 seem designed to deal 
with different issues, Whish (1998), pages 464 and 500, particularly in light of article 81 (3)(b) of the Treaty.
- 2 8 1 -
—mfmtiíinririTtfirrnfTníTTn rmrnmi—rrrr
4. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER SIX
Monti has said that companies can reasonably expect:
"...an adequate level of predictability and consistent application of the rales that allows 
them properly to assess how the rules will be applied."1092
Part B showed that article 81 is far from clear in this regard. This is a scandal.
There are two main problems with the way in which article 81(1) o f  the Treaty is implemented, 
as far as the consideration o f non-economic objectives within article 81 is concerned. The first 
relates to the imprecise definition of a restriction of competition. The second relates to the lack 
of clarity generated by mere-balancing within article 81(1), see Chapter Three.
Regulation 1/2003 does not mean that the wide reach historically given to 81(1) ceases to be 
important. Nor does it remove the need to clearly define article 81(l)'s scope; or, obviate the 
problems caused by mere-balancing in that provision. In fact, these issues have, arguably, 
become more important. Why? Undertakings can no longer protect themselves from fines 
through notification to the Commission; and, because article 81 actions are likely to become 
increasingly common.
Chapter Six is not suggesting that we become hostages to clarity. Chapter Two showed that 
many Treaty objectives should be balanced within article 81. This is not a science. The 
compromise requirement does not mean, however, that all Treaty objectives need to be directly 
considered all of the time and at every stage of the proceedings. This would create too much 
uncertainty and involve too much cost for insufficient return. This is one reason why we largely 
reject the use of market-balancing, see Chapter Five.
Section 2 argues that the notion of a restriction on economic freedom is unclear, that the 
arguments in favour of economic freedom are unpersuasive; and, that this definition has certain 
negative consequences. It suggests adopting an economic efficiency test. Section 3 adds that 
there is no need for mere-balancing within article 81(1). Furthermore, the benefits of performing 
the mere-balance in article 81(3) instead suggest that it is better done there. Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty is discussed in Chapter Seven.
The position o f  the ECJ on these two positions is uncertain. It has not responded to the CFI's 
Métropole télévision judgment. Furthermore, we do not know whether the Wovters Case was 
motivated by the procedural problems discussed in Chapters Two and Three, which no longer 
exist. A clear decision by the Community Courts to follow Chapter Six's proposals would 
provide some much needed clarity while giving adequate protection to the importance given to 
non-economic objectives within the Treaty context. This would benefit undertakings throughout
1092 Mario Monti in Ehlermann (2001), page 9.
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the Community and beyond, as long as Chapter Seven's recommendations are also taken into 
account. If such a judgment were forthcoming then there would be no need for a difficult Treaty 
change.109'’ Indeed, if the Community Courts clarified this position alone a Treaty change is 
probably not desirable. This is because the wide notion o f a ’restriction of competition' provides 
flexibility for the future too. However, if the Community Courts are not forthcoming then such a 
change should be considered. 1093
1093 See, Baquero Cruz (2002), page 56, discusses the difficulty of changing the Treaty.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HOW AND WHERE SHOULD NON-ECONOMIC
OBJECTIVES BE CONSIDERED IN ARTICLE 81(3) OF THE 
TREATY?
1. Introduction
2. The First Article 81(3) Test: balancing in the public interest
2.1. What sort of balancing test is demanded?
2.2. Which objectives should be considered within the balance?
2.3. Which markets should be considered when making the 
assessment?
2.3.1. Product Market Based Limits to the Analysis
2.3.2. Geographic Market Based Limits to the Analysis
2.3.3. Conclusion
2.4. Are the aims of the parties to the agreement relevant?
2.5. Conclusion
3. The Second Article 81(3) Test: consumers must get a fair share of 
the resulting benefit
4. The Fourth Article 81(3) Test: do not eliminate competition 
(Article 81(3)(b))
5. The Third Article 81(3) Test: indispensability (Article 81(3)(a))
6. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
If economic efficiency is to be the sole test under article 81(1) o f the Treaty, what is left for 
article 81(3)? Chapters One and Six showed that many other Treaty objectives are naturally 
promoted as a consequence o f furthering welfare. Nevertheless, some objectives cannot be (or 
are difficult to) pursued through the economic efficiency test. Others can be pursued in part, but 
not completely. That leaves room for their consideration in article 81(3), via a mere-balancing 
test.
Chapter Six argued that mere-balancing should only occur within article 81(3) o f the Treaty. 
This repartition better matches article 81's structure. Furthermore, article 81(3)'s framework can 
be used to limit the use of mere-balancing. The point is not that, in the Community legal order, 
welfare permanently outweighs all other objectives, Chapter Two. However, the Community 
has predominantly selected the market mechanism as the basic means of wealth creation.1094 The 
Commission agrees that Treaty ends should be achieved via the most appropriate means, taking 
account of the costs of each 'solution’. Article 81(3)’s structure can be used to ensure that this 
actually happens.
Chapter Seven examines article 81(3) o f the Treaty. The Commission is optimistic about legal 
certainty in article 81 as a whole:
1094 Where this is not the case, Chapter Six allowed the matter to be excluded from article 81 (l)'s remit altogether, as 
happened in the Albany Case.
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"Undertakings...at present enjoy a satisfactory level of legal certainty thanks to the set of 
clear rules that have been developed and refined through more than 30 years of 
Commission decision-making practice and Court of Justice caselaw and by the many 
different kinds of general instruments that have been adopted..."1095
More cautiously, the Commissioner for DG Competition has said:
"...it is evident, 1 believe, that the analytical framework for applying article 81(3) has not 
been explained in any kind of detail. So the purpose really of those Guidelines 
[Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines] is to remedy this by focusing on article 81(3)."1096
In clarifying the analytical framework for the application of both article 81(1) and (3) o f the 
Treaty the Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines provide useful guidance to national courts, 
competition authorities and firms.1097 Nevertheless, we have seen that many non-economic 
objectives have been (and should be) considered within article 81(3) of the Treaty. Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines do not discuss this at all, except to say:
"Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they 
can be subsumed under the four conditions of article 81(3)..."l098
Even if it is largely accepted that non-economic objectives have a role to play in article 81(3), 
little else is clear. There is uncertainty, even confusion, as to the proper application of article 
81(3) of the Treaty.1099
This problem has been exacerbated, for Member States’ courts and competition authorities as 
well as undertakings themselves, due to the Commission's own ambiguity with respect to the 
relevance o f the non-economic criteria in article 81(3) analysis. Sometimes it has argued that 
non-economic criteria are relevant. At other times the Commission argues that it cannot apply 
them, see Chapter Two. Of late, the Commission's notices and proposals include language 
focusing almost exclusively on the economic content of article 81(3) of the Treaty.
This may lead to less application o f the other Treaty objectives in article 81(3) analysis as well 
as a less Communitaire application of them when they are invoked, undermining the express 
wording o f the Treaty, see Chapter Two. The Commission seeks the consistent application of 
Community law via a variety of mechanisms in Regulation 1/2003. However, this is unlikely 
unless the issue of non-economic objectives is directly confronted.
1095 Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 51.
1096 Monti (2004), page 459.
1097 Lugard and Handler (2004), page 420.
1098 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 42. There is also a passing reference to safety and health 
concerns in paragraph 18(2), but this is equally criptic and relates to article 81(1) o f the Treaty.
1099 van Gerven (2004), page 421; Lugard and Hancher (2004), page 418; Whish (2003), page 154 and Ritter, Braun 
and Rawlinson (2000), page 118.
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Part C as a whole provides a framework for the consideration of non-economic objectives 
within article 81. Chapters Seven and Eight fill the gaps left by the Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, in relation to the consideration of non-economic objectives within article 81(3) of 
the Treaty. This is particularly important in relation to article 81(3) because the decision-maker, 
traditionally the Commission, has a wide margin of discretion when implementing all four 
article 81(3) tests.1100 Advocate-General Slynn emphasised this:
"...the Commission retains in any event a residual discretion, governed by the objects and 
policy of the Treaty and by the need to take into account only legally relevant factors, to 
refuse an exemption. Article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] provides that 'the provisions of 
paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable', which suggests the existence of a 
discretion, subject to judicial review by Court."1101
This is particularly significant in the balancing o f  non-economic objectives. Furthermore, 
because the Commission's assessment necessarily involves complex evaluations o f economic 
matters, judicial review by the Community Courts:
"...is necessarily limited to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the giving of 
reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and 
whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers..."1102
Review by the Community Courts includes an assessment o f whether the relevant objectives 
have been considered. It is unlikely to assess what weight these objectives should have been 
given in the balance, see Section 2, below.
Some suggest that Member States’ competition authorities, and particularly their courts, are not 
appropriate fora for the consideration o f public policy of the type we believe the Treaty 
demands. In this case, either the Treaty must be changed, to make it clear that non-economic 
objectives are irrelevant within article 8 1 o f the Treaty; or, Regulation 1/2003 should be found 
ultra vires, see the Introduction. Monti, rightly in our view, points to a risk that:1103
"The Commission might end up removing cases from the Member States when matters of 
. public policy are under discussion and grant an exemption on the basis of say employment 
considerations, which the Member States' authorities may be reluctant to take given the 
Commission’s exhortations that article 81(3) relates only to pure economic 
considerations...This could lead to the chaotic situation where the Commission grants 
article 81(3) exemptions according to a different set of standards from Member States!"
1.00 Goyder (2003), page 120; de Roux and Voillemot (1976), page 95 and Alexander (1973), page 16.
1.01 Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Fard-Werke and Ford o f Europe v. Commission 11985], page 2734.
1102 Case T-395/94 Atlantic Container Line v C om m ission [2002], paragraph 257. See also, for example, Case T- 
131/99 M ichael Shaw and Timothy Falla v. C om m ission [2002], paragraph 38. It is an open question whether the 
CFI’s greater interventionism in merger control will be reflected in its judicial review of article 81 decisions, see 
Case T-342/99 A irtours v. Commission [2002]; Case T-310/01 Schneider E lectric v. Commission [2002] and Case 
T-5/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002]. See also Bailey (2004) for a discussion of this point
1103 Monti (2002), page 1095.
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This is a real danger, but for the Commission to act in this way would not be an appropriate 
solution. Many agreements that fall within article 81(1) of the Treaty already raise non­
economic issues. The Introduction showed that the Commission has already considered such 
issues in a far from negligible proportion o f the decisions that it has taken. This proportion is 
likely to rise, once it becomes clear that non-economic factors are relevant. The best response to 
this is to make every effort to explain how these considerations can be taken into account. This 
also fits within the logic of the modernisation proposals, which said that the Commission 
needed the extra time that decentralisation would allow it to seek out and terminate the 
particularly pernicious cartels.1104
Chapter Seven's analysis comes in four parts, each of which discusses one of article 81(3)'s four 
cumulative1105 *tests. Section 2 deals with the first article 81(3) test, involving a public interest 
balance. Section 3 analyses article 81(3)'s second test, that consumers must get a fair share of 
the agreement's resulting benefit. The order o f the final two provisions has been altered to better 
reflect the changes that this chapter ultimately suggests. As a result, Section 4 focuses on article 
81(3Xb) o f the Treaty and Section 5 makes new proposals for article 81 (3Xa)- Section 6 
concludes.
One final issue must be briefly considered before the main analysis starts. The use o f the word 
'may' in article 81(3) of the Treaty gives the decision-maker a lot o f  discretion. Some believe 
that he or she can even introduce new requirements into article 81(3).n06 Vedder criticises the 
suggestion of a fifth article 81(3) test. He asserts that this runs:
"...counter to the clear and...unambiguous wording of article 81(3) which contains only 
four requirements for an exemption."1107
Whatever the reason, a fifth test may be contrary to the CFI's holding in the Matra Case:
"...in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its 
effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid down in 
article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty are satisfied and the practice in question has 
been properly notified to the Commission."1108
1104 Commission, White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 42.
1105 See references to cases in Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 42.
1.06 See, for example, Jacobs (1993/2), page 58 and Alexander (1973), page 16.
1.07 Vedder (2003), page 187. Glatz (1985), page 242, agrees.
1108 The Matra Case, paragraph 85. Wils (2004), page 671, reads the Matra Case in this way, for example. Whish 
(2003), page 150, may obliquely cover the issue too, although this is also unclear. "An agreement must satisfy four 
conditions if it is to benefit from article 8 1 (3)."
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Although admittedly, it is unclear whether this paragraph covers this issue, because the CFI was 
pronouncing on a somewhat different point. Nevertheless, Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines take a decisive stand on this point:
"The four conditions of article 81(3) are...exhaustive. When they are met the exception is 
applicable and may not be made dependant on any other condition.”1109
It is unlikely that Member States' courts and competition authorities would ignore such a clear 
statement. In any event, in our view a fifth condition is unnecessary because public policy can 
be adequately considered within article 81(3) as it is currently interpreted. Addition o f a new 
condition would merely add confusion as to its limits. It would also set a difficult precedent for 
Treaty interpretation in other areas.
2. THE FIRST ARTICLE 81(3) TEST: BALANCING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Article 81(3)'s first condition says that article 81(1) o f the Treaty may be declared inapplicable 
for agreements which contribute:
"...to improving the production or distribution of goods or to improving technical or 
economic progress..."
What objectives can be considered here? The Commission argued for a consumer welfare test in 
its policy statements, Chapter Two. Chapters Two and Four showed that article 8I(3)'s first 
test's wording has been interpreted widely. Many objectives have been considered there. Indeed, 
the CFI has held that:
"...in the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption 
under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."1110
Many Commission decisions, as well as Community Court judgments, show that the application 
of article 81(3) is "...not pure law or economics, but policy."1111 We have seen that the decision­
maker has a  lot o f discretion in the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty. Having said that, it 
is important that this discretion, combined with the potentially wide remit of article 8I(3)'s first 
test, does not mean that there is no control:
1109 Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 42.
1110 Joined Cases T-528/93, etc., M étropole Télévision v. Commission [19%), paragraph 118. See Chapter Two for 
other references.
1111 Sauter (1997), page 114. See also, B&C (2001), paragraph 3-019; Wesseling (2000), pages 20, 39. 109-111; 
Whish (1998), page 500; Amato (1997), pages 121 and 122; McGowan and Wilks (1995), pages 148 and 149; de 
Jong (1990) and Verstiynge (1988), page 4. This is also the implication of Commission, Co-operation G uidelines - 
N C As, paragraph 43, "...the Commission, as the guardian o f  the Treaty, has the ultimate but not the sole 
responsibility for developing p o licy  and safeguarding consistency when it comes to the application of EC 
competition law. [my emphasis]" and Commission, Handling o f  Com plaints Guidelines, paragraph 8. For a contra^ 
view see Wils (2004), pages 671, 672,694 and 718 and Wils (2002), page 123.
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"The importance of the competition rales in the overall scheme of the EC Treaty means that 
this authority to grant exemptions is not a matter within the Commission's [or now 
(presumably) that of the Member States’ courts and competition authorities] free discretion 
but must be exercised in accordance with legal standards*"1112
Many objectives are, and should be, considered within article 81(3)’s first test and this should 
continue to be the case. But, the decision-maker (and particularly the Commission which has a 
lot of influence here) must correctly explain which objectives (and effects) should be taken into 
account there, as well as the content and weight of these aims.1113 This is important in relation to 
article 81(3), because, under Regulation 1/2003, Member States' courts and competition 
authorities are now applying it for the first time. It has particularly important implications for 
article 81(3)'s first test, which forms the basis for the article 81(3) assessment.
Section 2 examines four issues that are relevant in the balancing process under the first 
condition of article 81(3) of the Treaty. Section 2.1. asks what sort of balancing test is 
demanded. Then Section 2.2. discusses which objectives can and should be considered within 
the balance. Section 2.3. investigates which markets should be considered when making the 
assessment; and then we ask whether the aims of the parties to the agreement are relevant, 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5. concludes. In addition, the rest of Chapter Seven discusses certain 
limits to this test and Chapter Eight provides guidance on how to inject more clarity and 
predictability into the balancing process,
2.1 W hat sort of balancing test is demanded?
Chapter Two showed that, in the Commission’s view, article 81(3) of the Treaty expressly 
acknowledges that restrictive agreements may generate objective benefits1114 which outweigh 
the negative benefits of the restriction of competition, under article 81(1). We call this the 
'optimal balance' or public interest. The optimal balance is currently assessed on an ad hoc way. 
Little or no effort is currently made to make a comprehensive assessment of the agreement's
1112 Ritter, Braun and Rawlinson (2000), page 114.
1113 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), page 97.
11,4 These are not just improvements to the parties. This has been clear since C onsten and Grundig Case, where the 
ECJ held, paragraph 13 of the case summary "The improvement in the production and distribution o f goods, which 
is required for the grant of exemption cannot be identified with all the advantages which the parties to the 
agreement obtain from it in their production or distribution activities, since the content o f the concept o f 
improvement is not required to depend upon the special features of the contractual relationships in question. This 
improvement must in particular show appreciable objective advantages of such a character as to compensate for the 
disadvantages which they cause in the field of competition." See also, Commission decision, Quantel International- 
Continuum/  O uantel, paragraph 52. Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 49, explains that this means 
that one should not look at the subjective benefits to the parties. Nor need they be benefits to consumers, 
Commission, A rticle 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 46, distinguishes between objective and consumer benefits. This 
makes sense because otherwise article 81(3)'s second test would be superfluous. In essence, what is important is that 
the agreement produces a positive effect on the market generally, Case T-131/99 M ichael.Shaw and  Timothy F alla  
v. Commission [2002], paragraph 163.
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wider effects. Where this is done, often only one or two objectives are examined. The whole 
exercise must be placed on a more formal footing, Section 2 and Chapter Eight aim to do just 
that.
From what we have seen, advantages due to benefits from non-economic objectives, such as 
environmental protection, would count in this regard.1115 Furthermore, these objective benefits 
can also be combined. In Commission decision, Ford/ Volkswagen, the Commission took 
account of industrial policy, employment, environmental and economic and social cohesion 
arguments1116 when considering the benefits that would likely accrue as a result of the 
agreement.1117 Chapter Eight provides a framework within which various objectives can be 
combined.
Chapter Six said that agreements that cause no competition problems, but cause environmental 
damage, for example, should be dealt with through environmental legislation and not 
competition law. This comment does not necessarily apply to the use of article 81(3) of the 
Treaty for the consideration o f  non-economic objectives.1118 In part this is because a competition 
problem exists, otherwise article 81(3) would not be relevant. To extend the détournement de 
pouvoir argument beyond this would involve ignoring the Treaty's structure, as interpreted by 
the Community Courts. It would also overlook the express wording o f the policy-linking 
clauses, which demand the consideration of many non-economic policies within, amongst 
others, article 81, see Chapter Two.
Should disadvantages, due to the way in which the agreement undermines non-economic 
objectives, such as environmental protection and culture, also be considered? In other words, 
imagine an agreement that restricts competition, but contributes to economic and social 
cohesion within the Community. Can the fact that the same agreement also prejudices 
environmental protection (i.e. causes negative effects) be taken into account in the balance too?
The language of article 81(3)'s first test only refers to 'improvements'. This could be read as 
excluding the consideration o f negative factors. That need not be the case, if we read it as 
meaning ’overall improvements’ once the agreement's advantages and disadvantages have been 
taken together as a whole.
1115 See, Chapters Two and Four; Monti (2002) and Bouterse (1994), pages 26-28 and 126-129.
1116 Although this is open to debate, see Chapter Four.
11,7 Many other examples exist, see Chapter Four, particularly the background to the consideration o f environmental 
issues within article 81(3) of the Treaty and Vedder (2003), pages 162-164.
1118 Vedder (2003), pages 76-78 and 169, agrees. This seems to have been accepted by the President of the 
Bundeskartellamt, see Wolf(1998), page 481.
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The Community Courts' and Commission's insistence that article 81 should be interpreted in 
light of the Treaty structure as a whole does not distinguish between positive and negative 
effects.1119 Considerable prejudice could be done to the pursuit of other objectives if negative 
effects must be ignored. Not only would this give a partial balance; but also some o f the policy­
linking clauses may demand the consideration of negative effects. Article 6, for example, says 
that:
"Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies [including competition policy]...in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”
This provision does not distinguish between the positive and negative effects on the 
environment. Nevertheless, its structure implies that negative effects are important.1120 
Furthermore, provisions such as article 174(2) of the Treaty, establishing the polluter pays 
principle in environmental policy, would be undermined if the parties to an agreement could 
profit without regard to any environmental harm that they might cause.
This proposition has also received academic support. Jacobs argues that there must be a 
conscious decision that "...the benefits o f the measure in question are able to outweigh the harm 
to the environment."1121 Jans agrees:
"The Commission ought to take account of the environmental effects of an 
exemption...However, this does not mean that the Commission would be wholly unable to 
grant an exemption if this were to imply significant environmental effects. These effects 
should be taken into account and carefully balanced against the other interests 
involved."1122
Finally, Chapter Four pointed to two objectives, market integration and consumer protection, 
which the Commission has already given such 'negative weight' in the balance.
1,19 In Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969], the ECJ held, paragraph 5, "While the Treaty's primary 
object is to eliminate by this means [article 81] the obstacles to the free movement o f goods within the Common 
Market and to confirm and safeguard the unity o f that market, it also permits the Community authorities to carry out 
certain positive, though indirect, action with a view to promoting a harmonious development of economic activities 
within the whole Community, in accordance with article 2 o f the Treaty." In Commission, RCP 1997, 
Commissioner van Miert said, page 10 “ ...competition policy can be expected to play a  federating role in the years 
ahead. To the extent that...the policy can contribute to the successful attainment o f the Union’s principal objectives, 
I believe it is our duty to act in a spirit o f even closer cooperation with other Community policies. The coordination 
o f the Commission’s various areas o f activity is already highly developed, but it must do more than just ensure a 
necessary degree of administrative efficiency, being given instead the force of a political principle.”
1120 A similar position arises in the other policy linking clauses, see article 127(2), 153(2), 159 and 178 of the Treaty. 
Arguably, some of these clauses are even clearer. For example, article 151(4) says that cultural policy must be taken 
into account "...in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity o f its cultures, [my emphasis]" Article 
152(1) says that Community policy in the area o f health will be directed towards "...improving public health...and 
obviating sources o f danger to human health."
1121 Jacobs (1993/2), page 58. Admittedly, Jacobs believes that this requires the insertion of a fifth article 81(3) 
condition, whereas we suggest weighing the requirement within article 81(3)'s first test We discussed this above.
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The consideration of both positive and negative effects in article 8I(3ys first condition would 
considerably increase the costs and complexity o f the balancing exercise. There is no direct 
evidence o f support from the Community Courts for this position either. For example, in 
paragraph 118 of Métropole Télévision case, cited above, the CFI said that the Commission was 
entitled to base itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order 
to grant exemption under article 81(3) of the Treaty. It does not say the Commission can base 
itself on public interest considerations to exclude exemption. This might be read as only 
applying to the positive consideration of such objectives.12 123 One might also resurrect the point 
that, where negative non-economic policy considerations can be raised, article 81 risks 
becoming a, for example, environmental policy instrument.
In our view, article 81(3)'s first condition, when considered in its overall Treaty context, 
demands that both the positive and negative weights of the relevant policy objectives be 
considered there.1124 To ignore them would not make sense.1125 True, a full balancing process 
complicates the decision-making exercise under article 81(3) of the Treaty, as well as its 
predictability for undertakings. These problems can be reduced through use of a more 
predictable balancing process. Chapter Eight provides a framework for this. Furthermore, while 
the Community Courts have not expressly ruled on the point, they have not ruled against it 
either. In fact, their judgments emphasise that article 81(3) requires a complex balancing 
exercise. We have seen the Commission include negative weight in the balance. There is some 
risk of détournement de pouvoir, however, a competition problem will now, by definition, have 
arisen and so the problems are diminished. This is especially so because the Treaty's structure 
tends to support a full balancing exercise.1126
2.2 Which objectives should be considered within the balance?
Many objectives have been considered within article 81(3) o f the Treaty, see Chapter Two. This 
is not a closed list and we do not seek to define them here. Section 2.2. considers whether the 
article 81(3) exemption should cover national, or only Community, issues. In our view, national
1122 Jans (2000), page 277. See also Vedder (2003), pages 186 and 187.
1123 Also, the Commission does not consider the possibility o f negative weight in Commission, Horizontal 
Guidelines, when discussing environmental protection, for example.
1124 Does Whish (2003), page 151, imply the same, in passing "Any advantages claimed o f the agreement must 
outweigh the detriment it might produce..."? This seems unlikely, as he is considering the article 81(1) restriction.
1125 The Commission has insisted on the assessment of "...all relevant positive and negative impacts..." in impact 
analysis. See, for example, COM(2002) 276, page 15.
1126 However, a decision which balances positive and negative factors in this way must not pretend to set down a 
general rule, for example that no agreement can be exempted that does not contribute X amount to the environment. 
That said, article 81(3) decisions would not contravene the Treaty’s constitutional framework where it is clear that 
they merely seek to balance the requisite factors in the case at hand, Vedder (2003), pages 187 and 188.
- 2 9 2 -
interests are relevant there. We discuss where they should be considered and who should decide 
how much weight they should be given.
First, let's define the issue more concretely. For the most part, we have discussed what are 
known as horizontal conflicts. That is, conflicts between different objectives of an equal level, 
such as conflicts between Treaty provisions, created by the policy-linking clauses. The issue 
considered in this part is different. It discusses conflicts between Community law and national 
policies. What we are referring to here are not mere vertical conflicts, where Community law 
would prevail.1127 Instead, at issue are conflicts between Community law in one area of 
competence, in this case article 81, and agreements which reflect national law/ policy in a 
different area of competence, where the Member States have exclusive competence, or there is a 
parallel or shared competence not yet occupied by the Community (diagonal conflicts).1128
Diagonal conflicts are often politically sensitive. It may well be that objectives that Member 
States hold dear are at stake. It is untenable not to consider certain policy rationales for the sole 
reason that they do not fall within Community competence,1129 or are not mentioned in the 
Treaty. This would promote Community interests to the exclusion o f those o f the Member 
States,1130 which would be unacceptable.
"...the Court has always had to strike a balance between the protection of the legitimate 
prerogatives of the Member States and those of the Community..."1131
Nevertheless, Monti argues that national interests cannot justify an exemption under article 
81(3) of the Treaty:1132
"...where a Member State has the right to request that national interests justify the non­
application of the full force of EC law, the Treaty has made express provision (e.g. articles 
30 and 86(2) EC) and the range of domestic policy considerations are fully
1127 See, Craig and de Burca (1998), Chapter 6.
1,28 See, Deckert (2000), pages 181 and 182.
1129 Schmid (2000), page 163.
1130 The European Convention may, if  adopted, change this position. Article 1-6 reads "The Constitution and law 
adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law 
of the Member States." This could be interpreted as relating to vertical conflicts, i.e. as a codification of the current 
law. See, for example, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, The Future o f Europe (2002/3), 
page 16. However, the provision is wide enough to include diagonal conflicts too. If  the Community Courts read it 
expansively, then Member State interests will no longer be relevant where they conflict with tire normal scope of 
article 81. See also Dashwood (2002), pages 416 and 417.
1131 Rodriguez Iglesias and Baquero Cruz (2003), page 74. See also, Boch (2003), page 47. Article F.l. o f the 
Maastricht Treaty expressly guarantees that the Union shall "...respect the national identities o f its Member 
States..." See also Handoll (1994), page 234.
1132 Monti (2002), page 1083. See also Evans (1985), page 101, "...the first condition for exemption requires the 
Commission to determine whether the agreement or practice contributes to attainment of objectives in the 
Community interest"
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circumscribed1 ,j3... Thus, it is submitted that absent an express renvoi embedded in the 
article 81, national interests cannot be taken into consideration when exempting an 
agreement under article 8 l(3).Ilj4"
Monti's argument can be broken down into two steps. First, he says that if a Member State 
wishes to justify the non-application o f Community law because of national interests it must 
find an express right in the Treaty. Examples of such a right are articles 30 and 86(2) of the 
Treaty. Secondly, he adds, that the range of domestic policy considerations that can be 
considered for exemption are fully set out in those exemption provisions. No others can be 
considered. He concludes that unless article 81 contains an express renvoi to national interests, 
which it does not, then they cannot be considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty.
We consider these points in turn. First, it is unclear what Monti means by "...the Treaty has 
made express provision..." where national interests justify the non-application of the full force 
of Community law. He refers to two Treaty provisions to support him, articles 30 and 86(2). 
Both provide defences based on national interests;13 4135 although, neither expressly refers to 
national interests. Nor do other exemption provisions that deal with national interests, such as 
article 39(4) o f  the Treaty, make specific reference to this fact.1136 The ECJ seems prepared to 
imply the fact that, for example, the public security exemption refers to national public security.
Is Monti's point that one can only have a  defence if there is a specific exemption provision? 
Perhaps, but then article 81(3) of the Treaty provides an explicit example of an exemption 
provision. Why couldn’t the Community Courts assume that this provision could apply to 
national interests where this were relevant? They have already interpreted it widely in relation to 
other Community interests. So Monti’s first point does not seem to be fulfilled in relation to 
article 81 and the consideration o f national interests by way o f defence.
1133 Weatherill and Beaumont, EU Law, 2nd ed. (Penguin, 1999), Ch. 16.
1134 "Two Advocates General have supported the use of Art. 81(3) to safeguard national interests (A.G. Jacobs in 
Case C-67/96, Albany International, [1999] E C R 1-5751 para 193, and Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov, [2000] 
ECR 1-6451 para 90; and A.G. Léger in W outers...\ However, their reasoning relies on the case law mentioned in 
sections 2 to 4 o f  this paper, which it is submitted is insufficiently compelling to support their argument The case 
which most closely justifies this position is Case C-360/92 P, Publishers’ Association v. Commission, [1995] ECR 
1-23 where the ECJ requested that the Commission take note of the policy reasons advanced by the English courts to 
allow resale price maintenance, and this might offer some indirect support for using national interests to justify a 
restriction o f competition, but the ECJ did not address this point fully. Cf. A.G. Lenz’s discussion in this case, at 
para 33."
1135 In relation to article 30, Case 34/79, Regina v. Nenn and Darby [1979], paragraph 15, where the ECJ said, "In 
principle, it is for each Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form 
selected by it the requirements o f public morality in its own territory." In relation to article 86(2) o f the Treaty see, 
Case C-202/88 France v. Commission [1991], paragraph 12; Case C-l 57/94 Commission v. Netherlands [1997], 
paragraph 39 and Commission Communication, Services o f General Interest, paragraph 22.
1,36 For examples o f cases where the national interest was considered under article 39(4) o f the Treaty, see Case 
152/73 Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost [1974]; Case 149/79 Commission v. Belgium [1980); Case 307/84 
Commission v. France [1986] and Case C-4/91 Annegret Bleis v. Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale [1991].
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In the second step o f Monti’s argument, he says that where defences have been granted in the 
Treaty they provide a closed exemption list. This position is supported in the caselaw related to 
the four freedoms.1137 In one case the ECJ said:1138
"Since it derogates from a fundamental rule of the Treaty, article 36 [now article 30] must 
be interpreted strictly and cannot be extended to cover objectives not expressly enumerated 
therein. Neither the safeguarding of consumers’ interests nor the protection of creativity and 
cultural diversity in the realm of publishing is mentioned in article 36."
However, Chapter Two demonstrated that the Community Courts have interpreted the heads of 
exemption in article 8 l(3)'s first test widely. They have done this in a way that would have been 
inconceivable under article 30 of the Treaty. As Monti points out,1139 the Commission is now 
entitled to base itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order 
to grant an exemption under article 81(3) o f the Treaty.
Furthermore, the ECJ restricts the interpretation of, for example, article 30, in terms of the heads 
of exemption that can be raised under it. New heads of claim, such as consumer protection and 
fairness o f commercial transactions1140 and economic policy cannot be added.1141 But, the ECJ is 
not restricting the interpretation of these heads in terms o f the source of the interest, be it 
national or Community. They have not restrictively interpreted an exemption in order to find 
that only Community and not national public policy could be invoked, for example.
From what we have seen above, Monti’s second step does not relate to the point about whether 
or not national issues can be considered within article 81(3) of the Treaty. This is either
because:
• unlike other Treaty exemptions, article 81(3)'s heads of exemption have been 
interpreted widely; or, alternatively,
• restrictive interpretation of Treaty exemptions does not imply accepting Community- 
based public policy but rejecting that of the Member States.
One might stop the analysis there. Monti's concluding remark, that absent an express renvoi 
embedded in the article 81, national interests cannot be taken into consideration when
1137 A possible exception may be Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium  [1992], but it is likely that the ECJ saw this as 
a mandatory requirement as opposed to an article 30 exemption, see, Craig and de Burca (1998), page 604. Also 
see, Mortelmans (2001), page 636, footnotes 118 and 119.
1138 The Leclerc Case, paragraph 30. See also, Case 113/80 Commission v. Ireland  [1981], paragraph 7. However, 
Oliver (2003), page 217, has suggested that article 28’s mandatory requirements be subsumed within article 30.
1.39 Monti (2002), page 1057.
1.40 Case 220/81 Crim inal proceedings against Timothy Robertson [1982], paragraph 8.
1.41 Case 72/83 Campus O il v. M inister fo r  Industry [1984], paragraphs 34 and 35.
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exempting an agreement under article 81(3), does not seem to be supported by his first two 
propositions.
But it is interesting to ask why there might be a difference between the article 81 approach and 
that o f  the free movement provisions. One possible answer is that, in article 81, the first and 
third paragraphs normally involve balancing two sets o f Community interests. For this reason 
there is no need to interpret article 81(3) so restrictively. This is not the case in relation to 
articles 30, 39(3) and (4), 45—48 and 55 o f the Treaty. These provisions, as interpreted by the 
Community Courts, all allow for the derogation o f a Treaty objective because o f  national 
interests.1142 It is not surprising, politically, that in. a clash between Member States* and the 
Community's interests, the Community Courts seek to interpret these exceptions narrowly.
This might support Monti’s proposition. If  he is right in saying that certain objectives, such as 
culture, are exclusively national in scope, perhaps they should be dealt with differently (or not at 
all) under article 81(3)? Perhaps the more restrictive approach that we see to exemptions in, for 
example, articles 28 and 30, should also apply here, as opposed to the expansive reading of the 
heads o f exemption in article 81(3) of the Treaty?
The Commission’s decisions and the Community Courts’ judgments do not support this thesis. 
Chapter Four suggested that Commission decisions, such as Jahrhundertvertrag and VJK-GVSt, 
seem to have been decided purely on the basis of national security issues.1143 The Commission 
has, as Monti points out,1144 regularly considered culture under article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
Chapter Four.1145 The Council also thinks that it should be considered there.1146 *Furthermore, in 
Métropole Télévision1141 the CFI considered a Commission exemption decision. The CFI found 
that the article 86(2) concept of a public mission was a fundamental component of the 
Commission's decision, paragraph 115. Although it held that this had been done improperly in 
this case, the CFI famously continued, paragraph 118:
"...in the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption 
under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."
1142 Evans (1985), pages 100 and 101 and Evans (1983), pages 593-599, also make this point
114î There are other examples too, see, Commission decisions, United Reprocessors and Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear 
Energy Agreement, paragraphs 3-12 and 33-36.
1144 Monti (2002), page 1084. Goyder (2003), page 94, says that if  the agreement had been notified, the Member 
State's interests in the Wouters Case would have been considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty.
,t4S Schmid (2000), page 168, says that the decision-maker is bound to do so because o f article 151(4) o f the Treaty.
1.46 Mortelmans (2001), footnote 138, argues that public health is also a national interest Public health has been 
considered within article 81(3) of the Treaty too, for example, Commission decision, Pasteur Mérieux-Merck.
1.47 Joîned Cases T-528/93, etc. Métropole Télévision v. Commission [1996]. Chapter Two discusses the facts of the 
case.
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Despite article 16 of the Treaty, it is clear that the public interest criterion under article 86(2) of 
the Treaty is made up of national and not Community interests, see above. This implies that the 
CFI was prepared to allow national interests to be considered in an exemption decision. This 
tends to support the view that these issues can be balanced under article 81(3).1148 *
There may be a limit as to which Member State objectives can be raised here. They may need to 
be justified in accordance with the Treaty's article 2 principles, or even those in the Preamble. 
Back in 1965, the ECJ held that:
"While the Treaty’s primary object is to eliminate by this means [either use of article 81(1) 
or through the application of article 81(3)'s first provision] the obstacles to the free 
movement of goods within the Common Market and to confirm and safeguard the unity of 
that market, it also permits the Community authorities to cany out certain positive, though 
indirect, action with a view to promoting a harmonious development of economic activities 
within the whole Community, in accordance with article 2 of the Treaty ."m9
Today, article 81 probably better reflects the current Treaty balance than the Community Courts' 
interpretation o f articles 28 and 30. They still give precedence to the needs o f the Common 
Market over objectives such as environmental and consumer protection. But as Demetriou and 
Higgins write:
"...while this precedence was justified under the original Treaty of Rome, subsequent 
amendments to that Treaty have ostensibly changed the relationship between the 
fundamental policies and other policies. In particular, the Treaty of Maastricht appears to 
have abolished any precedence between the various Community policies. Thus the Treaty is 
no longer built around the four fundamental freedoms. Instead, the Treaty contains a 
number of non-hierarchical 'Community policies’"1150
We have seen that Member States' interests can be considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty 
(although probably within the article 2 limits). But is this the best place to consider them? 
Monti, relying on his conclusion that national issues could not be considered within article 81(3) 
suggests the use of a rule of reason mechanism, providing Wouters as an example o f  the 
Community Courts' reasoning in this area.1151 Chapter Two showed that the European 
Parliament and the Council also believe that certain Member States' objectives (there it was 
culture) should be considered within article 81(3) o f the Treaty. Chapter Six explained why 
mere-balancing within article 81(1) is inadvisable and why it is better done under article 81(3)
1148 Monti also refers to Case C-360/92P, Publishers' Association v. Commission [1995], where the ECJ told the 
Commission to take note of the policy reasons advanced by the English courts to allow resale price maintenance. 
This might offer some indirect support for using national interests to justify a restriction of competition, pages 60 
and 61 and paragraph 32 and 40-44, although, as Monti points out, the ECJ did not address this point fully, see 
reference above.
1,49 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt [1969], paragraph 5.
1150 Demetriou and Higgins (2003), page 193.
1151 Monti (2002), pages 1086-1088.
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of the Treaty. There is an additional reason why Chapter Six's conclusion is even more 
appropriate for Member States' interests, from a Community perspective. That is because only 
considering restrictions of competition and Member States' interests under article 81(1) of the 
Treaty could have a negative effect on other Community policies.1152 Imagine an agreement that 
restricted competition, undermined environmental policy and yet improved cultural awareness 
within the meaning of article 151 of the Treaty. All o f these objectives could be balanced under 
article 81(3) o f the Treaty to establish the optimal outcome, see Section 2.1. However, under 
Monti's system, the environmental protection problems are irrelevant and cannot be considered. 
This moves the pendulum too far in favour of Member States' interests at the expense of 
important Community policies, ignoring the Treaty’s structure.1153
One final objection can be raised to Monti’s suggestion. It divides public policy into two 
categories, that of the Member States and that of the Community. But is this right? Surely the 
Treaty was signed in order to achieve Member States policy goals in the long term? Even if one 
could distinguish between Member States and Community objectives in the short term, how do 
we distinguish between them? Monti appears to assume that there are only two categories of 
competence, those where Member States have exclusive competence, and those where the 
Community has exclusive competence. However, there are many areas of mixed 
competence.1154 Policy objectives in areas of mixed competence may be hard to define as either 
Member State or Community aims. So, where would these issues be balanced, under article 
81(1) or (3) o f  the Treaty? How would we decide this? Would it depend upon who raised the 
issue, for example; or on whether the Community had acted? This problem could become 
contentious. Yet, dispute is unnecessary under the Treaty. Better, surely, to consider all 
objectives in one place and eliminate this controversy altogether?
So, the Member States’ objectives should be considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty. But, 
where they conflict with other objectives within article 81, who should decide where the balance 
lies between the Community interest(s) and the Member State interest(s)? Two cases should be 
considered. First, where the weight to be given to a particular objective is specifically defined in
11:52 Monti (2002), pages 1085 and 1086, also points out, rightly in my view, that using mechanisms such as denying 
an effect on trade between Member States for some net book agreements is unsatisfactory, see also Chapter Two.
1153 This conclusion is not altered by Regulation 1/2003, recital 9 and article 3(3): "Without prejudice to general 
princip les a n d  other provisions o f  C om m unity law , paragraphs 1 and 2 do not...preclude the application of 
provisions o f national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty, [my emphasis]” This is secondary legislation and is expressly without prejudice to other provisions of 
Community law. In any event it is intended to  cover a different situation, see, for example Kingston (2001), page 
342 and Wesseling (1999), pages 429 and 430.
ns4 See, Craig and de Burca (1998), page 117, where, in relation to external powers, for example, they say "For the 
most part, the external powers of the Community are shared with the Member States, rather than being exclusive..." 
The European Convention lists many more areas o f shared competence, see article 1-14, than those o f exclusive 
competence, see article 1-13.
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the Treaty. Secondly, what happens where the Treaty does not define the weight to be assigned 
to the objective? This last point can be split into two parts, depending upon whether or not the 
relevant Member State clarifies what weight it believes should be assigned to the objective in 
question.
Where the appropriate weight to be assigned to the objective is already established in the Treaty, 
the position is relatively straightforward. Take the example of public health. This is an area in 
which, within the limits set by Community law, the Member States retain full competence.1155 
Article 152(1) is the relevant clause for public health. This demands that:
nA high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community policies and activities."
Chapter Two explained why the Commission must consider public health issues in its article 
81(3) analysis. When performing the article 81(3) balance, the decision-maker is also bound to 
give public health the weight ascribed to it in the Treaty, in this case, a high level of protection 
is demanded, see Chapter Eight.1156 Once the weight for all relevant objectives has been 
established, the decision-maker must combine them to decide the case.
But what if the Treaty does not define the weight to be assigned to the objective? This is 
common. Consider national policies such as the security of the energy supply. Their weight is 
not defined in the Treaty. There may be a diagonal clash between this objective and 
competition, see Chapter Four.
The relevant decision-maker should be extremely sensitive to the Member States' arguments 
here. There are two problems. How can the decision-maker know what weight the Member 
States give these objectives; and, who should have the final say about this weight, the Member 
States or the specific decision-maker seized of the relevant case?
It should often be possible for the decision-maker to establish what the Member State concerned 
thinks the balance should be. This is because the Member State can intervene directly in the 
matter and articulate the balance that they think is appropriate. Where the relevant Member 
State decides not to intervene, the decision-maker has a problem. It must weigh the Community 
against the Member State's interests, but it does not know the importance given to this issue by 
the Member State. In such a case it would be appropriate to invite the Member State to 
intervene. If they do not, then the decision-maker should have full discretion as to what weight 
the national interest is given in the balance.1157
n5S Mortelmans (2001), section 6.1.2.3.
1,56 Although there are still quantitative issues to be resolved even here, see Chapter Eight 
1157 Gilliams (2005) DRAFT, page 27, explains the Wouters Case in the same way.
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It would be politically desirable, on legitimacy grounds, that the competent national and 
Community authorities should come to an agreement about the balance by weighing these two 
goals. For this there must be political and administrative co-ordination and negotiation.1158
Should the decision-maker be bound by the Member States' balance? The answer is a muted 
yes, although the Community Courts have the ultimate say here.1159 This is similar to the issues 
raised in the article 28/ 30 balance. The ECJ discussed this point in cases such as Henn and 
D a r b y There, two UK statutes forbade the importation of some types of pornography, which 
it held to be obscene. The ECJ said, paragraph 15:
"In principle, it is for each Member State to determine in accordance with its own scale of 
values and in the form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its own 
territory."
This shifts the weight very much in favour of Member States' interests.1161 In the absence of 
harmonised rules at the Community level,1162 recourse to article 30 can entail the application of 
different standards in different Member States, as a result of different national judgments, and 
different factual circumstances.1163
Nevertheless, the Community Courts do not completely relinquish control and insist on having 
the final say on where the balance lies in the free movement o f goods provisions. In Campus 
0*7,1164 the ECJ held that the purpose o f  article 30:
"...is not to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of die Member States; it 
merely allows national legislation to derogate from the principle of the free movement of 
goods to the extent to which this is and remains justified in order to achieve the objectives 
set out in the article."
Ultimately, it is for the Community Courts to decide whether or not derogation is justified.1165
im  Schmid (2000), page 161 and Deckert (2000), page 181. Co-ordination is still possible post Regulation 1/2003. 
The Commission can take article 81 decisions still, preventing the Member States' authorities from acting, see 
above. Where this happens, Member States are still consulted through the Advisory Committee, Commission, Co- 
operation G uidelines - NCAs, section 4.1.1. Even where a Member State's competition authority retains control of a 
matter, the Commission, as well as other Member States, can discuss the case with them, Commission, Co­
operation G uidelines - NCAs, section 4.1.2. See also Monti (2004), pages 408-410.
1159 Rodriguez Iglesias and Baquero Cruz (2003), page 73, write that the ECJ is "...the final arbiter o f the division of 
powers between the Community and the Member States." See also, Handoll (1994), page 240.
1160 Case 34/79 R egina v. Henn and D arby [1979].
1161 Schmid (2000), page 164.
1162 Case 72/83 Cam pus O il Lim ited v. M inister fo r  Industry and Energy [1984], paragraph 27.
m3 See, for example, Wyatt and Dashwood (1993), pages 225 and 226. See also, Case 94/83, A lbert H eijn [1984], 
paragraph 16.
1,64 Case 72/83 Cam ptis O il v. M inister fo r  Industry [1984], paragraph 32.
1165 See also, Case 121/85 Conegate L td  v. Commissioners o f  Customs a n d  Excise [1986], paragraphs 15-17; 
Mortelmans (2001), pages 622,635 and 637 and O'Loughlin (2003), pages 62-69.
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In the Wouters Case, Member State and Community interests were balanced under article 81(1) 
of the Treaty. Chapter Three noted that, in that case, the ECJ readily accepted the national 
assessment of the appropriate balance between competition and the Member State interest.1166 It 
also accepted that some Member States could legitimately have stricter rules than others.1167 
Nevertheless, the ECJ seems to reserve the right to hold that the balance has gone too far 
through its use o f the proportionality test True, the Community Courts have been more 
reluctant to interfere in the article 81(3) balance. Nevertheless, while they would leave a large 
discretion to the decision-maker, they would probably intervene where important Community 
and Member States interests conflicted within article 81(3) of the Treaty, if they thought the 
balance that had been established was clearly wrong.
The Member States may be unhappy about such interference, but they can always create new 
policy-linking clauses (and specific expressions of an objective's weight) in the next Treaty 
amendment, to the extent that they think that the Commission did not strike the right balance. 
These clauses are desirable as they improve clarity.
Note that, in relation to balancing under article 81(3), the decision of one Member State may 
affect other Member States. This is because article 81 only applies where trade between 
Member States is appreciably affected. This may undermine the balance that the second state 
seeks to strike in this area as well as restricting the Member States' ability to achieve the goals 
they seek.1168 Having said that, the same can be said of article 28, which only applies to 
quantitative restrictions on imports between Member States. Where such a clash takes place, it 
is for the decision-maker to try to take account of these 'externalities' in its decision.1169
Commission decision, FordV Volkswagen, may be an example of this. The parties'joint venture 
was supposed to create about 15,000 jobs in one of the Community's poorest regions, paragraph 
36. In the appeal to the CFI, the applicant argued that, paragraph 89:
"...the project coincides with the closure of several industrial sites in Europe and merely 
amounts to a transfer of employment from areas where unemployment is high and labour is 
costly to an area where there is less unemployment and labour is cheaper, so that the joint
1166 Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 8 and Siragusa (2005) DRAFT, page 3. By this I mean the prevailing perception 
in the Netherlands with respect to the legal profession, Gilliams (2005) DRAFT, page 27.
1167 Discussed in Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 8. Wesseling (1998), page 485, refers to the subsidiarity principle in 
relation to this too, article 5 of the Treaty.
,,6SGuaI (1995), page 41.
11691 do not mean by this that one should look to the interest o f  the Community as a whole, as is done in the 
implementation o f article 87(3) o f the Treaty, see Case 730/79 Philip Morris v. Commission (1980), paragraphs 24- 
26; Case COO 1/87 France v. Commission [1990], paragraphs 49-51 and Case C-278/95P, Siemens v. Commission 
[1997], paragraph 35. It is individual Member State's interests that are important However, where these undermine 
other Member States' interests, these must this be taken into account in the balance.
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venture cannot be regarded as contributing to the "economic and social cohesion” of the 
Community."
The Commission was bound, if  it took account of employment considerations in the decision 
(see Chapter Two), to balance the interests o f two Member States (Germany and Portugal) when 
applying article 81(3) of the Treaty.1170
In conclusion, in cases of diagonal conflict, the Member States’ interests, where ascertainable, 
cannot just be ignored. It is preferable to take account of them in article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
There is precedent for doing so.1171
The easiest case is where there are policy-linking clauses and the Treaty expressly assigns the 
weight that certain objectives must be given. The additional clarity provided by such clauses 
means that, where possible, more should be provided for in other areas of Member State 
interest. The context can change the weight; here the decision-maker should pay particular 
attention to the arguments of the Member States. Even where there are no such clauses, the 
Member States’ balance should be followed if  this is ascertainable. However, the benefits to one 
Member State must not unduly affect another Member State. Where this is the case the decision­
maker must take the interests o f the others into account in its balancing.1172 173Where a Member 
State’s balance is not clear then the decision-maker should have a discretion whether or not to 
take this factor into account and what weight to give it in the balance if it does. In all situations, 
the Community Courts remain the ultimate arbiter on whether derogation is justified.
Given the political sensitivity o f  diagonal conflicts, the decision-maker should take special care 
to discuss such cases with all relevant Member States. Indeed, this sort of (highly political) 
matter is precisely the type which the Commission might reserve for itself as it can under 
Regulation 1/2003.
1170 Although it is debatable whether the Commission actually balanced in this way, because, as Chapter Two 
explained, the CFI found that the Commission's decision was not informed by employment considerations. 
Furthermore, the Commission argued that no link had been proven between the closure of the German factories and 
the opening o f the Setubal project, the Matra Case, paragraph 96. If  this had not been the case, then it should have 
considered the issue.
1171 Prior to Regulation 1/2003, Schmid (2000), pages 168-170, suggested that the burden of proof may also have to
be re-analysed where Member States' objectives are considered. He would probably say the same today.
1173 It must also be seen to do this. It will be tempting for Member States’ courts and competition authorities to, for 
example, take more account of the effect o f an agreement on employment within the jurisdiction o f their State, as 
opposed to that within other Member States, or the Community as a whole. Such acts, or the perception of them, 
may also lead to tit-for-tat strategies. If a Portuguese court had decided the Commission decision, Ford/ Volkswagen 
matter there may have been such a  perception, even if this was not the case. Jones reports that the Bundeskarteliamt 
wanted to prohibit the arrangement, Jones (2004), page 27. The Commission must be ready to intervene where bias 
seems likely. Bellamy suggests referring such cases to the Commission as an independent arbiter, Ehlermann 
(2001), page 271.
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Before finishing this part we should also consider the different enforceability o f public policy 
considerations, depending upon who is the enforcer and the origin of the policy in question. 
Regulation 1/2003 essentially relies on three types of'body' for the enforcement of article 81, 
the Commission and Member States' competition authorities and courts.1173 In addition, the 
public policy considerations have three different origins. These are the policy-linking clauses, 
other Treaty aims and objectives, and the Member States’ public policy. We examine each body 
in relation to each of these policy sources.
First, consider the Commission's application of article 81(3) of the Treaty. Could one insist that 
it take account of one of the Treaty objectives supported by one of the policy-linking clauses, 
for example, the environment, in its decision? Yes. The policy-linking clauses create mandatory 
obligations,1174 which the Commission is bound to respect.1175 If  the Commission clearly did not 
consider environmental issues, where they were relevant to its decision, then one could appeal 
to the Community Courts (provided one has standing1176).1177 Some even allege that there is a 
presumption o f direct effect in the Community system.1178 The Commission's wide discretion 
under article 81(3) means that the Community Courts would be unlikely to interfere with the 
weight that the Commission attributed to each objective, however.1179 In conclusion, the
1,73 Regulation 1/2003, articles 4-6.
1174 Article 6, for example, says "Environmental protection requirements m ust be integrated..." [my emphasis] 
Although, Lane questions the justiciability of these clauses, Lane (1993), pages 957,972 and 978.
1175 Article 211 of the Treaty says "...the Commission shall: ensure that the provisions of this Treaty...are applied..."
1176 See Kerse (1998), chapter 9.
1,77 See, Case C-233/94, Federal Republic o f G erm any v. European Parliam ent and Council [1997], paragraphs 45 
and 48. See also, Advocate-General Cosmas "...therlast sentence of the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 o f Article 
I30r [now essentially article 6] o f the Treaty appears to impose on the Community institutions a specific and clear 
obligation which could be deemed to produce direct effect in the Community legal order. It expressly states that: 
"Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies.", Case C-321/95P Stichting Greenpeace Council and O thers v. Commission [1998], paragraph 
62. The ECJ was silent on the point; and the Opinion of Advocate-General Lenz in Case C-360/92P Publishers 
Association v. Com m ission [1995], paragraph 60. This is also the implication o f  Case C-180/96 R U nited Kingdom  
o f G reat B ritain and  Northern Ireland  v. Com m ission [1996], paragraph 63. See also, Dhondt (2003), pages 144- 
147; McGillivray and Holder (2001), page 154; Cunningham (2001), pages 158-160; Stuyck (2000), pages 386 and 
387; Jans (2000), page 277; Grimeaud (2000), pages 216 and 217; Whelan (1999), page 50; Bär and Kraemer 
(1998), pages 318 and 319; Woods and Scholes (1997), pages 50 and 51 and Baldock (1994), page 7. Bourgeois and 
Demaret (1995), page 73, accept this possibility in light of the article 6 language. Krämer (2003), page 21, doubts 
this formulation saying that environmental protection must be taken into account in all other policies, but not every 
individual measure. However, Community competition policy is essentially defined through the individual measures 
so perhaps here his argument carries less weight? See Chapter Two.
,17* Wathelet (2003), page 369.
1179 Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech S ri v S. & T. S r i [1998], paragraph 37, says there must be a ’manifest error of 
appraisal'. It was also the implication from the Echirolles Case, paragraph 25, see Chapter Two. See also, Bailey 
(2004), page 1328; Grimeaud (2000), pages 216 and 217; Whelan (1999), page 50; Bär and Kraemer (1998), pages 
318 and 319 and Evans (1981), pages 434-436. This is particularly true o f  policy-linking clauses such as article 151 
(culture). . It is possible that, where a high level o f protection is demanded (such as article 152(1) (public health)), the 
Community Courts would be more likely to intervene if they thought that the objective had been given insufficient 
weight in the balance. See the discussion in Dhondt (2003), pages 147 and 148.
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Commission must consider the policy-linking clauses' objectives when it conducts the balance. 
However, because of the enormous discretion it is given, the Commission can invariably decide 
what weight to give them.m0
For Treaty objectives without a policy-linking clause the position is different. It would be 
extremely hard to show that specific objectives should be considered, even when it seems clear 
they would contribute to, for example, the article 2 aims. In effect, this means that while the 
Commission can consider them,1181 it, in fact, has a discretion about whether or not it will 
consider them within the balance in a particular case.1182 The same position arises in relation to 
the consideration o f Member State public policy issues in article 81 of the Treaty, where they 
are not protected by a policy-linking clause. In effect, the Commission has more leeway to 
ignore objectives where there is no policy-linking clause.1183
Where the enforcer is a Member State's competition authority the position is probably similar, 
although the reasoning is a little more complex. As regards the policy-linking clauses, most are 
not directed at the Member States. Nevertheless, one can probably argue that they should take 
Treaty objectives into account in their decisions for three reasons. First, they have the article 10 
duty o f co-operation. Secondly, Regulation 1/2003 stresses the need for consistency in the 
application o f the competition rules,1184 and the Commission will be bound by the policy-linking 
clauses in its decisions, see above. Finally, further comfort might be gained, from the 
Community Courts' increasing reliance on interpreting the scope and application o f provisions 
of Community law in accordance with general principles o f law and the ECHR.1185 Temple 
Lang explains this by saying that, in such circumstances, the Member States are acting as agents 
or delegates of the Community in implementing its policies.1186 Whatever the motivation, the
11,0 We argue above that the position may be somewhat different where the policy-linking clause relates to a Member 
State interest
1181 Environmental issues were considered before the policy-linking clause, see, for example, McGillivray and Holder 
(2001), pages 152-154.
1,82 Although, in Case C-180/96 R United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission [1996], 
paragraph 63, the ECJ referred to article 3(l)(p) on public health. One might argue that this was to show that the 
Commission should consider health issues in its Common Agricultural Policy decisions. This might be one way of 
showing that certain objectives should have been considered? In that case though the ECJ also referred to the 
policy-linking clause for health, and this might have made a difference.
1183 In theory, if  the Commission does not exercise its discretion in a way that pleases the Member States, then they 
can introduce more policy-linking clauses in later Treaty changes. In fact, this seems increasingly unlikely in a 
community o f 25 states. This is an argument for giving the Commission even more discretion here.
1184 Regulation 1/2003, recital 21 and article 16(2). Admittedly, article 16 only says that Member States' competition 
authorities "...cannot take decisions which would run counter to the decision adopted by the Commission." 
Nevertheless, if  the Commission is bound to take account of the policy-linking clause then one might argue that the 
Member State body should foresee this and do the same, to avoid a potential future conflict.
1185 Craig and de Burca (1998), pages 320-323.
1186 Temple Lang (1991). For similar ideas see Constantinesco (1985), page 44.
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same logic should apply when the Member States’ competition authorities apply Community 
competition policy through article 81 of the Treaty. This means that the Member States’ 
competition authorities probably should consider the objectives protected through the policy­
linking clauses. However, if they do this, it is unlikely that, on appeal, the Community Courts 
would change the balance they ultimately arrive at.1187
The same would apply to Treaty objectives not protected by a policy-linking clause. However, 
as with the Commission, the difficulty o f establishing that such a policy should have been 
considered means that, in fact, there is a large discretion for the decision-maker to ignore the 
issue.
As regards the Member States' competition authorities' application of Member State objectives, 
the position is probably the same as it was for the Commission. The Community Courts would 
be even less likely to interfere in the balance where the policy in question was that o f the 
Member State represented by the competition authority taking the decision.1188 They might 
intervene more readily where the policy at issue was that of another Member State.
Finally, we examine the position of judgments of the Member States' courts. Here the arguments 
are somewhat easier. AH three points raised above in relation to Member State competition 
authorities should also apply here.1189 The argument in relation to consistency under Regulation 
1/2003 is even more powerful. Article 16(1) says:
"When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 
82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take 
decisions r unning counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. They must also 
avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the 
Commission in proceedings it has initiated."
In other words the Member States' courts must be even more wary of prospective Commission 
decisions than the Member States' competition authorities. In addition, there is the ECJ ruling 
from the Bosnian Case, which was an article 234 action. The point in question revolved around 
whether article 39 could apply to rules laid down by sporting associations such as UEFA and
11,7 Ehlermann has suggested that one effect o f the modernisation proposals might be that the Community Courts will 
look more closely at decisions in relation to article 81(3) of the Treaty, Ehlermann (2000), page 39 and Ehlermann 
and Atanasiu (2002), pages 74 and 75. The Community Courts are unlikely to feel comfortable performing such an 
exercise, Craig and de Burca (1998), pages 351-352.
lIM This could lead to political tension if  a Member States' own competition authority gives 'disproportionate' weight 
to a national policy consideration. A challenge might lie in extreme cases, but normally the weighting of such issues 
is for the decision-maker and will not be reviewable, see above.
m9 See, for example, in relation to article 10, Lenaerts and Arts (1999), paragraph 5-032 and Craig and de Burca 
(1998), pages 174 and 175.
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FIFA, in other words, private individuals who were not Member States. Let's examine the 
argument of UEFA and the reply of the EC J in this case:1190
"UEFA objects that such an interpretation makes Article 48 of the Treaty more restrictive in 
relation to individuals than in relation to Member States, which are alone in being able to 
rely on limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
That argument is based on a false premise. There is nothing to preclude individuals from 
relying on justifications on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
Neither the scope nor the content of those grounds of justification is in any way affected by 
the public or private nature of the rules in question."
Komninos suggests that the same logic applies when private individuals ask the Member States' 
courts to consider public policy arguments in article 81 of the Treaty.1191 In our view the ECJ 
will likely apply the same logic to allow individuals to rely on public policy (both that of the 
Member States and of the Community) in article 81 actions before the Member States' courts. 
Once again, it will be hard to challenge the actual balance arrived at by the court.
2.3 Which markets should be considered when making the assessment?
Chapter Six argued in favour o f a welfare analysis within article 81(1) of the Treaty. If such a 
test is confirmed there, it is likely that a  consumer welfare approach will be taken. Chapter Five 
argued that a partial equilibrium approach to efficiency analysis was not desirable. One reason 
given was that a broader analysis gives a more complete picture of the agreement's costs and 
benefits.
Chapter Two acknowledged that the Treaty demands consideration of non-economic objectives 
within article 81. Chapter Six argued that they should be considered within article 81(3) of the 
Treaty. Where these other objectives are considered, the analysis should also be conducted on a 
'global* basis, regardless of the relevant product and geographic markets concerned. Once again 
a more complete perspective is attained. This is particularly important, as many costs and 
benefits of the non-economic objectives are externalities to the welfare assessment. Their effects 
can often be felt far away from the relevant markets.
2.3.1 Product Market Based Limits to the Analysis
An agreement relating to one product market can have effects on other product markets too. If 
we ignore these effects, then this may alter whether or not the agreement is considered for 
exemption under article 81(3).
1190 Case C-4I5/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football A ssociation ASBL and Others v. Jean-M arc Bosman 
[1995], paragraphs 85 and 86.
1151 Komninos (2005) DRAFT, pages 12 and 13. He considers the mandatory requirements in the Wouters Case.
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Chapter Five showed how agreements in one product market could affect the economic 
efficiency in other product markets. For example, increasing the cost of trade with a region, by 
raising the cost o f shipping goods to and from the area, can affect the development and growth 
of those trading in and with this region. Shipping cartels almost certainly contribute to higher 
shipping costs. They likely have knock on effects on the trade in the products they cany. This 
may reduce welfare in the liner shipping market. The affects on other product markets can be 
important too. This is especially so where the underlying goods are things like textiles where 
transport costs make up a large proportion of the price, reducing welfare there too.1192
Considering these other markets may also bring development policy into play where product 
markets relating to developing countries are affected. One of the justifications for horizontal 
price-fixing given in Council Regulation, Shipping Cartels was the positive effects on 
developing countries created by liner conferences from the developed world.1193 Whether or not 
we agree with the logic of the block exemption, other product markets seem to have been taken 
into account by the Council when writing it. This makes sense. Development policy was 
considered even though this was well before article 177 was introduced.
In a world where the relationships between product markets are inextricably interlinked, such 
effects are common. The relationship between the product markets might be close,1194 or it could 
be much more distant, as in the shipping example. This applies in relation to economic 
efficiency. It also applies to non-economic objectives. We have just seen how development 
policy might be affected in other relevant product markets. Chapter Four also discussed how 
environmental policy could also be affected in different product markets.1195
These effects can be extremely important. To ignore them would provide a very incomplete 
picture. The same is also true in relation to the need to examine other geographic markets.
1,92 Townley (2004).
1193 On 6 April 1974 an agreement was signed under the auspices of UNCTAD. The UNCTAD Liner Code, 
established generally agreed norms relating to the conduct of liner conferences. It sought, according to its preamble, 
"...to improve the liner conference system...[whilst] [t]aking into account the special needs and problems of 
developing countries..." The UNCTAD Liner Code was intended to allow countries without a strong merchant fleet 
to develop one, as well as helping to counteract the anti-competitive actions of liner conferences. Recital 4 o f 
Regulation 40S6/S6 concludes that "...as far as conferences subject to the Code of Conduct are concerned, the 
Regulation should supplement the Code or make it more precise..."
1194 As in Commission decision, TPS, for example.
1195 Other examples can be found in Commission decisions, Asahi/  Saint-Cobain, paragraphs 24-26 and Philips- 
Osram, paragraph 27. Also note the significance that the Commission places on the public health effects in A sahi in 
Commission, RCP 1994, pages 353 and 354.
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2.3.2 Geographic M arket Based Limits to  the Analysis
From an economic efficiency perspective, anti-competitive effects in one geographic market can 
have important effects in other geographic markets, see Chapter Five. Is this also true for non­
economic objectives?
Some Treaty objectives, such as environmental protection and public health, often concern 
worldwide problems requiring worldwide solutions. It would be artificial and ineffective to 
disregard any effects (or contributory factors) outside o f our borders. It might also breach the 
Treaty. Article 152(1) of the Treaty says:
"Community action...shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing human 
illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to human health. Such action shall 
cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, 
their transmission and their prevention, as well as health information and education."
There is no reference to the fact that only the health o f  those in the Community is relevant.1196 
The idea that an international dimension to public health is important is supported in the Treaty, 
article 152(3) says that the:
"...Community and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third countries and the 
competent international organizations in the sphere of public health."1197
Indeed, some Community action is already aimed at improving public health in other 
countries.1198 Secondly, it is clear that R&D has a key role to play here, and that often means 
that undertakings should get involved.
Even if  it were only the public health o f those in the Community that is important, this does not 
necessarily mean that an isolationist approach is best.1199 For example, in relation to SARS, the 
Community found it necessary to co-operate with, amongst others, China, in order to better 
protect the health of those within the Community. Research and development activities outside 
of the Community could also benefit those suffering from SARS, or other diseases, within it.1200
It may be that an agreement between pharmaceutical firms could help achieve these aims. As 
well as the economic effects o f such an agreement, its effect on public health worldwide should 
be considered in the article 81 analysis. To hold otherwise would be a slap in the face for the
1,96 A  similar point applies in relation to consumer protection. Although, in relation to public health, the Treaty refers 
to the ’...the living and working condition o f  their peoples...', see the Preamble.
1197 See also documents such as, Press Release, IP/03/1091.
1198 Sec, for example, COM(2000) 585. See also recommendations for the future, such as, Press Release, IP/03/1091.
1199 See, for example, Press Release, IP/03/1091.
1200 See, for example, Extraordinary Council meeting, Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
(2003).
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new, humane, face that the Community has been cultivating.1201 It also risks undermining the 
objectives the Community is bound to embrace.
A similar position emerges in relation to environmental policy. Article 174(1) of the Treaty 
specifically says that the Community policy on the environment:
"...shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and 
improving the quality of the environment; protecting human health; prudent and rational 
utilisation of natural resources; promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems [my emphasis].”
It is clear that acting alone the Community cannot do much to counteract global warming or the 
depletion of the ozone layer. Environmental policy must have an international dimension, see 
also article 174(4) of the Treaty.1202 This international dimension is also important when 
environmental policy is incorporated into article 81. Exclusively looking at effects within the 
Community is a nonsense and ineffective.1203
There are other Treaty objectives, such as development policy, which, by definition, require an 
extra-Community analysis. Article 177(1) is very wide:
"Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation., .shall foster the sustainable 
economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the 
most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing 
countries."
The boundaries o f such a policy are extremely unclear. Does social and economic development 
include a cultural policy for developing countries?1204 Surely, it would include consumer 
protection policies;1205 environmental protection;1206 industrial policy; public health1207 and 
research and development aimed at helping these countries,1208 wherever it was undertaken? The 
Commission has underlined that:1209
1201 See, for example, Collège d’Europc (1998), pages 214 and 220.
1202 Collège d'Europe (1998), page 226.
1203 The same might easily be said o f the security o f the fuel supply in other countries. If there were another oil shock, 
for example, this could affect their ability to sell the Community the things it needs and to buy from the 
Community. This would affect the Community's industrial policy.
1204 COM(2000) 212, pages 6 and 23.
1205 COM(2000) 212, page 13.
1206 COM(99) 499 and Council Report, The Integration o f Environment into Economic and Development Co­
operation and SEC(92) 1986, page 6.
1207 See, for example, COM(2002) 129.
1208 COM(2000) 212, pages 6 and 10.
,2W COM(2000) 212, page 16.
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"Today, there is a wide consensus that poverty cannot be defined merely as the lack of 
income and financial resources but should be recognised as a multi-faceted concept. This 
new definition includes deprivation of basic capabilities and encompasses non-monetary 
factors such as the lack of access to education, health, natural resources, employment, land 
and credit, political participation, services and infrastructure. It also covers the risk 
dimension and the notion of vulnerability. Reducing poverty therefore implies addressing 
these economic, political, social, environmental and institutional dimensions."
The Commission has said that the private sector is a key actor in the development process.1210 It 
has also said that competition policy should take account o f development policy.1211 These 
effects too must be taken into account in an article SI analysis.
There are some Treaty objectives, such as culture and economic and social cohesion, that less 
readily lend themselves to an analysis o f effects outside o f the Community. Environmental 
policy, public health, security o f energy supply and development policy all seem to require such 
an approach. As regards objectives such as research and development, and possibly consumer 
protection, insofar as they do not apply to any of these four policy fields, a question mark 
remains.
2.3.3 Conclusion of Section 2 3 .
Within the Treaty's limits, the decision-maker should look at the effects on different product and 
geographic markets even here. As globalisation takes hold, and the world's economies become 
increasingly inter-related, it is more and more artificial to confine our analysis to one 
jurisdiction1212 or one product. A partial equilibrium approach is insufficient in economic 
analysis, Chapter Five; it is also problematic in relation to other non-economic objectives.
Furthermore, it is often in the Community's interest to encourage increased competition over the 
long term, wherever it originates. This is so not only as regards that specific issue, but this 
should also encourage reciprocity for the Community's openness. In relation to industrial policy, 
for example, the Commission normally works to achieve this through opening up markets to 
competition and encouraging R&D, as opposed to favouring particular industries in the more 
traditional version of such a policy, see Part B. These ends are also promoted via the approach 
advocated above. This is especially so if  one does not only look at the effects within the specific 
product market in question. For example, encouraging medical R&D into stress by two US 
companies (by exempting a co-operation agreement between them on these grounds) may make 
things more difficult for their European competitors. But finding a cure would have a profound 
effect, even from a purely economic perspective, on all areas of European (and worldwide)
1210 COM(2000) 212, section 3.4.
,2U COM(2000) 212, page 13.
12,2 College d'Europe (1993), page 263.
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trade, which would likely be extremely positive for European industry1213 (as well as those in 
other jurisdictions).
A 'global' approach to assessments under article 81 could create enormous evidentiary and 
political problems. An agreement may affect markets far removed (both geographically and 
product-wise) from those of the parties to an agreement. These effects will be difficult for the 
parties, as well as the relevant decision-maker, to assess. There may even be sovereignty 
problems in relation to accessing certain information outside the Community’s jurisdiction. 
Certainly, involving outside agencies will affect the timing, coherence and possibly even the 
quality o f the final decision, see Chapter Five. We must find a way to reduce the difficulty (and 
increase the transparency and predictability) of the analysis (balancing) for the decision-maker, 
and the parties to the agreement. This should be based on eliminating the consideration of 
irrelevant Treaty objectives and also those where the effects are not appreciable. How might this 
be done? Chapter Eight offers some suggestions.
2.4 Are the aims of the parties to the agreement relevant?
The final issue to consider here is whether the relevant objectives can only be taken into account 
in this first article 81(3) test if the aim, as well as the effect, o f the agreement is to promote 
them. At first sight a requirement related to intention is attractive. It gives the impression that 
improper or immoral conduct is being punished.1214 It also (superficially) mirrors the ’object and 
effect’ wording under article 81(1) of the Treaty.1215
In the VB VB/VBBB Case, the parties argued that the Commission should take account o f the 
cultural effects o f the agreement. The Commission replied "...it is unacceptable for 
organisations representing commercial interests to make a show o f  cultural arguments so as to 
infringe the Community competition rules." The Commission later referred to the cultural 
factors in this agreement as being "...adventitious..."1216 The Commission did not believe that 
the parties' agreement had been motivated by cultural objectives in this case.1217 The fact that 
the agreement might, in fact, promote cultural factors did not seem to be sufficient.1218
1213 The International Labour Organisation issued a report (ILO, Mental Health in the Workplace), stating, for 
example, that in the UK some 5 million working days are lost annually due to stress, depression and anxiety.
1214 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000), page 135.
I2IÎI say superficially because the 'object* assessment under article 81(1) o f the Treaty is not a subjective notion, see 
B&C (2001), paragraph 2-097.
1216 The VBVB/l'BBB Case, page 48.
1217 Additionally, the Commission said that cultural motivations were irrelevant to an article 81(3) analysis, page 48.
t2Ii The Commission seems to make a similar point in Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 47.
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The ECJ confirmed this approach in the Verband Case}219 There the applicant represented, 
promoted and protected the business interests of insurers providing industrial fire and 
consequential loss insurance. The applicant was authorised to cany on business in Germany. In 
1984 the Commission found that the applicant's attempt to re-establish stable and viable 
conditions in the insurance sector, by recommending increases in premium rates o f 10,20 and 
30% in specified circumstances, infringed article 81(1) of the Treaty. It refused an article 81(3) 
exemption. The applicant made an article 230 reference.
In relation to article 81(3), the applicant argued that the measure was objectively necessary to 
re-establish the profitability o f insurance companies and that it safeguarded the interests of the 
insured. The ECJ, paragraph 58, held that the Commission was right in saying that its task was 
not only to check:
"...whether the aim o f the recommendation was to deal with the actual problems 
confronting the market as a result of the continuing fall in premiums...and to consider 
whether the recommendation was a means of dealing with that situation, but also to assess 
whether the measures put into effect by the recommendation went beyond what was 
necessary to that end. [my emphasis]"
The ECJ found that this was not the case because a global premium increase was not necessary 
to achieve the intended objective.1220
It seems that when it refers to the aim o f the agreement the ECJ means the reason why the 
agreement was adopted. The point being that if the reason why the undertakings entered into the 
agreement was not, for example, environmental protection, then it is not sufficient that their 
agreement actually benefits the environment under article 81 (3) of the Treaty.
This would have a serious impact on the ability to use non-economic objectives within article 
81(3). Undertakings are normally motivated by the profit that they think that a particular 
strategy will generate for their shareholders, not by whether their agreements are 
environmentally friendly. This does not mean that their agreements do not also benefit 
others,1221 just that this is not normally the aim of the agreement.
Why did the Commission and the ECJ insist that the aim of the agreement, as well as its effect, 
must be to achieve these Treaty objectives? Perhaps they feared that the Commission would be 
inundated with claims that agreements, though restrictive, incidentally had beneficial effects 
upon the environment, employment and other relevant Treaty objectives?
12,9 Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer e. V. v. Commission [1987]-
1220 The Verband Case, paragraph 60.
1221 For example, think of the provision o f free anti-retroviral drugs to their infected workers by Anglo American, 
AngtoGold, De Beers, Old Mutual and Transnet, see Strategic Caring, The Economist, 3 October 2002 and Digging 
Deep, The Economist, 8 August 2002.
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While the Commission must ensure that agreements comply with the Community’s social and 
other aims (to the extent that this is allowed within, for our purposes, article 81), to insist that 
undertakings actually embrace and pursue these aims as their primary goals is unnecessary. The 
undertakings' intention is irrelevant. The important issue is whether or not, in fact, an agreement 
achieves the non-economic aims.1222 Furthermore, these demands risk imposing higher costs on 
firms, reducing the likelihood o f "beneficial interventions" in the future. This condition also 
risks reducing welfare, including consumer welfare, to a significant degree. Perhaps even more 
seriously, these notions undermine the rationale of capitalism itself and the effect o f the 
"invisible hand". By which we mean that, in a competitive market, even if  individuals act 
selfishly, their acts can benefit society as a whole.1223 Most economists believe that a company's 
primary duty is profit maximisation.1224 In many companies, to act otherwise may even breach 
the directors' fiduciary duty to their shareholders.
Two other objections are worthy o f mention. Introducing a requirement related to the 
agreement's aim merely adds a requirement of form. Sophisticated companies can easily add 
into the recitals o f the agreement, and their board minutes, the fact that the agreement aims to 
protect a relevant non-economic aim. This should allow them to get round this problem, unless 
the Commission will also check for lies (which would be hard to show). Smaller companies 
may make just as big a contribution to, for example, the environment with their agreements, but 
because o f the failure to follow the form this might not count in the eyes of the Commission. 
Secondly, such requirements also risk stifling criticism o f the balance. Third party undertakings, 
often the best-placed entities to complain to the Commission or others, run the risk that if  they 
complain the aims in their own agreements (which are likely to be similar to their competitors) 
may be questioned too. This might discourage exemption of their own agreements under article 
81(3) too.
This requirement is not seen in all cases. It should not be raised at all. The decision-maker 
controls the exemption process. It can ensure that the optimal balance has been struck. If  the 
Commission and the Community Courts insist that the object of an agreement, as well as its 
effect, be to further these Treaty objectives they set the decision-maker an impossible task. How 
can it properly assess what the true aims of the parties are? It also twists corporate motivations, 
often in a welfare reducing way. Better surely to look merely at the effects which can be 
ascertained more "objectively".
1222 Lenz (2000), page 70.
1225 See Hildebrand (2002), page 112.
1224 See, A. Smith (1976 Re-print), pages 477 and 478; Friedman (1962), page 133 and Henderson (2001), page 3.
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2.5 Conclusion of Section 2
The balancing test under article 81(3)'s first condition, as interpreted by the Community Courts, 
is (and should remain) extremely broad.
We have argued that there should be a full balancing exercise, not only considering how an 
agreement helps achieve relevant (Community and Member State) objectives, but examining 
how it undermines them as well. This analysis should include (potential) effects outside of the 
relevant markets. The subjective aims o f the parties when concluding the agreement should not 
be relevant.
Interpreting article 81(3)'s first condition as widely as is recommended here should have many 
benefits. It means that the decision-maker will be able to consider most relevant objectives that 
are affected by the agreement, whatever they are and wherever the effects are felt. Once these 
objectives can be overtly considered then decision-makers will be under less pressure to distort 
other parts o f the article 81 analysis in order to achieve similar aims.1225 This should lead to 
more transparent reasoning and predictable definitions there.
Such a wide definition of the first condition also imposes some costs. As already mentioned, it 
would be both politically and evidentially difficult to assess eveiy single effect that an 
agreement has. This should not be exaggerated. In most cases only arguments relating to 
economic efficiency, and possibly those relating to market integration, are raised. In most other 
cases only one or two objectives are considered.1226 True, the number o f non-economic 
objectives discussed will probably increase once it is clear that they are relevant. Nevertheless, 
in most cases these will not be appreciable, see Chapter Eight.
There are a number of institutional reasons for the limited consideration of non-economic 
objectives within article 81 of the Treaty. The first relates to the method of bringing cases. Most 
often the Commission takes a position either as a result of a notification to it or because of a 
complaint. Because of the lack o f clarity about the worth of raising arguments that do not relate 
to economic efficiency these are often ignored by applicants and complainants in such matters. 
This problem is exacerbated by commercial anti-trust lawyers who often think solely in terms of 
economic efficiency, as opposed to considering other Treaty objectives, which might be relevant 
in their case. Not only that, but because, until now, arguments have principally (although not
1225 In relation to how the definition o f ’undertaking' is affected by non-economic objectives, see Townley (2005). For 
similar issues in relation to the definition of: a ’restriction of competition', see the Albany and Wouters Cases 
(respectively the Community objective of promoting certain collective labour agreements and the Member State 
objective of the administration o f justice), Chapter Two; and, an 'affect on trade between Member States’, see the 
Leclerc Case (the Member State objective o f culture), discussed in Chapter Two.
1226 Aleinikoff (1987), page 977 and following, says courts often narrow down the issues they will consider in this 
kind o f balancing exercise. He criticises this because he feels that this tendency can be at the expense of getting the 
right answer. Many other public bodies probably only base their decisions on a few underlying objectives too.
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exclusively1227) been made by companies that operate in the same or a related field as that in 
which the agreement will operate then they may be reluctant to raise policy arguments from 
other areas of the Treaty, in the belief that such arguments may be raised against them in future 
cases.
To a certain extent these considerations do not apply in relation to Treaty objectives such as 
market integration and, increasingly, protection of the environment. This may well be because 
these are now such established areas of discussion in article 81 cases that interested parties are 
confident that they will at least be considered relevant by the Commission. Furthermore, as they 
are now so well established there is little point in a firm avoiding reliance on such Treaty aims 
in the hope that they will not be raised in relation to it in the future. Finally, DG Competition 
will be more willing to rely on such 'fashionable' arguments in the knowledge that when the rest 
of the Commission comes to vote on a decision they are likely to accept them as relevant.
A number of mechanisms are likely to encourage change. First, if the Commission were to 
adopt a clear underlying objective, or set o f objectives, in relation to its article 81 decision­
making then this would increase clarity in this area. This would make it more likely that 
interested parties would use such arguments in their submissions. It would also increase the 
confidence of case officers to rely on such arguments in their decision-making. Secondly, at an 
early stage in the case the decision-maker might make more effort to consider the matter from a 
number o f  perspectives in order to ascertain the impact of the agreement outside o f the 
economic sphere. This approach would be aided by DG Competition's attempts to get consumer 
organisations and other entities involved that can provide specialist information in relation to 
the underlying subject matter o f a particular agreement. Such bodies may also be more willing 
to provide relevant information where their business interests are unlikely to be negatively 
affected by the Commission relying on such an objective now or in the future. This strategy is 
also likely to be enhanced by a greater specialisation in relation to the underlying subject matter 
of case handlers. It would also be advisable to involve other DG's and government agencies in 
cases as early as possible, so that it can get better input about the likely effect of particular
1227 The Commission increasingly seeks to involve consumer organisations, COM(96) 520, page 7, "An efficient 
Single Market needs strong consumer organisations with access to clear information and instruments to represent 
and enforce consumers' rights" Resolution of the European Parliament on the Commission’s XXVIIIth Report on 
Competition Policy (1998) in Commission, RCP 1999, page 383 (points 7-9) “Takes the view that the further 
development of competition policy must be accompanied simultaneously by a comprehensive consumer protection 
policy and better involvement of consumer organisations...” The Commission answered on the same page, "To 
promote competition on the market is also to defend consumer interests. The Commission is convinced of this, and 
shares Parliament’s view as regards greater involvement of consumer organisations in competition policy. In this 
connection, the Commission has launched a number of initiatives aimed at consumers and the organisations 
representing them."
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agreements in relation to other Community action plans.1228 Finally, the problems that many 
relevant objectives would cause might encourage frivolous litigation.
Chapter Eight provides a framework for balancing that should help to reduce these problems. 
This involves more clearly describing various objectives’ weight in the balance, application of 
the appreciability doctrine to non-economic objectives, etc. Chapter Five also advocated 
limiting the investigation of affects to those in the relevant markets, unless major environmental 
or other problems would be overlooked by this method. Siragusa also suggests limiting the 
period for which exemption decisions can apply before they are reassessed.1229 Other limits are 
implied through article Sl(3)'s other three tests, discussed below.
Clear descriptions of how to implement the balance will reduce the problems involved. This 
chapter aims to help fill this gap. Over time, the application o f these (or similar) guidelines in 
concrete cases will also help. However, compromise is difficult and can never be entirely 
predictable, Chapter One. Every case is different and value judgements must be made about the 
optimal balance in each case. The presence o f this discretion should be celebrated. Legal 
certainty is not the only value legal systems espouse. There is also justice and fairness. While 
the decision-maker should be guided, their hands should not be tied.
The Council and European Parliament agree that non-economic objectives, including Member 
State ones, should be dealt with under article 81(3) of the Treaty, see Chapter Two.
The clarifications that have been suggested in Section 2 could all be implemented by the 
Community Courts in subsequent cases. Some suggest that article 81(3)’s first test should be re­
written to show that non-economic issues can be considered there.1230 This would be relatively 
simple. The conclusion to Part C provides a revised draft text for the whole of article 81(3) of 
the Treaty. If the Community Courts prove unwilling to follow the recommendations above, 
then this approach should be considered. There is a risk that, once article 81 is opened to 
discussion, the Member States would advocate more extensive 'populist' changes. That is always 
a risk in a democracy.
12:8 The flipside o f this approach is for undertakings to talk to other DGs and to try to get them to accept their 
agreements, at least in principle, before raising the matter with DG Competition, or at least to ensure that the 
agreement is in line with a Community action plan or initiative. This was the case in relation to both the ACEA and 
the CEM EP matters, respectively, Commission, RCP 1998, paragraph 131 and page 151 and Press Release, 
Commission clears European m anufacturers' agreem ent to im prove energy efficiency o f electric m otors, IP/00/508. 
Support for this proposition, at least in relation to environmental matters, is provided by Commission, Vertical 
G uidelines, paragraph 171.
1229 Siragusa (1998), page 486. This was the position under Regulation 17, article 8. There is a suggestion that this is 
no longer, possible under Regulation 1/2003, see Geradin (2004), page 15.
1230 See, fCirchner (1998), pages 515, 518 and 519 and Monti (2002), pages 1096-1099.
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3. THE SECOND ARTICLE 81(3) TEST: CONSUMERS MUST GET A FAIR SHARE OF 
THE RESULTING BENEFIT1“ 1
The second article 81(3) condition states that the agreement must allow "...consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit..." This provision raises three main problems. What is a benefit;
who is a 'consumer' and how much of the resulting benefit should consumers get?
The Commission focuses on economic benefits in Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines.123 232 
There is widespread agreement that non-economic benefits are also relevant,1233 even though 
only economic benefits are normally considered. The Commission has considered such 
objectives there in the past.1234 In Commission decision, Philips-Osram, for example, it said:
"The use of cleaner facilities will result in less air pollution, and consequently in direct and 
indirect benefits for consumers from reduced negative externalities."1235
The Commission would probably say the same today, remember that it has said that:
"Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they 
can be subsumed under the four conditions of article 81(3)...”1236
The Treaty does not define the concept o f a 'fair share' either.1237 The Commission has said:
"The concept of 'fair share’ implies that the pass-on of benefits must at least compensate 
consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them by the restriction of 
competition found under article 81(1)."1238
It is hard to produce a precise definition in the abstract1239 Lyons believes that, at least, one can 
say that the consumer benefits cannot be negative.1240 Despite this, the decision-maker has a lot 
of discretion,1241 and, in the past, a fair share has been established relatively easily.1242
1231 Thanks to Heli Askola, Galina Comelisse, Johanna Engstroem, Poul Noer, Assimakis Komninos, Tobias 
Witschke and Lorenzo Zucca for their comments on the different language versions o f  die Treaty.
1232 Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraphs 83-104.
1233 Whish (2003), page 157; Vedder (2003), pages 170-174; Monti (2002), page 1075; Jans (2000), page 280; 
Bouterse (1994), page 28 and Jacobs (1993/2), page 56. Although, Goyder (2003), page 123, only refers to 
economic advantages, he does not expressly reject non-economic ones.
1234 Even, arguably, when economic benefits were not present, Commission decisions, Jahrhundertvertrag and V1K- 
GVSt, paragraph 32 and International Energy A gency (1994), paragraph 6(b).
,23s Commission decision, Philips-Osram, paragraph 27. See also, Commission decisions, KSB/ G oulds/ Low era/ ITT, 
paragraph 27; REIM S II, paragraphs 77-85 and CECED, paragraphs 47-57. In CECED  the first and second tests 
under article 81(3) are taken together here, so it is difficult to know how important environmental issues were under 
each head.
1236 Commission, A rticle 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 42. See also paragraph 89. Furthermore, it is the overall benefit 
that is relevant, there is no need for consumers to participate in all benefits, they must just be better off overall, 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 86 and Jacobs (1993/2), page 56.
1237 Lyons (2002), page 1.
,23* Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 85.
1239 Whish (2003), page 156.
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These issues are important, but the focus o f Section 3 is the definition of 'consumer', for article 
81(3) purposes. The concept o f a 'consumer* in article 81 is unclear. Perhaps as a result of this, 
the Commission has not defined it consistently. We examine the Commission’s latest 
interpretation o f this term and discuss the implications of this for balancing non-economic 
objectives within article 81 o f the Treaty.
Who is a consumer? The Oxford English Dictionary defines this as a purchaser o f  goods or 
services. But there is an important subtlety. It can be any purchaser, but there is an inference 
that the purchaser is "...an individual who buys goods and services for personal use rather than 
for manufacture, processing or resale.",1240 243 for the purposes of Section 3, 'private end-users'.
Many of the different language versions o f the Treaty employ an equivalent word to 'consumer*, 
implying that an agreement can only be exempted if  it can be shown that a fair share of the 
resulting benefit goes to private end-users.1244 Other language versions utilise the more 
ambiguous term 'user', which could include private end-users, but also embraces those that will 
use these goods or services for manufacture, processing or resale, including those that buy from 
the parties to the agreement.1245
It may be helpful to illustrate the distinction by way o f an example. Imagine that two 
companies, A and B are both manufacturers of sulphuric acid. They set up a joint purchasing 
pool for sulphur. A and B sell all their sulphuric acid to C and D. C, a large multinational, uses 
all o f its sulphuric acid in a further industrial process to make synthetic detergent. C sells the 
synthetic detergent directly to private end-users, E, in its factory shop. D is a wholesaler that 
sells all of its sulphuric acid to privately owned schools, F. Pupils, G, attend chemistry lessons 
at F, from whom they buy sulphuric acid for their experiments in class.
If the agreement between A and B falls within article 81(1) it will require exemption under 
article 81(3) of the Treaty. For this to happen, amongst other things, consumers must get a fair 
share of the agreement's resulting benefit. But who are the consumers? Are they those that: (i)
1240 Lyons (2002), page 1.
1241 Jones and Sufrin (2001), page 196.
1242 See, Reich (1997), page 133, and the references made there; Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.156 and 
Bourgoignie (1985a), page 430.
1243 Aimner and Ammer (1977).
1244 This interpretation is supported by the Danish language version o f the Treaty, "forbrugeme"; the Finnish 
language version, "kuluttajat"; the German language version, "Verbraucher"; the Greek language version, 
"katanalotes"; as well as the Swedish language version, "konsumentema",
1245 This is the implication of the Dutch language version, "gebruikers"; the French language version, "utilisateurs"; 
the Italian language version, "utilazzatori"; the Portuguese language version, "utilizadores"; and the Spanish 
language version, "usuarios".
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'consume1 the sulphuric acid, in this case G (as C is not using it in a private sense); or (ii) those 
that use the sulphuric acid, even in a business sense, in this case C, D, F and G? The English 
version o f the Treaty suggests the former; the French version of the Treaty suggests the 
latter.1246
The Commission does not normally articulate who the consumer is when it applies this 
provision. On the rare occasions that it does, it has not adopted a consistent approach:1247
• sometimes, the Commission only considers the benefits o f those that buy directly from 
the parties, whether or not they are end-users, in our example, C and D;1248
• sometimes, the Commission considers the benefits for the end-users of the relevant
product. Even here the Commission is not consistent:
o sometimes it confines itself to an examination of the benefits for end-users, in 
our example, C and G;1249
o it often assesses the benefits to those in the distribution chain between the 
parties to the agreement and the end-users, in our example, C, D, F and G;1250
• sometimes, the Commission considers the benefits for the 'consumers' o f the products 
made with the relevant product, in our example, E. Here the Commission has confined 
itself to an examination of the benefits for the end-users of the derived product,1231 
ignoring those higher up the distribution chain;
12«  definition could be widened even farther by assessing the agreement's effects on those that 'consume' or 'use' 
products derived fro m  the sulphuric acid too. In this case, E would be included too.
1247 Except in one sense. In a vertical agreement, the buyer of the products covered by the agreement is normally one 
of the parties to the agreement (by definition). The Commission is not interested in any benefits the parties may get 
from the agreement in relation to this provision, see Commission decision, P&.1 Clubs, paragraphs 40 and 41 and 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 84.
,24î Commission decisions, Enichem /IC I, paragraphs 38 and 39 and B ayer/B P  Chemicals, paragraphs 32-34.
1249 Commission decisions, SPCA - K ali und Salz, page 5; Kali und Sah/K ali Chemie, pages 25 and 26; Beecham/  
Parke, D avis, paragraph 38; Vimpoltu, paragraph 49; Synthetic Fibres, paragraphs 39-41 and LH / SAS, paragraphs 
74 and 75.
1250 Commission decisions, Uniform Eurocheques, paragraph 38; A R C / Unipart, paragraph 41; Eurocheque: H elsinki 
Agreem ent, paragraphs 67-70 and FRUBO, page 21. There seems to be a consensus that this definition is normally 
adopted, see Whish (2003), page 156; Goyder (2003), page 123; Hildebrand (2002), page 245; Jones and Sufrin 
(2001), page 196; B&C (2001), paragraph 3-050; Ritter, Braun and Rawtinson (2000), pages 124 and 125; 
Alexander (1973), page 17 and Graupner (1965), page 21.
1251 Commission decision, Film purchases by German television stations, paragraph. 54, and possibly also 
Commission decision, Bayer/G ist-Brocades, paragraph 2?
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•  sometimes the Commission combines these four approaches; and,1252
* finally, sometimes the Commission analyses the benefits to society as a whole.1253
There is not a clear correlation between the authentic text used in these decisions, i.e. French or 
English, and the definition o f consumers. This could well be because the case teams that analyse 
these matters are often of mixed nationalities. There is no other obvious justification for these 
differences either.
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines attempt to clarify the position, paragraph 84:
"The concept of 'consumers1 encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products 
covered by the agreement, including producers that use the products as an input, 
wholesalers, retailers and final consumers, i.e. natural persons who are acting for purposes 
which can be regarded as outside their trade or profession. In other words, consumers 
within the meaning of article 81(3) are the customers of the parties to the agreement and 
subsequent purchasers."
This explains that 'consumers' includes all direct and indirect users of the products covered by 
the agreement. Some ambiguity remains. Must a fair share o f the benefit accrue to the customers 
of the parties to the agreement as well as subsequent purchasers? Apart from the citation above, 
the guidelines are ambiguous on this point.1254 However, paragraph 87 reads "The decisive 
factor is the overall impact on consumers o f the products within the relevant market and not the 
impact on individual members of this group of consumers..."1255 The emphasis on consumers 
within each relevant market might support the idea that each level in the supply chain must 
benefit.1256
To sum up so far, the different language versions o f this article 81(3) provision introduce 
ambiguity into the text. This makes interpretation difficult. The Commission has not been 
consistent in its definition of this provision. The Commission Article 81(3) Guidelines seek to 
impose order. They seem to merge both the French and English language versions o f the Treaty.
1252 Commission decisions, Rennet, paragraph 30; National Sulphuric A cid  Association, paragraph 47; Rockwell/ 
Iveco , paragraph 9; Schlegel, paragraph 20; Ivoclar, paragraph 23; Rich Products/ Jus~rol, paragraph 42; BBC  
Brown Boveri, paragraph 24; Cekacan, paragraph 45 and GEAEJP& W , paragraphs 81 and 82.
1253 Commission decisions. C ontinental/ M ichelin, paragraph 27; K SB / G oulds/ Lowered ITT, paragraph 27; Philips - 
Os ram , paragraph 27; P&I Clubs, paragraph 108 and CECED, paragraphs 47-57, particularly paragraph 56.
,2S4 Also, 'direct and indirect* may either include users of derived products, in our example E, or direct and indirect 
purchasers of the specific product. Kjolbye (2004), page 575, suggests the latter. The Commission, Article 81(3) 
G uidelines are unclear on this point too.
l2SS See also, Commission, Article 81(3) G uidelines, paragraphs 43,89, 103 and 104.
)2W Alternatively, it may refer to the situation where the parties themselves supply into different relevant markets? 
Also note that paragraph 90 stales " ...if  the restrictive effects of an agreement are relatively limited and the 
efficiencies are substantial it is likely that a fair share of the cost savings will be passed on to consumers." This 
might imply that we need only look at the parties' customers.
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In so doing the Commission may have introduced a twist 'Consumers' are defined as all (direct 
and indirect) users o f the products covered by the agreement Does this mean that the customers 
of the parties to the agreement as well as subsequent purchasers, including private end-users 
must all (or collectively?) obtain a fair share of the resulting benefit o f the agreement? In 
particular, must a fair share of the agreement's benefits accrue to private end-users? If so, is this 
the right approach?
What would the Community Courts say? The ECJ has held that the first principal of 
interpretation is to look at the ordinary meaning of the word in its context and in light of the 
objectives of the Treaty.1257 Predicting how the Community Courts will react to the 
Commission's 'clarification' is particularly difficult because all the language versions of the 
Treaty are authentic, article 314 o f the Treaty. Which should they follow? It cannot be assumed 
that they will adopt the meaning indicated by the majority of the texts. In Elefanten Schuh v. 
Jacqmain,1258 the ECJ followed the French and Irish texts of article 18 of the EC Brussels 
Convention and ignored the wording of the Danish, Dutch, English, German and Italian texts. In 
paragraph 14 of that case the ECJ explained that it had decided to follow the French and Irish 
texts because they "...were more in keeping with the objectives and spirit of the 
Convention."1259
This is the teleological approach to Treaty interpretation so often emphasised by the Community 
Courts. But does it help us in our case? It will only help us if we can determine what the 
Community Courts will consider the provision's telos to be. In this respect, it may be helpful to 
analyse the effect that the various interpretations might have on the relevant economic actors.
At first sight, the 'French version' is unsatisfactoiy. In effect, it means that undertakings 
operating lower down the manufacturing or distribution chain (than the parties to the agreement) 
are considered more worthy of surplus than those above them. Why should this be so? In many 
cases this will simply mean favouring certain companies at the expense of those upstream o f 
them. Interpreting the provision like this seems nonsensical, although this point is discussed 
further below. Furthermore, it could be extremely difficult and expensive to assess every 
downstream market.
Another approach we saw being used above was to look at the benefits to society as a whole, as 
opposed to consumers in particular. Jans favours this interpretation, in light of the
1257 Case 53/81 Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982], paragraph 9.
,2S> Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh v. Pierre Jacqmain f 1981J, paragraphs 12-17.
1259 The ECJ looks at how many language versions o f the Treaty say X, but this is only to support what on other 
grounds seems the best interpretation, Jacobs (2003), page 304.
environmental policy-linking clause, article 6 of the Treaty.1260 Monti argues that construing the 
provision as Jans suggests is problematic:
"Direct consumer benefits, in addition to societal benefits, must be established before an 
exemption is granted."1261
These do not always coincide.1262
The Commission has certainly caused a lot o f confusion here. Not only has it apparently 
considered societal benefits under this head in its decisions, its notices also speak o f societal 
benefits here.1263 Furthermore, the Commission has actually merged its analysis of article 
81(3)'s first and second tests in some o f its decisions.1264
Monti's critique seems to focus on the wording of article 81(3)'s second test. Article 81(3)’s 
second test merely says that "...consumers [must get] a fair share of the resulting benefit..." It 
does not state that these must be the consumers of the products in question. Therefore, on a 
purely (English) textual basis, it is difficult to criticise Jans. However, such an interpretation 
would be in direct contradiction with the French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish texts.1265 
These languages all refer to the users. This is more specific than the English text and seems to 
exclude the generalisation of the term to society as a whole.1266
Vedder distinguishes between economic and non-economic benefits. He argues that:
"Only with regard to the economic benefits of an agreement... is closer scrutiny in the form 
of the determination of an individual fair share called for. This is inherent in the purpose of 
the requirement of establishing a fair share for consumers, which... is to ascertain that only
1260 Jans (2000), pages 2S0 and 281. Jacobs (1993/2), page 57, discusses a similar concept
1261 Monti (2002), pages 1076 and 1077. Heimler and Fattori (1998), page 599; Tesauro (1998), page 223 and Evans 
(1985), pages 103,104 and 113,agree.
1262 Bourgoignie (1985), page 7.
1263 Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 85 (cited below). True, these comments come after a discussion 
of consumers, but why are societal benefits mentioned if they are not relevant here?
1264 Commission decisions, Visa International - M IE , paragraphs 74-95 and CECED , paragraphs 47-57.
1265 The French text says "...tout en réservant aux utilisateurs une partie équitable..."; the Italian text says "...pur 
ríservando agli utilizzatori une congrua parte..."; the Portuguese text says "...contanto que aos utilizadores se 
reserve uma parte equitativa..." and the Spanish text says " ...y  reserven al mismo tiempo a los usarios una 
participación equitativa...”
1266 Although, relying on the French text, Commentaire Megret (1997), paragraph 222, adopts a similar position to 
Jans, "...à notre avis, la notion d'utilisateur doit être entendue comme comprenant toute personne autre que les 
parties à l’entente." This view is based on Commission decision, P&I Clubs, where the Commission said that it was 
not enough that just the parties benefited. However, as we have seen, in that decision the Commission did not look 
to benefits for society as a whole. As paragraph 41 it said "...it must be shown that persons other than the insured 
themselves, nam ely transport users who are th e ir customers, an d  the fin a l consumers, also benefit from  the 
agreem ent in question, [my emphasis]" In the same paragraph Commentaire Megret (1997) also seeks to rely on the 
M etro I  Caser paragraph 48. But here the ECJ expressly refers to the consumer benefit of improved supplies, which 
cannot be understood as society as a whole, but rather users.
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advantages that not only benefit the parties themselves are exempted- Environmental 
benefits, by their veiy nature, cannot be kept for oneself. Economic benefits, on the 
contrary, may very well not be passed on to consumers."1267
In many ways this is a similar argument to that o f Jans. Vedder adds a kind of teleological point 
too. He says that, unlike economic ones, non-economic benefits cannot be reserved to the 
parties. As a result, there is no need to analyse the pass-on o f non-economic benefits.
There may be some logic in this position. It is unlikely that article 81(3) was originally designed 
with non-economic objectives in mind, at least to the scale that they are now included in the 
Treaty. However, the core of Vedder’s point is that the provision is there to ensure that not only 
the parties benefit from the agreement. But, as we have already seen, the French language 
version seems to require something more. It is not enough that not only the parties benefit from 
the agreement, but a specific group (users) must benefit too.
Secondly, the Commission does not distinguish between economic and non-economic benefits 
when it refers to societal benefits (nor does the Treaty). Indeed, it has expressly referred to 
societal benefits in relation to economic efficiencies. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
paragraph 85, says:
"...society as a whole benefits where the efficiencies lead either to fewer resources being 
used to produce the output consumed or to the production of more valuable products and 
thus to a more efficient allocation of resources."
Furthermore, Vedder’s suggestion ignores the fact that consumers need not benefit from every 
type of benefit, but must just get a fair share of the overall benefit, see above. It may be that an 
agreement generates some economic benefits and a lot of environmental benefits. Where this is 
the case, and the parties reserve all the economic benefits to themselves, Veddefs method 
would not be able to assess whether consumers got a fair share. The Commission (implicitly) 
seems to accept this point. Chapters Four and Eight show it attempting to quantify the extent of 
environmental benefits in Commission decision, CECED, for example.1268
Where consumers are defined as both direct and indirect users, the assessment will have to be 
made on many markets, especially if users o f derived products are also considered. As a result, 
the group of relevant consumers could become extensive. Perhaps references to examining the 
overall benefits to society are merely an efficient shorthand for a detailed analysis o f consumers 
on each and every relevant market? Although we prefer the English definition of consumer, to 
that implied by the French language version of the Treaty, use o f this shorthand would sit
1267 Vedder (2003), page 173.
1268 In addition, where an agreement only generated non-economic gains, according to Vedder, article 81(3)'s second 
test would be irrelevant. The Community Courts could read his interpretation into the provision, but I do not think 
they would readily do so.
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comfortably with our desire to avoid a partial equilibrium analysis. Having said that, the 
Commission has not embraced this definition either. It appears to insist that one assess the 
overall benefits on each relevant market,1269
So, what alternatives are there? Might it be advantageous to interpret 'consumers' in article 81(3) 
of the Treaty as private end-users of the goods or services covered by the agreement, in our 
example G?1270 This would be in line with, amongst others, the English and German versions of 
the Treaty.
The Preamble tells us that the essential objective of the Member States' Treaty efforts is "...the 
constant improvement o f the living and working conditions of their peoples..." Article 2 of the 
Treaty talks o f "...the raising o f the standard of living and quality of life..." Ensuring that 
private end-users benefit from anti-competitive agreements would help promote this end.
Other justifications can be found in the Treaty for this approach. The English language version 
of the Treaty, for example, uses the same word for 'consumer’ in article 81(3), as is used in 
article 153 of the Treaty, in relation to ’consumer protection’. This occurs in other language 
versions too,1271 although not in all o f them.1272 Could it be that the Danish, English, Finnish, 
German, Greek and Swedish language versions of the Treaty implicitly carry within them the 
idea that a 'consumer1, as used in article 81(3) of the Treaty, is someone who needs protection? 
The definition of consumer protection in article 153 o f  the Treaty is wide enough to include 
consumers' economic interests. Article 153(1) reads:
"In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests o f consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to 
organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests, [my emphasis]"
Defining 'consumer1 in this way would also give weight to article 153(2) of the Treaty:
"Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Community policies and activities."
Interpreting the word 'consumers' in article 81(3) to mean that private end-users should get a fair 
share of the agreement’s resulting benefit could be very appealing to the Commission. Mario 
Monti has said that this contributes "...to  an image of the European Union as a project not only
1269 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 43,89, 103 and 104.
1270 We may choose to include within this definition private end-users o f derivative products too, in our example E. 
This is discussed later in the text In the interim, we do not include these end-users in our definition o f consumers.
1271 This is the case in the Danish, English, Finnish, German, Greek and Swedish texts.
1272 The Dutch, French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish texts all use a different term in relation to those considered 
worthy o f consumer protection in article 153 o f  the Treaty.
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o f politicians, or for the benefit of business, but as a project for the people."1273 Indeed, in the 
same speech, Mario Monti emphasised:
"Our work is easier to understand if the underlying objectives of the competition rules are 
made clear. These objectives are to ensure wider consumer choice, technological innovation 
and price competition. This is achieved by ensuring that companies compete rather than 
collude, that market power is not abused and that efficiencies are passed on to final 
consumers, [my emphasis]"
This interpretation o f 'consumer* also receives support from the Community Courts. In relation 
to article 82, for example, the ECJ differentiates between customers and consumers:
"Article 86 [now article 82] prohibits any abuse by an undertaking of a dominant 
position...The dominant position thus referred to relates to a position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately o f the consumers, [my 
emphasis]"1274 1275
If  the second exemption condition is to be read as a consumer protection provision, we must 
define exactly who needs protection. It seems sensible to adopt the same concept as that used in 
relation to ’consumer* in article 153 of the Treaty. Why should the Commission intervene to 
protect those that do not need protection? This would also provide internal coherence to the 
Treaty. The concept of 'consumer* under article 153 is a complex notion, but essentially it is a 
private end-user.1276
Most of the actors in our example are established companies acting in the course of their 
business, so they would be unlikely to be considered 'consumers' in this sense. The only 
exception to this is G, who is a private individual. Therefore, if we interpret 'consumer* in this
1273 Mario Monti (2001a).
1274 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979], paragraph 38, See also, Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v. 
Commission [1991], paragraph 90 and Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal v. 
Commission [1978], paragraph 65 and compare with Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company v. Commission [1973], paragraph 11.3. Thanks to Giorgio Monti for this argument
In the French version o f these judgments the ECJ uses yet another word ’consommateurs’. Also, in the Pavlov Case 
the ECJ refers to final consumers (although this may be a literal translation from the French 'utilisateur final'), 
paragraph 81. This undermines the weight of this point somewhat
1275 Monti (2002), pages 1075-1077, suggests that it already is. See also, Commission decision, VW, paragraph 189, 
where the Commission, when discussing the possibility of an individual exemption of an agreement, said that this 
could not be contemplated. The agreement had not been notified, but the Commission added "The export ban/ 
restriction is in serious contradiction with the objective of consumer protection which article 85(3) [now article 
81 (3)] makes an integral part of the Community's competition rales."
1276 See for example, Council Directive, on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1993), article 2, which restricts the 
notion of consumers to natural persons. Although there is not total consistency here, sometimes the definition has 
been extended to include undertakings acting outside of their main area o f competence. For a more detailed 
discussion o f this concept, see Mortelmans and Watson (1996) and Aquaro (2003). Thanks to Giorgio Monti for this 
point
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way, we must assess whether or not G (and possibly E, if  we decide to include consumers of 
derived products) gets a fair share of the resulting benefit.
One might argue that reliance on article 153 of the Treaty in order to define 'consumer1 within 
article 81(3), is misleading. This is because when the Treaty was adopted in 1957 it did not 
embrace the concept of consumer protection (which is debatable in itself1277). Therefore, so the 
argument goes, we cannot read this concept into the telos o f article 81(3). However, such an 
argument misconstrues the Community Courts’ teleological approach in any event. Chapter Two 
explained that this is not a historical-purposive approach. Instead, the Community Courts 
interpret the Treaty in light of its objectives, as they see them today. This too argues in favour of 
incorporating a consumer protection notion into article 81(3). See, for example, the reference to 
the Preamble above.
However, inserting the consumer protection notion into article 81(3)'s second provision creates 
two major problems. First, particularly in horizontal agreements that fall within article 81, the 
parties will rarely sell directly to ’consumers'. We would need to examine every level of trade 
between the parties and the consumers to ensure that competition exists there too. If fierce 
competition does not exist in all downstream levels, even if there is perfect competition at the 
parties' level, then it is unlikely that the surplus that the agreement creates will be passed right 
down the supply chain. As a result, private end-users may not get a fair share o f the benefit. 
This sort of assessment would be an enormous task.1278 The result of this test is also unfair on 
the parties (who cannot normally ensure that the benefits go this far downstream1279) and 
reduces welfare for society as a whole. This is because, in effect, even agreements in fiercely 
competitive markets that create large benefits (under article 81(3)'s first test) will likely breach 
article 81(3) if  there is a level of, for example, distribution downstream of the parties where 
competition is not fierce. This, in turn, will reduce the ability o f the parties to compete with their 
rivals on the merits. It would also undermine the efficient allocation of resources and increase 
firms’ incentives to integrate vertically. Such distorted incentives are probably inefficient and 
costly to society as a whole.
1277 Evans (1981), page 425, points out that when the big consumer protection initiative started in the 1970s the 
Community Institutions "...were quick to point out that die promotion o f consumer interests had been implicit in 
their earlier work, especially the implementation o f competition policy."
1278 In some o f its decisions, the Commission implies that it has carried out such an assessment in downstream 
markets. See, for example, Commission decisions, SABA, paragraph 43; National Sulphuric A cid  Association, 
paragraph 47; SA B A ’s  EEC distribution system , page 50; Yves R ocher, paragraphs 61 and 62; Pronuptia, paragraph 
35 and EBU / Eurovision, paragraph 68. The ECJ obliquely refers to such an analysis in the M etro I  C ase, paragraph 
47, although it did not impose it as a  general requirement in all cases there.
1279 Commentaire Megret (1997), paragraph 222; Wyatt and Dashwood (1993), page 580 and Evans (1985), pages 
101 and 109.
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This leads us to the second problem that incorporating a consumer protection notion into article 
81(3) creates. Many goods and services do not have consumers, (private end-users), or have 
very few (as opposed to 'consumers' o f derived products). Think, for example, of large 
commercial aircraft. For such products and services we could either ignore the second article 
81(3) provision; or, we could consider the effects on the consumers o f the derived products, in 
our example this was E as well. The latter would be preferable, because the Community Courts 
will not ignore Treaty provisions lightly. But, if we include these 'derived consumers' then the 
assessment will rapidly become extremely complex. In reality A and B will sell to hundreds, if 
not thousands, of customers. There will be millions of derived consumers. It would be veiy 
difficult for the decision-maker, and impossible for private parties, to assess whether all these 
groups o f derived consumers got a fair share of the resulting benefit. We could infer the 
necessary consumer benefits if vigorous competition exists at all levels of production and 
distribution between the parties to the agreement1280 and the 'consumers' (derived or not). 
However, assessing this would still be an enormous task.
The conclusion so far is that there are good reasons, from a political perspective, to interpret 
'consumer' within article 81(3) of the Treaty, as a private end-user. This also fits with a 
contextual reading of the Treaty, taken as a whole. However, refusing exemption unless private 
end-users get a fair share of an agreement’s resulting benefit complicates the analysis 
immensely and may often mean that beneficial agreements (in Community terms) will not be 
allowed. This is unfair on the parties, as it will undermine their ability to compete on the merits. 
It also reduces society’s welfare. Furthermore, for the reasons outlined below, it may be 
unnecessary. Interpreting consumers as private end-users was not the only possibility. The 
French word 'utilisateur1 also includes those that buy from the parties to the agreement. Does it 
make sense to ensure that the parties' customers get a fair share o f the resulting benefit? 
Enforcing competition policy is expensive. We asked above whether the Treaty should seek to 
ensure that the benefits of the agreement are passed down the manufacturing or distribution 
chain, normally from one company to another? We said that, at first sight, the answer was no.
In fact, when one considers the issue in more detail and in light o f our further discussion, the 
benefits of a 'refined French approach' become clearer. Imagine that eveiy level of 
manufacturing and distribution below the parties to the agreement is competitive. Remember 
too that competitive pressures will normally ensure that cost-savings (or other benefits) are 
passed on by way of lower prices, etc. This means that as long as we can ensure that a fair share
1280 Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 136 and Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 34, which 
say "Generally the transmission of the benefits to consumers will depend on the intensity of competition on the 
relevant market Competitive pressures will normally ensure that cost-savings are passed on by way of lower prices 
or that companies have an incentive to bring new products to the market as quickly, as possible." See also, 
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 96.
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of the benefits created by the agreement are passed on to the parties' customers, then these 
benefits should be passed on, right down the supply chain, to the private end-users. To the 
extent that there is not sufficient competition at every level beneath the parties to the agreement, 
the competition authorities should intervene to improve situations there, rather than outlaw 
beneficial agreements generated by undertakings competing on the merits.
Pelkmans criticises this suggestion. He believes the provision demands that certain direct 
benefits, as opposed to merely indirect efficiency ones, be passed on to consumers.1281 However, 
he does not explain or justify this view. It is hard to understand because article 81(3) does not 
distinguish between the types o f benefits involved; nor do the Community Courts or the 
Commission, in their application of this provision. Perhaps the idea is similar to that of Evans, 
when he notes that:
"...while the benefit for intermediaries m the economic process lies in profitability and the 
benefit for consumers as members of the public lies in the broader notion of consumer 
satisfaction, the Commission does not appear to recognise such a distinction."1282
The private end-user might get consumer satisfaction from, for example, a certain amount of 
choice in relation to the products in question. This would increase marketing and distribution 
costs and so, Evans seems to assume, that, for example, it conflicts with the intermediaries’ 
profitability and would be ignored in an assessment of their benefits. However, this need not 
always be the case. In a competitive market, the intermediaries should be receptive to consumer 
demand. If consumers value increased choice enough to pay for it then, in theory, the 
intermediaries would take account o f  this, and the two concepts would no longer conflict. 
Pelkmans is right in that direct consumer benefits should also be relevant here, but we see no 
reason why the provision should relate exclusively to them.
As a  result, it certainly seems to be acceptable, to deem article 81(3)’s second condition to be 
fulfilled where it can be shown that a fair share of the resulting benefits are passed on to private 
end-users. However, for the reasons outlined above, it should not be necessary to show that this 
group receive a fair share of the resulting benefit. Where all downstream markets are efficient, 
we can achieve our consumer protection aim by ensuring that the parties to the agreement pass a 
fair share o f their agreement’s benefit on to their customers. We do not need to look any 
further,1283 even if  they are not private end-users. Even if  not all downstream markets are 
competitive (so that these benefits are not, in fact, passed down to private end-users), then the
1281 Pelkmans (1985), pages 32 and 33. See also Evans (1985), page 109.
1282 Evans (1985), page 105.
1283 Indeed, to look further downstream means that we risk making a false assessment of what benefits have and have 
not been transferred as a result o f the agreement Remember that it is the overall transfer of benefits that is 
important.
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best strategy is to ensure that these markets become competitive. It is not to refuse exemption 
for an otherwise acceptable agreement in the upstream market.
It is hard to justify article 81(3)'s second test on anything other than consumer protection 
grounds. We have discussed a practicable mechanism for the assessment of this objective, i.e. 
the transfer o f benefits to the parties' direct customers. In our view, this is how article 81(3)'s 
second objective should be interpreted.
Consumer protection is an important Treaty objective. It should be considered within article 
81.1284 However, Chapter Two argued that the Commission and the Community Courts have 
widened the first article 81(3) test to essentially become a public interest balancing exercise. 
This would likely include consumer protection, particularly in light of article 153(2)’s policy 
linking clause. The Commission may have already considered it there, see Chapter Four.
Does this mean that we are wrong to interpret the first article 81(3) test in this way? Not 
necessarily. The first test could include all relevant objectives, excluding consumer protection 
ones. These could then be considered under article 81(3)'s second test.
The final question we need to ask is whether the second article 81(3) test should be retained. In 
our view it should not. Retaining the consumer protection requirement should give it more 
weight in article 81(3).1285 Imagine an agreement that contributed greatly to, for example, public 
health, see article 152 of the Treaty, yet offered no consumer benefits. The optimal Treaty 
balance (even including the lack of consumer protection) might be to allow the agreement. This 
would be possible if consumer protection fell under article 81(3)'s first test. However, this 
would not be the case today due to the presence of the second article 81(3) test1286
If  consumer protection would be given less weight in article 81(3)’s first test's balance than it 
currently gets under the second article 81(3) test, it implies one o f two things. Either consumer 
protection would not have been given enough weight in the balance; or, the second article 81(3) 
test over-emphasises its importance today. If the first is true, then the balance needs to be done 
correctly (and the second provision is irrelevant). If it is the latter, then this second provision
1284 Also, see the arguments of the Plaintiff Case 249/85 Albako M argarinefabrik v. Bundesanstalt fu r  
landw irtschaftliche M arktordnung [1987], page 2348 and Case C-376/92 M etro SB-Großmärkte v. Cartier [1994], 
see the opinion o f Advocate-General Tesauro, paragraph 33, "...considerations relating to consumer 
protection ...should  not be unconnected with the interpretation of article 85 [now article 81] of the Treaty."
1285 See, for example, Evans (1981), page 434. Although we have said that this provision is achieved relatively easily, 
see above, the Commission, Article 81(3) G uidelines, seek to make this requirement harder to satisfy.
1286 The last statement is only true where a fair share is always seen as a positive benefit, as it generally is, see above. 
One could argue that where, for example, an agreement would generate considerable environmental benefits, it is 
fa ir  that those that consume pay extra to achieve this, for the benefit o f all; although see Evans (1985), page 102, in 
this regard. Even if  this definition of'fair share* is used, which is not currently the case, see Commission, A rticle 
8 I ß )  G uidelines, paragraph 85 and Kjelbye (2004), page 575, then article 81(3)'s second test is still unnecessary, 
see below.
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undermines the optimal balance. The second scenario is increasingly likely. Consumer 
protection is an important Treaty aim, but it is not the only one, or even necessarily the most 
important, see Chapter Eight. The Treaty also demands a high level of protection for 
environmental and public health concerns, for example.
For these reasons, our preferred solution is to remove the second article SI(3) provision 
demanding that "...consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit..." from the Treaty. This 
provision might have reflected the optimal Treaty balance in 1957. It does not do so today. The 
non-economic objectives can best be balanced under article 81(3)'s first test.1287
4. THE FOURTH ARTICLE 81(3) TEST: DO NOT ELIMINATE COMPETITION 
(ARTICLE 81(3)(B))
Article 81(3)(b) o f the Treaty says that agreements must not:
"...afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question."
This provision creates a hierarchy, by promoting one objective above all others in article 81(3) 
analysis, at least to a limited degree. Hierarchy is discussed below. Its presence creates a 
problem within article 81(3) of the Treaty. In order to understand why, we must first consider 
what is meant by ’competition’ in article 81(3Xb).
What does 'competition' under article 81(3)(b) refer to? Does it, for example, refer to restrictions 
on economic freedom or economic efficiency? A similar issue arose in Chapter Six, in relation 
to the definition of'competition' under article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Monti believes that it refers to 
economic freedom.1288 Many Commission decisions suggest that Monti might be right.1289 
Another possibility is that when the Treaty refers to 'competition' here, it is referring to the 
possibility o f achieving efficiency gains. One of the clearest examples of this interpretation is 
Commission decision, IFPI 'S im u lca stin g This decision deals with an agreement between 
collecting societies from all around the world, which facilitated the grant of multi-territorial 
licences for simulcasting activity. The Commission found that the agreement encouraged 
competition between record producers' collecting societies, where there had been no 
competition before. This was because, paragraph 119:
m l Politically, it may be difficult to achieve this, as it will likely be seen as a reduction in consumer rights vis-à-vis 
undertakings. In fact, it should be seen as an enhancement of society's interests.
nit Monti (2002), page 1064.
1289 See Commission decisions, Rennet, paragraphs 32 and 33; Uniform Eurocheques, paragraph 43; VIFKA, 
paragraphs 21-23; D utch Banks, paragraph 65; IATA Passenger Agency Programme, paragraph 63; ¡ATA Cargo 
A gency Programme, paragraph 54; A ssurpol, paragraph 41; Schôller Lebensm ittel GmbH & Co. KG , paragraphs 
130 and 135 and Stichting Baksteen, paragraph 39. Also see, Joined Cases T-185/00, etc. M étropole Télévision v. 
Commission, [2002], paragraphs 63-86.
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"The collecting societies will be able to actually compete and to differentiate themselves in 
terms of efficiency, quality of service and commercial terms."
The Commission continued that the agreement also meant that, after an additional adaptation 
period, the competition between collecting societies would extend to pricing. At paragraph 120 
it said:
"Accordingly, the participating EEA [European Economic Area] societies will have to 
increase their efficiency as regards their administration costs in such a way as to be able to 
provide a "one-stop" simulcasting license at the lowest cost possible to EEA users."
In the next paragraph the Commission emphasised that the increased transparency that the 
agreement would introduce would:
"...allow users (as well as members of the societies) to better assess the efficiency of each 
of the societies and have a better understanding of their management costs."
In light of these (and other) factors the Commission said that the agreement would not eliminate 
competition for the purposes of article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty. Prior to this decision, the 
Commission had not been so explicit in its language. That said, there is certainly the implication 
in many other cases, decisions and communications, that the word 'competition’, as used in 
article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty, refers to efficiency gains.1290
Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 105, are even more confusing:
"Ultimately the protection of rivalry and the competitive process is given priority over 
potentially pro-competitive efficiency gains which could result from restrictive agreements.
The last condition of article 81(3) recognises the fact that rivalry between undertakings is 
an essential driver of economic efficiency, including dynamic efficiencies in the shape of 
innovation. In other words, the ultimate aim of article 81 is to protect the competitive
1290 See, for example, Commission decisions, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG , paragraph 31; SABA, paragraphs 47-50; 
Bayer/  G ist-Brocades, paragraph 4; U nited Reprocessors GmbH, paragraph 4; KEWA, paragraph 4; Junghans, 
paragraph 37; De Laval - Stork, paragraph 12; B eecham / Parke, D avis, paragraph 45; Langenscheidt/ H achette, 
paragraph 23; Amersham Buchler, paragraph 14; R ockw ell/ Iveco, paragraph 11; Nuovo CEGAM, paragraph 25; 
Synthetic F ibres, paragraphs 48-52; G rundig's EEC distribution system , pages 6 and 7; Optical F ibres, paragraphs 
73-80; the M etro II Case, paragraphs 40-47; ENU M ontedison, paragraphs 39-41; Yves Rocher, paragraphs 64 and 
65; Boussois/ Interpane, paragraph 20; Enichem / IC1, paragraphs 46-50; O livetti/C anon, paragraph 58; B ayer/ BP  
Chemicals, paragraphs 38-41; IVECO/ FORD , paragraphs 37-40; BB C  Brown Boveri, paragraph 33; Charles 
Jourdan, paragraph 42; UIP, paragraphs 56-59; A lcatel Espace/ A N T  M achrichtentechnik, paragraph 21; 
Commission, RCP 1991, page 42; Yves Saint Laurent Parfums, page 34; Parfum s Givenchy system  o f  selective 
distribution, pages 21 and 22; Ford/ Volkswagen, paragraphs 37 and 38; the M atra Case, paragraphs 150-156, 
although note paragraph 155; Commission, RCP 1993, paragraph 85(iv); E xxon/ Shell, paragraphs 79-82; Pasteur 
M erieux-M erck, paragraphs 95-101, 103, 110 and 113; O livetti-D igital, paragraph 33; Fujitsu AMD Sem iconductor, 
paragraph 45; Atlas, paragraphs 59-74; P heonix/ GlobalOne, paragraphs 65-72; Unisource, paragraphs 94-101; 
Uniworld, paragraphs 83-85; Van den Bergh F oods Lim ited, paragraphs 242-246; Sicasov, paragraph 77; TPS, 
paragraphs 135-138; P & t Clubs (1999), paragraphs 113-115; P & O Stena Line, paragraphs 67-130 and 135; REIM S 
II, paragraph 90; B ritish Interactive Broadcasting/ O pen, paragraphs 168-186; Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraphs 
2.169-2.172; Eurovision (2000), paragraphs 100-105; SAS M aersk A ir, paragraph 77(d); D SD  and Others, 
paragraphs 158-163, although there is a hint o f economic freedom in paragraphs 159 and 163; and, Commission, 
Horizontal G uidelines, paragraph 134.
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process. When competition is eliminated the competitive process is brought to an end and 
short-term efficiency gains are outweighed by longer-term losses stemming in te r  a lia  from 
expenditures incurred by the incumbent to maintain its position (rent seeking), 
misallocation of resources, reduced innovation and higher prices."
This paragraph says the ultimate aim of article 81 is protection o f the competitive process. This 
seems to refer to the concept o f economic freedom. However, this ultimate objective does not 
properly reflect the interpretation o f article 81 in a Treaty context, see Chapter Two. 
Furthermore, if  the Commission is discussing economic freedom here, it is used because such 
rivalry is "...an essential driver o f economic efficiency..." does this mean that economic 
efficiency is the ultimate aim? This is confusing because, as Chapter Six showed, economic 
freedom and economic efficiency do not always coincide.
In conclusion, there is a lack o f consistency from the Commission. Sometimes it interprets 
article 81(3Xb) as referring to economic freedom, at other times efficiency. The Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines do not help either. Nor have the Community Courts clarified the 
matter. Their judgments do not contain clear and consistent statements on this issue. The only 
point that can be made with any certainty is that article 81(3Xb) probably refers to either 
efficiency considerations or economic freedom and nothing else.1291
This has an important implication. In order to explain why, we must return to what the 
Commission is doing when it performs the balance in article 81(3)'s first test. Where a 
restriction of competition has been demonstrated then the assessment moves to article 81(3) of 
the Treaty. We have seen that the relevant factors under article 81(3)’s first provision (i.e. the 
relevant objective benefits produced by the agreement) are balanced against the restriction of 
competition under article 81(1) o f the Treaty, see above. In the words of the ECJ, the:
"...improvement [under article 81(3)'s first test] must in particular show appreciable 
objective advantages of such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which they 
cause in the field of competition [article 81(1)].”1292
Chapter Six argued above that 'restriction o f competition' should be interpreted in terms of 
economic efficiency considerations. Others, such as Monti, see Chapter Six, thought that it 
relates to economic freedom. Despite this disagreement, we both agree that both of these 
objectives could be considered relevant in a particular case. We just disagree about where, in 
article 81(1), or in article 81(3)'s first condition. So, we agree that economic freedom and 
economic efficiency, where relevant, are balanced when the restriction of competition under
1291 That is not to  say that these concepts are not affected by other relevant objectives, see Vedder (2003), pages 181- 
185; Jans (2000), pages 283 and 284 and Bouterse (1994), pages 22-25 and 122-125.
1292 j ^ e Qonsten anci Qrundig Case, page 348.
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article 81(1) is weighed against article 81(3)'s first condition.1293 In addition, we have just seen 
that one, or possibly both, of them (economic freedom and/ or efficiencies) are also considered 
in the fourth article 81(3) test. There they are placed in a hierarchy, at least to a limited extent. 
These two tests (balancing and hierarchy) are either unnecessaiy or inconsistent. Why?
We examine the 'unnecessary' point first. Article 81(3 Kb) is unnecessaiy when the agreement 
’fails' the first article 81(3) test.1294 Imagine that the relevant decision-maker, for example, the 
Commission, weighs (amongst other things) economic freedom and efficiency in article 81(3)'s 
first test's balance. If it decides that the restriction on economic efficiency is not outweighed by 
the improvement to economic freedom generated by the agreement,1295 then the fourth article 
81(3) provision is irrelevant. This is because the article 81(3) tests are cumulative, see the 
introduction. It has already been decided that the restriction of competition is not justified and 
so the fourth provision adds nothing.
While it is true that, substantively, the fourth test adds nothing in this situation, there may be a 
procedural benefit to retaining it. The balancing exercise which must be undertaken within 
article 81(3)'s first test is complex and expensive.1296 The 'elimination of competition' test is 
relatively simple (and cheap) to apply.1297 As long as it accurately reflects the outer limits of the 
balancing exercise,1298 retention of the article 81(3)(b) test could still be beneficial as a kind of 
quick 'first check'. If the agreement failed here, the expense of article 81(3)'s first test could be 
avoided. We return to this issue below.
The last two paragraphs have discussed the case where the agreement would fail both article 
8l(3)'s first and fourth tests. We suggested that, in this instance, article 81(3)(b) is irrelevant, 
from a substantive perspective. Despite this, it might have a procedural value as a quick first 
check, as long as it properly defined the outer limits o f the first test’s balance. This introduces 
the second issue referred to above, that o f the possible inconsistency of these two tests.
1293 Chapters Three and Four and Section 2 argued that other objectives may be relevant, depending on the facts o f 
the case. Whether or not they are considered is irrelevant to this point
1294 We need only consider the occasions when agreements eliminate competition. If they do not then article 81(3)(b) 
o f the Treaty is irrelevant because it does not change the analysis, in that it does not prevent exemption.
1295 For the purposes o f this argument it is assumed that 'competition' means economic efficiency, but the argument is 
the same if it is interpreted as economic freedom.
1296 expense, complexity and lack of predictability of this process dramatically increase when many other 
objectives are considered, as we argued should take place in Section 2 and Chapter Six.
1297 There are difficulties with it due to the definition of the relevant market, etc. Nevertheless, it is simpler, cheaper 
and more predictable than a general balancing test.
1298 Even if this were not always the case, if  it were nearly always so, such a per se rule might still be beneficial, see 
Chapter Six.
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What do we mean by inconsistency? Imagine that, in the context of a specific agreement, it is 
considered worth restricting competition (economic efficiency) in order to achieve the promised 
economic freedom (or other) gains. Article 81(3)'s first test establishes this. Furthermore, 
imagine that the prospective benefits were believed so important that application o f the balance 
under this first test justified the elimination of competition. Even if we were to decide this, then 
the agreement could not be exempted because it would 'fail' article 81(3Xb). In other words, the 
fourth provision would undermine the assessment of the ’optimal’ article 81(l)/(3) balance in the 
first test.
An inconsistency can arise between article 81(3)'s first and fourth tests. It must be stressed again 
that this is not because article 81(3)'s first test has become a general balance.1299 Only three 
factors are needed for inconsistency to arise:
•  ’competition* under article 81(1) and 81(3) o f the Treaty must have the same meaning;
•  the factors in article 81(1) and those considered under article 81(3)'s first test must be 
balanced against each other; and
• the outcome of article 81(3)'s first test's balance (as applied by the decision-maker) must 
justify the elimination of competition.
The first two points are relatively uncontroversial. First, 'competition' must have the same 
meaning in both article 81(1) and 81(3)(b) of the Treaty. Or, more generally put, the resulting 
elimination of'competition' (as defined under article 81(3Xb) of the Treaty) must already have 
been considered within article 81(3)’s first test.1300 This is uncontroversial.1301 Secondly, Chapter 
Two also showed that the Commission and the Community Courts have embraced a test where 
the factors in article 81(1) and those considered under article 81(3)'s first test are balanced 
against each other. In our view, they are right to do so, particularly in light of the increasing 
importance of non-competition objectives within the Community legal order.1302
The final point which is necessary to establish inconsistency was that the outcome of the 
balance (as applied by the decision-maker) must be that the objective introduced under article
1299 Although, theoretically, inconsistency might be more likely where more factors are considered in article 81(3)’s 
first test, such that those considered in article 81(1) are more readily outweighed.
ljoo wouid m0Si likely occur because 'competition' has the same meaning within article 81(1) o f the Treaty. It 
would be unusual to interpret the same word in the same article in a different way.
1301 See, for example, Commission, Horizontal Guidelines, paragraphs 36, 71, 105, 134, 155, 174, 175 and 197 and 
Hildebrand (2002), page 247.
1302 Chapter Two explained that while the first article 81(3) test allowed for a balancing process it does not demand 
one. It merely asks that there be some contribution to improving the production or distribution of goods, etc. If this 
balancing exercise were omitted than article 81(3Xb) would be left as the sole method of resolving conflicts 
between restrictions of competition and the objectives pursued by article 81(3)'$ first provision. Seen in this light, 
article 81(3)(b) has a relevance.
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81(3)’s first test justifies the elimination of competition. This would be inconsistent with article 
81(3)(b) o f the Treaty. Such an outcome could (theoretically) occur for two reasons:
• because the decision-maker did not perform the article 81(l)/(3) balance correctly. This 
might occur if the decision-maker misunderstood the optimal balance, which, in fact, so 
the argument goes, would never justify the elimination o f competition; or,
• because the decision-maker achieves the 'optimal' article 81(l)/(3) balance (under the 
first test), but that article 81(3)(b) does not reflect this balance.
Let's examine these points in turn.
The first suggestion (which we disagree with) about why the decision-maker might not have 
performed the article 81(3)’s first balance correctly is because he or she misunderstands the 
optimal balance. Imagine that, in the Community legal order, competition were considered so 
important that it should never be eliminated. If the decision-maker did not understand this then 
he or she might (wrongly according to this theory) believe that in the particular case at hand, an 
important environmental or efficiency benefit, for example, would justify the restriction (in this 
case elimination) o f competition. As a result, he or she would say that the agreement passed the 
first article 81(3) test, but would be brought up short by the fourth test. This is an argument 
about never.
Some believe that, in the Community legal order, it is never in the public interest to eliminate 
competition. Take Bourgeois and Demaret, for example. They view the 'elimination o f 
competition' test as the outer limit of Community action.1303 They justify this by citing article 
81(3Xb), the ECJ's article 82 judgment in Continental Can1304 and article 2(2) o f the Merger 
Regulation. They add:
"We submit that the principle according to which competition may not be eliminated in 
respect of a substantial part of the relevant market is to be viewed as a general principle of 
Community law and that, as such, it ought to bind Community institutions not only when 
they apply the competition provisions of the EC Treaty, but also when they take measures 
implementing other policies."1305
Bourgeois and Demaret acknowledge that this implies the primacy o f the competition rules.1306
1303 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), pages 84-S6.
1304 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and  Continental Can Company v. Commission [1973], paragraph 24, 
"...if article 3(f) [now article 3(lXg)l provides for the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the 
Common Market is not distorted, then it requires a fortiori that competition must not be eliminated. This 
requirement is so essential that without it numerous provisions o f the Treaty would be pointless."
1305 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 84.
1306 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 85.
- 3 3 5 -
Chapters Two and Four argued that the Treaty does not permanently prioritise any Treaty 
objective. It may normally be the case that it is not in the public interest to eliminate 
competition. However, there are times, within the Community legal order, when the optimal 
balance might demand that competition be eliminated.
Bourgeois and Demaret cite three areas of competition policy where the approach they suggest 
has been favoured, they provide no example from without this policy area. Their idea that a 
'competition cannot be eliminated' rule is a general principle o f law is not taken up by major 
textbooks.1307 There is not even a policy-linking clause for competition.
Their argument is further weakened because the Treaty allows for the elimination of 
competition, as it is understood under article 81(3)(b) o f the Treaty. In some cases the ECJ has 
said that environmental considerations must be made 'without reference to economic 
considerations.1308 Furthermore, competition can be eliminated even within the area of 
competition policy. Gyselen illustrates this, for example, in his discussion o f the VOTOB Case. 
He shows that a situation which was seen to eliminate competition, for the purposes of article 
81(3Xb) o f the Treaty, was allowed under the State aid provisions.1309
In addition, if article 81(3)’s first test is meant to be a balance that would never eliminate 
competition, then article 81(3Xb) of the Treaty would have no function.
Finally, on a practical level, while it may be true that it is not normally beneficial to eliminate 
competition, in practice, the Commission has sometimes 'ignored' article 81(3Xb) of the Treaty, 
where it thought that it might undermine the optimal Treaty balance. Bourgeois and Demaret do 
not even discuss these decisions, which imply that, at least in the Commission’s view, these two 
article 81(3) tests do not always coincide. Whish writes:
"In some cases the Commission has not paid a great deal of attention to this head of article 
81(3)...because it has already clocked up sufficient merit marks under the other heads to 
qualify for lenient treatment under this one."1310
It is not even clear how the Community Courts define 'competition* in this provision. So how 
can the Commission ensure that it is not eliminated? In any event, not much weight is given to
1307 There is no mention of it in, for example, Amull, Dash wood, Ross and Wyatt (2000) and Craig and de Burca 
(1998).
1308 See, for example, Case C-44/95 R  v. Secretary o f  State fo r  th e Environm ent, ex parte RSPB [1996], in relation to 
Council Directive, on the conservation o f  natural habitats and Council Directive, on the conservation o f w ild birds; 
and, Case C-371/98 The Queen v. Secretary o f  S ta te fo r  the Environm ent. Transport and the Regions, ex parte FCS 
[20001.
1309 Gyselen (1994), pages 250-252 and 257.
1310 Whish (2003), page 159. See also, Hildebrand (2002), page 247 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.170, 
"Commission decisions have not always given this condition as much consideration as some of the other conditions 
o f article 81(3)." Although Faull and Nikpay add that this is an important condition.
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article 81(3Xb). The Council has promulgated at least one block exemption that encourages 
horizontal price-fixing cartels in the liner shipping industry.1311 The result is that competition is 
as good as eliminated on many trades.1312 This is an extreme case, but the Commission has 
watered down the test too. For example, it has said:
"The last criterion of elimination of competition for a substantial part of the products in 
question is related to the question of dominance. Where an undertaking is dominant or 
becoming dominant as a consequence of the vertical agreement, a vertical restraint that has 
appreciable anti-competitive effects can in principle not be exempted. The vertical 
agreement may however fall outside article 81(1) if there is an objective justification, for 
instance if it is necessary for the protection of relationship-specific investments or for the 
transfer of substantial know-how without which the supply or purchase of certain goods or 
services would not take place."1313
There are other examples. The agreement considered in Commission decision, United 
Reprocessors GmbH, for example, almost completely eliminated competition in the short and 
medium term. At paragraph 4 the Commission said:
"Admittedly, during a transitional period (which does have a fixed date of expiry) URG's 
only competitors in the common market will be three small-scale reprocessing units...two 
of which are either shut down or are being used for reprocessing non-oxide nuclear fuels; 
from 1978 it might possibly have to compete with the new Eurochemic plant - a relatively 
small one - and later still with Eurex I I . ..
However, the eventual creation of effective competition is both one of the aims of the 
agreement and one of the conditions imposed by the Commission once the objective 
requirements, i.e., adequate load factors, are met, a time limit also being fixed. 
Accordingly, the undertakings concerned are faced with the certainty of becoming 
competitors at that time, which obliges them to behave from now on bearing this in 
view... ” [my emphasis)1314
In this decision, the Commission accepted that competition would essentially be eliminated in 
the short and medium term. In order to justify exemption, it relied on the fact that the parties 
would compete against each other once adequate load factors were met as well as the power of 
their customers.1315 This would be in fifteen years time, at the earliest. This is quite a long time 
for the two undertakings, in their regular (and now legal) meetings, to construct a sophisticated
13.1 See, for example, Council Regulation, Shipping Cartels.
13.2 See Townley (2004).
1313 Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 135. See also Commission, H orizontal G uidelines, paragraphs 36, 
71, 105, 134 and 155. The Commission has tried to massage these statements in Commission, A rticle 81(3) 
G uidelines, paragraph 106. My thanks to Giorgio Monti for this point
1314 A similar position emerged in Commission decisions, KEWA, paragraph 4, where the Commission found that 
competition would probably be eliminated for 10 years, although it thought that it would be restored after that; and 
E P I code o f conduct, paragraph 46. It must be said that sometimes the Commission has taken the issue of 
eliminating competition more seriously, see Commission decision, AuA/LH, paragraphs 96-104 and Whish (2003), 
page 160,
1315 Commission, R C P 1975, pages 43 and 44.
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collusion strategy. The result o f this sort of decision-making can be that the Commission 
substitutes its judgment, for that of the market.1316
The Community Courts and the Commission have emphasised the importance of competition. 
However, it does not seem to be a general (and absolute) principle of Community law that 
competition can never be eliminated. Furthermore, both the Commission and the Council have, 
on occasion, allowed competition to be effectively eliminated where to do otherwise would 
undermine what they saw as the optimal Treaty balance. This supports our argument that there 
are times (however few) when the elimination of competition is appropriate in the public 
interest. This means that our first (theoretical) possibility can be ignored. The public interest, as 
assessed under article 8I(3)'s first test, does not dictate that competition can never be 
eliminated.
Even if  we were wrong in this regard, the best solution would be to ensure that the decision­
maker applies article 81(3)'s first test appropriately.1317 The Commission does not always 
achieve a consistent balance here, or make sufficient effort to explain how these different 
objectives interact. Nor has it outlined a coherent balancing method. This is particularly 
important now that many actors can apply article 81(3) of the Treaty. Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines help in this regard, although they do not properly deal with the specific problems 
raised by non-economic objectives. Chapter Eight provides a framework for this. The 
Community Courts should ensure that the Commission is more rigorous in its implementation of 
the balance, both its theoretical underpinnings, as well as assessing the balance itself. Once the 
balance under article 81(3)*s first test were correctly applied, article 8I(3Xb) would be 
irrelevant.
Let's consider our conclusions so far. The argument is that the presence of both article 81(3)'s 
first and fourth tests is either unnecessary or inconsistent. We showed that when the agreement 
'fails' the first test, then there is no need for the fourth test, because all four tests are cumulative. 
We did suggest that there might be procedural reasons for retaining article 81(3Xb) however, as 
long as this accurately reflected the outer limits of the balance. We also argued that when the 
optimal balance under the first test justified the elimination of competition then the presence of 
the fourth test, undermines this assessment. In this scenario, article 81(3)(b) is inconsistent with 
the public interest. We suggested two reasons why such a conflict might occur. Some believe 
that the balancing exercise under article 81(3)'s first test could never permit the elimination of 
competition. We argued that, in fact, this is wrong, but even if  this is the case, it simply
1316 Amato.(1997), pages 62 and 114 and Wesseling (2000), page 39.
1317 We have just seen that article 8I(3)(b) o f the Treaty is not always an effective check in any event
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confirms that article 81(3Xb) is irrelevant here too, as such an assessment should have been 
made under the first article 81(3) test.
The decision-maker might find that the first article 81(3) balance justifies the elimination of 
competition. This would conflict with article 81(3Xb) of the Treaty. We have just discussed one 
possible reason for this, that the decision-maker would have incorrectly assessed the first test 
This test (the public interest), so the argument goes, could never justify the elimination of 
competition. We argued that this was not correct. As a result, we must conclude that the article 
81(3)(b) test does not (always) reflect the public interest.
Article 81(3 Xb) of the Treaty may promote competition too highly. In other words, it may not 
accurately reflect the balance that the Commission (or other decision-maker) considers 
appropriate under article 81(3). When the decision-maker decides the optimal balance there, it 
should consider whether or not the objective benefits justify the elimination of competition in 
respect o f a substantial part of the products in question.1318 Presumably it would not decide this 
very often, but if it did then should the decision-maker be undermined by article 81(3Xb)?
Assume that, in a particular case, the 'optimal balance' under the Treaty, as established under 
article 81(3)'s first test, indicates that competition would better be eliminated. It might still be 
the case that the 'optimal balance' in relation to agreements between undertakings should not 
eliminate competition. Agreements which eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part 
o f  the products in question significantly undermine the free market mechanism. One could say 
that agreements between undertakings should not completely undermine this important 
mechanism. The ECJ has said this many times. In both the Metro I  and the Metro II  Cases,1319 
for example, the ECJ held:
"The powers conferred upon the Commission under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] show 
that the requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may be reconciled with 
the safeguarding of objectives of a different nature and that to this end certain restrictions 
on competition are permissible, provided that they are essential to the attainment of those 
objectives and that they do not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part 
of the Common Market."1320
Such a rule seems like a major limit. This is probably not the case. First, agreements that 
eliminated competition would rarely fit the optimal balance under article 81(3)'s first test. 
Secondly, as this is only the hierarchy in article 81, it is open to the institutions of the European
13,8 In other words, one could argue that there is no need for a separate article 8 l(3Xb) test
1319 Paragraphs 21 and 65, respectively. See also, the citation above of Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and  
C ontinental Can Company v. Commission 11973], paragraph 24.
1320 Commission made the same point in a different way in the VBVB/VBBB Case, when it said, at page 39, that 
there "...are no grounds for attributing to the cultural factor any absolute priority over the rules of competition." 
Advocate-General Verloren van Themaat concurred, page 89.
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Union (and the Member States) to legislate in favour o f the other objectives if they deem it 
necessary. In other words, article 81(3Xb) does not lead to a permanent priority for competition 
throughout the whole Community legal order, we have already argued that it does not 
encapsulate a general principle o f law. Furthermore, such a statement sends out a clear 
statement to undertakings about the importance of competition in the Common Market.
However, in our view, this suggestion does not hold up to closer scrutiny. First, on a point of 
principle, there is no a priori reason why publicly imposed regulations should automatically be 
entitled to deference while privately imposed ones are treated with suspicion.1321 Secondly, 
when applying article 81, the decision-maker must take account o f  all the circumstances of the 
case. As a result, one o f the considerations in article 81(3)’s first test should be whether it is 
appropriate to eliminate competition in an agreement between undertakings. In addition, it 
seems wrong, in principle, to permanently promote one objective over all others in this fashion. 
There must surely be some instances, if competition were to clash with a fundamental human 
right, for example, where its elimination would be acceptable.1322 The ECJ's judgments, cited 
above, counter this view, but perhaps that is because o f  the existence of article 81(3Xb) of the 
Treaty. If it were removed, would the Community Courts say the same?
As we have said above, Member States could still legislate here.1323 However, as Gyselen 
convincingly argues, competition should be neutral vis-à-vis the regulatory or legislative 
techniques which the State authorities choose to pursue, for example, their environmental 
policy:
"These choices ultimately reflect the conception these authorities have o f  a certain type o f  
society. Some States have a regulatory tradition; others favour a more deregulatory 
approach. The former w ill have the ir regulations scrutinised under the Treaty provisions 
concerning the free movement o f  goods (article 30 [now article 28] and following). The 
latter w ill have their m arket-based instruments exam ined under the Treaty com petition 
provisions: article 85 [now article 81], article 85 in com bination w ith article 3(f) and article 
5(2) or article 92 [now articles 3 (lX g), 10 and 87]. It is not for the Com mission to interfere 
w ith choices o f  regulatory o r legislative techniques a t S tate le v e l." 1324
The provisions just named should have the same legality standard. This is undermined because
an equivalent to article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty is not present in these other provisions.1325
1321 Forrester (2005) DRAFT, page 18.
1322 Komninos (2005) DRAFT, page 3, article 81(3Xb) "...means that an agreement creating a monopoly, although 
socially desirable because of accruing efficiencies, will still be prohibited."
1323 Möschel (1991), page 12.
1324 Gyselen (1994), page 245, See also, pages 246 and 257.
1325 Attachment to article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty more directly affects Member Stales' regulatory policy choices 
through a combination of articles 3(1 )(g), 10 and 81 of the Treaty.
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In conclusion, competition is an important Treaty objective. It is rarely in the public interest for 
this to be eliminated. As a result, article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty could have a role, in providing a 
first quick check when exemption is being considered. Where an agreement eliminates 
competition it is unlikely that it will pass the first article 81(3) test either. Article 81(3Xb)'s 
presence in such cases would make the proceedings cheaper, easier and more predictable than a 
general balance. Having said that, in our view, in the Community legal order, competition is not 
so important as to permanently 'beat' all other relevant objectives. To invoke a special rule in 
relation to agreements between undertakings may have made sense in 1957. However, today the 
Treaty is a much more complex document. Many objectives are relevant that were not 
envisaged in the Community's early days. Some of these, such as human rights, public health 
and environmental protection have a lot o f weight. The presence of article 81(3)(b) o f the Treaty 
can undermine the public interest. It does this at a time when undertakings are being encouraged 
to act in these non-economic areas. Article 81(3)(b) also undermines the idea that the Treaty 
should be neutral vis-à-vis the regulatory or legislative techniques which the State (or 
Community) authorities choose to pursue. It might even force the Community to use legislative 
or regulatory techniques that are not as efficient for achieving the public interest as agreements 
between undertakings.
Competition’s importance can be adequately protected within article 81(3)’s first balance. 
Article 81(3)(b) of the Treaty is either unnecessary or inconsistent with the public interest and 
should be removed from the Treaty, Having said that, we appreciate the need for simplifying the 
decision-making process. Article 81(3)(b) might be reflected within the first article 81(3) test by 
creating a rebuttable presumption that where competition were eliminated no exemption would 
be possible.
5. THE THIRD ARTICLE 81(3) TEST: INDISPENSABILITY (ARTICLE 81(3)(A)) 
Consideration of many Community and Member State interests is necessary within article 81 of 
the Treaty. We believe that the best place for this is article 81(3)’s first test. The fact that all 
relevant objectives can be openly considered there means that other provisions and definitions 
within article 81 are less likely to be distorted. This should lead to a more open and transparent 
application of the provision.
Nevertheless, such a wide balancing test in article 81(3) o f the Treaty demands an extensive and 
complex analysis. It also provides ample scope for fundamentally undermining the market 
mechanism (depending upon how much 'weight* competition is given in the balance). While this 
possibility reflects the balance advocated within the Treaty, we have already examined two 
article 81(3) provisions that seem designed to limit the influence o f the possibility o f exemption.
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From what we have seen so far, these limits are far from those advocated by our theoretical 
conclusion in Chapter One. There we said:
"Ignoring non-economic policy  objectives when applying com petition law can create 
significant benefits, in term s o f  enhanced legal certainty. T his encourages firm s to invest 
and innovate. That said, a t a certain point the benefits that enhanced legal certainty brings 
are outweighed by the im portance o f  the policy goals it underm ines. Even then, it m ay still 
be better to focus on a pure w elfare test in com petition  po licy  i f  these non-welfare 
objectives can be adequately protected  through other legislative tools."
We arrived at these conclusions in a legal vacuum. They did not take account of the various 
demands that the Treaty’s structure or provisions make about the consideration of non-economic 
objectives within article 81. Having said that, they obviously impact upon our approach to 
article 81 analysis and we wondered whether there might be a justification for introducing an 
equivalent concept there.
Section 5 analyses the final article 81(3) 'limit1, the 'indispensability test'. This test is set out in 
article 81(3)(a) of the Treaty, which says that agreement must not:
"...im pose on the undertakings concerned restrictions w hich are not indispensable to  the 
attainm ent o f  these objectives113261.. ."
In our view, this provision could be used to achieve the ends we seek. It is important, because, 
without such a provision, many Treaty articles would, in practice, end up being 
indistinguishable from each other. Chapter Two argued that many Treaty objectives should be 
balanced in some of these provisions. But the indispensability test reminds us that although non­
economic objectives can be weighed within article 81(3), competition can only be undermined 
where this is indispensable. In other words, article 81(3)(a) underlines that article 81 is 
principally about the competitive process.
Article 81(3)(a) of the Treaty embodies a  three stage process. As a preliminaiy step, there must 
be a balancing exercise to assess which combination o f  objectives should be achieved by the 
agreement in question, this is discussed above.1326 327 *Then the decision-maker must ensure that:
"First, the  restrictive agreem ent as such  m ust be reasonably  necessary in order to  achieve 
the efficiencies. Secondly, the  individual restrictions o f  com petition that flow from  the 
agreem ent m ust also be reasonably  necessary  for the attainm ent o f  the efficiencies."Ij28
1326 "...these objectives..." refers back to article 81(3)’s four heads o f  exemption, see T-66/89 Publishers Association 
v. Commission [1992], paragraph 73 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.165.
1327 The system o f  this paragraph is somewhat strained if the balancing up is carried out again in the context of the 
first negative condition of article 81(3) o f the Treaty, see the opinion o f Advocate-General Verloren van Themaat, 
the VBVBTVBBB Case, page 88.
I3zi Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 73.
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The indispensability test does not only apply to restrictions necessary in order to achieve 
efficiencies. Those needed in order to achieve non-economic objectives are relevant as well.1329
There is general agreement that the article 81(3Xa) test ensures that the agreement is 
indispensable, in the sense that without it the parties could not have attained the relevant 
objectives.1330 See, for example, the Matra Case, where the CFI held that the central question 
under article 81(3Xa) of the Treaty:
"...is whether the joint venture is strictly indispensable to enable the founders to penetrate 
the market in question, [my emphasis]"1331
However, article 81(3Xa) of the Treaty could equally have generated a different enquiry. On the 
condition that Chapter Six’s recommendations for article 81(1) are accepted, the inclusion of the 
indispensability test in article 81(3) of the Treaty allows us to ensure that intervention is as 
successful as possible, while at the same time reducing (presumably consumer) welfare losses to 
the bare minimum.
The economic theory of optimal intervention says that one can rank the efficiency o f different 
policy instruments, according to the end to be achieved, Chapter One. When we consider 
whether or not a restriction of competition is indispensable to achieve a balanced set of policy 
objectives, we could take the theoiy of optimal intervention into account. The need to achieve 
Treaty ends through the best means, taking account of the costs of each ’solution’, has been 
accepted by the Commission.1332
In other words, the relevant decision-maker, and ultimately the Community Courts, should only 
exempt restrictions of competition under article 81(3) o f the Treaty when they are convinced 
that there is no other method which:
• is at least as effective for achieving the balance achieved by the agreement; and,
* does not reduce welfare less than the agreement.
1329 Vedder (2003), pages 178 and 179; the VOTOB matter, Commission, RCP1992, paragraphs 177-186 and Jacobs 
(1993/2), page 57.
1330 See, for example, van Gerven (2004), page 431; Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraphs 75 and 76; 
Vedder (2003), pages 175-181 and Faull and Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.168.
1331 The Matra Case, paragraph 138. See also, the Opinion of Advocate-General Roemer in the Consten and Grundig 
Case, pages 374-377; Case 71/74, Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Fruit v. Commission [1975], paragraph 42 and 
Commission decisions, Duro-Dyne - Europair, page 13; Goodyear Italiana - Euram, paragraph 13; Grundig's EC 
distribution system, paragraph 38; Enichem/ICI, paragraphs 40-45; Atlas, paragraph 56; Exxon/Shell, paragraph 72; 
Pheonix/GlobalOne, paragraph 61.
1332 SEC(92) 1986a, pages 9 and 10.
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Some Commission decisions hint that this has sometimes been the test applied. For example, 
Commission decision, Aluminium imports from  Eastern Europe,1333 dealt with an agreement to 
reduce imports of aluminium into the Community. In relation to whether or not the restrictions 
were indispensable the Commission said:
"Even i f  the protection o f  the w estern alum inium  m arket from  com petitive perturbation 
were accepted as an improvement in production o r distribution, o r contributed to  economic 
progress, the Brandeis arrangem ents [the agreem ents that the Com m ission w as considering] 
were not indispensable for the achievem ent o f  that purpose.
I f  EEC producers o f  alum inium  had  needed any protection from  the com petition offered by 
aluminium producers in eastern E urope, their p roper course w ould have been to  m ake an 
application to  the public authorities entrusted by  law  w ith  the  regulation o f trade."
Furthermore, in a Press Release relating to book pricing agreements between publishers and 
booksellers in Germany and Austria the Commission said, in relation to a book-pricing scheme 
it had sent a statement of objections on:
"The Com m ission takes the  view th a t alternative m echanism s are available which are a 
great deal less objectionable from th e  point o f  view  o f  com petition policy: publishers and 
booksellers could contribute to  a fund to  support m ore dem anding literary works; targeted 
and selective direct aid could be  given; discounts could be  quality-based rather than 
quantity-based; or indeed there could  be a  selective distribution system designed to 
encourage w orks with a strong cultural elem ent."1334
Note that this kind o f a test is fundamentally different to the other 'limits', which are to be found 
within article 81(3) of the Treaty. Those tests affected the balance achieved under article 81(3)'s 
first test. Our interpretation o f  article 81(3Xa) is completely different because it places a 
procedural limit on the use of the article 81(3) exemption. Thus, it does not deny the importance 
of the various Community and Member State objectives. Instead, it encourages all relevant 
actors to achieve these ends in as efficient a way as possible.
Note too, that this proposal is not denying the role o f  undertakings in the achievement o f non­
economic objectives. The Commission has said:1335
"The Com m ission also takes the v iew  that it is n o t for undertakings or associations o f 
undertakings to  conclude agreem ents on cultural questions, w hich are principally a m atter 
for governm ent (although the C om m ission recognizes that undertakings can also p lay  a 
valuable part in the dissem ination o f  culture). T he Com m ission is sure that the M em ber
1333 Commission decision, Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe, section 16.2.3. See also similar arguments in, 
Commission decisions. United Reprocessors GmbH, paragraph 111(3); Grohe's distribution system, paragraph 24; 
Ideal-Standards distribution system, paragraph 24; Uniform Eurocheques, paragraphs 40, 42 and 43.
1334 Press Release, IP/98/30.
1335 Commission decision, VBBBf VBVB, paragraph 60. See also the Report for the Hearing, on appeal, the 
VBVB/VBBB Case, page 43.
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States concerned would not hesitate to take action to protect certain cultural interests should 
this be necessary."
We do not agree with this assessment. Sometimes the only, or most efficient, way o f  achieving a 
particular non-economic end is through agreements between undertakings. The discussion of 
corporate social responsibility in Chapter One indicates that, today, the Commission would 
probably agree with us. We accept that our proposal will reduce undertakings' use o f corporate 
social responsibility, but only to the extent that this is inefficient1336
How could this system be implemented? The party relying on the article 81(3) exemption must 
demonstrate that the agreement fulfils article 81(3)'s first balancing te st If this is the case, it 
(and the opposing party) must list the various ways of achieving the relevant objectives to the 
same extent as the agreement.1337 This is the right test, because we have already established that 
this is in line with the public interest under article 81(3)'s first test
Imagine, for example, that agreement reduces the environmental impact of washing machine use 
in the European Union by prohibiting all machines that belong to energy categories D to G of 
the relevant Commission directive.1338 One way of achieving this may be to allow all, or the 
majority, o f undertakings in the relevant sector to agree to only produce washing machines 
better than or equal to this energy efficiency.1339 Alternatively, the Commission could have 
proposed environmental legislation prohibiting the sale o f washing machines, belonging to 
energy categories D to G of Commission Directive 95/12/EC, in the European Union. It, or the 
Member States could also have introduced more fundamental reform aimed at internalising the 
environmental externalities.1340
1336 The rule presented here also bears a passing resemblance to the subsidiarity test, see article 5 o f the Treaty. The 
subsidiarity test asks whether, in certain areas, an action is best taken by the Community or the Member States, 
Craig and de Burca (1998), page 127. "In practical terms, subsidiarity means that, when exercising its powers, the 
Community must, where various equally effective options are available, choose the form o f action or measure 
which leaves the Member States, individuals or businesses concerned the greatest degree o f  freedom.", The 
subsidiarity principle, (1992) Bulletin of the EC, page 10-122. However, our rule does not seek greater freedom for 
the actors, but more efficient mechanisms for achieving the relevant objectives. Sometimes these two coincide, but 
this will not always be the case.
1337 In Commission decision, Olivetti/  Canon, paragraph 56, the Commission refused to follow one, less restrictive, 
proposal because it thought that this would not achieve the agreement's benefits to the same extent "The benefits of 
the increase o f research and development the improvement of technology and the strengthening o f the competitivity 
o f  the European industry through the transfer o f technology could not be achieved without the joint venture. 
Without that cooperation, costs of R&D and production would be spread over a smaller number o f units, and this 
would result in either an insufficient improvement o f the products manufactured by one or both o f the companies, or 
higher prices of those products. The grant of a licence would not have allowed the transfer o f technology to the 
same extent as is allowed by a joint venture. The major involvement o f the partners inherent in a manufacturing 
joint venture permits a permanent and intense flow o f technology."
1338 Commission, Directive on Energy Labelling o f  Household Washing Machines, see Annex IV.
1J'*9 See Commission decision, CECED, discussed in Chapters Two, Four and Eight
1340 See, Hahn and Hester (1989).
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Assuming that the second or third suggestions above would achieve the end in question, just as 
effectively as the first option, then, subject to what is said in the rest o f Section 5, the 
«dispensability test should have prevented the adoption of Commission decision, CECED. This 
is on the assumption that the restriction on competition is more welfare reducing than the other
two methods suggested above.
In Commission decision, Synthetic Fibres, for example, the Commission had been asked a 
number of times whether it would exempt an agreement on restructuring within this industry 
and each time had refused. At the same time it contacted Member States asking them to 
"...avoid aggravating the over-capacity problem by granting any form of State aid to the 
sector.", paragraph 12. It might also be possible for the Commission to suggest to Member 
States that they grant State aid, where this would be just as effective and have a less restrictive 
effect on competition?
Chapter One watered down this extreme efficiency rule however. It suggested that there may 
still be times when the decision-maker, in its discretion, could legitimately allow a restriction of 
competition under article 81(3) o f the Treaty, even if this would not be the most efficient route. 
This might be the case where:
• inclusion of certain factors in the price mechanism might not be possible, or at least not 
at the level that the Community demands;1341
• the relevant objectives have not been achieved to the level promised by the agreement 
and allowing the restriction means that the relevant objectives could be achieved to this 
level more quickly than would otherwise be the case.1342 Without the agreement we 
might have to wait for a sufficiently large gap in the legislative programme. 
Fundamental reform, such as internalising environmental externalities, * could take 
years.1343
The Commission may be tempted to seize such cases for itself, as it is permitted to do under 
Regulation 1/2003, and resort to this method of'legislation', where it has a lot o f control, rather
1341 "Because adequate standards do not exist, some environmental costs are still not, or only partially, reflected in the 
price; moreover, the market economy is proving unable fully to achieve Community environmental objectives in all 
cases. In consequence, the various parties have felt the need to restrict competition in certain markets in order better 
to attain the desired environmental objectives.", Jans (2000), page 271.
1342 The Commission or Member States may also be bound to act multi-laterally in certain areas and so until 
agreement can be generated between States the Commission might achieve its ends through voluntary agreements 
between undertakings, as suggested in, SEC(92) 1986a, page 6. This is already a principle within the 
indispensability test as currently interpreted, see Commission, A rticle 81(3) G uidelines, paragraph 76 and Faull and 
Nikpay (1999), paragraph 2.166.
1343 By way of example, an implementing regulation was not provided in sea transport for some 24 yean. Recent 
Commission reports suggest that the ’new* Member States will take some eleven yean to implement some of the 
binding European environmental legislation, 11 years fo r  E V  law s, The Law Society Ga2ette, 14 October 2004.
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than to using the normal routes, see articles 250-252 o f the Treaty. This it should not do 
otherwise its acts may be ultra vires. However, it might be that the Commission believes that 
while legislation is the best option, the objectives that require protection are important enough 
to require a temporary restriction on competition until the appropriate legislation is enacted. In 
such a case the right course of action might be to grant an article 81(3) exemption until the 
relevant institutions have time to legislate. Such a policy should lie within the discretion of the 
Commission. Nevertheless, it will have to consider whether:
(i) the inaction on the part o f the institutions is, in itself, a policy decision. In other words, 
the institutions might have analysed the need for environmental protection legislation 
relating to the energy efficiency o f  washing machines. If they had decided that no such 
legislation was necessary because the appropriate level of protection had already been 
achieved, it would normally be wrong for the Commission to introduce such an 
exemption by this route;
(ii) the same would apply where the Community has legislated in an area and the 
Commission decides that a specific risk has not been adequately covered. In the Verband 
Case there was already European legislation in place that sought to prevent firms from 
knowingly maintaining an imbalance between income and expenditure.1344 Advocate- 
General Darmon argued for allowing a horizontal cartel seeking to make sure that the 
risk was more adequately covered than the European legislation demanded.1345
Unless it can be shown that either the specific problem at issue in a specific case is 
materially different from the issues that the legislation sought to deal with; or, that 
circumstances have materially changed since the legislation was passed; then it is not the 
place for the Community Courts or the Commission to substitute their will for that o f the 
legislature.
This additional change introduces a type o f  moral hazard. If  the Commission is able to ’legislate' 
in this way it may reduce the Member States’ incentive, through the Council, to take common 
positions in certain areas (although under certain circumstances it might increase it too). 
Nevertheless, there will be occasions when it is still better to take this path, at least until longer 
term solutions can be found and agreed upon.
It should be noted that this interpretation o f indispensability also helps simplify the balancing 
task in the earlier part of article 81(3) o f the Treaty. This is because where some of the
1344 The Verband Case, page 427.
,MS Although, ultimately, he felt that the restrictions on competition went too far it seems clear from the case that if 
the agreement had related to the fixing of net premiums, rather than gross premiums, he would have recommended 
an exemption, pages 445-446.
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objectives could be achieved more efficiently in another way they should not be considered 
within the basket o f  benefits (or cons) of the agreement.
The "indispensability test" should be amended to restrict the impact of these other policy 
objectives upon competition policy. This should force the Commission to take account of the 
efficiency point, discussed in Chapter One.1346 At the same time, the relevant objectives can be 
pursued via the article 81 mechanism where this is the best/ most efficient way of achieving 
them.
It should be noted that this is a long way from arguing that Treaty objectives are/ should be 
irrelevant to those implementing article 81. Nor can it be said that in this way we are effectively 
giving economic efficiency too much weight in the balance. Rather than promote that objective, 
we are promoting the development o f an efficient market system, as a mechanism for wealth 
distribution.
6. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER SEVEN
Non-economic objectives must be taken into account in article 81 of the Treaty. We have 
suggested that their consideration be confined to article 81(3). In our view, article 81(1) of the 
Treaty should be a pure economic efficiency analysis.
While accepting that non-economic objectives are relevant in article 81(3), Commission, Article 
81(3) Guidelines, offer no guidance about how they should be integrated. This issue is of prime 
importance given how often these objectives have been considered in the past, and the 
inconsistent ways in which this has been done, see Part B. In addition, since 1 May 2004, the 
Member States' courts and competition authorities need guidance, they now have to apply 
article 81 of the Treaty in its entirety for the first time.
This guidance would involve explaining which non-economic objectives are relevant; defining 
each objective precisely;1347 and clarifying its weight. This is because, in article 81(3)'s first test, 
these non-economic objectives must be weighed against the restriction of competition, 
established under article 81(1) of the Treaty. Chapter Eight discusses the issue of weight, 
although ultimately, this is a political decision and this thesis does not assign weights. Chapter 
Eight also provides a framework for balancing. This makes the process more predictable and
1346 This would not only be the Commission but also the Member States' courts and competition authorities. 
However, these are the sort of cases that the Commission will likely seize for itself, under Regulation 1/2003. 
Furthermore, while it is debateable whether the Member States' institutions (and particularly their courts) are the 
appropriate fora for these questions, that should not undermine the substantive questions posed under article 81. It 
might lead us to question the validity o f Regulation 1/2003, however. That debate is outside this thesis' remit
lj47 The Netherlands Dutch Ministry o f Economic Affairs, The Liberal Professions, pages 24, 49 and 84 and Gual 
(1995), page 21.
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easier for the relevant actors to apply. Chapter Seven’s Section 2 deals with four other issues in 
relation to this first test.
The first matter is what sort of balancing test we should have under article 81(3)*s first test. 
Various non-economic objectives have been considered and combined there. Sometimes their 
combined weight was necessary to 'justify1 the restriction o f competition. We argue that whether 
an agreement undermines non-economic objectives should also be a relevant consideration in 
the balance. Both issues should be assessed in every case. This must be done in a more 
structured way. This makes balancing within this provision more complex; but to do otherwise, 
would undermine the Treaty. It would also be unsustainable, from a logical perspective.
Secondly, Chapter Two and Part B showed many non-economic Community objectives being 
used in article 81(3) of the Treaty. Some o f them had policy-linking clauses, some did not. 
Member State objectives are also relevant there, in cases o f diagonal conflict. As in article 30 o f 
the Treaty, we suggested that, ultimately, it is for the Community Courts to decide whether the 
Member State objective has been given excessive weight in the balance.
Thirdly, Chapter Five argued that the agreement's effects on product and geographic markets 
other than the relevant one should be considered in the economic efficiency analysis. We argued 
the same here, for non-economic objectives. Often the effects on non-economic objectives are 
not felt in the relevant market(s), so to do otherwise could mean ignoring them. This adds a new 
level of difficulty, but to do otherwise would risk ignoring the weight the Treaty gives to these 
aims.
Finally, sometimes the Commission and the Community Courts have demanded that the aim o f 
the agreement be to achieve the non-economic goals, if they are to be considered. This imposes 
a purely formulistic requirement that is irrelevant. We should focus on the effect of the 
agreement, as opposed to the parties' aims. Even where the parties seek to be efficient, this is 
not for the 'good o f all’, but rather because they hope, ultimately, to make more profit for their 
firm. Section of the genius of capitalism is to unite the individual's aims with those of society, 
so that the one often achieves the other. The same can also be true in respect of non-economic 
objectives.
This leaves article 81(3)'s first test as a wide assessment. However, although many objectives 
must, theoretically be considered, their effect on welfare depends upon how much weight they 
are given in the balance. Furthermore, although an agreement frequently affects many non­
economic objectives, these effects are normally not appreciable, and thus need not be 
considered. Chapter Eight discusses the application of the appreciability concept in such cases.
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How much competition can be restricted also depends on the importance placed on article 
81(3)'s other 3 tests. Article 81(3)'s second provision demands that consumers get a fair share of 
the agreement’s resulting benefit. Section 3 suggested that the rule only makes sense where 
consumers are defined as private end-users o f the relevant goods or services. However, it is 
inordinately difficult to assess whether such people get a fair share of the benefit. We showed 
that assessing the benefits for the parties' direct customers was sufficient. However, we argued 
that this provision should be deleted. Consumer protection objectives can (and have been) 
adequately considered under the first provision in article 81(3) o f the Treaty.
Another implication of mere-balancing in article 81(3) o f the Treaty is that, at the very least, a 
more consistent approach to the definition o f ’competition' in article 81(3Xb) is needed. But, we 
suggest the deletion of this provision too. It is either irrelevant, as this can already be considered 
in the first provision's balance; or, it undermines that balance by promoting an objective to a 
level that is inconsistent with the Treaty’s 'optimal balance'.
Finally, article 8 l(3Xa) of the Treaty should be redefined. In order to take proper account of the 
concept of optimal intervention, mere-balancing should be restricted to the occasions when it is 
the best way of achieving the end in question. This does not mean that non-economic objectives 
are unimportant. It is simply that, in order to preserve the market mechanism upon which the 
Community is primarily based, it is important to keep market distortions to a minimum. This is 
as long as non-economic objectives can be achieved in alternative (and equally effective) ways.
Considering all relevant non-economic objectives under article 81(3) o f the Treaty, both those 
of the Community and those o f the Member States, has two main benefits:
•  this is in line with our view of the Treaty, described in Chapter Two, of a wide range of 
interlinking, self-reinforcing and conflicting objectives, none of which are permanently 
prioritised, but which should be blended to achieve the optimal Community balance; 
and,
•  it should reduce the perceived need to distort article 81's other wording, such as 'the 
effect on trade between Member States' and the terms 'undertaking' and 'competition* to 
protect relevant objectives.
Potentially, such a wide first test means that many non-economic objectives will be applicable 
in every case. In reality, most will not be appreciable. That is not to say that the balancing 
exercise itself is going to be easy. It will be especially difficult to ensure consistency in light of 
the many decision-makers that Regulation 1/2003 creates. As a result, Chapter Eight is 
dedicated to providing a framework for this balancing process.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A FRAMEWORK FOR BALANCING OBJECTIVES WITHIN
ARTICLE 81
1. Introduction
2. Defìning an Over-Arching Objective
3. Weight for the Right Balance?
3.1. Qualitative and quantitative weight
3.1.1. Qualitative weight
3.1.2. Quantitative weight
3.1.3. Combining qualitative and quantitative weight
3.2. Likelihood that objective will be achieved/ harmed
3.3. Discounting for the future
3.4. Appreciability
3.5. Conclusion
4. Comparing Apples and Pears - A Common Meter?
5. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
Within article 81, conflicts between objectives are, principally, resolved through balancing.1348 
Given the significance o f the balancing method, one would expect clear guidance about how the 
balancing exercise should be performed. None exists.1349 Some doubt that the provision o f 
useful guidelines is possible.1350
Despite this pessimism, this chapter provides some foundations for balancing article 8 l’s 
objectives. The Commission should either accept this framework, or propose a new one. Even if  
it accepts the framework proposed here, the Commission must also settle many o f the political 
questions that are raised in this chapter.
This chapter's methodology would be important even if only economic freedom, economic 
efficiency and market integration were relevant in article 81. Chapter Two and Part B 
demonstrate that many other objectives should be (and are) considered in article 81.1351 This 
increases the complexity of the decision-makers’ task, and the importance of such a framework.
Why is guidance desirable? It helps to create a unified body of decisions, rather than a set of 
individual ad hoc and inconsistent measures. As a result, the underlying objectives are more
1348 Thai is not to say that exclusion is irrelevant in article 81, although it is quite rare, see Chapter Two. In addition, 
article 81(3)(b), discussed in Chapter Seven, states that the agreement must not afford the parties to it "...the 
possibility o f eliminating competition..." As a result, article 81 contains within it a limited form o f hierarchy, 
competition cannot be eliminated.
1349 Perhaps, this is not so unusual. The OECD found a similar position in many other countries, OECD (2003), pages 
3 and 10.
1350 Bourgeois and Demaret (1995), page 110.
,3it The Introduction showed how prevalent these considerations are in article 81 decisions.
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likely to be realised.1352 Without such a system, the overall quality o f competition law would be 
endangered.1353
Secondly, defining the balance’s objectives, as well as the rules on how to perform it, informs 
those performing the balance o f what they are trying to achieve and how to do this.1354 This 
chapter shows just how crucial guidelines are in this regard, by illustrating the plethora o f value 
judgments that are involved in article 81's balance. Guidance is particularly important today, see 
below.1355 The Member States' courts and competition authorities, while bound to apply articles 
81 and 82 in their entirety,1356 cannot take decisions running counter to Commission 
decisions.1357 For Member State bodies to replicate Commission decisions and achieve the 'right 
result* in a 'new' case, they need to know what the Commission is trying to achieve through its 
balance and what factors are relevant to it.1358 Also, to generate an acceptance o f balancing, as 
well as to improve their capacity for this, decision-makers need to have the process explained 
and justified to them.1359 Greater understanding and acceptance of the balancing standard 
reduces arbitrariness and subjectivity, breeding a system o f trust.1360
1352 See, the Economic and Social Committee's O pinion on the Twentieth R eport on Competition Policy, page 236 of 
Commission, RCP 1991, paragraph 2.1.2.9.; COM(200I) 4S6, pages 17-19 and Goldman (1998), page 327.
1313 Van den Bergh (2002), page 35. This is also the implication from the Economic and Social Committee, Opinion 
on the Twentieth Report on Com petition Policy, page 236 of the Commission, RCP 1991, paragraph 2.1.2.7
,3M See, Goldman (1998), page 327 and Goldman and Barutciski (1998), page 414.
1355 Hildebrand (2002), page 3 and Wesseling (2000), page 112.
1356 Regulation 1/2003, recital 4 and articles 5 and 6.
1337 Regulation 1/2003, recital 22 and article 16.
1358 D'Agostino (2003), pages 163-165. Is this so important? The Commission must be kept aware, in good time, of 
all article 81 and 82 actions by the Member States' competition authorities and courts, Regulation 1/2003, recital 21 
and article 11(3). It can also appear before Member States' courts and competition authorities, Regulation 1/2003, 
recital 21 and article 15(3). See also the Commission, Co-operation G uidelines - National Courts, paragraphs 17-20 
and 31 -35. These bodies can also send questions regarding the application o f  articles 81 and 82 to the Commission, 
Regulation 1/2003, recital 21 and articles 11(5) and 15(1). See also the Commission, Co-operation Guidelines - 
National Courts, paragraphs 27-30. In exceptional cases, where the public interest of the Community so requires, 
the Commission can also reserve a case to itself, Regulation 1/2003, recitals 11,14 and 17 and articles 10 and 11(6).
That said, the previous system, where the Commission alone took article 81(3) decisions, prevented it from 
concentrating its limited resources on curbing the most serious infringements, Regulation 1/2003, recital 3. We saw 
that these objectives (and thus balancing) are relevant in many cases. Unless the Member States’ courts and 
competition authorities are given sufficient information about how to perform the balancing test, and are confident 
that they can do this correctly, then they will continue to refer (and arguably are bound to refer) many cases to the 
Commission/ Community Courts. This may undermine the reform process itself, see, Gyselen (2002), pages 79, 80 
and 85. Furthermore, when the Commission acts under article 81, the case handlers there will be aided by the 
definition of a meta-objective, which they can apply in cases of conflict
1339 Miller and Rose (1993).
1360 Porter (1995), pages ix and 90. This is particularly important where there are principal/ agent relationships 
involved," Bamberg and Spreman (1989); like those created between the Commission and the Member State 
authorities by Regulation 1/2003, see recitals 15, 17, 21,22, 34 and articles 11,15 and 16.
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Finally, guidelines provide greater predictability (legal certainty) and transparency to 
undertakings, their advisers and other actors in the market place.1361 Since 1 May 2004 article 
81’s predictability is even more important. The system of prior notification has been replaced by 
a system of direct applicability.1362 Undertakings can still seek guidance on novel questions 
from the Commission, but are no longer protected from fines.1363 In addition, more article 81 
decisions should be taken under the new system.1364
This chapter provides a framework for balancing. It does not stipulate precisely how to balance. 
To ensure the uniform application of Community competition law, the national courts and 
competition authorities must achieve consistent decisions (results) to those adopted by the 
Commission, see above. The method they use to achieve this is largely up to them. As the 
Commission notes:
"In the absence of Community law provisions on procedures...related to the enforcement of 
EC competition rules by national courts, the latter apply national procedural 
law...However, the application of these national provisions must be compatible with the 
general principles of Community law."1365
Today, national courts and competition authorities can use their own balancing procedures. 
However, they must implement Community legislation in a way which is consistent with the 
general principles o f Community law, such as clarity and certainty1366 and achieves the same 
results as those of the Commission.
This minimum framework for balancing focuses on three areas. First, no balance can be 
properly conducted without defining what ultimate objective is being pursued; the Commission 
must enunciate article 81's meta-objective, Section 2.1367 Secondly, due to the number, breadth 
and complexity of the objectives involved, explicitly defining the meta-objective (while 
necessary) may not sufficiently enhance clarity for those interpreting the competition 
provisions. Guidance is also needed on which factors should affect the relevant objectives’ 
weight when the balance is performed. Section 3 highlights features that the Commission
1361 D'Agostino (2003), page 163; Goldman (1998), page 327 and Korah (1998), page 526. Chapter One explains why 
legal certainty is important.
1362 Regulation 1/2003, article 1.
1363 Commission, Guidance Letters Guidelines, paragraphs 5 and 7. Considering the sensitivity o f balancing 
objectives within article 81, as well as the Commission’s reluctance to explain this issue thus far, is it likely that the 
Commission will answer such questions now? It seems unlikely, see also, Gyselen (2002), pages 79 and 80.
1364 See, Regulation 1/2003, recital 3 and Lenaerts (2002), page 18.
1365 Commission, Co-operation Guidelines • National Courts, paragraph 10. See also, Kerse (1998), pages 418 and 
419 and the references made there.
1366 See, Amull, Dashwood, Ross and Wyatt (2000), pages 137-142 and Craig and de Burca(l998), pages 357-364.
1367 The expressions 'meta-objective', 'ultimate aim', 'over-arching goal' and 'optimal objective', as well as 
combinations of these terms, are used synonymously in this chapter.
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currently considers when assessing restrictions of competition. It discusses the adequacy of the 
Commission’s approach when applied to non-economic objectives. Finally, Section 4 asks how 
these objectives, which are often not directly commensurable, can be balanced rationally.
A word of caution. We seek a more coherent, transparent system for article 81 which closely 
follows the Commission’s decisions. Legal certainty and the uniformity of Community 
competition law are important.1368 That said, each case is different and there are an infinity of 
situations in which article 81 might apply. Objectives clash and value judgments must be made 
about the optimal balance in each case. Decision-makers exercise their discretion in these value 
judgments.
"Balancing is not a  procedure leading in every case to  a  precise and unavoidable 
outcom e."1369
Since 1 May 2004, the Member States' authorities share this discretion. Their decisions will not 
always be precisely what the Commission (or the Council) would like. However, uniformity is 
not principally threatened by rogue judges, see above, but by the lack of transparency that 
shrouds balancing as a process. National authorities do not know what the Commission would 
do in their place, so they cannot emulate it. Through appropriate notices,1370 the Commission 
can guide the balancing process,1371 eliminating many value judgments and thus limiting the 
exercise of discretion. But legal balancing is not mathematics. Where there is balancing, 
discretion will remain. This should be celebrated. Legal certainty is not the only value that legal 
systems espouse,1372 think of justice or fairness, for example. While the decision-maker should 
be guided, his (or her) hands should not be tied.
Finally, the Community is developing impact assessment tools. Impact assessment is a 
systematic method of analysing the likely effects of intervention by public authorities. It should 
improve the efficiency, quality and coherence of the Community policy development process. 
Why? Because, identifying the likely positive and negative effects o f proposed policy actions on 
different Treaty objectives, means that more informed, political judgments could be made in 
relation to proposed policy actions.1373 This process bears some resemblance to that of the 
decision-maker in an article 81 balance. By identifying the likely positive and negative effects
13M Regulation 1/2003, recitals 21 and 22 and article 16.
1369 Alexy (2002), page 100. See also pages 83, 105, 362-366, 383-385 and 402; Goldman (1998), page 327; Faull 
(1998), page 509 and 510 and Burton (1992), page 59.
1370 The Commission, H orizontal G uidelines, expressly apply only to economic considerations, paragraphs 10.
1371 Notices help clarify thinking in relation to the application o f the theory in practice, Baker and Wu (1998) and 
Vogelaar (1994), page 544.
1372 Frazer (1990), pages 622 and 623.
1373 See, COM(2002) 276, page 2, which explains where the impetus for this came from.
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o f  an agreement on the relevant objectives the decision-maker can make a more informed 
judgment about where the balance lies. Where appropriate, we examine how these impact 
assessments are performed, as this process may shed light on how article 81’s balance might be 
conducted.
2. DEFINING AN OVER-ARCHING OBJECTIVE
It is important to define the ultimate objective of the balance.1374 Why? It helps those 
performing the balance to know what they are trying to achieve.1375 How? They can better 
determine which values will weigh positively/ negatively in the balance; and, where there is a 
problem o f limited resources, as is often the case in our area, decide how much of each value to 
allow in order to arrive at the 'best decision*. Secondly, as set out above, defining overall 
guiding principles for decision-making helps create a unified body of decisions, rather than a set 
o f  individual ad hoc and inconsistent measures. Finally, defining a meta-objective provides 
greater predictability (legal certainty) and transparency to undertakings, their advisers and other 
actors in the market place.
Defining the optimal objective also has a downside. First, it is very hard (both in fact and 
politically) to find one that incorporates all the relevant values according to the weight we give 
them and yet is not meaninglessly wide, see below. Some even argue that the definition o f an 
over-arching goal is theoretically impossible. It certainly requires difficult political choices, see 
below, but in relation to the values we discuss it is likely not impossible. The monism/ pluralism 
debate in political philosophy is relevant here. Monists believe that, in the event of a conflict 
between values, one can define an over-arching goal where the underlying values are 
compatible with each other. Pluralists disagree.1376 However, the pluralists* assessment is 
contingent upon the values in dispute. The problems that lead them to their conclusions relate to 
fundamental, incommensurable, political values (such as dignity, liberty and the autonomy of 
the individual) and not the quantifiable values (normally) considered in our balance.1377 To the 
extent that the values considered in article 81 are incommensurable, balancing is not rationally 
possible in article 81.1378 The issue is not discussed further as the values that are weighed in 
article 81 are invariably quantifiable; to the extent that they are not, these problems are 
contingent on the pluralists* conception o f  such values. The Commission and the Community
1374 See, the Economic and Social Committee's Opinion on the Twentieth Report on Competition Policy, page 236 of 
the Commission, RCP1991, paragraphs 2.1.2.7-9.
1375 Sec, Bell (1983), pages 26 and 27.
1376 For a summary see Dworkin (2001) and Lilia (2001).
1377 See, for example, Berlin (1990), pages 11-12.
1378 See Zucca (2004), although note the contrary view of Lucy (1999), pages 153 and 154..This problem may apply 
to the extent that fundamental rights are considered in our balance, and possibly even other values such as ’fairness*.
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Courts evidently do not share this conception because, as we have seen above, they generally 
balance these values.
Secondly, if the decision-maker is forced to define the meta-objective, this may reduce his/her 
discretion in a concrete case, making challenges to the decision easier. But, the limited 
discretion referred to here is limited arbitrariness. Restricting this may be disadvantageous to the 
decision-maker specifically seized of the matter; however, it benefits most other actors, as well 
as the Community competition system as a whole, see above.
Finally, the definition of a meta-objective may create rigidity, making it difficult to incorporate 
values that were not part of the test when it was established, or to disregard values that are no 
longer considered important.1379 The importance o f this issue can be overstated. Changes in 
values are not a daily occurrence. When values need to be added or subtracted the meta­
objective can be changed to incorporate them. Expressly changing the meta-objective in this 
way further enhances clarity.
But defining the balance's objective is not merely helpful. Without a meta-objective it is 
impossible to balance at a ll As Peczenik says:1380
"Each principle, or value, can be a prima-facie reason of action. But they can collide...One 
needs then meta-reasons ("super-reasons") to choose between them."
The meta-objective defines, in a sense, the rules of the balancing game and is necessary for two 
reasons. First, without isolating the meta-objective we cannot know  whether different objects or 
effects should be considered positively or negatively. For example, if we want to know whether 
increasing employment is to be considered positively or negatively in the balance, we have to 
refer to a meta-rule to tell us. We might say that increasing employment is positive because it 
provides a better quality of life (on the other hand, we might say it is negative because work is 
unpleasant). Why is a better quality o f  life important? Perhaps because it contributes to human 
dignity? We can continue this dialectic until we arrive at the meta-objective upon which all 
rational article 81 judgments are based.
But, aren’t we already told whether specific values are positive or negative, in a Community 
context? The Treaty states what should be considered positively: "A high level of human health 
protection shall be ensured...", article 152(1), for example. However, the Treaty does not define 
all objectives that must be taken into account in the article 81 balance. For example, neither 
economic freedom nor efficiency are mentioned in the Treaty.
1379 Although definition of the meta-objective does not mean that the values incorporated into it will always be given 
exactly the same weight Rigidity is not created in this way, see Section 3.1.
1380 Peczenik (1989), page 75. See also, Lucy (1999), pages 154-156; Burton (1992), pages 51-54 and Brkii (1985), 
page 44.
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Definition o f a meta-objective is also imperative, as without it we cannot assign different 
weights to the values in the balance. Unless we can do this we cannot solve conflicts through 
balancing. Imagine that, in a concrete case, employment comes at the expense of economic 
efficiency. Assume that both are to be considered positive values in our balance and that both 
cannot be fully achieved with our limited resources. Understanding the over-arching objective 
enables us to decide how much o f each o f  these two entities is optimal, i.e. where the balance 
should lie between them. As we saw in article 152(1), sometimes the Treaty provides an insight 
into what weight certain values should be assigned, there it demanded a  high level o f protection. 
But what does a high level of protection mean? In addition, the Treaty does not provide a 
weighting for all the values it mentions; nor does it define what happens, for example, when two 
objectives requiring a high level o f protection clash. On top of this, as we have seen, not all 
relevant values are even mentioned in the Treaty.
To this one might retort that courts perform balancing every day and rarely define a meta­
objective. This is certainly true (the same can be said o f academics1381), although there are 
exceptions.1382 However, this does not mean that they do not rely on a meta-objective, just that it 
is not explicit. This is likely due to the political controversy that such a definition would cause. 
And yet, unless the Commission defines it explicitly (and correctly), then, where balancing is 
required, the Modernisation Proposals cannot achieve their desired ends.
But, if a meta-objective is imperative, that does not mean that it is easy to define. It is very hard 
to select an optimal objective that incorporates all relevant values according to the weight we 
give them and yet is not so wide that it is meaningless. This, possibly combined with the 
sensitivity of defining this meta-objective,1383 1384is probably why, at times, the institutions have 
tried to avoid defining an underlying objective in abstract terms. In one case, Advocate General 
Tesauro, when introducing article 81(1), although his words seem to apply more generally to the 
whole of article 81, said:’384
"In relation to the ratio legis of that provision, the Court has stated that the requirements of 
protection of competition pursued by it cannot be defined in abstract terms but must be seen 
in the specific context in which the conduct of the undertakings came about."
Advocate General Tesauro is right that the balance is affected by the specific context of the 
agreement, see below. But, does this prevent the definition of an abstract objective? No. Even
1381 In her seminal article on the proportionality test Dc Burca does not consider this issue, De Burca (1993). Nor 
does Aleinikoft in an equally influential article on balancing, Aleinikofif(1987).
1382 This has been accepted in German Public Law, forexampte, see Limbach (2000), pages 158-161; Emiliou (1996), 
pages 32-34, 43 and 57-59 and the references made there and Alexy (2002), pages 93 and 94. Alexy hints at the 
need for a meta-objective at pages 107,404 and 405.
1383 See, Bell (1983), page 27.
1384 Case C-250/92 Gettrup-Ktim v. Dansk Landbrugs, page 5654.
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when one is balancing in the specific context of a case, a meta-objective is needed in order to 
guide the process.1385
So what should the over-arching objective be? Some hint that the sole objective of the balance 
should be economic efficiency. In Part A we saw that the Commission has said that the aim of 
the Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. This meta­
objective is too narrow. Chapter Two demonstrated that, in the context of the European Union, 
other objectives should be (and are) taken into account in article 81 cases. The picture is further 
complicated because, as we move away from a ’pure economic’ community,1386 article 81's 
objectives, and the factors that need to be taken into account within it, are changing too.1387 This 
means that a clear, consistent, picture may not emerge overtime.
Some judgments refer to attaining the ”... objectives o f a single market between States.”1388 
Others refer to "...the observance of the conditions o f competition and unity of the market 
which are so essential to the Common Market..."1389 Achieving European unity has also been 
mentioned as a goal.1390 Perhaps in order to take account of the burgeoning number of values, 
article 81's underlying objectives have, at times, been defined very generally indeed. In Chapter 
Two we saw that the Community Courts have said that the competition rules aim:
"...to prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest,
individual undertakings and consumers."
This is not very helpful, as it does not provide much content to, or guidance for, dealing with 
conflicts. Nor does taking the ’European social balance’1391 as article 81’s underlying objective 
provide the disciplined framework that we seek, because it is an illusive and largely undefined
1385 See, Heimler (1998), page 596.
1386 See, for example, Streit and Mussler (1995).
1387 Monti (2002), page 1077; Whish (2001), page 14; Ritter, Braun and Rawltnson (2000), page 17 and Bouterse 
(1994), pages 10-12, 54 and 55.
1388 The Consten and  Grundig Case, page 341; Case 5/69 Franz Volk v. Vervaecke, paragraph 5/7 and Case 1/71 
Société Anonym e Cadillon v. Firm a H öss, paragraph 6, See also, Bredimas (1978), page 91. Although, note the 
M etro I  Case, paragraph 20, for example. Bouterse (1994), page 3 criticises this as "...insufficient for any 
clarification of what exactly makes up the spirit o f Community action - and thus of article 85 [now article 81]..."
1389 Case 40/70 Sirena v. Eda, paragraph 10.
1390 See, Opinion 1/91 Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph o f A rticle 228(1) o f the Treaty, 
paragraphs 17 and 18. Although Rasmussen argues that when Mr Robert Lecourt left the ECJ the other judges lost 
their over-riding allegiance to this goal, Rasmussen (1993), page 3.
1391 This is implied in Case C-l 85/91 B undesanstalt fü r  den G üterfernverkehr v. Gebrüder Reiff, in the Opinion of 
AG Darmon, paragraphs 23 and 24. He also cites Fox (1986), page 982.
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notion.1392 This argument need not be decisive, however. Over time, case law and Commission 
notices could flesh out these skeletal concepts.1393
When the Commission considers the definition of a meta-objective, it might also refer to the 
Preamble o f the Treaty? There, the High Contracting Parties state that:
"...the essential objective of their [the High Contracting Parties'] efforts [is] the constant 
improvement of die living and working conditions of their peoples..."
To the extent that this accurately reflects the Treaty objectives as they are currently 
interpreted,1394 perhaps this would be a good objective, to be further clarified over time? Many 
clarifications are needed. For example, the meta-objective should indicate the time-scale over 
which the benefits are sought. Can short-term sacrifices be made for long or medium term gain? 
Should the development of economic activities be sustainable over the next five years, or fifty, 
see Chapter One?
The fact that the Commission has not clearly and accurately defined (or even, until recently, 
attempted this) its underlying objectives when implementing article 81 is deeply troubling.1395 
How does it decide the individual matters before it in case of conflict? While we do not suggest 
that outcomes are random, where the ultimate objectives remain undefined, there is certainly an 
implication that any balancing that does take place is done on an intuitive and not on a wholly 
reasoned basis.1396 This is unacceptable for a public body.1397
Even if  each individual Commission decision were decided rationally and reflectively, the 
Commission's decision-making practice implies that there is no meta-objective that it is 
consistently trying to achieve. This* suggests that decisions are taken on an ad hoc basis, as 
opposed to being part of an over-arching system.1398 The Commission has been more explicit 
where market integration is involved in the balance.1399 But even here, the Commission's notices 
are indicative of a mechanical, as opposed to a rational, reasoned, process, see Chapters One
1392 See, in this regard, Commission, RCP1996, page 7 and COM(96) 90 "Europe is built on a set o f values shared by 
all its societies and combines the characteristics o f democracy - human rights and institutions based on the rule o f 
law - with those o f an open economy underpinned by market forces, internal solidarity and cohesion." On a similar 
point, cultural identity, see Amato (1999), pages 1,9-15. See also, Jebsen and Stevens (1995-6), pages 450,451 and 
460, discussing the objectives of Community competition policy more generally.
1393 Alexy (2002), page 108.
1394 This is questionable; see, for example, articles 177 and 178 of the Treaty on development co-operation.
1395 Unfortunately, the European Convention is not any clearer than the Treaty, Cseres (2004), page 227.
1396 The idea that balancing takes place either arbitrarily or unreflectivcly is one o f Habermas' main critiques of it as a 
process, see Habermas (1996), page 259. See also, the reference to Schlink (2001), pages 445-465 in Alexy 
(2003b), page 436.
1397 Finnis (1997), pages 215 and 216.
1398 Indeed, Wesseling (2000), page 49, suggests that priorities are selected on a case-by-casc basis.
1399 See, for example, Commission, Vertical G uidelines, paragraphs 49-55.
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and Three. They are of some help, but not much. Greater clarity in the underlying objectives 
pursued may lead to better quality decision-making as well as generating the other advantages 
referred to above.
Finally, the Commission might argue that it has an overall policy objective that is consistently 
applied in its case law. If this is correct then it is not obvious.1400 This lack of clarity, and the 
enormous leeway that the Commission is given by the Community Courts, means that even if 
the Commission is using a proper system it needs to explain more clearly what it is.1401
These problems are magnified now that the Modernisation Proposals have been implemented. 
Decision-making devolves to national courts and competition authorities as well. The lack of 
clear guidance may lead to a disparate body of case law emerging from these various 
authorities, which will be hard to check. This is particularly serious, as the rules of the balancing 
game will no longer be principally applied by a Community institution. It remains to be seen 
how effective the Commission's monitoring procedures will be.
The difficulty for the Community Courts is that they have been led by the Treaty to allow the 
inclusion of various objectives within article 81 analysis. However, because of the structure of 
their review o f its article 81 decisions (essentially a judicial review type process) they have been 
reluctant to intervene with die Commission's discretion and impose greater order.
A meta-objective must be defined in order for the balancing process to be clear, predictable and 
effective. It would also provide the decision-maker with guidance in difficult cases. The meta­
objective needs to be both wide enough to include all relevant Treaty objectives and flexible 
enough to adapt to changes in these. We have not attempted to define a meta-objective, as this is 
a political task for which a lawyer is ill equipped, but we have suggested some relevant factors.
It may be that, due to the complexity o f the underlying objective's constituent parts, the 
Commission cannot immediately find a notion that precisely and directly explains what the 
balance is. It might have to rely on Notices and cases, to illustrate where the balance should be 
drawn in a variety o f instances, in order to produce a more specific picture via induction. This 
does not mean that the Commission can avoid constructing, at least internally, a coherent value 
framework in which its decisions can be placed and understood. Its long-term goal should be to 
clarify the meta-goal so that others can use it in a meaningful way.
1400 W hish{2001), page 14.
1401 Forrester (1998), page 382.
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3. WEIGHT FOR THE RIGHT BALANCE?
Determining an objective's weight is a difficult and politically controversial task.1402 Due to the 
number, breadth and complexity of the objectives involved, explicitly defining the over-arching 
goal may not sufficiently enhance clarity for those interpreting article 81, especially in the short 
term. Chapter Seven showed that both Community and Member States objectives, which 
contribute to the relevant ends, should be considered.
Guidance is also needed on factors affecting the objectives’ weight in the balance.1403 Section 
3.1. discusses the relevant objectives' weight. Clear guidelines explaining what this should be in 
the abstract, while accounting for the particular circumstances o f the case, are vital. Other 
factors impact upon what weight an objective should be given in a particular case. The two main 
ones are the likelihood that the objective will be achieved, Section 3.2., and, when the objective 
will be achieved, Section 3.3. Finally, the appreciability doctrine is discussed, Section 3.4., this 
can be employed to reduce the number o f objectives in the balance, simplifying the decision- 
makers' task. The Commission already uses all of these methods. Here we highlight them, to 
make the balance more transparent. We also apply them to the objectives, outside o f economic 
efficiency and freedom, examining some problems that this causes.
3.1 Qualitative and quantitative weight
Alexy has said that balancing can be broken down into three stages:1404 14056
"The first stage is a matter of establishing the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, 
the first principle. This is followed by a second stage, in which the importance of satisfying 
the competing principle is established. Finally, the third stage answers the question of 
whether or not the importance of satisfying the competing principles justifies the detriment 
to, or non-satisfaction of, the first"
In order to balance, one must be able to rationally determine how much one objective will be 
infringed (and the competing one achieved). This is a quantitative assessment. There is also a 
qualitative assessment of the importance o f  the infringement (or achievement) o f the principles 
at stake.1405 1406 The qualitative and quantitative elements must then be combined to ascertain the 
objective's weight in the balance. This process cannot be contemplated without reference to the 
balance's underlying objective, see above.
1402 Dworkin (1977), page 26.
1403 This would be ultimately decided in light of the meta-objective.
1404 Alexy (2003a), page 136. See also, Alexy (2002), page 102.
1405 See also, The World Bank and OECD (1999), page 9 and Wathem (1988), pages 12 and 13.
1406 In this paper, qualitative assessments indicate the abstract importance of an objective, based on assessments of its 
value or quality. Quantitative assessments ask how much benefit/ damage was done, in fact
-361 -
The Community Courts and the Commission state that the legal, economic, political and social 
context should be taken into account when applying article 81 o f the Treaty.'407 This allows a 
more accurate assessment of the agreement’s qualitative and quantitative harm or benefits.
3.1.1 Qualitative weight
Two things must be decided under this heading. First, should the objectives have different 
qualitative weights in the balance? Secondly, if  the first question is answered in the affirmative, 
what should these weights be?
Should the objectives have different qualitative weights in the balance? The Treaty does not 
expressly say that the objectives should be assigned different qualitative weights. Indeed, some 
suggest that they should not.1407 408
However, the Treaty does refer to a 'high level o f protection' in relation to some,1409 but not 
all,1410 objectives. The Tiigh' appellation must mean something;1411 environmental protection 
became a *high' priority after the Treaty o f Maastricht, before that, a high level was not 
demanded, for example. These textual differences are hard to explain, except in relation to the 
qualitative weight that the objectives might be given in the balance.1412 Policy statements by the 
Commission, Council and European Parliament support the use o f qualitative weight.1413 The 
ECJ may support this too.1414
1407 In Commission, RC P  1992, the Commission says that competition policy cannot "...be pursued in 
isolation...without reference to the legal, economic, political and social context.", page 13. Also see, Commission, 
RCP 1993, paragraph 3; Case C-250/92 G ottrup-K lim  v. D ansk Landbm gs, Opinion of AG Tesauro, page 5654; 
Case T-6I/89 D ansk P elsdyravlerforening v. C om m ission , paragraph 52; Case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer 
v. Com m ission, paragraph 15 and Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Ford- Werke and  Ford o f Europe v. Commission, 
paragraphs 33 and 34. See also, Frazer (1990), pages 622 and 623 and Wesseling (2000), page 35.
1408 Demetriou and Higgins (2003), page 197 and Wasmeier (2001), page 160 (in relation to the article 2 heads).
1409 Article 127(2) o f the Treaty demands that " ...a  high level of employment shall be taken into consideration in the 
formulation and implementation of Community policies and activities." Also see, articles 152(1) (public health "...a 
high level of human health protection shall be ensured...”), 153(1) and (2) (consumer protection "...ensure a high 
level...”) and 6 and 174(2) (environment "„.aim  at a high level of protection...") of the Treaty.
1410 Article 151(4) o f the Treaty merely says, "...cultural aspects shall be taken into account..." See also, articles 157 
(industrial policy "...shall contribute to the achievement...[without creating]...a distortion of competition"), 159 
(economic and social cohesion "...take into account..."), 163(3) (research and development "...implemented in 
accordance with...") and 178 (development co-operation "...take account...") o f the Treaty.
1411 Loman, Mortelmans, Post and Watson (1992), pages 195 and 196.
1412 'High level* is an abstract appellation, so it cannot refer to a quantitative element, as opposed to ‘a large amount’ 
or ‘a lot’, for example. Also, use of the word 'level* is inappropriate for quantitative, but not qualitative, measures. 
Finally, article 2 of the Treaty refers to " ...a  high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment..." This links *high level* with 'quality o f the environment*. See, also, Kramer (2000), pages 6-9. Lenz 
(2000), pages 47-49, may oppose this position.
1413 The Commission has said that both qualitative and quantitative dimensions should be considered in Community
policy impact assessments, for example, COM(2002) 276, pages 15, 16 and 19. It adopts a similar approach in its 
Vertical G uidelines, paragraph 120 (highlighting a qualitative and a quantitative dimension to weight when
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The Treaty and the Community institutions imply that certain objectives should be given a high 
priority, and that others should not. If  this level of priority were 'captured' in the objectives’ 
qualitative weight in the balance, then article Si's weighing process would better reflect this 
preference. As a result, achieving/ undermining high priority objectives would count for more 
and undertakings would be more likely to consider them in their agreements.1415 This could j
undermine competition, but this seems to be justified by the Treaty, see Chapter Two. j
i
If the objectives have different qualitative weights in the balance, what should these weights be? •>
At the outset, we might differentiate between at least two distinct levels.1416 Those where a high |
p
level o f protection is demanded, and all the rest. This would produce the following bifurcation: ,1!
!
discussing restrictions o f competition). The Commission emphasises qualitative weight in other documents too, see; 
COM(2003) 745 fmal/2, page 17 ("...improving the health and safety of workers and the general public is a key 
political objective of the Community chemicals policy. Maintaining high levels o f employment is also a priority." 
At page 30 the Commission refers to "...a high standard of environmental protection..."); COM(2002) 778, page 8 
(the paramount importance of human rights); Commission, Environmental State a id  Guidelines, recitals 20 and 37; 
it has called the protection of competition, the "...primary objective..." o f Community competition policy, market 
integration remains a second important objective, COM(98)544, page 5 (see also, Commission, A rticle 81(3) 
G uidelines, paragraphs 13,33 and 43 (although paragraph 21 undermines this somewhat) and Commission, Vertical 
G uidelines, paragraph 7) and Commission, A  Handbook on Environmental Assessm ent, pages 33-35. The Council 
and the European Parliament also imply that both qualitative and quantitative dimensions should be considered, see, 
European Parliament and Council, on the assessm ent o f the effects o f certain plans and program m es on the 
environm ent, Annex II (assess "...the value and vulnerability of the area likely to be affected...", as well as the 
effects' magnitude) and Council, on Com m unity consumer policy strategy 2002-2006, recital II(I), for example.
14,4 Case C-233/94, Germany v. European P arliam ent and Council where Germany argued that consumer protection 
required a  high level o f protection, which the directive at issue had not achieved. The ECJ held that "...although 
consumer protection is one of the objectives o f  the Community, it is clearly not the sole objective. As has already 
been stated, the Directive aims to promote the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the 
banking sector. Admittedly, there must be a high level of consumer protection concomitantly w ith those freedom s', 
however, no provision of the Treaty obliges the Community legislature to adopt the highest level of protection 
which can be found in a particular Member State, [my emphasis]", paragraph 48. The different objectives must be 
balanced. The ECJ seems to imply that the *high' appellation has a relative, as opposed to an absolute, qualitative 
w eight.
1415 On the benefits o f this see Chapter One.
14,6 This chapter only discusses the weight o f Treaty objectives. The Commission must also explain the limits o f  the 
Member States' discretion for balancing their own policy objectives within article 81. Then the Member States must 
provide guidelines within these limits. This chapter does not discuss this issue further.
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Qualitative weight Policy
High Employment, public health, consumer protection, environment, 
competition, market integration1417
Not-high Culture, economic and social cohesion, research and development, 
development co-operation1418
Should these groups be further sub-divided? Is the 'value* o f public health’s 'high' appellation 
(article 152(1)) the same as that in article 174(2) (environment), for example? This is unclear. 
There are strong similarities between these articles. The Treaty uses the same word (high) in 
relation them both. On the other hand, the public health language {ensure a high level of 
protection) is stronger than that o f environment {aim at a high level).1419 A similar split emerges 
in the 'not-high* band.
It may be that these textual differences do not reflect diverse priorities; but, on balance, a second 
sub-division along these lines probably better mirrors the Treaty's wording.1420 If this Treaty 
language signals a  prioritisation then reflecting this in the objectives' qualitative weights would 
be beneficial, see above. Tentatively, I suggest the following categories:
Qualitative weight Policy
High Heavy Public health, consumer protection, competition
Light Employment, environment,1421 market integration1422
Not-
high
Heavy Research and development
Light Culture, economic and social cohesion, development co-operation
It is questionable whether this 'ranking' is reflected in Community policy initiatives.1423 This is 
important, because the Commission is given a lot of discretion in relation to weighing and the 
Community Courts are unlikely to interfere with its policy, see Chapters Two and Seven.
Further sub-divisions are also possible. For example, due to the breadth of many policy heads 
one might ask whether the whole objective should be given the same weight. Take consumer
1417 Despite Chapter Four’s conclusions, economic efficiency and market integration are here due to the emphasis 
placed upon them by the Commission in its policy statements, see above and Chapter Two.
1418 Industrial policy is not included because of article 157(3) o f the Treaty. However, in Chapter Four I noted that it 
is considered in article 81 despite this provision.
1419 One could also argue that the words ‘...ensure that..’ indicate a hierarchical threshold, as was the case for 
‘...eliminating competition...' under article 8I(3)(b) of the Treaty. This point is not considered further here.
1420 On the importance o f  the Treaty's wording in strengthening environmental protection considerations, see, 
McGillivray and Holder (2001), Section IV, for example.
1421 One could justify the 'promotion' of environmental protection into the Tieavy' category on other grounds. For 
example, it is included as a principle in article 6 of the Treaty, see, Monti (2002), page 1078 and Hession and 
Macrory (1998), page 103; it is mentioned in article 2 of the Treaty; and the Commission often emphasises its 
importance, for example, COM(2003) 338.
1422 As noted in Chapter Three, the importance o f market integration was waning. This may have changed since 1 
May 2004 and the accession of the new Member States, it is too early to tell.
1423 See, fbr example, the Council, Multi-annual Strategic Programme 2004-2006, (15896/03), which cites five 
principle policy goals, which essentially mirror all the Tiigh’ heads, page 11.
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protection, article 153(1) of the Treaty refers to protecting the .health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers..." Should all three interests be assigned equal weight?1424 Without 
denying the importance of consumers' economic interests, surely their health and safety are of 
greater consequence? The Treaty provides some support for further sub-division; several articles 
expressly provide for prioritisation.1425 It is already Council and Commission practice to focus 
their initiatives on more precise goals in all areas.1426 This makes their achievement more 
likely.1427 This would be re-enforced by reflecting the importance of these goals in their 
qualitative weight in article 81's balance, see above.
The discussion this far has revolved around whether the two basic categories (*high' and 'non- 
high') could be sub-divided. This seems possible. We suggest further categorisation, mainly for 
illustrative purposes, rather than to provide concrete bands. Even if  these were agreed, there is a 
further problem. There is no real guidance on the relative values (weights) of the high and 'non- 
high' appellations in the Treaty or elsewhere. How much more important (weighty) are policies 
that require a high level of protection than those that do not? The same point can be expressed in 
relation to the further sub-divisions suggested above. How much more weight does a 'High- 
Heavy' policy carry than a 'High-Light' one, for example?
This point is fundamental. All that we have discussed so far has been a tentative lexicographical 
or ordinal ranking. This gets us part o f the way, but is insufficient for balancing. Why? Ordinal 
rankings cannot be used to weigh more than two objectives in the balance.1428 Arguably, 
balancing in article 81 normally involves more than two objectives: economic freedom, 
economic efficiency and at least one other. Furthermore, even where only two objectives are 
balanced, an ordinal ranking does not provide conclusive help where the balance involves other
Lh
1424 A similar point could be made in relation to most other policy-linking clauses, see articles 125 (employment); i
151(1) and (2) (culture); 152(1) (public health); 157(1) (industry); 158 (economic and social cohesion); 163 and 164
(research and development); 174(1) (environmental protection) and 177 (development policy).
1425 See, articles 161 (economic and social cohesion); 166(1) (research and development) and 175(3) (environmental ,
protection). 1
1426 See, for example, Commission, Review o f  the Rolling Programme o f  A ctions o f  the Consumer P olicy Strategy 
2002-2006, SEC(2003) 1387, page 3; COM(2002) 778, pages 9 and 10 (cultural events o f major importance);
COM(2002) 714, pages 11-24; Council, on Community consumer p o licy  strategy 2002-2006, recital 11(3);
Commission, A H andbook on Environmental Assessm ent and Commission, Environm ental State a id  G uidelines, see 
recitals 31 and 32, and references made there.
,427 See, for example, COM(2002) 208, page 11 and COM(1999) 587, paragraphs 17-24 and 27.
1421 D'Agostino (2003), page 7 and Adler and Posner (1999), page 192.
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dimensions to the ranked one.1429 1430This is the case in article 81's balance, where the quantitative 
dimension is also relevant, see below.1450
The decision-maker must employ qualitative weights for the objectives relative to one 
another,1431 not just rank them. Where can we get guidance on these weights? The Preamble and 
article 2 of the Treaty provide some help, but are not precise enough to resolve the matter, 
particularly while article 81's meta-objective remains undefined. To our knowledge, despite 
frequently balancing objectives (and implying that the qualitative dimension is important, see 
above), the Community institutions* statements rarely explain what the objectives' relative 
weights are in general, let alone provide their relative qualitative weights, see Section 3.1.3.1432 
The Commission's decisions in this area are opaque and unsatisfactory, see Part B and Section 4 
below.
Given their importance for balancing, why haven't relative qualitative weights been established, 
at least for the major objectives? Qualitative weights are only needed if objectives are ranked. 
Earlier, we used textual arguments to suggest that the Treaty ranks objectives. Yet, the 
Community Courts would probably place more emphasis on teleological arguments in this area, 
see Chapter Two. So, while textual arguments provide some help, they cannot be relied upon 
entirely. Having said that, we have seen some evidence that the ECJ does not ignore the ’high’ 
and 'non-high* appellations, at least.
Does the Commission consider the qualitative aspect (and thus ranking) irrelevant? One could 
argue that this is the case. Qualitative weight is not alluded to in the Commission's guide to 
public health impact assessments, for example.143'’ The Community Courts give the Commission 
a lot of leeway, as regards the balance, Chapter Seven. It is unlikely that they would contradict 
the Commission if  it were to adopt such a stance. And yet, the idea that qualitative weight is 
irrelevant is out o f synch with many Community institutions' policy statements, see above. 
Furthermore, while textual arguments are not decisive, they are hardly irrelevant as a means of 
Treaty interpretation.1434 Even a basic ranking o f weights would help better achieve article 81's
1429 Knowing that A has a  higher ranking than B, does not tell us whether A has a  higher ranking than 2B.
1430 While incorporating qualitative weight within his formula, Alexy (2003b), pages 440 and 446, Alexy sidesteps 
die issue o f how it would apply in practice; his examples assume equal qualitative weight between rights. He is 
forced to do this as his triadic scale only produces an ordinal ranking.
1431 Unless, in a particular case, the qualitative weights can be ignored, see last footnote.
1432 Even where a balance was arrived at I have found no explanation about what the qualitative weights are, see, 
Commission, Environmental State aid Guidelines, Section E, for example.
1433 Commission, Ensuring a high level o f health protection, page 9. The Commission does not explain why the 
qualitative element was ignored, and may not have specifically considered the issue.
1434 See, Arnull (1999), pages 516 and 517 and the references made there, for example.
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meta-objective. As a result, the qualitative element should not be irrelevant, nor is the 
Commission likely to treat it as such in the future.
If ranking is appropriate, the relative qualitative weights must be established. However, this is 
not only extremely difficult, it is also politically controversial, see above.1435 This may be why 
they have not already been provided.1436 The Commission avoided discussing this issue publicly 
while it alone applied the article 81(3) exemption. Since 1 May 2004 this approach is more 
difficult to justify. The Member States are now directly implicated in this decision-making 
process and will push for clarity.
Future Treaty changes should explicitly deal with the qualitative weight to be applied to each 
policy head, or at least allow the decision-makers to do this in concrete cases.1437 In the 
meantime, the qualitative weight to be attributed to those objectives not set out in the Treaty, as 
well as the relative and absolute weight of Treaty objectives, should both be refined and 
explained through the judgments and decisions of the Commission and the Community Courts. 
Commission Notices would be particularly useful in resolving ambiguities in the short term.
The Commission should clearly rank or weight the qualitative values.1438 To keep the political 
problems to a minimum, this system o f values should be as simple as possible, possibly having 
only two bands, for example. While the Commission should account for the ‘high’ and ‘non- 
high’ appellations in the Treaty, from a strategic point o f view, it may be better for it not to rely 
solely on the Treaty when producing the framework.1439 This would give it more flexibility 
about which policies to favour at any given time. This approach is less transparent, but the 
Commission could reduce such problems through regular notices etc., which could reflect the 
priorities in its annual legislative and work plans, for example.1440
Until this has been done, the relevant Member State actors will not have the relevant tools (or 
sufficient experience) to rationally provide different, relative, qualitative weights for the
1435 In 2002 the Commission promised to produce detailed technical guidelines on how to conduct consolidated 
impact assessments for economic, social and environmental factors, COM(2002) 276, page 16 and COM(2002) 278, 
page 7, The Commission would have had to examine the qualitative weight questions discussed in this Part. This is 
fimdamental for balancing. Its failure to publish these guidelines indicates how sensitive the matter is.
1436 Instead, the Commission has suggested using methodologies, such as internalising externalities, cost-benefit 
analysis and multi-criteria analysis, COM(2002) 276, Annex 2. They give weight to the qualitative aspect, however, 
they may not do this in line with the Treaty, sec Section 4.
1437 Indeed it has been suggested that article 3 o f the Treaty should more clearly hierarchise the different Treaty 
objectives, Whish (1998), pages 462 and 501 and Kirchner (1998), page 515.
1438 See, Fotrester (1998), page 382.
,4j9 The Community Courts would likely accept this approach as long as all the relevant objectives were considered, 
see Chapters Two and Seven.
1440 See, COM(2003) 645, for example.
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objectives in the way the Commission would like. In 2002, the Commission declared its 
intention that impact assessment play:
"...a major role throughout the process of improving the quality of European legislation,
providing a decision-making aid but not taking the place of political judgment."1441
Obviously, judges (and national competition authorities) take political decisions too.1442 But 
their lack o f experience; lack o f accountability; and, the fact that the 'wrong decision' may 
undermine the achievement of objectives here and in other areas1443 means that the Commission 
should provide the necessary guidance. In a balance there is always a margin of discretion, see 
above, but there is currently so little guidance that this discretion demands fundamental policy 
choices.
As a result, until concrete guidance is given, the Member States' authorities should adopt an 
interim position. The best strategy would be for the decision-maker in a specific case to seek 
Commission help on qualitative issues before coming to a decision,1444 Regulation 1/2003, 
articles 11(5) and 15(1) allow for this.1445 The quantity o f potential references may lead to 
bottlenecks, however. If the Commission is not forthcoming then, the national competition 
authorities might adopt a common position, either themselves, or through the Advisory 
Committee.1446 For example, they could assume that all objectives have the same qualitative 
weight. Then they could conduct the balance, see below. If, after that, the result is ambiguous, 
then more weighty (high) objectives might be given decisive weight. Their decisions may be 
appealed to the Community Courts, this can only be beneficial in the long term.
3 .1.2 Quantitative weight
A determination of how much each relevant objective will be infringed/ achieved is also 
relevant. This is a quantitative assessment. For example, it should be relevant whether, in a 
particular case, the positive (or negative) environmental repercussions would be felt throughout 
the whole Community or in just a part of it.1447 It should also be relevant how long these effects
1441 COM(2002) 275, page 3.
1442 See, for example, Sturgess and Chubb (1988), Chapter Six.
1443 See, for example, COM(2002) 208, section 3 and COM(2002) 276.
1444 The same applies to undertakings, but the Commission has already sought to reduce their power to do this, see, 
Regulation 1/2003, recital 3 and Commission, Guidance Letters Guidelines, paragraphs 6-10.
1445 The Commission might even take up the case itself, Regulation 1/2003, recital 14 and article 10.
1444 See, for example, Regulation 1/2003, recital 15 and Commission, Co-operation Guidelines - NCAs, paragraphs 1, 
43 and 58.
1447 See, Commission, Fining Guidelines, page 3, for example.
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will last.14 *448 These issues should be reflected in the balance. Section 4, below, examines how 
this might be done.
3.1.3 Combining qualitative and quantitative weight
The next step is to combine each objective's qualitative and quantitative weights. Generally, the 
Community institutions do not explain what the objectives' relative weights are in general, let 
alone their relative qualitative weights.1449 More rigour is needed both in relation to this and in 
explaining how these values are combined in the balance.1450
Some argue that context often has more importance than the Treaty’s specific wording.1451 
While the context may affect the application of the general rule, over time, one would expect 
objectives such as environmental protection (which needs a high level of protection) to 'win' 
more balances than objectives for which there is no such requirement.1452 This is after all, we 
believe, the will o f the Contracting Parties. Sections 3.1.1. and 4 discuss how to set/ measure 
these qualitative and quantitative weights. This process must take account of article 81's meta­
objective, as well as the factors outlined in Sections 3.2. to 3.4.
1441 See, Commission, Fining Guidelines, section 1(B) and Commission, Vertical Guidelines, paragraph 133.
1449 The 'clearest* (if incomplete) Commission statement on this issue appeared in the Draft Commission, Article 
81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 38, said that non-economic objectives could be considered in article 81(3) but added 
that it was not "...the role of article 81 and the authorities enforcing this Treaty provision to allow undertakings to 
restrict competition in pursuit o f general interest aims.” This was removed in the final version o f the Commission, 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 42, and in my view was not an accurate reflection of the position at law. 
Otherwise, statements give little or no guidance about what the qualitative weights are. See, for example: 
COM(2004) 60, pages 31-33 (environment with other policies); COM(2Q03) 745 final/2, pages 20-22; COM(2003) 
723, pages 19-23 and 31 (environment and competitiveness); COM(2003) 338, page 8; COM(2002) 778, pages 33 
and 34 (culture and competitiveness o f European programme industry); COM(2002) 714, pages 2, 3, 7, 17, 20 and 
25-28 (social, environmental and economic impacts); COM(2002) 262, pages 16-18 (environment, health and 
industrial policy); COM(2002) 208, pages 7, 12 and 24 (consumer policy and other policies); European Parliament 
and Council, on the assessment o f the effects o f certain plans and programmes on the environment, Commission, on 
the links between regional and competition policy,; Council, on Community consumer policy strategy 2002-2006,
recitals 2 and 5; COM(2001) 88 (industrial policy, health and the environment), Annex I; Commission, Community
policies in support o f employment and Commission, A Handbook on Environmental Assessment, pages 54-56 and 
63 (environmental, social and economic impacts).
1450 Alexy (2003b), pages 440 and 444, multiplies them. The Commission adds the qualitative and quantitative
elements in Commission, Fining Guidelines, section 1(B), but this is the same as Alexy's method, mathematically,
because the quantitative element is itself a multiple of the qualitative one. Multiplication is appropriate as it
accounts for the relative nature o f the qualitative element
1451 Collège d'Europe (1998), page 229, suggest that the practical effect of these high* labels appears to be minimal.
Monti (2002), page 1075, does not seem to agree.
,4Si Schmid (2000), pages 164 and 165. This is as long as the high' appellations are equivalent in the various policy-
linking clauses, see above.
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3.2 Likelihood tha t objective will be achieved/ harmed
Uncertainty is our constant companion, but how to deal with her? Imagine that significant harm 
could be done to a relevant objective by the agreement in question, but the likelihood o f that 
harm occurring were small. Should the decision-maker account for certainty, or the lack o f it?
Rational actors choose options that maximise their expected benefit. Logically, the value of an 
objective in a balance would be its expected benefit (or harm); that is the weighted average of 
the benefit (or harm) if it occurs.1453 We do not 'maximise' benefits under article 81, instead, we 
evaluate whether the factors on one side of the balance have more weight than those on the 
other side. Nonetheless, the notion o f expected benefit is relevant here too.1454
The Commission discusses this issue in many policy areas;1455 including in relation to 
restrictions of competition.1456 Where the object of an agreement is not to restrict competition, 
article 81(1) should take account of actual effects on competition but it "...must also take 
account o f the agreement's potential effects on competition..."1457 Presumably, potential effects 
on the objectives considered in article 81(3) of the Treaty should also be considered? The 
Commission has said that the likelihood of, for example, each claimed efficiency under article 
81(3) must be substantiated.1458
How should this factor impact upon the balance? One possibility is a sliding scale.1459 The 
greater the uncertainty about whether or not consumer protection is undermined, for example, 
the less weight consumer protection has in the balance. In theory, this is the 'perfect' option as it
,4S3 This is an accepted part of decision theory, see, for example, Schick (1997), page 35.
,4S4 See, for example, Slote (1989).
1455 For example, this factor was considered in a guide to undertaking health impact assessments in public health, 
Commission, Ensuring a high level o f health protection, page 9.
1436 This is not the same as considering a reduction in potential competition between the parties to an agreement, on 
the relevant market, essentially the effect discussed in contestable market theory, see Joined Cases T-374/94, etc., 
European Night Services v. Commission, paragraph 137. For a discussion o f  contestable market theory see Motta 
(2003), section 2.6.2. Imagine an agreement between monopolist (A) and its only potential competitor (B). Where 
there is a  contestable market, there is a certain repercussion on the market due to the removal of B, "...the 
incumbent firm will not charge the monopoly price, but the price which is just enough to cover its average cost...", 
Motta (2003), page 73. If the market were extremely contestable, A would have been charging at average cost and 
cannot charge a monopoly profit. If  the market were barely contestable, A would already be charging a near 
monopoly rent and the damage (price increase) would be less. In both cases damage is certain. The extent is not
1457 Case C-7/95 P, John Deere Ltd. v. Commission, paragraph 77 and, more generally, Goldman and Barutciski 
(1998), page 415.
,4S* Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 51.
1459 This is what Alexy suggests in relation to constitutional balancing, see Alexy (2003b), pages 446448 and Alexy 
(2002), pages 414422.
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seeks to calculate the exact probability-weighted average of the benefit (or harm). In practice, 
the level of uncertainty is often hard to predict.1460
One alternative is to assign ratings (such as low, medium and high) to reflect the probability that 
a specific objective would be achieved (or harmed).1461 In this way, one could take account of 
the expected benefit (or harm), but reduce difficulties related to precise risk-quantification.1462
The Commission has not chosen this strategy. Instead, these effects are simply ignored unless 
the agreement has "...likely anti-competitive effects."1463 [my emphasis].1464 1465 In BAT and  
Reynolds v. Commission™* for example, the agreement created a situation in which a potential 
restriction on competition could arise in the future (depending on the behaviour o f  two parties to 
the agreement as well as that o f unknown third parties). The ECJ thought it unlikely that this 
situation would arise, but it was possible. The Commission ignored these potential anti­
competitive effects. The ECJ supported it.
This formulation is more convenient than Alexy's.1466 Perhaps we can ignore events/effects that 
are not likely in our article 81 balance? Is this acceptable? In relation to some objectives the 
answer is probably yes. For example, article 178 of the Treaty (development policy) says:
"The Community shall take account of the objectives...(of Community development 
policy] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.
[my emphasis]"
However, where we are not specifically told to ignore all but the likely effects then Alexy's 
three-part scale is a better compromise. Why? This convenience may lead us to ignore 
(potentially) important outcomes simply because we cannot show a high level o f probability that 
an agreement will cause them. Significant precision (and weight) is sacrificed for convenience.
1460 Alexy (2002), page 417, "...empirical knowledge of this quality is practically never available." Attempts to get 
round this problem can be found in: Jeffrey ( 1983) and Sahlin (1990).
1461 See, Alexy (2003b), pages 446-448.
1462 By only taking account o f likely events, the Commission may also be seeking to simplify the balancing test by 
reducing the number of objectives considered there. This could also be achieved in the ratings alternative by 
ignoring all expected benefits (or harm) that have a low outcome probability.
1463 In relation to article 81(1) see Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 24. Later in the paragraph the 
Commission uses the alternative phrase "...with a reasonable degree of probability..." The same guidelines discuss 
the article 81(3) position at paragraphs 35-58, the relevant efficiencies, for example, must be "...likely to 
materialise.”, paragraph 56 and in relation to consumer benefits, refer to "...any actual or likely negative impact 
caused...”, paragraph 85.
1464 Note that this is different from the notion o f appreciability. There the effect must be appreciable. What we are 
discussing here is that the likelihood of the effect occumng, regardless of what that effect will be.
1465 Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, British American Tobacco and R. J. Reynolds v. Commission, paragraphs 57-59.
1466 Although it is not clear what probability a 'likely1 event must have, it must be reasonably high.
Furthermore, in relation to some objectives, ignoring all but likely outcomes seems plain wrong. 
Article 174(2) (environmental policy) states that Community environmental policy ”... shall be 
based on the precautionary principle...” The precautionary principle is not defined in the Treaty 
but the ECJ has interpreted article 174(2):
"Where there is uncertainty as to the existence...of risks...the institutions may take 
protective measures without having to wait until the reality...of those risks become fully 
apparent"1467
This leaves open the question o f how much certainty is needed;1468 but, the implication is that 
even where there is considerable uncertainty as to the existence of risks in relation to 
environmental protection, these risks (and potential benefits?) can still be weighed in the 
balance. One might remark that the ECJ only said may take such methods, but the Treaty says 
that the precautionary principle shall be taken into account.1469 As a result, only considering 
likely environmental risks probably infringes the Treaty in relation to the environment.
The Treaty only mentions the precautionary principle in relation to environmental policy. This 
has not prevented the Commission from suggesting it should also apply in other areas.1470 It may 
be appropriate to extend it to all objectives that require a high level of protection? Then these 
objectives will be given special protection.
Where uncertainty occurs, the weight these objectives are given in the balance should be less 
than it would have been if we were certain that the specific problems/ benefits would occur.1471 
Bayesian logic suggests multiplying the objective's weight by the probability of achieving it. If 
possible, the probability should be calculated. Where this is impossible, approximations of 
probability should be used; values need to be assigned for them.1472 This is, somewhat, arbitrary, 
but at least it is relatively accurate and clear. To simplify the balance the Commission may 
continue to ignore objectives with a low, or even a medium risk, unless the precautionary 
principle applies to the objective in question.1473
1467 Case C -157/96, The Queen v MAFF, ex parte National Farmers’ Union, paragraph 63.
1468 Majone (2002), pages 91-95 and Scott and Vos (2002), pages 254-273 and 283-286.
1449 This is confirmed in the French ("...doivent être intégrées..."), Spanish ("...deberán integrarse...") and Italian 
("...devono essere integrate...") versions of the Treaty, for example.
1470 COM(2000)1, pages 2, 9 and 22. See also, Majone (2002), pages 90 and 95-98.
1471 Use o f  the precautionary principle must be proportionate and based on the costs and benefits of action and lack of 
action, COM(2000) 1, pages 17-19.
1472 For example, certainty = 1, high risk = 0.75, medium risk = 0.5, low risk = 0.25.
1473 Majone (2002), pages 101-108, explains that the precautionary principle may also mean that all consequences 
will be considered, rather than the 'most likely* consequences. As he explains, this would be a mistake.
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3.3 Discounting for the future
An agreement's costs and benefits occur over time. Economic analysis and decision theory1474 
tend to assume that a given unit of benefit today matters more if  experienced now than if it 
occurs in the future. Why? People are impatient and prefer their benefits now. Secondly, if we 
invest capital, rather than consume it now, these resources should yield a higher level o f 
consumption in a later period. Where the benefits of investment exceed the 'costs' o f impatience, 
it is worth waiting this extra period before consuming.1475
"Discounting is...the mechanism through which one finds the present value of future 
benefits and costs."1476
When balancing we should account for when costs and benefits occur. Then, their weight in the 
balance will better reflect the harm/ benefit that is caused.1477
The Commission encourages discounting in article 81's balance. In paragraph 51 of its Article 
81(3) Guidelines it states that when each efficiency will be achieved is relevant. Paragraph 55 
explains that this allows the decision-maker to verify the value o f the claimed efficiencies. A 
similar point is made in section 3.4 o f the same guidelines, which discuss the 'fair share for 
consumers' test.
An analogous process is justified in relation to other objectives. The predicted harm (or benefit) 
that arises as a result of the agreement should be discounted in the balance, depending upon 
when it occurs. Improvements in environmental protection or public health today are worth 
more than equivalent improvements tomorrow.
However, specific problems arise in relation to some objectives. For example, depending upon 
the circumstances, increasing the discount rate has an ambiguous effect on environmental 
protection.1478 On one hand, higher discount rates may encourage discrimination against future 
generations. If social costs occur well into the future and net social benefits occur in the near 
term, high discount rates make the project more acceptable in the balance, think of global 
warming.1479 On the other hand, a low discount rate would discourage development projects that 
compete with existing environmentally benign land use. This may slow the depletion of limited 
natural resources.
1474 Sec, respectively, Broome (1999), Chapter Four and Schick (1997), pages 64-68.
,47S Pearce and Turner (1990), page 213 and Broome (1999), pages 53-67.
1476 Pearson (2000), pages 77 and 78.
1477 Discounting is used in impact assessments for Community policy, COM(2002) 276, pages 12,16 and 19.
1471 See, Broome (1999), section 4.4.
1479 For a discussion o f this see, Degrees o f Difference, The Economist, 1 May 2004, page 80, and more generally see 
Pearce and Turner (1990), pages 217-224 and Pearson (2000), pages 86 to 94.
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How can we value the discount? At paragraph 88 of its Article 81(3) Guidelines the 
Commission explains:
"The discount rate applied must reflect the rate of inflation, if any, and lost interest as an 
indication of the lower value of future gains."
The appropriate discount rate for non-monetaiy objectives is extremely difficult to quantify, 
involving economic theory, empirical observation and ethical choices.1480 Development of 
specific formulae for discounting each relevant objective is technical and goes beyond the scope 
of this work;1481 but the Commission needs to take a stance on the economic and ethical choices; 
develop guidelines of how it will discount in the balance, and whether this is always 
appropriate. If we are not careful, considerable uncertainty may be generated. And yet, to ignore 
this effect could have serious consequences on resource allocation in the future in general, and 
sustainability in particular.1482
3.4 Appreciability
Is there an acceptable way of reducing the number of objectives that one needs to consider in 
the balance? We saw above that we might ignore objectives that were unlikely to be achieved. In 
addition, where an objective will be affected but is not relevant to any important degree then the 
benefits o f clarity may outweigh the benefits of perfection.1483
The Commission, with the support o f the Community Courts,1484 already uses this type of 
limitation in relation to the article 81(1) objective(s).1485 In its De Minimis Notice the 
Commission states that where the parties' aggregate market share is below a certain level, 
paragraphs 7 and 9, it will not normally, paragraph 8, find that an agreement between them 
appreciably affects competition. These market share tests are primarily designed to assess
1480 Pearson (2000), pages 77 and 78. The discount rate is (potentially) different for each commodity. As it is different 
from monetary discounting, one does not overcome this problem by use of the common meter. For example, if one 
wants to value a future risk of environmental harm (at time T), it would not be appropriate to change the present day 
value o f the environmental harm into monetary form (imagine it was worth £X) and then find the value o f £X at T. 
This is because the valuation discounts for monetary and not environmental future risks.
1481 As regards the environment see, for example, Pearce and Turner (1990), Chapter 14; Pearson (2000), Chapter 4; 
Broome (1999), section 4.6 and Lomborg (2004).
1482 Article 6 o f the Treaty reads "Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in article 3, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development" Similar principles have been 'found' in other Treaty objectives, in relation to 
culture see http://www.cordis.lu/eesd/ka4/home.html; for other policies see COM(2001) 264,
1483 By not considering all the objectives our final decision will not perfectly reflect the meta-objective but judgment 
is easier, cheaper and can be taken more quickly. The Commission points to this trade-off when using impact 
assessments in its decision-making, COM(2002) 275, pages 3 and 4. SEC(93) 785/5, page 5, says that when other 
policies have a significant impact on environmental protection then this must be justified. This implies a similar 
(although less sensitive) notion.
14.4 Case 5/69 Franz Volk v. Vervaecke, paragraphs 5/7 and Case 22/71, Beguelin Import v. GL, paragraph 16.
1485 It also uses it more generally in its impact assessments, COM(2002) 276, page 16.
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whether an agreement significantly contributes to closing off the markets at issue.1486 1487This is 
probably being assessed in order to establish whether or not market integration or economic 
freedom/ efficiency is significantly affected. This is a quantitative test.
There also appears to be a qualitative part to the test. The Commission says, paragraph 11, that 
the above does not apply to agreements containing certain hardcore restrictions, such as price­
fixing and limiting output. The de minimis doctrine can still apply where there are hardcore 
restraints, it is just that its presence cannot be presumed where hardcore restrictions are
1487present.
Similar principles could be created for other Treaty objectives (or certain aspects of 
them1488).1489 The Commission could publish block exemptions and/or, notices, setting out both 
qualitative and quantitative tests. The Commission should define core areas of each objective; 
later Treaty amendments could incorporate these. This is also important in relation to weight in 
the balance, see above. These areas should contain only the parts of each aim that the 
Commission considers absolutely vital. Some objectives, particularly those where a high 
standard is demanded, will contain many such areas. For example, in relation to public health, 
all areas relating to life-saving techniques may be hardcore. Other objectives, such as culture, 
may contain none.
Once the Commission has defined these hardcore areas it must establish a quantitative test. 
Insofar as an agreement impacts upon a non-hardcore part of a specific objective then only 
appreciable effects on that aim will be considered in the balance. The Commission must define 
the appreciable concept in its guidance.
For example, in the area of environmental protection, it might be felt that the effects of CO2 
emissions would be non-hardcore. The Commission may then decide that an agreement that 
would lead to, for example, less than 20 tons of such emissions per year would be de minimis. It 
would then ignore environmental policy in the balance in relation to agreements that caused 
annual emissions of less than 20 tons. Environmental policy would normally be a factor in the 
balance for agreements that created more pollution than this.
1486 Case T-77/94, Vereniging van Groothandelaren v. Commission, paragraph 140.
1487 See, for example, Case 5/69 Franz Volk v. Vervaecke, paragraphs 5/7.
1488 For example, there may be three cultural issues, but one may be so much less important than the other two that it 
can safely be ignored without significantly affecting the robustness o f our conclusions.
1489 This should only be done once the objectives are rendered comparable. Lack of appreciability is a relative 
concept and can only be assessed against other actors o f its kind, D'Agostino (2003), pages 91, 92 and 95.
- 3 7 5 -
However, as with the de minimis concept as currently employed,1490 where an agreement went 
over this level (over 20 tons of emissions) it could still be de minimis, when placed in its legal 
and economic context. Alternatively, it might also be that, even where the effects under one or 
more Treaty objectives were not appreciable, their cumulative effect might be such that, taken 
together, they should be weighed in the balance.1491
Furthermore, this concept should also apply in the area o f hardcore restrictions as long as, 
taking into account the legal and economic context, the effect was in fact de minimis. Even if 
such an effect were found not to be de minimis, small effects may not be given much weight in 
the balance, see above.
Another mechanism may also contribute to the reduction o f which Treaty objectives should be 
included in the balance. Chapter Seven, in the part discussing indispensability, argues that only 
restrictions which achieve some Treaty aim, where that aim cannot be achieved more effectively 
in any other way should be exempted. However, if an agreement could help achieve four Treaty 
objectives, A-D, in a non de minimis way, and where two o f  these objectives, A and B, could be 
more effectively achieved by, for example, State aid, then only objectives C and D should be 
considered in the balance. If this interpretation of article 81(3)(a) were accepted, it would 
significantly reduce the factors to be considered in the balancing process and thus the 
complications inherent within it.
3.5 Conclusion of Section 3
If the Commission is to assure the uniformity o f article 81 decisions it must explain what factors 
affect the objectives' weight in the balance. This part has examined difficulties associated with 
ascertaining the qualitative and quantitative weight. It also looks at issues, such as discounting 
and likelihood o f achievement, which the Commission ought to account for, as well as 
explaining how to do this. Other factors, such as the irreversibility,1492 and the duration,1493 of 
the harm might also be considered. Finally, we suggest simplifying the balance by ignoring non- 
appreciable objectives. There is still much work for the Commission to do. These suggestions 
must be worked into a practical political framework. In part this can be communicated via 
induction, but guidelines are far more appropriate for a major change/ clarification such as this.
1490 See, Cases C-215/96 and C-216/96, CarloBagnasco v. Banco Popolare di Novara, paragraphs 34 and 35.
1491 This point is similar to the effect which paragraph 8 of the De Minimis Notice seeks to prevent. Cumulative 
impacts are considered in relation to environmental impact assessments, see, for example, Commission, A 
Handbook on Environmental Assessment, page 50.
1492 See, Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 45. This issue is mentioned in relation to impact 
assessments in general, COM(2002) 276, page 16 and environmental ones in particular, European Parliament and 
Council, on the assessment ofthe effects o f certain plans and programmes on the environment, Annex 11.
1493 See, European Parliament and Council, on the assessment o f the effects o f certain plans and programmes on the 
environment, Annex H.
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4. COMPARING APPLES AND PEARS - A COMMON METER?
There is a practical problem at the balance’s core. Once we have calculated each objective’s 
weight, we must weigh it in the balance with the others. This is the third step in Alexy’s 
process, see above. As Aleinikoff notes, the problem for balancing:1494
"...is the derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common
currency for comparison,"
Balancing involves summing the weighted averages (accounting for the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects, see Section 3) of the relevant objectives.1495 Summing is only possible if 
the relevant objectives can be substituted for one another (are comparable).1496 Absent 
substitutability we cannot rationally establish which combination o f objectives has the greatest 
weight; and so, we cannot decide which side of the balance should prevail.
Are the relevant objectives substitutable? Some of them are, sometimes. Chapter Three asked 
what market integration means. The Commission has defined economic efficiency as a product 
of market integration. It said, for example, that agreements which undermine market integration 
"...hold back the improvement in the economic efficiency o f the Community's production 
structure..."1497 It may be that market integration can be defined in terms o f economic 
efficiency. That said, we saw that the Commission does not exclusively define market 
integration in efficiency terms. There may not always be substitutability. In any event, Chapter 
Two established that many other objectives, such as, culture (article of the 151(4) of the Treaty) 
and public health (article 152(1) of the Treaty), are relevant in article 81. Imagine an agreement 
that undermines public health and yet promotes culture. We cannot directly compare these 
objectives, they are not substitutable. So how can we rationally balance them?
Fortunately, comparability can also arise by means of an indirect scale.1498 We can directly 
compare 2 and 3, they are both natural numbers, and thus substitutable, (2<3). In contrast, we 
cannot directly establish whether 2 apples<3 pears. Apples and pears are not directly 
comparable; there is no direct rate of substitution. However, given a common meter (common 
denominator), such that 1 apple is equivalent to 3 bananas, and 1 pear is equivalent to 5 
bananas, for example, then we can easily show that:
1494 Aleinikoff (1987), pages 973 and 976.
,49i Schick (1997), page 42.
1496 Lucy (1999), pages 154-156; Schick (1997), pages 41-44 and D’Agostino (2003), page 28.
1497 Commission, RCP 1992, paragraph 2.
149> Johansson (1991), page 111 and Wathem (1988), page 14.
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1 apple -  3 bananas 1 pear = 5 bananas
1 banana = 1/3 apple 1 banana = 1/5 pear 
=> 1/5 pear = 1/3 apple 
1 apple = 3/5 pear 
=> 2 apples = 6/5 pear 
=> 2 apples<3 pears
The common denominator enables us to overcome the direct incommensurability problem. As a 
result, apples and pears become comparable.
If disparate factors, such as economic efficiency, culture and public health, are to be balanced 
against each other, outside of the market mechanism, then we need an indirect meter, into which 
all of them can be converted. Otherwise, these objectives cannot be compared, as the 
Community Courts' interpretation of article 81 demands.
Selecting (and using) a common meter is not a value-neutral exercise.1499 Therefore, it is vital 
that the Commission is explicit about what the common meter is and how to convert different 
objectives into it. This will introduce transparency (and thus enhance repeatability) into the 
decision-making process. Otherwise, the decision-makers' differing political and social outlooks 
will generate diverse judgments (balances) throughout the Community. This is particularly 
problematic since 1 May 2004, now that there are many more decision-makers from a plethora 
of backgrounds, with much less experience of applying article 81. Diverse judgments will not 
produce the desired level of uniformity under article 81.1500
The indirect method of comparability allows us to assign a value for the amount o f damage/ 
benefit attained (both qualitatively and quantitatively). Using environmental protection as our 
example, we illustrate this process below. Once a comparable value has been established for all 
relevant objectives, the values can be added/ subtracted, as appropriate, to ascertain which side 
of the balance is weightier.
How can one translate the requisite amount of environmental harm onto a common scale? 
Another way o f saying this is what numerical value should we give X amount o f environmental 
harm on the meter? Remember, harm has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension.1501 
Examining the quantitative dimension first, article 174(2) of the Treaty explains that:
"Community policy on the environment...shall be based on...the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at 
source and that the polluter should pay."
1499 Espeland and Stevens (1998), page 317,323-326 and 330-332 and D’Agostino (2003), pages 9-14 and Section 21.
is» -phis could be positive, leading to competition for the 1)651' mix o f objectives, D'Agostino (2003), pages 14, 15, 
137 and 138. But the Council has not chosen this model o f competition, Regulation 1/2003, articles 10 and 16.
1501 As discussed in Section 3 above, it should also account for issues such as the likelihood o f  damage and when 
damage will occur, but I do not consider them here as they unnecessarily complicate the analysis for our purposes.
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Article 174(2) gives us a clue as to how to evaluate the quantitative aspect of environmental 
damage. The polluter should pay. We could assess, quantitatively, how much environmental 
damage has been/ will be done by asking how much it would cost the polluter to sort it out. 
Money could be the common meter.
Would money be a good meter? Yes. It is readily divisible, and thus, flexible. Furthermore, the 
Community institutions, the Member States and undertakings are already familiar with using 
money for balancing. Member States, and the Community itself, must decide how much of the 
EU budget is to be spent on the different policy areas. Individuals are also used to balancing 
such disparate decisions as whether to buy oranges or medical insurance, houses or education, 
using the money they earn. This familiarity with money could also be a disadvantage, however. 
We must ensure that our intimacy does not blind us to some o f the assumptions that its use 
involves. See, the Commission decision, CECED (2000) discussed below. That said, on balance 
money is a good scale to use.
Note that environmental protection’s conversion to the common meter is already riddled with 
value judgments. The polluter must pay, but is this the most effective/ best/ cheapest way to 
reduce environmental harm? Is this relevant? A second problem relates to what we mean by 'we 
could ask how much it would cost the polluter to sort the environmental damage out*? Article 
174(2) implicitly prioritises at least two approaches to environmental harm. Rectifying the 
damage at source is a priority (Option A). Alternatively, the polluter should clear up the 
environmental damage that has occurred (Option B). This complicates our analysis somewhat. 
Imagine that Option A costs £90 and Option B costs £50.1502 Which is better? The Treaty ranks 
these options in order of preference, but it does not tell us how much more preferable Option A 
is than Option B. In this example, we assume that the best strategy, taking account o f both price 
and the Treaty’s ranking, is to clear up the environmental damage that has occurred, Option 
B.1503
We now have the quantitative assessment of the environmental damage caused by our 
agreement. For the sake of argument, assume that it was £200 (£50 multiplied by the value of 
the preference for Option B). To establish the objective’s weighted average, we multiply £200 
with the Commission's qualitative assessment of environmental protection. As discussed in
1501 These assessments should take account o f  all appreciable direct and indirect costs. In relation to the four different 
environmental costs, see Johansson (1991), page 114. As regards culture, see Snowball and Antrobus (2001), pages 
755 and following.
1503 No other objectives expressly incorporate the ’polluter pays' principle. The Commission could, as a starting point 
for the other objectives, compare the position with and without the agreement, a kind o f ‘the parties pay’ principle. 
The cost o f reducing the level of harm to its level before the agreement (or the cost o f achieving the same 
improvement through other means) is the amount o f quantitative harm/ benefit provided by the agreement This 
might price these objectives too highly. Another possibility would be to use cost-benefit analysis. A final suggestion 
would be to employ a form of the Neumann/ Morgenstem technique, D'Agostino (2003), pages 97-99.
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Section 3.1., the qualitative figure is based upon an abstract value related to the importance of 
environmental protection, as explained by the Treaty’s meta-objective. It may also take account 
of the specific type of environmental damage threatened by the agreement.
Determining the qualitative value is complex, political and somewhat arbitrary exercise. The 
Commission may determine one figure, or there may be a function that describes an indifference 
curve between the two (or more) objectives. There are many methodologies that can be used to 
obtain this sort o f information.1504 One is to articulate different levels of gravity of infringement, 
for each objective (qualitative issue). For example, there could be two categories of ‘high* and 
‘non-high’, reflecting the Treaty's own distinction; see Section 3.1., for issues that must be 
considered if this approach is adopted. Then, the qualitative and quantitative values must be 
combined.1505
Cost-benefit analysis collapses the qualitative and quantitative steps into one assessment.1506 By 
assessing people’s 'willingness to pay',1507 cost-benefit analysis should automatically account for 
qualitative and quantitative weight, as well as discounting.1508 The same applies to pricing 
through the market.
It has been suggested that cost-benefit solutions (including internalising externalities) are the 
most appropriate means to account for other objectives.1509 However, the qualitative values 
adopted are those of the individual. These might differ from the qualitative weight that the 
Treaty (or the Commission) assigns; for example, due to a lack o f information, different 
priorities, or externalities. The individual might also assess the importance of the impact o f his/ 
her decision on others differently than the Treaty.1510 For example, she might not take 
‘sufficient’ account of the environmental damage that she creates for future generations when 
driving her car, as this will not affect her.1511 As a result, cost-benefit analysis might not always 
give the 'right' qualitative weight.1512
1504 D'Agostino (2003), pages 99 and 100 and Dasgupta (2001), pages C4-C13 and references made there. In relation 
to the environment, see, for example, Sinden and Thampapillai (1995). As regards Community initiatives see, for 
example, COM(2002) 276, pages 15 and 16.
1S0i Once again split into different degrees of seriousness. For more accuracy a list of aggravating and attenuating 
factors could also be added, see, for example, Commission, Fining Guidelines.
1506 See, Adler and Posner (1999), pages 197-204.
1507 See, for example, Commission, Cost-benefit analysis o f MSWs, pages 269.
1508 See, Broome (1999), page 57.
1509 See, Gyselen (1994), page 244 and Chapters One and Part C.
IS1° See, for example, the Economic and Social Committee, Comments on COM(1999) 543, paragraph 3.3. and 
Majone (2002), page 101.
1511 Broome (1999), page 51. For example, in The Sixth Environment Action Programme (2001), paragraph 1, the 
Commission says: “A clean and healthy environment is part and parcel o f the prosperity and quality o f life that we 
desire for ourselves now andfor our children in the future, [my emphasis]”
- 3 8 0 -
Many methods aim to improve the assessment of the qualitative element.12 513 Further work needs 
to be done in valuing these objectives.1514 The Community is already considering this issue in a 
number of policy areas.1515 The Commission should explain how it goes about this process in its 
article 81 decisions. It should also explain when cost-benefit analysis is appropriate and when it 
is not.
There is very little evidence of the Commission using meters in its article 81 analysis. Yet, 
direct balancing is not possible for comparing all objectives, see above. We suggest using 
money as a meter. There are other alternatives. The meter might even change, depending upon 
the objectives at stake. The Commission must provide guidance on which common meter(s) to 
use and how to translate the objectives into them. One decision where the Commission embarks 
upon this process is Commission decision, CECED. For a description of the facts, see Chapter 
Two.
There, the Commission focused on the agreement’s economic benefits to consumers. It argued 
that the increase in the purchase price for these environmentally friendly machines would be 
compensated for by savings on electricity bills, paragraph 52. The Commission added that there 
were also collective environmental benefits.1516 It highlighted article 174 of the Treaty, 
paragraph 55, and added:
"Agreements like CECED's must yield economic benefits outweighing their costs and be
compatible with competition rules..."
What are 'economic benefits'?1517 The Commission said that these could include the costs of 
pollution.1518 It discussed the cost, to society, of avoiding the carbon dioxide and sulphur 
dioxide emissions, which the increased energy efficiency would obviate and said, paragraph 56:
IS12 This is hinted at by Poiares Maduro (1999) pages 466 and 470.
15.3 See the discussion in Commission, Case studies on strategic environmental assessment Volume 1, pages 39-41; 
Commission, Cost-benefit analysis o f MSWs, pages 269, Annex I and Johansson (1991).
15.4 The Commission makes this point, for example, in COM(2003) 338 (public health and environmental protection), 
page 17; COM(2002) 714 (industrial policy), pages 3 and 28 and COM(2001) 486 (consumer protection), pages 19 
and 19.
I5IS For example, in relation to public health and the environment, COM(2003) 338, page 17.
15,6 The Commission followed a similar approach both in relation to the EACEM Agreement, see Commission, RCP 
1998, paragraph 130 and page 152, and in the Annex to COM(95) 689, where the Commission made a preliminary 
assessment of the costs and the benefits of technical measures to reduce C 0 2 emissions from cars.
1517 This term is discussed in Chapter Four, which concluded that it was referring to a financial way of assessing 
environmental harm.
1511 See, Chapter Four of this thesis.
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"On the basis of reasonable assumptions, the benefits to society brought about by the 
CECED agreement appear to be more than seven times greater than the increased purchase 
costs of more energy-efficient washing machines*"
Taking its base point as what would have happened absent the agreement, the Commission 
found that the environmental benefits to society were seven times greater as a result of the 
agreement. This is the same base point that we suggest above. The Commission concluded that 
the expected improvements to energy efficiency, the cost-benefit ratio of the standard and the 
return on investment for individual users, implied that the agreement would contribute 
significantly to technical and economic progress, paragraph 57.
In conclusion, the Commission found that individual users' return on investment meant that, 
although the initial purchase price would rise, the lifetime cost o f the machine would likely fall. 
It also found that the cost of avoiding the pollution that would arise if the agreement were not 
adopted would be seven times that of the increased purchase price of the more energy-efficient 
machines.
In order to compare the environmental improvements with the initial loss of consumer welfare 
the Commission used a common meter. The meter it chose was money. The inclusion of a 
common meter is an important first step. However, while the Commission took account o f the 
quantitative dimension of the benefit, it failed to consider the qualitative issue.1519 Nor did it 
discuss whether preventative action were better than cleaning up the damage and account for 
this in the balance. In fact, it assumed that all environmental problems would be fixed 
completely. This prices environmental protection too highly.
A monetary meter is more easily applied to some Treaty objectives, such as environmental 
protection and economic efficiency, than to those such as economic and social cohesion the 
effect o f  which is often particularly hard to quantify in monetary terms. Objectives such as 
respect for human rights and public health may also be difficult to quantify in this way for 
political reasons.1520
Despite the problems highlighted above, we broadly welcome the Commission's use o f a meter, 
at this stage. First, its introduction is an extremely important step, creating the possibility of 
greater transparency in the area. Secondly, a monetary meter, while not ideal, should be 
applicable to many of the Treaty objectives that are touched by agreements considered under 
article 81. Nevertheless, the Commission must use the common meter more consistently and 
make provision for qualitative analysis too, where appropriate. It must also increase the clarity
1519 As noted above, this is only acceptable if the objectives being weighed have the same qualitative values. The 
Commission also ignores discounting and likelihood.
1520 Sunstein (1997), pages 235-238.
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of its analysis. Furthermore, efforts need to be undertaken to produce a meter or meters in areas 
where the monetary meter developed above is deemed inappropriate.
5. CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER EIGHT
Many objectives must be considered within article 81. They often conflict. The Commission 
resolves these conflicts through balancing. The Community Courts support this approach. There 
is little or no explanation about how such conflicts should be resolved or how balancing should 
be performed. As a result, article 81 decisions are not predictable for undertakings, nor are 
Commission decisions reproducible by the Member States’ authorities. Guidance in this area 
would significantly contribute towards the effective enforcement of article 81. Since 1 May 
2004, the need for such guidance is even more pressing.
For this reason we proffer this framework. The Commission should produce Guidelines on 
Weighing, providing a framework for balancing, either accepting ours or suggesting a new one. 
These guidelines should allocate an abstract (qualitative) value for each relevant objective, or at 
least the important ones that are frequently cited. This would introduce a more mechanised 
approach to balancing; which, while remaining sensitive to the demands of the Treaty should 
make the prediction o f the balance, and, ultimately, decision-making, simpler.1521 These abstract 
values will be somewhat arbitrary. But transparency demands that they be assigned. Due to the 
political importance of setting such weights, the Member States may consider defining this in 
future Treaty amendments. In concrete cases, this must be combined with the quantitative harm 
(or benefit) attained by the agreement. We demonstrated how this might be done in relation to 
environmental protection. Different rules may apply to other objectives and the Commission 
should clarify this procedure in relation to at least the major ones.
The Commission must also explain which factors theoretically affect the objectives' weight. 
Likelihood of harm is relevant, as is discounting for the future. The Commission should explain 
how these concepts can be calculated and provide examples in relation to the important article 
81 objectives. It should also explain how appreciability would apply to objectives in the 
balance.
Finally, these guidelines should adopt a meta-objective. At first, this will probably be too 
general to provide much help. That said, it is still important and decision makers will refer to it 
when, after having allocated values to the relevant objectives in the case before them, they 
remain unsure about how specific conflicts should be decided. Over time, case law will help 
define the content of the meta-objective and increasingly decisions will be made relying directly 
upon it.
1521 Espeland and Stevens (199S), page 314.
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The Commission will continue to adopt block exemptions.1522 It could also consider issuing 
them to help clarify the balancing exercise. Lenz suggests that the Commission may not have 
sufficient experience to produce an environmental agreements block exemption.1523 That 
conclusion might be questioned, when the Commission's experience of balancing under article 
81 is examined in relation to other objectives too. Furthermore, block exemptions have already 
been issued which balance the provision o f State aid with Treaty objectives such as employment 
creation and regional aid.1524 The Commission could apply this experience when issuing 
equivalent block exemptions. Producing block exemptions will be difficult,1525 especially due to 
the dynamic nature of the balance. But it is important, not only because it will clarify the need 
for such an exercise in the Commission’s statements but also because it will provide a 
framework within which this exercise can take place. However, due to the plethora of different 
situations that can arise, it may be better to restrict block exemptions' application to 
circumstances where the relevant agreement only affects two or three objectives appreciably. 
This would allow the exemption regulations to be more finely tuned. Guidelines could be used 
in other instances.
This chapter is not revolutionary. It is not intended to be.1526 Rather, it has taken concepts that 
the Commission normally uses in the balance and asked how they will operate in relation to 
objectives such as public health and environmental protection. It has shown that (i) the 
application of these concepts to the relevant objectives raises many difficult questions; and, (ii) 
it demands a plethora of value judgments. As a result, producing guidelines will not be easy. 
But it is this very difficulty that makes them necessary. Without them, the Member States' 
courts and competition authorities must struggle with these issues alone. They are inexperienced 
in applying article 81(3) of the Treaty. Without guidance they will soon become lost, rudderless 
ships in the night. Nor must they be allowed to shelter in their home ports of nationally 
influenced value judgments. The Commission must guide them out of this darkness, towards the 
light of the optimal Community balance’s dawn.
1522 Regulation 1/2003, recital 10 and article 29.
1523 Lenz (2000), pages 60-62.
,i24 See, http://europa.eu.int/comm/conipetit ion/state_aid/legis!ation/aid3. htmI#Regulation I for some examples.
1525 This, the Council noted, involved "...factual, legal and economic issues o f a very complex nature and great 
variety in a constantly evolving environment..." Council Regulation, Horizontal State Aid, recital 11.
1526 Although it is certainly less developed than I would have liked, due to the lack of detailed discussion o f these 
issues in relation to article 81 of the Treaty.
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CONCLUSION OF PART C
Non-economic objectives can conflict with antitrust's economic goals. Chapter Two argues that 
the Treaty favours compromise over exclusion. This is particularly the case in articles which 
specifically provide a balancing mechanism. One such article is article 81 of the Treaty. This is 
not lost on the Commission, which has often balanced non-economic objectives there.
Part B asks how the Commission conducts its article 81 balancing. There is little order or 
consistency. Sometimes it (and the Community Courts) balances in article 81(1) of the Treaty, 
sometimes in article 81(3), and sometimes it claims that it cannot balance within article 81 at all. 
Part B posed a series of questions that must be answered before the consideration of non­
economic objectives within article 81 can be considered even remotely transparent. Until then, 
few claims can be made to the maturity o f  Community competition policy either.
In light of Part B’s observations, Part C makes a series of proposals for the consideration of non­
economic objectives within article 81 o f the Treaty. We said that certain elements must be at the 
heart of any proposed changes:
• the decision-maker must be able to take account of the various relevant objectives 
within article 81;
• businesses, decision-makers and consumers need clarity and transparency; and,
• the proposed system must respect the Treaty, unless amendments arc proposed.
Chapter Six makes two recommendations. First, it proposes an economic efficiency test, as the 
basis of article 81(1) o f the Treaty. Secondly, it argues that non-economic considerations should 
be exclusively considered under article 81(3) of the Treaty. While non-economic objectives 
must be considered within article 81, this does not mean that they should be directly considered 
all o f the time. This would create too much uncertainty and involve too much cost, for 
insufficient return.
Chapter Six recommends clarifying and simplifying article 81(1). The current test is too wide 
and unclear. This imposes enormous costs on business and society as a whole. The justifications 
for these costs are unpersuasive, especially today when the benefits of competition and the need 
for antitrust laws is understood and accepted throughout the Community. Adopting an economic 
efficiency test would introduce more transparency and clarity. Furthermore, Chapter One 
showed that an economic efficiency test often helps achieve other relevant non-economic 
objectives, in the long term. Having said that, it would not take account of all of these, nor could 
it be guaranteed to give them the weight that the Treaty demands. This should not be too 
prejudicial as most of these non-economic objectives can be more efficiently promoted through
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other instruments. In any event, article 81(3) of the Treaty is there to ensure that, where 
necessary, relevant non-economic objectives can be taken into account.
Chapter Seven makes a series o f recommendations for article 81(3) o f the Treaty. As regards the 
first test in article 81(3) it suggests a full balancing exercise; which should include consideration 
of Member States’ interests, in cases of diagonal conflict. It goes on to recommend the deletion 
of the second and fourth article 81(3) conditions. They are either irrelevant or undermine the 
balance that is struck in the first article 81(3) test. The outcome of the above is that while 
efficient agreements would be cleared within article 81(1) of the Treaty, agreements that fail 
this test can be exempted where they promote relevant non-economic objectives. This is in line 
with the articles 2-4 of the Treaty and the various policy-linking clauses. Such compromise 
could create a massive distortion of competition, even where these ends could better be 
achieved by other means. For this reason, we suggest re-defining article 81(3)(a). This would 
essentially mean that only where an objective could not be achieved in any way (to the 
appropriate level) more efficiently than by distorting competition would it be exempted. This 
does not mean that we believe that non-economic objectives are unimportant. Quite the 
contrary. However, it is hoped that this will preserve the market mechanism as the fundamental 
tool of wealth creation because of its many advantages. At the same time, it will encourage the 
use o f the most efficient tool to achieve Treaty objectives. This can be through distortions of 
competition where necessary.
Finally, Chapter Eight provides a framework for balancing non-economic objectives within 
article 81 of the Treaty, under article 81(3)’s first test. The Commission has not provided such a 
guide. It must do so either by adopting our guidelines, or by proposing its own. We consider the 
weight o f non-economic objectives. Although we do not assign specific values, the Commission 
must provide them, as well as explaining how they can be compared and combined. It must also 
explain what other factors could hypothetically affect an objective's weight in the balance. We 
discuss issues such as the likelihood of harm and discounting for future effects. The 
Commission must also deal with appreciability for non-economic objectives. Finally, it must 
provide an appropriate meta-objective for balancing under article 81 of the Treaty. Chapter 
Eight offers suggestions in all o f these areas. Producing such guidelines is not going to be easy. 
It is precisely this that makes them so necessary.
The Commission's leadership role has been reaffirmed by Regulation 1/2003. This brings with it 
a certain responsibility. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines have injected a welcome 
transparency into its article 81 decision-making. However, other than accepting that non­
economic objectives are relevant under article 81(3) o f the Treaty (they do not discuss the
-386-
Wouters Case1527) these guidelines offer no guidance about how this should be done. Part C has 
tried to establish the foundations of compromise here.
Finally, Part C also suggested certain amendments to article 81 of the Treaty. These solely focus 
on the balancing o f non-economic objectives within this provision and do not consider other 
relevant changes which might be made, to the jurisdictional test, for example. Those changes we 
have recommended are brought together here:
Article 81
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition1528 within the common market.1529
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 are1530 inapplicable in the case of:1531
• any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
• any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
• any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
whose overall Member State and Community public policy benefits'532 outweigh the negative 
effects on competition,1533 and which does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives.1534
The overwhelming majority of commentators reject changing the Treaty.1535 This is unfortunate.
Given the seismic changes in the Treaty since 1957, we believe that a re-clarification at this
stage would be helpful. Non-economic objectives have been important in article 81. They are
1527 Although Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 18(2), probably hint at a similar point
tS2g The reference to competition has been left unchanged, on the condition that the Community Courts make it clear 
that this refers to economic efficiency. Chapter Six argued that this was preferable, as we may welcome the 
flexibility of the 'competition' reference if changes need to be made in the future.
1529 As recommended by Chapter Six, we have removed the five examples of restrictions of competition.
1530 The language has been changed from 'may1 to 'is', to reflect the fact that the article 81(3) tests are exhaustive. 
There are now only two article 81(3) conditions, as opposed to the original four.
1531 In his seminal article in this area, Monti suggested adding a new article 81(4) for the consideration o f non­
economic objectives, Monti (2002), pages 1097. We believe they can be (and have been) adequately dealt with 
under article 81(3) o f the Treaty. For this reason we have not followed him here.
1532 This change emphasises the wide nature o f the first test as well as the fact that both Community and Member 
States objectives can be considered there. It also explains that 'overall' benefits are what count As a result where 
the agreement undermines the achievement o f relevant objectives this can be taken into account
1533 This expressly states that any benefits found under the first conditions must be weighed against the negative 
effects caused by the restriction of competition in article 81(1) of the Treaty.
1534 The wording of the second condition is the same as that in article 81(3Xa), but it has the new meaning proposed 
in Chapter Seven.
1535 Monti (2002), page 1099 and Ehlermann (2001).
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becoming more so. This is an issue that will not go away. It must be dealt with. And soon. A lot 
could be achieved through reinterpretation o f article S i’s existing provisions. But, we have 
argued, that some are no longer necessary and, in any event, without Treaty reform it is more 
difficult to predict how the Community Courts will respond to change.1536
1536 Kirchner (1998), page 519.
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THESIS CONCLUSION
This thesis discussed public policy's place in article 81 of the Treaty. It demonstrated that public 
policy considerations are relevant within that provision. It also suggested how and where they 
should be considered there.
The thesis is basically in three parts. Part A discussed whether non-economic (public policy) 
objectives should be considered in article 81 of the Treaty. While the Commission accepts that 
they might be, the leeway for this is seriously restricted. Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines 
state that:
"The objective of article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources."1537
Many influential Community competition scholars and practitioners would agree. An oft-cited 
reason is that public policy objectives are increasingly irrelevant in other jurisdictions' 
competition provisions (including those of the USA, although this is debateable). By following 
a similar policy in the Community we could reduce costs for multinational firms. Furthermore, 
competition policy cannot achieve everything. Non-economic goals can normally be better 
achieved using other policy instruments. Chapter One looked at these and other claims. It 
concluded that, from a theoretical perspective and outside of the Treaty framework, one might 
reasonably conclude that:
"AH policy objectives cannot (and should not) be ’regulated* through competition 
policy...Often competition law is entirely inappropriate for that purpose (or other policy 
tools are much more efficient). Indeed, where competition policy pursues a consumer 
welfare standard it is often better to ignore non-economic policy objectives when 
implementing the competition law...However, this robust conclusion should be 
reconsidered where the benefits that enhanced legal certainty brings are outweighed by the 
importance of the policy goals at stake and these interests: (i) cannot be protected through 
alternative legislation (either in fact or for jurisdictional reasons); or (ii) have not actually 
been protected by alternative legislative tools."
Nevertheless, Chapter Two shows why this kind of argumentation is inappropriate in a 
Community competition law context:
"Both the structure of the Treaty and the presence of the policy-linking clauses create the 
possibility of conflicts in Community law. The Treaty normally prefers compromise, but 
sometimes it is silent The Community Courts have had to fill these gaps. While doing so, 
they had to choose between exclusion and compromise. In the vast majority of cases, 
including those related to article 81, they have chosen compromise."
When the Community Courts construe particular articles of the Treaty they have regard to the 
framework of the Treaty as a whole, to its general principles, to the tasks and activities which 
the Treaty prescribes for the Community. Article 81 (and competition policy as a whole) is not 
an end in itself but rather one of the instruments for achieving the fundamental goals laid out in
15T7 Commission, Article 81(3) Guidelines, paragraph 13.
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the Treaty. Community competition provisions cannot be understood or applied without 
reference to this legal, economic, political and social context There is a growing tendency 
among Community competition specialists to treat their topic in a highly technical way, as 
distinct from Community law as a whole. This is inappropriate. Back in 1966 the BCJ held:
"Article 85 [now article 81] as a whole should be read in the context of the provisions of the 
preamble to the Treaty which clarify it and reference should particularly be made to those 
relating to 'the elimination of barriers' and to 'fair competition' both of which are necessary 
for bringing about a single market"1538
The Treaty (and our understanding of it) has changed fundamentally since the 1960s. The single 
market has largely been achieved;1539 and the gradual process of building this has pushed the 
Community into ever-wider policy fields. The signing of the Single European Act, the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty (as well as the more recent European Convention) 
have transformed the legal, economic, political and social context in which the Community now 
operates. It is no longer an economic community; it is much more than that. As a result, it is 
little surprise that the CFI has more recently held that
"...in the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is entitled to base itself on 
considerations connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption 
under article 85(3) [now article 81(3)] of the Treaty."1540
This statement has also received support from the European Parliament and the Council. The 
Commission's position is more complex. Chapter Two said that the Commission:
"...is creating a lot of ambiguity by publicly implying that public policy concerns are 
irrelevant in article 81 decision-making. The Commission is not able to make such a policy 
change as it is bound by the Treaty and the Community Courts' judgments. That said, the 
Commission has considerable discretion about how to balance different values within 
article 81 ...It is acceptable for the Commission to focus on economic analysis within article 
81; however, this must be tempered by other approaches where this does not adequately 
take account of other relevant objectives.
In practice the Commission seems to be following the Community Courts' lead in its 
decisions. Many objectives are regularly considered within article 81..."
This conclusion is foundational. Most Community lawyers would readily accept it. Many 
Community competition lawyers would be surprised. This is important. The consideration o f 
non-economic objectives within article 81 can fundamentally alter that provision's assessment; 
which could affect the agreement’s status under article 81(2) of the Treaty. Today, this issue is 
in need of particular attention, because of:
,S3S Case 32/65 Italy v. Council and Commission [1966], page 405.
1539 As a result of the enlargement process of 1 May 2004, this may no longer be so throughout the Community.
1540 Joined Cases T-528/93, etc., Métropole Télévision v. Commission [1996], paragraph 118.
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•  the recent introduction of Regulation 1/2003;
•  the enlargement on 1 May 2004; and,
•  the appointment in November 2004 o f the new Commissioner for Competition.
Once it is accepted that non-economic objectives can be relevant in article 81 decisions, one 
naturally asks how and where these objectives are considered and what the limit of the balance 
is. Paît B discussed the Commission's current practice. There is little or no transparency. The 
fact that balancing occurs at all is rarely acknowledged openly. Non-economic objectives have 
been considered in both article 81(1) and 81(3) o f the Treaty, see Chapters Three and Four. 
There is no discussion about when one provision should be preferred over the other. 
Furthermore, Chapter Five says that:
"The m echanism  that the Com m ission adopts when balancing is unclear and thus not 
repeatable, b y  undertakings, their lawyers, o r the M em ber States’ courts and com petition 
authorities."
Finally, the limits of the balance are uncertain. Firm conclusions are hampered by the lack of 
formal, transparent, decisions. But, in fact, in Commission decisions, when public policy 
objectives were considered relevant, they always seem to tilt the balance in its favour, i.e. public 
policy 'wins' the compromise. This is not in line with either the Commission’s recent policy 
statements or the perceived wisdom in the doctrine.
The state of the law in this area is pitiable. This is particularly so given the quantity o f formal 
Commission decisions where non-economic objectives have been considered, and even played a 
decisive role. The recent decentralisation o f article 81 and 82 enforcement, appears:
" ...to  assum e that the system 's goals a re  w ell-defined and  thus that those who w ill m ake 
decisions in  the  m odified system  can easily  identify and  follow  them. The history o f  
com petition law  in Europe suggests o therw ise.”1541
Significant fault must be laid at the Commission's door here. However, others are also to blame. 
Community competition lawyers must consider all relevant objectives within their competition 
assessments. To do otherwise would be a disservice to their clients. The Member States should 
have provided a clearer, more coherent, system for dealing with such conflicts in the Treaty. 
Amendment o f article 81, for example, could have clarified where and when specific objectives 
should be considered. The relevant weight o f the various objectives could also have been 
discussed more clearly. On top o f this, the Community Courts should reach internal agreement 
on how public policy should be incorporated into article 81.1542 One solution to this issue is for 
the Member States, under article 239 o f the Treaty, to submit a dispute to the ECJ about the
1541 Gerber (2001), page 125.
1542 One can only assume that such agreement is lacking, compare the W outers Case, paragraph 97 and Case T- 
112/99 M étropole télévision  (M6) and  O thers v. Com m ission [2001], paragraphs 76 and 77, see Chapter Six.
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precise scope o f article 81. Alternatively, the Community Courts could themselves rule on this 
issue, if an appropriate case comes before them via another route.
Part C makes a series o f proposals on how and where to consider non-economic objectives 
within article 81 of the Treaty. These suggestions try to take account of the Treaty's imperative 
to consider public policy within this provision, while injecting sufficient transparency, such that 
this process is both predictable and repeatable.1543 It also seeks to take into account, to the extent 
allowed by the Treaty, Chapter One's conclusions. To this end, clear and consistent statements 
are required by the Community Courts on the following issues:
• the notion o f 'competition* under article 81(1) refers to economic efficiency;1544
•  that non-economic objectives are irrelevant in article 81 (1) o f the Treaty;1545
• under article 81 (3) of the Treaty:1546
o the first test should involve:
■ a full balancing (i.e. considering positive and negative effects) of 
Community public policy objectives. Member States' public policy 
objectives should also be considered in cases o f diagonal conflict;
■ consideration of these objectives, even in cases between private parties, 
whether before the Commission, or a Member State court or 
competition authority;
■ consideration of all appreciable effects, even those outside the relevant
market;
o article 81(3Xa) should be re-interpreted to mean that the agreement must be 
indispensable, in the way described in Chapter Seven. This would essentially 
mean that only where an objective could not be achieved in any way (to the 
appropriate level) more efficiently than by distorting competition would the 
agreement be exempted; and,
o that the agreements' aim is irrelevant under article 81(3) of the Treaty.
1S4Î They are also made in the awareness that the Community is part of a global trading system. The Treaty's aims 
will more likely be achieved where the increasingly global nature of commerce is recognised. To this end, the 
proposals open the way for more convergence with US antitrust than we have seen in the past Nevertheless, 
although the consideration of non-economic objectives reduces convergence (Ehlermann (1998), page xi), the 
Treaty's imperative for this cannot be ignored.
1544 See Chapter Six.
1545 See Chapter Six. The Community Courts can limit the temporal effects of their judgments on certain conditions, 
see Case C-415/93 U nion Royale Beige des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and Others v. Jean-M arc 
Bosman f1995], paragraph 77. It may be appropriate to do this for market integration as regards trade with the 
Member States that joined on 1 May 2004.
1546 See Chapter Seven.
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The Commission should then, once it arrives at a clear and consistent internal position, produce
guidelines:
• to clarify the scope of, at least the most important, objectives (including the definition 
o f economic efficiency1547);
• to explain why these objectives are pursued, so that it is clearer when conflicts arise 
between them;1548
• on what considerations are relevant when balancing non-economic objectives under 
article 81(3)’s first test. This should include:1549
o provision of a meta-objective;
o guidance on the qualitative weight of at least the commonly invoked public 
policy objectives, as well as rules for assessing their quantitative weight 
(including the relevance o f  how likely the cost or benefit is to arise, discounting 
for the future and appreciability); and,
o rules on how to convert each objective into an indirect, common, meter;
•  which provide a clear co-ordination mechanism between the decision-maker, the 
relevant Director Generals in the Commission and any concerned Member States, when 
their interests, or those with which they deal, are appreciably affected by an 
agreement;1550 and,
• to keep all relevant up-to-date, so as to reflect the balance as it changes over time.
,S47 See Chapter Six.
1548 See Chapters One and Three.
1549 See Chapter Eight
lSi0 Some believe that co-operation is already considerable, Rosenthal (1990), pages 298 and 299. However, there 
seems to have been a lack of co-ordination between DGs in the past Buigues, Jacquemin and Sapir (1995a), pages 
xx and xxi. The same applies between the Community and the Member States, Gual (1995), pages 2 1 and 31. In this 
regard certain comments of the European Parliament as well as the Commission's replies, are instructive: European 
Parliament Resolution on the XXVIth report by the Commission on competition policy, reported in Commission, 
RCP 1997, page 368, point 2, the European Parliament "...repeats its call for closer cooperation among the 
Commission departments concerned, an aim which could be achieved most effectively by setting up a separate 
department within the Commission to evaluate the costs and benefits - especially in terms of employment - arising 
when the four above-mentioned policies (competition, industrial, commercial, and internal market policy) are 
framed and implemented, and to draw up recommendations to the Commission, set out in an annual policy 
coordination report that should also be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council...” The Commission 
replied, page 374 “The Commission does not agree with Parliament’s view o f the need to create a specific structure 
responsible for coordinating various Union policies. It would point out to Parliament that all significant 
Commission decisions on competition are prepared through interdepartmental consultations and account is taken of 
observations made by the directorates-general concerned. Moreover, major decisions concerning competition policy 
are adopted by the Commission as a  collegiate body, where all members are able to bring out the interests o f the 
policies for which they are responsible. Regarding the annual report on the activities o f the European Union, this 
already covers the coordination of various Commission policies.” Since decentralisation came into effect on 1 May 
2004, not all article 81 decisions are taken by the Commission as a collegiate body.
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These guidelines will be difficult to produce. However, it is this difficulty that drives the 
imperative for them. Finally, the Member States should:
• in the next Treaty revision:
o explain which Treaty provisions, if any, justify the exclusion of the competition 
provisions;1551 152
o provide guidance on the Treaty's meta-objective and explain how public policy 
objectives should be balanced in general throughout the Treaty’s operational
_  „ .1 5 52provisions;
o provide more guidance on the qualitative weight to be assigned to objectives in 
case of conflict between objectives;1553 
o consider amending article 81, as set out in Part C’s Conclusion;1554 
o consider implementing a policy-linking clause for competition; and,
• consider amending Regulation 1/2003, if it is felt that Member States’ courts (and 
possibly even Member States’ competition authorities) are not suitable fora for the 
balance that article 81 demands.
Until this guidance is forthcoming, undertakings would be well advised to seek support for any 
agreements that might appreciably undermine welfare. We have seen that DG Competition 
might be slow to advise in such cases. Nevertheless, Part B’s Conclusion suggested that where:
"...the parties to an agreement act in accordance with a specific Community law, DG 
Competition is more willing to accept the non-economic objectives...While it is not 
necessary to have prior Community support in this way, it clearly helps...
It is also beneficial to get another of the Commission's Directorate-Generals to support the 
agreement in question."
In other matters the approval of one o f the Member States may also have affected the outcome 
of the balance. Compromise is, and will likely remain, a political process.
In the Introduction we cited Bork:
"Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one 
question: What is the point of the law - what are its goals? Everything else follows from the 
answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by several, 
how is he to decide cases where a conflict in values arises? Only when the issue of goals 
has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules."1555
1551 Should the A lbany Case be confirmed, for example, see Chapter Two?
1552 See Chapters Two and Eight
1553 See Chapter Eight.
1554 Chapters Six and Seven explain why these amendments should be made.
1555 Boric (1978), page 50.
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Unlike in the USA, in the European Union competition policy is incorporated into the 
Community legal order’s constitution. This has an important impact upon how the relevant 
provisions should be interpreted. The Treaty’s structure, the policy-linking clauses, the 
Community Courts’ judgments, the Council, the European Parliament and many Commission 
decisions all support the consideration o f public policy objectives within Community 
competition policy. As to how, where and the limits of this balancing, there is less agreement. 
Sauter has written:1556
"As a ’constitutional charter', the Treaty sets out the objectives, principles, policies and 
institutional provisions of the Community. As an international agreement, however, it did 
not aim to establish and justify a coherent and independent political structure before a 
critical polity, or even to resolve conflicts of laws. Successive Treaty amendments have 
produced only half-hearted attempts at revising its structure. Hence the Treaty does not 
clearly establish goals, principles and instruments at various levels in an explicit hierarchy 
of norms and legal acts, as a written constitution would usually do, and the priorities of the 
Community are difficult to discern. This gives rise to conflicts of interpretation which are 
repeated with each amendment of the Treaty."
Although the European Convention attempts a more thorough structure revision, it does not 
confront the main problems highlighted either. The recent Commission, Article 81(3) 
Guidelines are predicated on the idea that the law is clear. We have shown that this is not the 
case in relation to the consideration o f public policy within article 81.
This thesis has suggested how and where to consider public policy within article 81 of the 
Treaty. The aim has been to help establish a coherent body of substantive rules. In so doing, we 
have sought to produce a structure that enhances the clarity and predictability o f decision­
making, as well as the demands o f ’globalisation'. At the same time, we wanted to give adequate 
weight to non-economic goals.
Even if  all the recommendations above were implemented, there would not be perfect 
transparency. Compromise is difficult and can never be entirely predictable. This is not 
necessarily a problem; certainty is not the only goal. Public policy balancing is not mathematics, 
as Chapter Eight explains:
"Every case is different and value judgements must be made about the optimal balance in 
each case. The presence of this discretion should be celebrated. Legal certainty is not the 
only value legal systems espouse. There is also justice and fairness. While the decision­
maker should be guided, their hands should not be tied.”
There is much (difficult) work to do. We have listed above a number of political and economic 
tasks that must be undertaken by the Community Courts, the Commission and the Member 
States in order to provide a minimum level of clarity in the area. There is also a need for a
lss6 Sauter (1998), page 38.
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framework for balancing» to guide in times of doubt Only once this is done can Community 
competition law legitimately claim to have come of age.
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ANNEX
1. TABLE 1
Y ear Total Number 
of Article 81(3) 
Cases
Number of Article 81(3) Cases where:







Num ber % Number %
1993 3 0 0 2 67
1994 11 0 0 5 45
1995 1 0 0 0 0
1996 5 3 60 1 20
1997 2 0 0 0 0
1998 3 0 0 0 0
1999 12 1 8 2 17
2000 3 0 0 1 33
2001 5 0 0 1 20
2002 3 0 0 0 0
2003 3 1 33 0 0
2004 2 0 0 0 0
Total 53 5 9.4% 12 23%
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